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Given a post-structuralist critique of the metaphysics of presence 
within western thought, It is surprising that much contemporary theory that 
discusses fetishism still subscribes to concepts of substitution and disavowal 
which uphold a notion of self-present value. 
This study offers an original critique of traditional views of fetishism via a 
consideration of the role of surplus and equivalence within the production of 
value. Rather than describing fetishism in terms of a disavowal of a self-
present determination of value, this critique recognizes that what is ultimately 
denied within traditional accounts is the artificial surplus production upon 
which its value is premised. 
An original account is proposed in which fetishism is perceived as an 
immanent productive process where difference generates signifiers of value. 
The fetish can be perceived as the means by which established measures of 
value are both endorsed and transgressed in relation to a restricted economy. 
This theory supplements the Bataillean notion of the fetish as an 
untransposable object of desire and considers the implications of a 
Deleuzean metaphysics of difference. The work of Deleuze offers a means to 
resolve the contradiction in which the fetish can be perceived as both an 
instigator and transgressor of value. As such, fetishism is found to be the 
archetype of value, rather than its substitute. 
An original contribution to the corpus of Deleuzean theory is made via an 
understanding of fetishism in relation to the Body Without Organs. Whereas 
fetishism has been discussed in terms of a reifying tendency, a wider 
consideration of Deleuze and Guattari’s work allows the notion to be 
considered from the point of view of transgression and becoming. Such a 
conception is found to have greater efficacy than current theories in that it 






Fetishism within modernity has always been associated with the 
problem of exchange in which the term is used to describe a process of 
substitution and disavowal of that which is perceived as both the origin 
and true determination of value. Given a post-structuralist critique of the 
metaphysics of presence, the notion of value being determined elsewhere, 
outside fetishistic relations, can be subject to criticism. If value can itself 
be viewed as a fetishistic construction, then operating within a traditional 
model of disavowal and substitution can be perceived as being complicit 
with a metaphysics of presence and the terms of a restricted economy in 
which it operates.  
A post-structuralist critique of the metaphysics of presence within 
western thought has undermined the legitimacy of privileged signifiers that 
instigate binary oppositions premised on notions of presence and lack. 
Given this, it is surprising that much contemporary theory that discusses 
fetishism still subscribes to concepts of substitution and disavowal that 
uphold a notion of self-present value. As such, instances of fetishism are 
described in terms of some form of cultural lack that is then disavowed via 
strategies of substitution.  
This study offers an original critique of the conventional view of 
fetishism within modernity via a consideration of the role of surplus and 
equivalence within the production of value. Rather than describing 
fetishism in terms of a disavowal of a self-present determination of value, 
this critique recognizes that what is ultimately denied within traditional 
accounts is the artificial surplus production upon which its value is 
premised. The tendency for traditional models of fetishism to repetitiously 
orientate around a singular economy in which one object becomes the 
privileged signifier of value is criticized – this is perceived as omitting the 
possibility that difference lies at the heart of the production of the fetish. 
Given the arbitrary and artificial nature of privileged signifiers that act as 
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equivalents of value, it is demonstrated that fetishism should be perceived 
as the archetype of value rather than a substitute. 
Against a traditional model of fetishism, an original account is 
proposed in which the concept is perceived as an immanent productive 
process where difference generates signifiers of value. As such, the fetish 
can be perceived as the means by which established measures of value 
are both endorsed and transgressed in relation to a restricted economy. 
This account supplements the Bataillean notion of the fetish, as an 
untransposable object of desire, and considers the implications for a 
Deleuzean metaphysics of difference for the notion of fetishism. Whereas 
Bataille offers a means to view the fetish as an untransposable object that 
transgresses the profane world of the everyday, with its concern for 
functionality and utility within restricted economies, the work of Deleuze is 
found to offer us a means to resolve the contradiction in which the fetish 
can be perceived as both an instigator and transgressor of value. 
An original contribution to the corpus of Deleuzean theory is made 
via an understanding of fetishism from the viewpoint of the Body Without 
Organs. Whereas Deleuze and Deleuze and Guattari discuss fetishism in 
terms of a reifying tendency of anti-production, a wider consideration of 
Deleuze and Deleuze and Guattari’s work allows the notion to be 
considered from the point of view of transgression and becoming. Against 
the traditional notion of a fetish that orientates around an economy of the 
same, in which an object is offered as a substitute and disavowal of a 
given value, this new conception offers a means to view the fetish as a 
repetition of difference in which value is simultaneously dispersed and 
created. As such, this study will offer a fresh perspective on fetishism 
without recourse to notions of origin, presence and lack.  
A Deleuzean conception of fetishism, constituted upon difference 
and becoming, is found to have greater efficacy than current theories of 
fetishism in that it allows the fetish to be understood as either a reified or 
transgressive value. By relying on traditional principles that have remained 
consistent with the notion, contemporary theories continue to subscribe to 
the reified oppositions that a restrictive economy puts in place; as such, 
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these theories can be considered to be blind to the full potential of 
fetishism as a productive force. 
In the first section of this study, Fetishism and the problem of value, 
the domain in which the notion of fetishism is defined within modernity is 
explored. An examination of the notion within modernity recognizes that 
the concept is used as a means of delineating legitimate value from its 
deviant other – as such, fetishism is found to be a tool incorporated within 
the discourse of modernity for confronting the problem of value. The 
origins and etymology of the term has been explored. By examining the 
work of William Pietz, the term is found to simultaneously to contain within 
it idea of magic, witchcraft and artifice within it. The concept is recognized 
as originating during the mercantile interchange between Europe and 
Africa and was used as a means to understand the non-universality and 
incomprehensibility of value between the two cultures. Rather than 
celebrating this difference, the concept acted as a means to validate 
western value whilst deprecating African notions.  
By examining the use of the term within modernity – from the 
eighteenth century onwards – it is recognized that it is used as a means to 
describe an irrational investment of value in an object that is believed to be 
innate, yet is in reality a product of human construction. This is true of de 
Brosses’ original use of the term to distinguish primitive, irrational beliefs in 
opposition to western rationality and scientific reason. It is also true of 
those psychosexual and socio-economic theories that incorporated the 
term. In each case the fetish is perceived as deviating from modern 
western standards of reason and value. The notion of fetishism within both 
socioeconomic and psychosexual discourses within modernity is found to 
have been used as an ironic means of describing the irrational and deviant 
element inherent within western societies – an irrational element whose 
underlying causes are subsequently disavowed. Whereas the modern 
world of the nineteenth and early twentieth century was considered to be 
rational, Marx, Binet and Freud highlighted the ways in which irrationality 
could still be found in the areas of economics and the bourgeois psyche. 
As such, the notion was adopted by ‘Marx, and nineteenth-century 
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psychologists, to refer to forms of irrational valuation within their own 
society’ (Ades 1995, p.67). For Marx, the exchange of the commodity form 
within capitalist society obscured the underlying nature of social relations, 
so that what should be ‘definite social relations between men [becomes] 
the fantastic form of a relation between things’ (Marx 1990, p. 165). For 
Binet and Freud, the rationality of the civilized, modern mind both veiled 
and conflicted with the underlying desires hidden deep within the 
unconscious of the human personality. 
In the case of both socio-economic and psychosexual economies, 
fetishism is recognized as being a product of surplus where an arbitrary 
value is constituted beyond the realm of need. By examining socio-
economic and psycho-sexual accounts of fetishism (Marx, Freud and 
Lacan), a similar use of the notion of fetishism as a means of designating 
the arbitrary investment of value into an object is recognised. In both 
cases, such allocation of value is described as phantasmagoric – the 
value of the commodity, as a thing, hides the true condition of its value 
based on abstract human labour and the value of the psychosexual fetish 
derives from a fantasy in which the maternal phallus is believed to exist. 
By examining Marx’s view of surplus value and Freud’s notion of sexual 
drives, such an investment in value can only manifest itself at a point 
beyond need – socio-economic surplus value can only exist when 
production surpasses subsistence, psychosexual desire and its constituent 
sexual drive which forges new objects can only exist as an excess beyond 
biological need.  In both circumstances, such an excess is found to be 
channeled through a restrictive economy of value instituted by an arbitrary 
universal signifier – in the case of socio-economic fetishism, the signifier is 
gold and its monetary equivalent that instigates the drive for accumulation 
and investment, in the case of psychosexual fetishism, the signifier is the 
phallus and the instigation of desire based upon presence and lack.  
By recognizing that chosen privileged signifiers act as a means of 
channeling the exchange of surplus within restricted economies of value, 
the question is raised as to why exchange resolves around restrictive 
economies with determined and equivalent values and what role is played 
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by privileged signifiers within them?  This, in turn, raises another question. 
If the chosen privileged signifier and its corresponding signified is an 
arbitrary construction, then to what degree can we discuss the fetish as an 
irrational deviation from an endorsed rational order? The arbitrariness 
would appear to destabilize an appeal to the validity of such an 
established order whilst also questioning the criteria from which the non-
western other is perceived. It would also appear to question the motive 
behind the associated notion of disavowal within the concept of fetishism – 
when that which is disavowed is human agency, which invests objects with 
an arbitrary value, then the purpose of disavowal can be extended – as 
well as misrecognizing the causal relations, disavowal also performs the 
task of vindicating value via a denial of the excess, arbitrariness and 
artificiality upon which it is based.  
In the second section of this study, Fetishism, the Other and the 
Privileged Signifier, the instigation of an established signifier of value is 
recognized which serves the function of delineating a legitimate exchange 
of surplus whilst designating the fetish as an illegitimate divergence from 
its own restrictive economy. As such, privileged signifiers are perceived as 
acting as a means to channel surplus production into a form that can be 
accumulated and reproduced. Capitalist surplus value is exchanged via a 
signifier that acts as an equivalent to value that is accumulated and 
reinvested in which to develop further surplus. Prodigal expenditure 
outside of this cyclical mechanism is ignored and excluded – this becomes 
important in a later consideration of the work of Bataille. Likewise, the 
surplus that manifests itself as the sexual drive is channeled into an 
exchange where desire revolves around either having or not having the 
phallus. Because the phallus instigates a lack in the unity of the subject, 
desire is recognized as insatiable, requiring an endless cycle of either 
having or being the phallus that can never be attained. Desire outside the 
realm of the phallic economy is excluded as perverse and interpreted as a 
deviation from the reproductive aim. 
By examining the work of Michel Foucault, the discourses that 
sustain the authority of these privileged signifiers can be recognized as 
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examples of power-knowledge relations where a legitimate value is 
established as much by what is excluded as by that which is included 
(Foucault 1982). It is found that in this relationship, the fetish is identified 
as that which disavows difference in an economy of the same, whilst 
signifying the excess and surplus upon which value is based. It is found 
that by positioning the phallus at the heart of an economy of desire, desire 
is allocated the function of reproduction in which male presence fills the 
void of female lack in a coital act that excludes any form of sexuality and 
desire that stands outside the terms of its economy. As such, erotic 
enjoyment and desire that exists beyond the realm of the phallus is 
excluded and classified as deviant. According to Foucault, that which is 
judged as deviant in desire is epitomized by the notion of the fetish – this 
is due to the fact that the model of fetishism is found to illustrate the 
tendency for desire to diverge from its ‘natural’ utilitarian aim. 
Connotations of femininity are to be found in the etymology of fetishism 
and the feminine which is, in turn, closely associated with notions of the 
‘primitive’ and the deviant – all are considered outside the legitimate 
domain of value within a male-dominated, rational western culture.  
Likewise, in the economic realm, money as a privileged signifier that 
signifies a surplus in the form of commodities is found to exclude prodigal 
expenditure in favour of accumulation and production. For Foucault, 
economic value in the modern episteme is determined by historical labour 
in which man is confronted by his relationship to scarcity; it is this 
relationship that sanctions a cycle of accumulation and production that 
excludes expenditure outside its economic terms.   
The fetish in modernity, in both its psychosexual and socioeconomic form, 
is therefore placed within a contradictory position – it must embody 
difference, but remain anchored to an economy of value, through an act of 
disavowal, in which to retain its derivative and anomalous status.  By 
performing this contradictory function, it serves the role of defining the 
Other as illegitimate in a sanctioned economy of the same. As such, 
legitimate value and that which it excludes are mutually defining terms. 
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This contradictory function of the fetish can be resolved once it is 
recognized that any appeal to a self-presence of value is unsustainable.   
 Whereas it is recognized that both socioeconomic and 
psychosexual forms of value are predicated upon a surplus, a legitimate 
and conventional form of value is found to be sanctioned via an appeal to 
a foundation, an initial presence, at the origin of exchange that 
authenticates the values within both economies. The authority of such 
value is found to be contained within the notion of a privileged signifier that 
generates a similar restrictive code in both socio-economic and 
psychosexual economies that operate via their own logic.  
With reference to Derrida’s critique of the metaphysics of presence, 
the signifiers that constitute value in both socioeconomic and 
psychosexual economies are recognized as being not only arbitrary, and 
therefore artificial constructions, but are also found to be based upon 
unsubstantiated myths of origins and presence that attempt to legitimate 
their agency. An examination of the work of Marx demonstrates the 
mythical nature of the idea of primitive accumulation upon which capitalist 
economics is based. The work of Anne McClintock critiques the Freudian 
myth of a primal law that underwrites Oedipal relations. An examination of 
Derrida’s critique of Phallogocentrism - the term used to describe the 
privilege accorded to the phallus (sign of sexual difference) as a mark of 
presence within logocentric thought – demonstrates how a restricted 
phallic economy is intimately linked with the prejudices of logocentrism in 
that, by being the privileged signifier of presence and absence, the phallic 
signifier becomes the origin from which the single (male) sexual economy 
is put in place.  
The work of Jean Baudrillard is found to recognize an equivalent 
function between privileged signifiers in both socioeconomic and 
psychosexual economies. For Baudrillard, our fascination with the form of 
the fetish exists due to our placement within a ‘restrictive logic of a system 
of abstraction’: money and the imperatives of capital. Baudrillard equates 
this socio-economic phenomenon to that of the psychosexual fetish. 
Whereas the fetish object bears the mark of the phallus that puts a system 
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of sexual exchange into place, the commodity bears the mark of money / 
capital that puts a system of economic exchange into motion – both 
objects therefore rely on a system of exchange put into play by privileged 
signifiers.  In each case, the authority of the privileged term within each 
economy is found to be arbitrary. By recognizing the arbitrary and 
fabricated nature of value, not only is the legitimacy of an established 
order destabilised, but also the criteria from which the non-western other is 
perceived – if all value is arbitrary and fabricated, then western appeals to 
a universal, rational order are no more legitimate than a perceived 
capricious investment in objects by non-western cultures.  
If value is recognized as being predicated upon an artifice 
constituted by surplus and excess, in which all appeals to a self-present 
origin are found to be both fraudulent and arbitrary, the possibility that the 
notion of difference, rather than negation, is inherent within all social value 
may be considered and that the derivative connotations attached to the 
notion of fetishism can be put into question – in an act of reversal, this will 
have the consequence of allowing the fetish to be perceived as both a 
positive affirmation and the archetype of value, rather than a derivation.  
The notion of artifice contained within the etymology of the word can then 
be foregrounded as a positive attribute that generates value, the notion of 
disavowal could then be perceived as an attribute that refutes artifice - 
value has the potential to become a reified entity in which fabrication is 
hidden for reasons of efficiency and utility.  
In the third section, Fetishism, Death and the General Economy, 
the connections between fetishism, death and the general economy are 
considered. By examining these connections, the possibility of constituting 
a positive notion of the fetish based upon a relation of difference outside a 
restricted economy of the same can be explored. To understand how a 
notion of the fetish and value can be constructively constituted upon 
difference rather than identity requires an examination of the notion of 
death. In Symbolic Exchange and Death  (1976), Baudrillard points out 
that the concept of death is found to provide a shared notion of Otherness 
for both socioeconomic and psychosexual realms and provides the origin 
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and foundation to legitimate their corresponding values. It is this concept 
that ties these realms together as homogeneous economies that exclude 
that which is in excess to their utilitarian and reproductive roles.  
An exploration of the Freudian and Lacanian notion of the death 
drive allows us to recognize its premise upon a metaphysics of presence. 
The death drive is identified as being subject to repetitions fuelled by the 
currency of the phallic signifier – the symbol of exchange between those 
that have the phallus and those that lack. The repetitions of the death 
drive are therefore found to be subject to the same metaphysics of 
presence, with its appeal to some origin at its foundation from which we 
are separated. As such, the death drive is tied to a notion of the repetition 
of the same where the possibility of difference is excluded. According to 
Louise Kaplan (2006), the funeral imagery in Freud’s conception of the 
fetish draws our attention to the denigrated and castrated status of 
femininity – a status that excludes the presence of women from a 
masculine Symbolic Order that constitutes value and identity. Whereas the 
Lacanian concept of the objet petit a describes the eternal, repetitious and 
ultimately futile search for the lost object of desire, its position as a 
substitute for this object allows us to consider the possibility that all objects 
of desire are but fetishes that serve the function of attempting to fill the 
void inaugurated upon entry in the Symbolic Order – we can therefore 
consider the possibility that the phallus is nothing more than a privileged 
signifier, or fetish, within a restricted economy that instigates lack at the 
heart of desire. This conception reverses the usual psychoanalytic 
interpretation of the fetish in which the phallus exists as presence first (if 
only in phantom form), followed by a substitution. If the object-cause of 
desire – the objet petit a – allows us to interpret all objects of desire as 
fetishes once we recognize them as substitutes for that which has been 
lost, their status as fetishes, once we negate the causal notion of an 
original presence from the equation, needs to be considered. Such a 
consideration points to a notion of the fetish as an immanent object of 
desire artificially produced rather than being anchored to an original causal 
relationship. As such, the sexual drive can be perceived as a means of 
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generating an untransposable fetish – an object that transgresses the 
restrictive economy of the same. To understand how desire operates 
outside an economy of the same, the writings of Jean Baudrillard and 
Georges Bataille are examined.  
Baudrillard criticizes the death drive as yet one more example of a 
tendency to homogenize economies via exclusions. Baudrillard connects 
the notion of death within this drive to that which is excluded within political 
economy. Baudrillard proposes that a historical trend exists in which the 
dead have been increasingly prohibited from symbolic circulation. Death is 
perceived as the ultimate deviancy within modernity, against which the 
normal functioning human can be defined. Death is therefore to be 
radically excluded in order to legitimize the value of life – its very exclusion 
both valorizes life and provides an alibi for its legitimation. According to 
Baudrillard, the very notion of survival is itself tied to the exclusion of 
death, which, in turn, legitimates an intensified valorization of life. 
Baudrillard perceives a correspondence between death as a value, as a 
radical Other, political economy and the psychosexual. Whereas Foucault 
identifies notions of scarcity as a determining factor in modern political 
economy, in which life and death find an equilibrium, Baudrillard perceives 
death as the blindspot of political economy, the ‘absence haunting all its 
calculations, [where the] absence of death alone permits the exchange of 
values and the play of equivalences’ (Baudrillard 1993, p.154). The 
mechanism of accumulation and exchange within a capitalist economy is 
therefore perceived as a means to guarantee survival, deflect scarcity and 
ward off death. Baudrillard critically ties this notion of equilibrium and 
equivalence to the concept of the death-drive in its endorsement of death 
as an absolute finality in opposition to life – an absolute horizon to which 
we are repeatedly drawn. Baudrillard contemplates the possibility that a 
prodigal waste and expenditure within the system would upset the circuit 
of accumulation and exchange to the point that it could no longer function.  
According to Baudrillard, the work of Georges Bataille offers us a 
vision of death that negates its regulative function. To understand the 
cyclical relationship of life and death and how ideas of surplus and excess 
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offer an alternative to restrictive economies that delineate that which is to 
be included and excluded, the notion of eroticism and the general 
economy within the work of Bataille is considered. An examination of 
these concepts is found to generate a conception of death as an integral 
part of the life cycle. By understanding death and life as cyclical rather 
than viewing death as an origin to which we incessantly wish to return, the 
possibility of perceiving the fetish as an untransposable object of desire 
becomes viable.  Within such a cyclical relationship, repetition offers the 
potential of a circuit of desire that can be reproduced and repeated without 
an appeal to some origin of presence. By examining Bataille’s notion of 
the general economy, the possibility of exchange and value outside the 
logic of homogeneity and equivalence within restrictive economies is 
identified. By expending surplus prodigally, the notion of the general 
economy offers us a means to understand the artifice of production and 
desire beyond socially endorsed taboos and the realms of utility and 
reified value. In such circumstances, desire is interpreted as that which 
transgresses the profane world of the everyday, offering us a means of 
communication with that which is in excess of ourselves and society – it 
therefore allows communication with death on the road to becoming Other. 
Transgression therefore allows the death of identity in favour of difference 
– it is the constant negotiation between these two realms that gives us a 
sense of becoming.  
By examining Bataille and Michel Leiris’ conception of the fetish in 
relation to the general economy, the fetish is recognized as an object of 
desire that bridges these two realms and is therefore to be viewed as 
untransposable. The fetish is found to seduce via its appeal to the 
transgressive and excessive realm of the sacred, outside the exclusions 
constituted by taboos and the reified values within a restricted economy. 
By transgressing the taboo, the fetish is therefore found to enter into the 
realm of the ineffable – from this perspective desire, in its excess, remains 
outside the realms of socially endorsed categories of utility, production and 
reproduction. Whereas a Bataillean conception of the fetish offers a notion 
that transgresses the profane world of the everyday, it fails to explain and 
 12 
resolve the contradiction in which the fetish can be perceived as both an 
instigator and transgressor of value.  
In the Fourth section, Fetishism, Difference and Deleuze, the ideas 
of Deleuze and Guattari are explored in which to provide an understanding 
of how desire productively invests in a fetish object without recourse to an 
original standard of value. Conversely, their ideas will also explain how 
such an unprecedented investment has the potential to become an 
ossified equivalent value. Such explanations will generate an 
understanding of the mutual relationship that exists between both the 
reified and transgressive worlds that inhabit the fetish.  
 By examining the relationship between difference and repetition 
within the work of Deleuze, a cyclical movement of becoming that 
incorporates the complementary elements of life and death is recognized 
that no longer has recourse to an initial origin. This rebuttal of origins 
refuses the self-present movement and repetition inherent to the death 
drive and is found to subvert western conceptions of rational linear time. 
Deleuze’s concern for difference and repetition is then positioned within 
the context of the Body Without Organs  – a concept used to explain the 
production and cycles of desire conducted within and upon the body. In 
contrast to the death drive, the repetitions and reductions of intensity 
performed upon the Body Without Organs is manifested via a play of 
difference. By exploring a series of syntheses performed upon the Body 
Without Organs, desire can be understood as a productive and liberating 
force, as well as a means for forging recognition and identity – as such, it 
offers a means to account for the manifestation of desire and value within 
both restrictive and general economies.  
 The relevance of Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of the Body 
Without Organs to a revised conception of the fetish is explored via a 
reading of Deleuze and Deleuze and Guattari’s writings on the topic. Such 
a reading is found to allow us to move beyond their notion of the fetish as 
a reifying tendency of anti-production, towards the possibility that the fetish 
is a productive process that generates a new object of desire akin to that 
produced upon the Body Without Organs. As such, a Deleuzean line of 
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flight is conducted beyond his own writing on the topic. In the case of 
Deleuze’s comparison with masochism, the fetish appears as a means of 
suspending subjective relations and putting them in potential; the fetish is 
therefore found to correspond to the Body Without Organs in that there is 
no determined state prior to the connections made during desiring-
production. In the case of Deleuze’s notion of the impulse-image, fetishes 
are those part-objects invested with energies that dislocate such entities 
from their previous contexts; as such, the fetish of the impulse-image 
corresponds to those assemblages achieved upon the Body Without 
Organs. Given the correspondence between the Body Without Organs and 
fetishism within Deleuze’s work, a conception is determined in which the 
fetish is generated through immanent desire without the determination of a 
fundamental presence or lack. This revised conception of the fetish 
manifests itself in terms of invested fragments; for Deleuze, both the 
connective synthesis within the Body Without Organs and the impulse-
image have the potential to rupture, dislocate and fragment so that objects 
can be reinvested with new possibilities. These new manifestations are 
then recorded and memorised as so many coordinates of desire. Such 
coordinates upon the Body Without Organs allows us to recognise a given 
state of identity - an identity always subject to transformations generated 
by further disjunctive syntheses. As such, a Deleuzean account posits the 
fetish as an archetype of value, rather than its derivative. A Deleuzean 
account therefore supplements the Bataillean notion of the fetish as an 
untransposable object of desire whilst resolving the contradiction in which 
the fetish can be perceived as both an instigator and transgressor of 
value.  
A comparison is made between contemporary theories of fetishism 
in relation to a Deleuzean model in which to ascertain their efficacy for 
interpreting modes of fetishism that transgress conventions and establish 
new values. Contemporary interpretations of fetishistic strategies are 
explored in the work of Amanda Fernbach, Louise Kaplan and Tina 
Chanter. Despite offering both criticisms and insights into the extended 
application of fetishism within culture, it is suggested that, by interpreting 
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the fetish from the perspective of traditional and, in some cases, 
unsubstantiated principles that have remained persistent throughout the 
history of the concept, such interpretations continue to focus on notions of 
presence, lack and the oppositions a restrictive economy puts in place. It 
is proposed that a Deleuzean notion of the fetish has greater efficacy in 
that it allows the notion to be understood as productive of value, allowing 
the possibility to forge value outside the terms of such an economy. 
The fifth and final section of the study, Fetishism, Femininity and 
the critique of lack, examines attempts to identify a sexual economy 
outside the singular male phallocentric realm. Such attempts revolve 
around the possibility of feminine difference, as this is the realm that is 
most overtly excluded within traditional accounts of fetishism. According to 
the traditional psychosexual account, the idea of female fetishism is 
deemed an impossibility – woman has no reason to disavow castration 
when already placed within this position. It is argued that accounts of 
female fetishism expose the limited scope of a phallocentric economy of 
desire and that other economies must therefore be possible to account for 
this impasse at the heart of fetishism.  
The literature concerning female fetishism is described in which to 
survey the current understanding of the phenomenon in terms of its 
relationship to, and divergence from, previous ideas of fetishism. The 
attempt to define a notion of the female fetish in the work of Elizabeth 
Grosz, Anne McClintock, Theresa De Lauretis and Gamman and Makinen 
is explored. By entering into a dialogue with the terms of a singular 
phallocentric economy, these interpretations of female fetishism are found 
to replicate the pattern of reducing desire and its objects to a pregiven set 
of binary oppositions that perceive difference and identity in gendered 
terms – either as a parody or masquerade, or a pathological response to 
maternal separation anxieties, themselves tied to a wider Oedipal logic.  
Post-structuralist feminist thought is discussed in its attempt to 
negotiate the insights of Lacanian psychoanalysis in which to define a 
sexuality outside the confines of a singular phallocentric economy. These 
theories are found to be effective at defining a sexuality that is the Other of 
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a phallocentric economy, but which ultimately leaves the binary 
oppositions upon which it is founded intact. By referring to the work of 
Christine Battersby, the perceived failure of theories of feminine difference 
to move beyond the reified categories of a phallocentric order can be seen 
as symptomatic of a potentially flawed epistemology. The work of Irigaray 
is examined as a possible means to recognize an alternative economy 
outside such an order by appealing to women’s morphology. It is argued 
that a Deleuzean model of desire and value has greater efficacy for a 
model of fetishism due to the artificial and productive notion found to be 
contained in the idea of the fetish – a notion that is required to go beyond 
morphological notions of sexual difference.  
A comparison is made between a Kristevean and Deleuzean notion 
of fetishism within literature in which to identify how an alignment to 
feminine difference can be reinterpreted from an immanent perspective in 
which to avoid remaining within the binary terms of a restrictive economy. 
Accusations of phallocentric gender complicity within Deleuze and 
Guattari’s notion of productive desire are addressed. The concepts of 
‘becoming woman’ and the potential neglect of the reproductive realm 
within their work are discussed in relation to Battersby’s metaphysics of 
natality.  
By offering a positive model of identity-through-difference, a 
Deleuzean notion of the fetish is found to escape the Freudian / Lacanian 
narrative of presence and lack and is found to provide an effective means 
to interpret fetishism beyond phallocentric oppositions. By perceiving 
fetishism as a productive activity where objects of desire are constructed 
via the repetition of difference upon the Body Without Organs, value is 
understood as a temporary unity within the interface of the body / world 
which can either produce a restricted economy or can be disseminated to 
make new connections. As such, a Deleuzean model of the fetish has the 
capacity to account for traditional representations of the fetish, as well as 
manifestations of difference in which the fetish punctuates the point at 
which desire has taken flight. In conclusion, it is asserted that the fetish 
should be understood as a productive artifice, an archetype of value 
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generated from productive desire. It is always an excess, a surplus desire, 

































Part One - Fetishism and the problem of value  
 
 In this section, we will outline the domain in which the notion of 
fetishism is defined within modernity. As we shall see, the concept is used 
as a means of delineating legitimate value from its deviant other – as 
such, fetishism is found to be a tool incorporated within the discourse of 
modernity for confronting the problem of value, understood as the lack of 
equivalence in exchange across incongruous  social groups. 
 The etymology of the notion is examined in order to identify how 
fetishism came to stand for that which has deviant value against that 
which is legitimate within modernity. The word is found to incorporate two 
central notions: the idea of magic or witchcraft and the idea of 
manufacture or artifice. Subsequently, the term ‘fetishism’ is found to be 
used to signal the Other of European Enlightenment - whereas modern 
reason was considered progressively rational, the notion could be used to 
indicate what was considered irrational, based on superstitious belief, or 
that which is beyond reason and in excess of western values. The word 
also comes to signal the fact that such perceived superstitious beliefs hold 
their power via the fact that the social relations, which produce their value, 
are disavowed. 
 By using the distinction between European reason and non-western 
beliefs and practices, the notion of fetishism is found to provide a satirical 
tool for modern socio-economic theorists and psychologists to reflect upon 
those aspects considered irrational within their own society. Whereas the 
modern world of the nineteenth and early twentieth century was 
considered to be rational, Marx, Binet and Freud highlighted the ways in 
which irrationality could still be found in the areas of economics and the 
bourgeois psyche. For Marx, the exchange of the commodity form within 
capitalist society obscured and disavowed the underlying nature of social 
relations, so that what should be ‘definite social relations between men 
[becomes] the fantastic form of a relation between things’ (Marx 1990, p. 
165). For Binet and Freud, the rationality of the civilized, modern mind 
both veiled and conflicted with the underlying desires hidden deep within 
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the unconscious of the human personality. As such, the fetish comes to 
stand for those points within modern society where difference is 
disavowed within an established order.  
 In each case, the fetish in modernity is recognized as being 
founded on a surplus – whether surplus production or excess erotic 
energy - which then deviates from a prescribed exchange that serves a 
specified social function. In both instances, the deviation enacted by the 
fetish is determined by an established term that acts as an equivalence of 
value, which simultaneously designates that which digresses from its 
authority.  
 
Fetishism and the cultural imperialism of value 
 
In The Problem of the Fetish, 1 (1985), William Pietz points out that 
the ‘idea of the fetish originated in a mercantile intercultural space created 
by the ongoing trade relations between cultures so radically different as to 
be incomprehensible’ (Pietz 1987, p.24). As such, the fetish is a term that 
comes to signify the problem of understanding the relative investment of 
value within social exchange. As Pietz indicates, the  
 
problem of the nonuniversality and constructedness of social value 
emerged in an intense form from the beginning of the European 
voyages to black Africa […] The mystery of value – the dependence 
of social value on specific institutional systems for marking the 
value of material things – was a constant theme in transactions [.] 
(Pietz 1985, p.9) 
 
As Anne McClintock points out, for ‘both Africans and Europeans, the 
fetish became the symbolic ground on which the riddle of value could be 
negotiated and contested’ (McClintock 1995, p.187). PIetz gives an 
example of the relativity of value exposed within fetishistic practices. In the 
African Akan economy, gold became a measure of value in response to 
trade relations with Europeans. Whereas Europeans used gold as an 
 19 
equivalent measure of value in exchange, the Akan population would also 
adorn themselves with gold weights in which to bring good fortune and 
health – as such, two forms of value were embodied in one object: 
European commodity value and indigenous social value (Pietz 1988, 
p.110-111).  
Pietz describes the etymology of the term ‘Fetishism’ as it evolved 
within colonial interchanges between Europe and Africa. Pietz argues that 
the term originally developed from the pidgin word Fetisso that was used 
by Portuguese traders in Africa during the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries. This word derived from the Portuguese word feitico, meaning 
the “magical practice” or “witchcraft” performed by the “ignorant classes”. 
The word Feitico, in turn, originates from the Latin adjective facticius, 
which means to be “manufactured” (Pietz 1985, p. 5). The modern 
manifestation of the word Fetishism does not occur until 1757, when 
Charles de Brosses first coined the term in his work Du Culte des dieux 
fetiches, ou parallele de L’ancienne religion de L’Egypte avec la religion 
actuelle de Nigritie. In this work, the term fetishism is used to describe the 
erroneous worship of material objects in “primitive” societies, where the 
truth ‘of the fetish resides in its status as a material embodiment [as 
opposed to] that of the idol, for the idol’s truth lies in its relation to iconic 
resemblance to some immaterial model or entity’ (ibid, p.7). Pietz 
summarises this post-enlightenment view of the fetish, in which it is 
viewed as the ignorant, superstitious practice of worshiping material 
entities, in contrast to the proper understanding achieved by scientific 
reason:  
 
Failing to distinguish the intentionless natural world known to 
scientific reason and motivated by practical material concerns, the 
savage (so it is was argued) superstitiously assumed the existence 
of a unified causal field for personal actions and physical events, 
thereby positing reality as subject to animate powers whose 
purposes could be divined and influenced. Specifically, humanity’s 
belief in […] supernatural powers was theorized in terms of pre-
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scientific peoples’ substitution of imaginary personifications for the 
unknown physical causes of future events over which people had 
no control and which they regarded with fear and anxiety. (1993, p. 
137-8) 
 
 Though this view of the fetish persisted within the imagination of 
western writers during the nineteenth century onwards, it is a perception 
projected from western prejudices and beliefs that are blind to the actual 
functions and practices of the fetish objects within their native cultures.  As 
Anthony Shelton points out, 
 
[t]he Western image of African ‘fetishism’ was constructed from a 
selective combination of medieval Christianity and witchcraft beliefs 
with fifteenth and sixteenth-century Portuguese, Dutch and French 
explorers’ and traders’ accounts of the beliefs and practices 
encountered on Africa’s Guinea coast. (Shelton 1995b, p11) 
 
By projecting western viewpoints onto African indigenous practices, 
European writers, missionaries and colonialists could assert that 
‘adherence to ‘fetishism’ implied ignorance, leading to an irrational fear of 
the world around them, and pointed to a basic mental inferiority which was 
used to justify their tutelage by European powers’ (ibid, p.14). The notion 
of fetishism was viewed as inferior to western belief systems, where 
‘popular and learned writers alike generally accepted that the worship of 
terrestrial, material objects […] was the most primitive moment of religion’ 
(Pietz 1993, p. 131). This derogatory view of the fetish within 
enlightenment thought is evident in the writing of Hegel. For Hegel, there 
is no consciousness of higher powers or universals in the religious 
fetishism of African culture. Man is identified as having power over 
elements through “magic”, mastery over which is given in an external 
fetishistic form: animal, stone, wooden figure etc. If the fetish object 
failures to control an element, the user will ‘bind and beat and destroy the 
Fetich […] making another immediately, and thus holding it in their power 
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(Hegel 2001b, p.112). As such, African peoples are perceived as having 
no relation with other forces or consciousness outside their own sensuous 
whims and desires, making rational universal principles impossible. As 
Hegel states: 
 
[…] an outward form [is given] to this supernatural power – 
projecting their hidden might into the world of phenomenon by 
means of images. What they perceive as the power in question, is 
therefore nothing really objective, having a substantial being and 
different from themselves, but the first thing that comes their way 
[…] it may be an animal, a tree, a stone, or a wooden figure. This is 
their Fetich – a word to which the Portuguese first gave currency, 
and which is derived from feitizo, magic. Here, in the Fetich, a kind 
of objective independence as contrasted with the arbitrary fancy of 
the individual seems to manifest itself; but as the objectivity is 
nothing other than the fancy of the individual projecting itself into 
space, the human individuality remains master over the image it 
has adopted (ibid). 
 
For Hegel, the perceived whimsical fetishistic values of African culture, 
that prevent the development of higher universal principles, have 
implications for historical time. Whereas western enlightenment believes in 
a notion of linear historical progress – manifested in Hegel’s dialectical 
movement – the arbitrariness of the fetish positions African culture outside 
of historical time. As Hegel states: 
 
[Africa] is no historical part of the world; it has no movement or 
development to exhibit […] What we properly understand by Africa, 
is the Unhistorical, Undeveloped Spirit, still involved in the 
conditions of mere nature, and which [has] to be presented […] as 
on the threshold of the World’s History. (ibid, p.117) 
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The subjugation and deprecation of African culture implicit within 
western discourses on fetishism correlates with Orientalist practices 
identified by Edward Said as a ‘Western style for dominating, restructuring, 
and having authority’ (Said 2003, p.3). According to Said, an ‘idea of 
Europe, a collective notion identifying “us” Europeans as against all 
“those” non-Europeans’ (ibid, p.7) was asserted in which to produce a 
hegemony ‘both inside and outside Europe: the idea of European identity 
as a superior one in comparison with all the non-European peoples and 
cultures’ (ibid). As such, the subjugation of colonial peoples and the non-
western was justified via a western hegemonic discourse in which the 
Other was viewed as inferior through notions of ‘backwardness, 
degeneracy, and inequality’ (ibid, p. 206). The notion of Otherness that 
informs Said’s discussion of Orientalism is influenced by Foucault’s 
concept of power-knowledge, a notion explored in part two.  
This distinction between European reason and non-western beliefs 
and practices inherent to the notion of fetishism is found to provide a 
satirical tool for modern socio-economic theorists and psychologists. Marx, 
Binet and Freud adopted the western notion of the fetish – complete with 
its assumptions of Otherness, superstition and irrationality – as a means to 
reflect back upon European society what was irrational and superstitious 
within their own culture. As the cultural theorist Laura Mulvey states, these 
thinkers used the word ‘ironically, throwing back at their own [modern] 
societies the term used to encapsulate primitive, irrational, beliefs that we 
associated with Africa’ (Mulvey 1996, p.2). In each case, that which is 
deemed irrational is the deviation from the determinants of value – social 
relations of production and reproduction – towards an investment in 
objects that appear to have an inherent value in their own right. This 
apparition occurs via a disavowal. The implications of notions of deviation 






Fetishism and Disavowal. 
 
As Pietz has recognised (Pietz 1993, p.134), Marx had studied 
religious fetishism in depth, making extensive excerpts from the book in 
which the term was coined, Charles de Brosses’ Du culte des dieux 
fetiches (1760). Marx first makes reference to the notion of fetishism in his 
article Debates on the Law on Thefts of Wood (1842) in the Rhenish 
Times. Within this article, Marx makes a direct comparison between the 
fetish practice of Cuban ‘savages’ and the material interests invested in 
wood by Rhineland forest owners. Marx states: 
 
The savages of Cuba regarded gold as a fetish of the Spaniards. 
They celebrated a feast in its honour, sang in a circle around it and 
then threw it into the sea. If the Cuban savages had been present 
at the sitting of the Rhine Province Assembly, would they not have 
regarded wood as the Rhinelanders’ fetish? (Marx / Engels 1975, 
p.262-3) 
 
According to Marx, the Rhineland Province Assembly, which was 
dominated by the Rhine forest owners, orientated their interests around 
wood as a material object, rather than prioritizing the general interest. As 
such, wood, as an embodiment of the forest owners’ private economic 
interests, ‘abolish[ed] all natural and spiritual distinctions by enthroning in 
their stead the immoral, irrational and soulless abstraction of a particular 
material object and a particular consciousness which is slavishly 
subordinated to this object’ (ibid). In this first example, we can see that 
Marx adopts the typical nineteenth  century perception of the notion of 
fetishism in which to compare a perceived superstitious and primitive 
practice with that which was perceived as irrational in the West – the 
subordination of consciousness to a particular inanimate object that 
appears to have inherent value. Marx extends this use of the concept in 
Capital: Volume 1 (1867) in which it is applied to commodities in general, 
regardless of their material qualities.   
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 In chapter 1 of the first volume of Capital, Marx makes his famous 
analogy between the fetishism of commodities and that of 
contemporaneous perceptions of “primitive” religions. In section 4 of this 
chapter, The Fetishism of the Commodity and its Secret, Marx describes 
how the value of commodities, which are the ‘definite social relations 
between men [become] the fantastic form of a relation between things’ 
(1990, p. 165). To illustrate this phenomenon, Marx takes  
 
flight into the misty realm of religion. There the products of the 
human brain appear as autonomous figures endowed with a life of 
their own, which enter into relations both with each other and with 
the human race. (Marx 1990, p.165)  
 
By making the comparison whereby the seemingly innate value of 
commodities is akin to the superstitious, purposeful meanings erroneously 
applied to intentionless natural objects within popular notions of African 
fetishism, Marx was able to describe the process whereby the determinant 
of exchange value – the socially necessary labour time to produce a 
commodity - becomes lost through the alienated relations between 
producers, giving the false impression that commodities have a value in 
themselves. According to Marx, the production of commodities embodies a 
two-fold character of labour: concrete labour and abstract labour. Whereas 
concrete labour refers to the diverse range of particular skills necessary in 
the creation of a specific object, abstract labour refers to the expenditure 
of labour in general in the production of commodities. For Marx, it is only 
when labour is reduced to this abstraction that all concrete instances can 
be comparably measured and exchanged for money – more on this will be 
said when we consider surplus and equivalence later in this chapter. In 
chapter one of Capital, Marx describes how commodities have a 
determinate value, of which exchange-value is the reflection. This value is 
the cost to society of producing a commodity, the cost of which can be 
measured through abstract human labour. As Marx states: 
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On the one hand, all labour is an expenditure of human labour-
power, in the physiological sense, and it is this quality of being 
equal, or abstract, human labour that it forms the value of 
commodities. On the other hand, all labour is an expenditure of 
human labour-power in a particular form and with a definite aim, 
and it is in this quality of being concrete useful labour that it 
produces use-values (1990, p.137). 
 
The measurement of abstract human labour is determined through 
the socially necessary labour time ‘required to produce any use-value 
under the conditions of production normal for a given society and with the 
average degree of skill and intensity of labour prevalent in that society’ 
(Ibid, p.129).  As the above implies, there is also a two-fold character to 
commodities produced – all commodities have both a use-value and an 
exchange-value. The use value is defined as that which the commodity 
can be used for, the exchange value is the quantitative value of a 
commodity in relation to other commodities. Because a commodity is, by 
definition, that which has been produced for exchange, the diverse range 
of use-values are not that which gives the commodity its value – it is the 
embodiment of abstract labour in the production of a thing for exchange, 
personified by money, that is the determinant. As Marx states: 
 
As use-values, commodities differ above all in quality, while as 
exchange-values they can only differ in quantity, and therefore do 
not contain an atom of use-value. (ibid, p. 128) 
 
As we shall see later, it is this notion of an object produced as a surplus 
for exchange that determines the need for an equivalent manifested in the 
form of money towards which all other commodities are compared. As an 
object of exchange then, a commodity’s value has nothing to do with its 
useful, material features. Because the commodity only enters an 
exchange relation via the marketplace – a relation that separates the 
consumer from the producer – each worker is forever alienated from each 
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other and the commodity appears to have value inherent to itself; it is this 
alienation and disavowal of productive relations that gives the commodity 
its fetishistic character. As Marx points out,  
 
the labour of the private individual manifests itself as an element of 
the total labour of society only through the relations which the act of 
exchange establishes between the products, and, through their 
mediation, between the producers. To the producers, therefore, the 
social relations between their private labours appear as what they 
are, i.e. they do not appear as direct social relations between 
persons in their work, but rather as material relations between 
persons and social relations between things. (ibid, p. 165-6) 
 
Labour relations, as the determinant of value, are therefore disavowed 
precisely due to the fact that such relations are hidden once a worker’s 
expropriated labour has been alienated within the marketplace. As Laura 
Mulvey points out, the fetishisation of commodities occurs because of the 
‘disavowal of the source of [their] value in labour power’ (Mulvey 1996, 
p.4). One can extend the notion of disavowal within the commodity fetish 
further – it is not only a disavowal of productive relations, the commodity is 
also a disavowal of human artifice and activity within the very surface of 
the packaged commodity itself; as Mulvey states: 
 
Any indexical trace of the producer or the production process is 
wiped out, in a strange re-enactment of the failure of the workers’ 
labour power to stamp itself on its products as value. Any ghostly 
presence of labour that might haunt the commodity is cancelled by 
the absolute pristineness and the never-touched-by-hand 
packaging that envelops it. And the great intellectual achievement 
of capitalism, the organization of an economic system as a 
symbolic system, can continue in its own interests. (ibid, p.4-5). 
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As we shall see, this notion of an economic system as a symbolic system 
becomes pronounced when we come to consider the work of Baudrillard – 
this notion will clarify our understanding of the concept of the fetish as a 
reified product within a restricted economy.  
 
On considering the role of fetishism and disavowal within socio-
economic theory, let us now move on to consider the manifestation of 
these notions within the psychosexual realm. Alfred Binet first proposed 
the notion of fetishism as a psychosexual category in his essay Le 
fetichisme dans l’amour (1887). In this work, the conventional European 
understanding of fetishism as an African religious object irrationally 
invested with value was deemed an appropriate analogy for a particular 
sexual deviation within psychosexual research. As Binet states: 
 
The worship of these patients for inanimate objects like night caps 
or nails boots resembles in all respects to the worship of the negro 
to wild fish bones or pebbles bright, except that this fundamental 
difference, in worship of our patients, religious worship is replaced 
by a sexual appetite. (Binet 2001, p.2) 
 
Refusing to separate and place a clear distinction between Western 
religious practices and non-western beliefs, Binet declared that all 
religions were in some way involved with fetishism in their development 
and equates this devotion to religious objects to that experienced by the 
sexual fetishist. As Binet points out, the idols and images used since the 
early Christian era, ‘sufficiently proves the generality and strength of our 
tendency to confuse the deity with the material and tangible sign that 
represents it. Fetishism holds no lesser place in love’ (ibid, p.1). When it 
comes to love, Binet believes that we are all fetishists to a certain degree, 
he states: ‘everyone is more or less fetishistic in love’ (ibid, p.2). As such, 
Binet identifies what he calls a petit and a grand fetishism – it is only the 
later which is considered pathological. For Binet, the fetish object could be 
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either an inanimate object or any fraction of the body; however, certain 
body parts are identified as more subject to fetishism than others.  
 
[O]ften [the fetish] is a fraction of a living person, like the eye of 
woman, a loop hair, perfume, a mouth with red lips, no matter the 
subject of perversion, the important fact is the perversion itself, it is 
the tendency that individuals have for objects which are normally 
unable to satisfy their genital needs. (ibid) 
 
For Binet then, the irrational and superstitious investment of values 
upon material objects inherent to the concept of fetishism is something 
that can be equally applied to both Western and non-western practices. 
The sexual desire invested within objects is therefore not considered as 
exclusively Other, but is only considered a perversion by the degree in 
which an object comes to satisfy a genital need. However, Binet’s theory 
does not address the causes or function of the fetish within sexual desire, 
these were to be addressed by Sigmund Freud.  
 
Following Binet, Freud first addressed the concept of fetishism 
some eighteen years later in his Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality 
(1905). Within this work, Freud identifies both the cause and role of the 
fetish. Within pathological conditions, the fetish is recognised as a 
substitute for the normal sexual object: 
 
What is substituted for the sexual object is some part of the body 
[…] which is in general very inappropriate for sexual purposes, or 
some inanimate object which bears an assignable relation to the 
person whom it replaces and preferably to that person’s sexuality[.] 
(1905, p.297) 
 
In this sense, the fixation of desire upon an object deemed 
‘inappropriate’ for sexual purposes corresponds to Michel Foucault’s point 
that the phenomenon of fetishism comes to illustrate the potential of the 
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instinct to deviate from its ‘natural’ reproductive goal, towards other 
objects, according to an ‘individual’s historical adherence’ (Foucault 1990, 
p.154). As we shall see in the next chapter, according to Foucault, the 
artificial fusion of biological notions of reproduction with an increasing 
categorization of sexual practices within a deployment of sexuality, comes 
to define what is normal in the reproductive and ideological interests of the 
dominant section of society.  
The analogy between the substitute object perceived in fetishism 
and the superstitious investments made within nineteenth century 
perceptions of so-called “primitive” religions is apparent in Freud’s 
comment that such ‘substitutes are with some justice likened to the 
fetishes in which savages believe that their gods are embodied’ (Freud 
1905, p.297). In his essay Fetishism (1927), Freud declares: 
 
When now I announce that the fetish is a substitute for the penis, I 
shall certainly create disappointment; so I hasten to add that it is 
not a substitute for any chance penis, but for a particular and quite 
special penis that had been extremely important in early childhood 
but had later been lost. That is to say, it should have normally have 
been given up, but the fetish is precisely designed to preserve it 
from extinction. To put it more plainly: the fetish is a substitute for 
the woman’s (the mother’s) penis that the little boy once believed in 
and […] does not want to give up (Freud 1927, p.152). 
 
The fetish then, is perceived by Freud to be a substitute for an object of 
pure superstition - the maternal phallus (or the woman’s penis, as Freud 
describes it here) that woman is perceived as lacking. According to Freud, 
it is the reluctance to give up a belief in the maternal phallus that 
generates the fetish – the trauma caused by castration anxiety leads to a 
contradictory belief within the child: the woman still retains the phallus, but 
it is no longer the same because something else has taken its place. As 
Freud describes:  
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He has retained the belief, but he has also given it up. In the conflict 
between the weight of the unwelcome perception and the force of 
his counter-wish, a compromise has been reached […In] his mind 
the woman has got a penis, in spite of everything; but this penis is 
no longer the same as it was before. Something else has taken its 
place, has been appointed its substitute, as it were, and now 
inherits the interest which was formerly directed to its predecessor’ 
(ibid, p.154). 
 
Freud therefore declares the function of fetishism to be an act of 
disavowal; as Louise Kaplan states: ‘Disavowal is the sine no qua of 
sexual fetishism’ (Kaplan 2006, p.27). Within the fetishistic act, the fetishist  
 
can disregard reality and all the facts to the contrary and continue 
to believe that a woman has a penis. Yet, all the while, he will 
continue to take account of reality and recognize that she does not 
have a penis. (ibid) 
 
Because Freud attributes fetishism to castration anxiety, women 
are considered incapable of fetishizing – if woman is already deemed 
castrated within Oedipal relations, then, by inference, there is no room in 
Freud’s theory for a woman to experience the anxiety that is a prerequisite 
for fetishism. This view of woman as castrated and lacking will be criticized 
in later chapters when we consider the feminist critique of lack and the 
phenomenon of female fetishism. 
 
For Freud, fixations upon an object only ‘becomes pathological 
when the longing for the fetish passes beyond the point of being merely a 
necessary condition attached to the sexual object and actually takes the 
place of the normal aim, and, further, when the fetish becomes detached 
from a particular individual and becomes the sole sexual object’ (1905, 
p.298). As such, Freud places a similar emphasis to Binet upon judging 
the pathological nature of fetishism via the degree to which an object 
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comes to replace the typical sexual aim and object of desire. Unlike Binet, 
Freud identifies the recognition and subsequent disavowal of lack as the 
condition by which fetishism occurs. The work of Jacques Lacan follows 
Freud in identifying the role of lack in the constitution of an economy of 
desire and its subsequent disavowal within fetishism. In a move that 
revises the central tenets of Freud’s theory, Lacan situates our entry into 
language as the causal mechanism of a radical lack that constitutes 
sexual desire and the aim of our sexual drives. As with Freud, there is a 
division between the sexes in Lacan’s account between those that have 
the symbol of desire (the Phallus) and those that are perceived as lacking. 
In his famous ‘return to Freud’, Lacan advocated a rereading of 
Freud that paid particular attention to the emphasis and effects of 
language in both constituting the unconscious and mapping its 
mechanisms. By focusing upon the effects of language, Lacan 
incorporated the central tenet of structuralism – that meaning is generated 
through a differential system of signifiers – into the realm of 
psychoanalysis. According to Lacan, subjectivity does not exist until we 
enter the Symbolic Order of language – prior to this, we experience a 
fragmented world that lacks coherence or identity in what Lacan defines 
as the realm of the Real. Lacan describes the pre-Oedipal development of 
the child that eventually leads to the identification of the self in relation to a 
sense of either having or lacking the phallus. According to Lacan, the 
infant experiences its body as fragmented during early infancy because it 
has no sense of a unified body image. The infant therefore experiences a 
series of biological and instinctual needs without any sense of self as 
separate from the external world or others – as such, the child perceives 
no sense of lack at this stage. On viewing its body within a mirror, or 
perceiving its body in relation to its mother or fellow child, the infant begins 
to identify its body as a separate and coherent entity through the image of 




It suffices to understand the mirror stage […] as an identification, in 
the full sense that analysis gives to the term: namely, the 
transformation that takes place in the subject when he assumes an 
image […] For the total form of his body, by which the subject 
anticipates the maturation of his power in a mirage, is given to him 
only as a gestalt, that is, in an exteriority in which, to be sure, this 
form is more constitutive than constituted [.] (Lacan 2006, p.76) 
 
Lacan’s conception of the Mirror Stage therefore suggests that it is ‘in the 
other that the subject first lives and registers himself’ (Lemaire 1994, 
p.177). Such a recognition has two important consequences for the 
constitution of the self. Firstly, the mirror stage provides the infant with a 
coherent imagined identity. Secondly, by recognising this identity through 
the reflection of the other, the mirror stage establishes the child’s first 
alienation from the real world - by observing and mimicking the other, the 
child perceives itself in relation to an external social context. This process 
of identifying self and other through reflected images situates the child 
within the realm of the Imaginary. On identifying coherent images within 
this realm, the Imaginary also initiates the recognition of the child’s objects 
of desire: the body of the mother and to be all that the mother desires. 
Because the child’s identity is alienated within the image of the other, it 
has no sense of a separate self; it therefore requires the intervention of a 
third party to break this dualistic identity–other (child–mother) relationship: 
namely, the father. The child recognises that the mother is part of a social-
symbolic network outside the dualistic relationship that she has with itself. 
This social-symbolic network is represented through the codes and 
significations of language that occur every time the father is present and 
communicating with the mother. Such a theory has implications for a 
model of fetishism – the lack that the fetishist perceives and then disavows 
is not a literal penis, but the phallus as signifier within the system of 
language. As Grosz points out, as a signifier, 
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no one has a privileged or unique relation to [the phallus], for it 
exists only by virtue of the entire signifying chain and an 
intersubjective, multi-subjective, symbolically regulated social order. 
It functions only through the Other and the other, and this makes 
clear its divergence from the male biological organ […] The penis, 
in other words, does not have sole right of alignment with the 
phallus. Not only does the penis act as if it were the ‘meaning of the 
phallus’, a series of substitute objects are also capable of taking on 
this function; a baby […]; the whole of a woman’s body […]; and 
parts of her body […] The penis, as imaginary object is always 
already bound up with signification. It is itself already a signifier, 
and as such, can function as a metonymic displacement of the 
phallus. (Grosz 1990a, p. 118-9) 
 
As such, Lacan recognizes the fundamentally conventional nature of 
gender division based, as it is, upon the arbitrary nature of signification 
within language. As we shall see, this has implications for the production 
of desire and the creation of sexual difference. As Jacqueline Rose states: 
 
By breaking the imaginary dyad, the phallus represents a moment 
of division […] which re-enacts the fundamental splitting of 
subjectivity itself. And by jarring against any naturalist accounts of 
sexuality […] the phallus relegates sexuality to a strictly other 
dimension – the order of the symbolic outside. (Rose 1982, p. 132) 
 
On interpreting castration as an effect of division inaugurated by our entry 
into language, both sexes are radically alienated and neither of which can 
assume the position of the phallus, as it signifies a lack at the heart of 
being once we enter the realm of the symbolic; as such, any assumed 
position of either having or lacking the phallus is ultimately a masquerade. 
As Colebrook points out: 
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[T]he phallus acts as a signifier only because it can never be 
fulfilled. Furthermore, its ability to act as transcendental signifier 
(which orders the gender system) depends upon its difference from 
any actual body part. As the signification of full presence the 
phallus must be other than the penis; the fullness of the signifier is, 
therefore, dependent on its lack at the level of the signified. It is 
therefore neither given in man nor woman. (Colebrook 2000,p.120) 
 
Though the signified of the phallus, as an effect of language, is deemed 
arbitrary, its function as a paternal metaphor is subject to criticism – as we 
shall see, though signification may be arbitrary, the assumption that its 
divisive function occurs via a paternal law against incest, reduces the 
generation of desire and subjectivity to the conventional road of male 
presence and female lack. 
 
Lacan calls the codes and conventions produced through the 
significations within language the Symbolic Order.  The coincidence of 
language with an authority figure – typically the Father – is referred to by 
Lacan as the “Name-of –the-Father”.  The Name-of-the-Father is therefore 
equivalent to Freud’s threat of castration in which the father splits up the 
dyadic unity between mother and child, preventing the child further access 
to the mother’s body.  
 
[…] it is thanks to the Name-of the-Father that man does not remain 
bound to the […] service of the mother, that aggression towards the 
father is at the principle of the Law, and that the Law is at the 
service of desire, which it instigates through the prohibition of 
incest.  
[I]t is, therefore, the assumption of castration that creates the 




Because our objects of desire remain beyond the realm of 
language within the Imaginary, Lacan suggests that the unconscious is 
not a secret realm hidden within our mental apparatus, but is an effect 
of language; because our symbolic representations can never articulate 
our Imaginary objects of desire, they remain outside of consciousness. 
Our unconscious desires appear through the substitutions we make for 
lost objects and in the repetitions, metaphors and metonyms we make 
in language. As such, ‘the subject is divided into two parts: his 
unconscious truth and the conscious language which partially reflects 
that truth’ (Lemaire Op Cit., p.163).  It is only through the close 
monitoring of these processes of substitution and combination within 
language that the analyst is able to identify the root causes of neurosis, 
perversions and psychosis – it is in this sense that Lacan suggests that 
the unconscious is structured like a language. Lacan applies this 
process of monitoring the substitutions and combinations in language to 
an analysis of fetishism in relation to the unconscious.  
Whereas Freud perceived the fetish to be a disavowal of the 
mother’s missing penis, Lacan perceives it to be a desire to preserve 
the maternal phallus within the subject of the mother. For Lacan the 
phallus is the symbol that represents what the mother wants outside the 
mother – child relationship, it is not therefore to be equated with an 
actual penis. Lacan claims that the relationship between the maternal 
phallus and the fetish as substitute can only be understood as a 
linguistic phenomenon. To support this claim, Lacan makes reference to 
Freud’s patient who developed a fetish for shiny noses1. Freud points 
out that this fetish occurred because the patient mistook the English 
phonetic word ‘glance’ for the German phonetic word ‘glanz’ which 
means ‘shine’ when translated. Such a mistake occurred because the 
patient had been nurtured within an English nursery before moving to 
Germany.  As such, from a Lacanian perspective, the maternal phallus 
is but one example of the phallic signifier that signifies our entry into the 
socio-symbolic order through language. This metonymic exchange of 
the phallic signifier is repeatedly evident within Freud’s work - a range 
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of substitutions are evident in which the penis, mother and baby can all 
be symbolic of the phallus. 2 For Lacan, the relationship between the 
mother’s lack of a penis and the fetish (the last thing seen before 
recognising his mother’s absence: shoes, underwear fur, etcetera) is 
not one of visual resemblance:   
 
Indeed, if a slipper were, strictly speaking, a displacement of the 
female organ and no other elements were present to elaborate the 
primary data, we would consider ourselves faced with a primitive 
perversion completely beyond the reach of analysis (Lacan and 
Granoff 1958, p.268) 
 
On identifying the phallic signifier as the sign of both sexual difference and 
the acceptance of the Name-of-the-Father, the child fixates upon the last 
thing seen, embedded within the Imaginary, as a means of simultaneously 
denying and acknowledging his mother’s castration - the child therefore 
refuses to fully accept his entry within the Symbolic Order: 
 
What is the register in which, for a moment, this child refuses to 
place himself? We would say […] the register of the symbol – a 
register essential to human reality (ibid, p.269) 
 
To interpret the fetish by means of visual analogy would therefore be a 
mistake. If the fetish is chosen arbitrarily and is trapped within the realm of 
the Imaginary, it should not be expected to have visual resemblance and 
the causal relations will not be conscious. Because the phallus is a 
signifier within language, it is susceptible to metonymic substitutions of 
which the fetish item is an example. The patient discussed in Lacan and 
Granoff’s account of fetishism (ibid, p.267-275) demonstrates a fear of 
amputees and a tendency to both caress and cut the shoes of both his 
mother and analyst – the maternal phallus has therefore been 
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metonymically displaced, whilst also being subject to behaviour which both 
simultaneously disavows whilst acknowledging castration.   
In both the above socioeconomic and psychosexual cases of 
fetishism, we can recognise that the act of disavowal relies upon a sense 
of excess and a notion of equivalence that sets a standard within an 
economy of value.  In the commodity form, the product generated via 
surplus labour is exchanged through the universal equivalence of money 
that results in its fetishization as an object that appears to be inherently 
imbued with value. Psychosexual desire revolves around the universal 
equivalence of the phallus – as either a physical or symbolic entity - that 
designates those which have and those that lack. Anxiety surrounding the 
notion of having or lacking is perceived as producing the fetish that 
consequently disavows the acknowledgment of lack and its association 
with femininity and the maternal body. This notion of surplus and 
equivalence will now be considered in which to ascertain their role in a 
definition of the fetish, understood as a disavowal and deviation in both its 
socioeconomic and psychosexual manifestations.  
 
Surplus Value and Equivalence 
 
For Marx, different historical socio-economic formations can be 
distinguished via the form in which surplus labour is expropriated between 
dominant and subordinate classes. As Marx states,  
 
[w]hat distinguishes the various economic formations of society – 
the distinction between for example a society based on slave-labour 
and a society based on wage-labour – is the form in which […] 
surplus labour is in each case extorted from the immediate 
producer’ (Marx 1990, p. 325)  
 
Given such a view, the problem of value and exchange within 
society is a priori a problem of surplus and its distribution once society has 
satisfied the needs of basic subsistence – as we shall see later, Bataille 
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refers to this problem of surplus as an accursed share. As we have seen, 
according to Marx, the use-value of objects, in all their particularities, can 
be distinguished from value in its universality; value is an abstraction 
constituted at the point at which different qualitative objects need a 
constant towards which a quantitative equivalence can be determined. 
How is this quantitative measurement of value materialized in a constant? 
Marx describes the process in which a given type of useful object 
becomes the conventional and equivalent exchange object in trade 
activities. At this point, the object is recognised as embodying a general 
form (the expenditure of human labour) and therefore takes on a new role, 
that of the universal form of exchange: money. It can only become the 
universal equivalent through its exclusion from the relative form of value 
that other commodities are subject to.  As Marx points out:  
 
[T]he universal form is a form of value in general. It can therefore 
be assumed by any commodity […A] commodity is only to be found 
in the universal equivalent form […if] it is excluded from the ranks of 
all other commodities, as being their equivalent. Only when this 
exclusion becomes finally restricted to a specific kind of commodity 
does the uniform relative form of value of the world of commodities 
attain objective fixedness and general social utility’ (Ibid p.162).  
 
Marx identifies one arbitrary commodity ‘which has historically conquered 
this advantageous position’ (Ibid) as universal equivalent: Gold. As Marx 
points out, ‘commodities set apart a specific commodity, say, gold, which 
becomes the direct reification of universal labour-time or the universal 
equivalent’ (Marx 1971, p.65). For Marx then, fetishism is symptomatic of 
exchange in its universal equivalent form. Once society is capable of 
producing a surplus beyond its immediate needs, this surplus becomes 
subject to exchange in which value is determined by the mediation of the 
money sign at the point of which objects enter the marketplace - on 
entering this arena, both producer and consumer are unequivocally 
alienated from each other. As such, objects are fetishized in terms of the 
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fact that they appear to have an inherent value within themselves.  
Whereas most commentaries on commodity fetishism focus upon the 
effects of reification - in which economic relations of exchange and 
production appear as immutable laws that dominate individuals, rather 
than serving the needs of the human agencies that created them – it 
should be recognized that the object relation that is most subject to this 
process is money (and its gold equivalent), which has the touch of King 
Midas in relation to everything it comes into contact with. Of necessity, 
money must remain completely reified if it is to mark all social exchange 
relations with a universal notion of value – it thus presents us with a 
restrictive, homogeneous economy that absorbs everything within its 
movements.  
 
 Let us now consider surplus value in the realm of the 
psychosexual and the role played by equivalence in determining an 
economy of desire. At the heart of Freud’s theory of psychoanalysis is the 
recognition that desire is based upon a surplus and it is precisely this 
excess that leads to the problems of neurosis – our active role in 
constructing objects of desire always risks deviating from the conventional 
aims and objects designated to it by society. This potential for deviation 
within surplus desire occurs at the point at which the instinct directs itself 
beyond an object of need. For Freud, the idea that the instinct can deviate 
from an original object of need relates to his notion of sexual drives. Freud 
differentiates between sexual drives and ‘natural’ biological instincts 
through the example of nourishment: 
 
The satisfaction of the [oral] erotogenic zone is associated, in the 
first instance, with the satisfaction of the need for nourishment. To 
begin with, sexual activity attaches itself to functions serving the 
purpose of self-preservation and does not become independent of 
them until later […As such, the need] for repeating the sexual 
satisfaction […] becomes detached from the need for taking 
nourishment – a separation which becomes inevitable when the 
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teeth appear and food is no longer taken only by sucking [.] (Freud 
1905, p.322) 
 
The original satisfaction found in the biological function of 
nourishment becomes a drive to repeat through the replacement of 
another object at the same oral erotogenic zone. This need to repeat 
through such a replacement is constituted through the absence of the 
object associated with nourishment – this being the breast / mother. Freud 
points out that this replacement object is usually another part of the child’s 
body, due to the fact that ‘it makes […them] independent of the external 
world’ (ibid). This autoeroticism therefore inaugurates the autonomy of the 
drive. Sexual drives then, can be defined by their departure from their 
original biological goal. As such, sexual drives and any subsequent 
‘substitute’ object can be viewed as being constituted as a surplus beyond 
the realm of need.  
The phallic stage of development, with its corresponding role in the 
formation of the Oedipus Complex, is identified by Freud as the point at 
which surplus erotic energy is focused towards socially given aims and 
objects. As Freud famously proposes, we assume certain gendered roles 
after recognizing our relation to the phallus associated with the father. 
According to Freud, we recognize that our first love object, the mother, 
desires that which is outside ourselves. This generates a hatred of the 
father that consequently results in both guilt and a fear of castration that is 
instigated by our recognition of sexual difference. As Freud points out 
within The Interpretation of Dreams (1900), we are ‘all destined to direct 
our first sexual impulses towards our mothers, and our first impulses of 
hatred and violence toward our fathers’ (Freud 1950, p.174). On 
recognizing that it is prohibited from having the mother as its love object, 
the male child recognizes its physical proximity to that which is desired by 
the mother and assumes the gendered position of the father; the female 
child recognizes it lacks that which the mother desires and correlates its 
own physicality with that of the mother and assumes the feminine gender 
role. As such, the son wants to become the father and the daughter wants 
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to become the mother in a bid to obtain the power of the Other that 
separates the child from its original object of love. As this whole dynamic 
revolves around the mother’s desire for the Other which has the phallus, 
the whole edifice of sexuality is thought to be masculine – as Freud states, 
‘for both sexes, only one genital, namely the male one, comes into 
account. What is present, therefore, is not a primacy of the genitals, but a 
primacy of the phallus’ (Freud 1923, p.391).  As such, a phallocentric 
sexual economy is constituted in which the sexes are divided into ‘having 
a male genital and being castrated’ (ibid, p.394). This situation in which 
one is understood as either having or lacking is then perceived as being 
responsible for the productive of opposing gender traits. Rather than being 
based upon an economy of difference then, sexuality is perceived as 
being founded upon a notion of equivalence where the phallus, as a 
singular privileged signifier, is the convention that determines desire and 
subjectivity for all.  
This perception of a singular sexual economy determined by the 
phallus persists within the work of Lacan. Though Lacan views sexuality 
and subjectivity as being constructed within language, it remains tied to 
the notion of the phallus as a privileged signifier. For Lacan, the child 
recognises that the satisfaction of its needs can only occur by negotiation 
with its mother through language within the Symbolic Order. Such 
negotiation is required due to the mother’s needs being met elsewhere – it 
is this inevitable alienation of needs within language that subsequently 
subjects the child to the realm of desire and lack. For Lacan, the Name-of-
the-Father is represented by the phallic signifier that is to be viewed as 
something separate to the real penis it signifies. For Lacan, the phallus is 
the signifier, in language, which represents both sexual difference and the 
desire of the mother outside of the mother-child dyad; it therefore also 
represents the birth of the self as an ‘I’ that accepts its role within the 
Symbolic Order and acknowledges its separation from an imagined unity 
with its mother.3 According to Lacan, desire occurs because the object of 
immediate gratification (the mother) is forever lost on entry into the 
Symbolic Order. Desire is insatiable in that the objects we choose in life - 
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whether a sexual partner, commodities, power or status – can never return 
us to the unity we had with the maternal body as an infant.  
This condition, in which an object of desire is always a substitute for 
the lack of the real, is given a formulaic expression by Lacan and is 
referred to as the objet petit a. As Lacan points out, the objet petit a is not 
a Real object (Real in the sense that it exists beyond the realm of lack and 
the Symbolic Order), but the ‘presence of a hollow, a void, which can be 
occupied […] by any object’ (Lacan1991, p.180).  The a within this formula 
stands for the fact that any object can be substituted once we are 
alienated within language – as Lacan states, he wished the objet petit a to 
have the ‘status of an algebraic sign’ (ibid, p.282). Because the objet petit 
a always remains an object substitute for an irredeemable loss, it should 
be understood as the object-cause of desire – an object substitute will 
always remain a failed attempt to fill the void which is the object of our 
sexual drives. Once we attain an object, it is never enough to satisfy our 
sexual drives because it will never fill the void created by a condition of 
lack – as Grosz points out, the ‘drive is indifferent to its object: it is not an 
object that satisfies it, for this object reveals only another want, another 
satisfaction for which it yearns’ (Grosz Op Cit., p.75). As Žižek points out, 
‘no matter how close [we] get to the object of desire, its cause remains at 
a distance [from us]’ (Žižek 2006, p. 77); enjoyment / satisfaction is 
therefore always the remainder, an excess beyond the Symbolic Order, 
created by the lack at the heart of our sexual drives. The notion of the 
objet petit a has consequences for the notion of enjoyment. According to 
the concept of the objet petit a, enjoyment can only exist as a condition of 
a surplus; it is only when an erotogenic zone becomes subject to the 
object of a sexual drive – an excess beyond the needs of the biological 
instinct – that the subject can experience enjoyment beyond any biological 
function. At the point that the subject enters the Symbolic Order, 
enjoyment reaches its highest point of maturity – it is here that desire 
becomes insatiable, that its object (objet petit a) is forever barred from 
conscious thought. At this point, the importance of the notion of surplus as 
a prerequisite to psychosexual desire should be apparent. As we have 
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described, for Freud, the sexual drive is produced at the point the body 
generates a means of gaining pleasure beyond the realm of need; 
similarly in the case of Lacan, the body generates new means of pleasure 
once it is forever barred from the real via the Symbolic Order – as 
indicated, the objet petit a is the name given to the range of substitutes 
that constitute the means of enjoyment once barred.  
On understanding the above, the Phallus is ultimately to be 
perceived in a similar way to Freud: it is the singular privileged signifier 
that puts the economy of desire into play – all parties, whether child, 
mother or father, wish to have the phallus which always symbolises the 
lack of unity within each subject and the desire for something beyond in 
which to attain satisfaction. 
 
The phallus is the privileged signifier of that mark where the share 
of the logos is wedded to the advent of desire. One might say that 
this signifier is chosen as what stands out as most readily seized 
upon in the real of sexual copulation, and also as the most symbolic 
in the literal (typographical) sense of the term, since it is the 
equivalent in that relation of the (logical) copula […] If the phallus is 
a signifier then it is in place of the Other that the subject gains 
access to it. But in that the signifier is only there veiled and as the 
ratio of the Other’s desire, so it is this desire of the Other as such 
which the subject has to recognize, meaning, the Other as itself a 
subject divided by the signifying Spaltung [(division)] (Lacan 2006, 
p.581) 
 
For Lacan, the differentiation between the sexes is explained in terms of 
having or lacking the phallus; this is described as either having or being 
the phallus. As discussed, before the Oedipal stage the child perceives the 
mother as the sole means of satisfaction – as such, the mother is 
perceived as the all powerful phallic mother. During the Oedipal Stage, the 
mother loses her phallic role to the father, not because of a perception of 
anatomical lack, but because her desire exists outside in the form of the 
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father who, in turn, represents the social codes within language: the 
Name-of-the-father. At this point, by having the anatomical signified of the 
phallic signifier, the boy assumes the role of the Name-of-the-Father, 
whilst, lacking any anatomical signified of her own, the girl strives to affirm 
her position as desirable – being the phallus - for the other through 
secondary narcissism (secondary in that, by becoming the object of desire 
for man, she receives her phallic status through him). As Elizabeth Grosz 
describes, ‘[h]is position as the subject of desire is confirmed, while her 
position as the object of desire is affirmed’ (Grosz 1990, p.127, emphasis 
added).  
In both the writings of Binet and Freud, there is a presumption that 
normal sexuality is synonymous with reproductive activity, evident in the 
fact that deviancy is judged by the degree to which desire and eroticism 
wavers from the ‘normal’ reproductive act of penetrative coitus - hence 
Freud’s focus on the essential role of the penis as the original object of 
desire for which the fetish subsequently becomes a substitute. A similar 
emphasis can also be attributed to Lacan – on identifying the phallus as 
the original signifier of desire, subjects are positioned as either having or 
being (lacking) the phallus. Though no subject can ultimately fill the void 
that the Phallus signifies via our entry into language, man has the signified 
that the Phallus alludes to, whereas woman is always positioned as 
lacking. As such, a restrictive economy of desire is put into play in which 
normal desire revolves around a single privileged signifier that is 
associated with the act of coitus – later we will see how such a singular 
economy is subject to criticism and ultimately lacks foundation. 
 
Let us review what we have identified so far. Firstly, the origins of 
the term fetishism have been explored – the term has been found to 
simultaneously contain the idea of magic, witchcraft and artifice. The 
concept has been recognized as originating during the mercantile 
interchange between Europe and Africa and was used as a means to 
understand the non-universality and incomprehensibility of value between 
the two cultures. Rather than celebrating this difference, the concept acted 
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as a means to validate western value whilst deprecating African notions. 
As Dawn Ades points out: 
 
[C]onnoting over-evaluation and displacement, its job was to signal 
error, excess, difference and deviation. Perhaps one of the key 
phantoms of the dream of reason, it helped to structure and enforce 
distinctions between the rational and irrational, civilized and 
primitive, normal and abnormal, natural and artificial (Ades 1995, 
p.67).  
 
The overriding use of the term within modernity – from the 
eighteenth century onwards – has been to describe an irrational 
investment of value in an object which is believed to be innate, yet is in 
reality a product of human construction. This is true of de Brosses’ use of 
the term to distinguish primitive, irrational beliefs in opposition to western 
rationality and scientific reason. It is also true of those psychosexual and 
socio-economic theories that incorporated the term. In each case the 
fetish is perceived as deviating from modern western standards of reason 
and value. 
Secondly, it has been found that the notion of fetishism within both 
socioeconomic and psychosexual discourses within modernity has been 
used as an ironic means of describing the irrational inherent within 
western societies – an irrational element whose underlying causes are 
subsequently disavowed. Whereas the modern world of the nineteenth 
and early twentieth century was considered to be rational, Marx, Binet and 
Freud highlighted the ways in which irrationality could still be found in the 
areas of economics and the bourgeois psyche. As such, the notion was 
adopted by ‘Marx, and nineteenth-century psychologists, to refer to forms 
of irrational valuation within their own society’ (Ades 1995, Op CIt). For 
Marx, the exchange of the commodity form within capitalist society 
obscured the underlying nature of social relations, so that what should be 
‘definite social relations between men [becomes] the fantastic form of a 
relation between things’ (Marx 1990, p. 165). For Binet and Freud, the 
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rationality of the civilized, modern mind both veiled and conflicted with the 
underlying desires hidden deep within the unconscious of the human 
personality. 
Thirdly, in both the case of psychosexual and socio-economic 
economies, fetishism has been recognized as being a product of surplus 
in which an arbitrary value is constituted beyond the realm of need. By 
examining the above socio-economic and psycho-sexual accounts of 
fetishism, we have identified a similar use of the notion of fetishism as a 
means of designating the arbitrary investment of value into an object. In 
both cases, such allocation of value is described as phantasmagoric – the 
value of the commodity, as a thing, hides the true condition of its value 
based on abstract human labour, the value of the psychosexual fetish 
derives from a fantasy in which the maternal phallus is believed to exist. 
As we have seen, in each case, such an investment in value can only 
manifest itself at a point beyond need – socio-economic surplus value can 
only exist when production surpasses subsistence, psychosexual desire 
and its constituent sexual drive which forges new objects can only exist as 
an excess beyond biological need.  In both circumstances, such an excess 
is channeled through a restrictive economy of value instituted by an 
arbitrary universal signifier – in the case of socio-economic fetishism, the 
signifier is gold and its monetary equivalent that instigates the drive for 
accumulation and investment, in the case of psychosexual fetishism, the 
signifier is the phallus and the instigation of desire based upon presence 
and lack.  
As described, the chosen privileged signifier acts as a means of 
channeling the exchange of surplus within a singular economy of value – 
this raises the question as to why exchange resolves around singular 
economies with determined and equivalent values and what role is played 
by privileged signifiers within them?  This, in turn, raises another question. 
If, as the above recognizes, the chosen privileged signifier and its 
corresponding signified is merely an arbitrary construction, then to what 
degree can we discuss the fetish as an irrational deviation from an 
endorsed rational order? The arbitrariness would appear to destabilize an 
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appeal to the validity of such an established order whilst also questioning 
the criteria from which the non-western other is perceived. 
It would also appear to question the motive behind the associated 
notion of disavowal within the concept of fetishism – when that which is 
disavowed is human agency, an Otherness hidden behind objects 
themselves invested with an arbitrary and constructed value, then we can 
consider the possibility that the purpose of disavowal can be extended – 
as well as misrecognizing the causal relations of value, disavowal also 
performs the task of vindicating such value via a denial of its arbitrariness 
and artificiality. Whereas the commodity disavows labour, the sexual fetish 
disavows the loss of sovereignty of the mother / love object which is 
subject to the artifice of language and the agency of the father. Later we 
shall go further still, given the artificiality and arbitrariness of the fetish, 
psychosexual accounts can be considered to be guilty of fetishizing the 
phallus and not, like Marx, perceiving that what is disavowed in the last 
instance is an active human agency, in this case, an unfettered and 
creative sexual drive - which both underlies and is subsequently 


















Part Two: Fetishism, Otherness and the Privileged Signifier 
 
Within the last section, the question was asked as to why exchange 
revolves around singular economies with determined and equivalent 
values and what role is played by privileged signifiers within them?  In this 
section, it will be recognized that an established signifier of value functions 
to delineate a legitimate exchange of surplus by designating the fetish as 
an illegitimate divergence from its own restrictive economy of the same. 
As such, the privileged signifier is perceived as acting as a means to 
channel surplus production into both a form that is socially useful and 
which can be reproduced. Capitalist surplus value is exchanged via a 
signifier that acts as an equivalent to value that is accumulated and 
reinvested in which to develop further surplus and accumulation. A 
prodigal expenditure outside of this cyclical mechanism is ignored and 
excluded – this will become important in our later consideration of the 
writings of Bataille. Likewise, the surplus that manifests itself as the sexual 
drive is channeled into an exchange where desire revolves around either 
having or not having the phallus. Because the phallus instigates a lack in 
the unity of the subject, desire is recognized as insatiable, due to the fact 
that the phallus, as the signifier of lack, can never be attained. Desire 
outside the realm of the phallic economy is excluded as perverse and 
interpreted as a deviation from the reproductive aim. 
In this section, the discourses that sustain the authority of these 
privileged signifiers can be recognized as examples of power-knowledge 
relations in which a legitimate value is established as much by what is 
excluded as that which is included. It is found that in this relationship, the 
fetish is identified as that which disavows difference in an economy of the 
same whilst signifying the excess and surplus upon which value is based. 
It is found that by positioning the phallus at the heart of an economy of 
desire, desire is allocated the function of reproduction in which male 
presence fills the void of female lack in a coital act that excludes any form 
of feminine sexuality or polymorphous perversity that stands outside the 
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terms of its economy. As such, erotic enjoyment and desire that exists 
beyond the realm of the phallus is excluded and classified as deviant. That 
which is excluded is judged as deviant and is epitomized by the notion of 
the fetish – the model of fetishism is found to illustrate the tendency for 
desire to deviate from its ‘natural’ utilitarian aim. Connotations of femininity 
are to be found in the etymology of fetishism, and the feminine, in turn, is 
found to be closely associated with notions of the ‘primitive’ and the 
deviant – all are considered outside the legitimate domain of value within a 
male-dominated, rational western culture. Given this, the fetish in 
modernity is placed within a contradictory position – it must embody 
difference, but remain anchored to an economy of value, through an act of 
disavowal, in which to retain its derivative and anomalous status.  By 
performing this contradictory function, it serves the role of defining the 
Other as illegitimate in a sanctioned economy of the same. This 
contradictory function of the fetish can be resolved once it is recognized 
that any appeal to a self-presence of value is unsustainable.   
 Whereas it is recognized that both socioeconomic and 
psychosexual forms of value are predicated upon a surplus, a legitimate 
and conventional form of value is found to be sanctioned via an appeal to 
a foundation, an initial presence, at the origin of exchange which 
authenticates the values within both socioeconomic and psychosexual 
economies, whilst classifying that which is in excess of its authority as 
illegitimate. In each case, the authority of the privileged term within each 
economy is found to be arbitrary and lacking any self-present authority. 
With reference to Derrida’s critique of a metaphysics of presence, the 
signifiers that constitute value in both socioeconomic and psychosexual 
economies are recognized as being not only arbitrary, and therefore 
artificial constructions, but are also found to be based upon 
unsubstantiated myths of origins and presence that attempt to legitimate 
their agency. An examination of Derrida’s critique of Phallogocentrism 
demonstrates how a restricted phallic economy is intimately linked with the 
prejudices of logocentrism in that, by being the privileged signifier of 
presence and absence, the phallic signifier becomes the origin from which 
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the single (male) sexual economy is put in place. The work of Jean 
Baudrillard is found to recognize an equivalent function between privileged 
signifiers in both socioeconomic and psychosexual economies. The 
arbitrary and fabricated nature of value is recognized as not only 
destabilizing the legitimacy of an established order, but also disrupting the 
criteria from which the non-western other is perceived – if all value is 
arbitrary and fabricated, then western appeals to a universal, rational order 
are no more legitimate than a perceived capricious investment in objects 
by non-western cultures.  
If value is recognized as being predicated upon an artifice 
constituted by surplus and excess, where all appeals to a self-present 
origin are found to be both fraudulent and arbitrary, we then need to 
consider the possibility that the notion of difference, rather than negation, 
is inherent within all social value and that the derivative connotations 
attached to the notion of fetishism must be expelled – in an act of reversal, 
this will have the consequence of perceiving the fetish as both a positive 
affirmation and the archetype of value rather than a derivation.  The notion 
of artifice contained within the etymology of the word can then be 
foregrounded as a positive attribute that generates value, the notion of 
disavowal will then be perceived as a negative attribute that denies such 
artifice, in which value becomes a reified entity where its artificiality is 
hidden for reasons of efficiency and utility. As such, disavowal will be 
understood as vindicating value via a denial of its arbitrariness and 
artificiality.  
 
Inclusions and exclusions: fetishism and modernity 
 
In the previous section, fetishism was found to be associated with a 
surplus beyond the realm of need. We will now explore how the use of the 
notion of fetishism has been used as a means to judge such an excess as 
either legitimate or deviant, useful or perverse – in turn, such 
discriminations will be identified as symptomatic of a culture in which 
objects, desire and activity is judged in terms of productive and 
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reproductive utility within restricted economies organized around privileged 
signifiers. As such, those values that serve no utility are found to be 
judged as deviant. The distinction between legitimate and deviant value, in 
which a notion of Otherness acts as a means of excluding that which has 
no utility within a restricted economy, will be identified as an effect of the 
modern episteme in which normative subjects are produced and 
categorized in a society which prioritizes notions of production and 
efficiency whilst excluding that which deviates from such concepts: the 
mad, sick, criminals and the perverse.   
In his work The Order of Things (1966) Foucault devised the notion 
of an episteme. For Foucault, an episteme is defined as the  
 
space of order [in which] knowledge was constituted […] in which 
knowledge, envisaged apart from all criteria having reference to its 
rational value or to its objective forms, grounds its positivity and 
thereby manifests a history which is not that of its growing 
perfection, but rather that of its conditions of possibility (Foucault 
1994, p. xxii). 
 
The conditions of knowledge are therefore grounded within what 
constitutes a particular order and its given categories within a specific 
historical period – in Foucault’s study, the classical and modern age are 
his particular focus for examination. For Foucault, a given order of 
knowledge, that which can be verified as true, is defined as much by what 
it excludes as by what it includes.  
As industrialization, uniformity and discipline within modernity placed 
increasing emphasis upon the normative individual as a means of 
calculating its utility and efficiency within society, it was contrasted against 
that which deviated from it: the mad, the sick, the criminal and the 
perverse. Foucault was to see these forms of inclusion and exclusion as 
effects of power-knowledge. Following a Nietzschean notion that the will-
to-truth is but a manifestation of the will-to-power, Foucault conceives both 
discourse and activity as a mode of power relations, he therefore extends 
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the typical conception of power relations beyond those usually associated 
with violence and coercion – as Foucault states, ‘even though consensus 
and violence are the instruments or results, they do not constitute the 
principle or the basic nature of power’ (Foucault 1982, p.789). Foucault 
perceives power as ubiquitous throughout all thought and action: 
 
It is a total structure of actions brought to bear upon possible 
actions; it incites, it induces, it seduces, it makes easier or more 
difficult […] it is […] always a way of acting upon an acting subject 
or acting subjects by virtue of their acting or being capable of 
action. A set of actions upon other actions (ibid)  
 
For Foucault, power operates via knowledge discourses and actions which 
position the subject in relation to their intended objectives – the subject 
can therefore be coerced into a consensual normative role or be 
understood as a deviant Other – in each case, power operates in a 
disciplinary mode upon the actions of others, whether these actions be 
coercive, consensual or punitive measures; in each case the subject is 
generated, categorized and coopted via the techniques within a particular 
power relationship. As Foucault points out 
 
[…] a power relationship can only be articulated on the basis of two 
elements which are each indispensible if it is really to be a power 
relationship: that “the Other” (the one over whom power is 
exercised) be thoroughly recognized and maintained to the very 
end as a person who acts; and that, faced with a relationship of 
power, a whole field of responses, reactions, results, and possible 
inventions may open up […] The exercise of power consists in 
guiding the possibility of conduct and putting in order the possible 
outcome […P]ower is less a confrontation between two adversaries 




For Foucault, the ‘question of government’ should be understood in its 
broader sense, as that which ‘designate[s] the way in which the conduct of 
individuals or of groups might be directed’ (ibid p.790).  If all affiliations 
between subjects are effects of power-knowledge relations, then this has 
clear ramifications for a notion of resistance. According to this view, to be 
liberated from a set of coercive relations is not to recover a self that is free 
from constraint; as Foucault points out: 
 
[P]ower is ‘always already there’, that one is never ‘outside’ it […] 
But this does not entail the necessity of accepting an inescapable 
form of domination or an absolute privilege on the side of the law 
[…T]here are no relations of power without resistances; the latter 
are all the more real and effective because they are formed right at 
the point where relations of power are exercised[.] (Foucault 1980, 
p. 141-2) 
 
Resistance then, should rather be understood as an opposing alternate 
set of power-knowledge relations that either contest or take flight from 
current discourses or practices – as such, strategies of resistance define 
the limit point for a specific relationship of power. As Foucault states, 
 
there is no relationship of power without the means of escape or 
possible flight. Every power relationship implies, at least in potentia, 
a strategy of struggle […] Each constitutes for the other a kind of 
permanent limit, a point of possible reversal. […] It would not be 
possible for power relations to exist without points of 
insubordination which, by definition, are means of escape. 
(Foucault 1982, p.794) 
 
Such an understanding of resistance will become important in our later 
discussion of the Body Without Organs, where relatively static points of 
desiring relations are always subject to the possibility of lines of flight in 
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which new fetishistic relations of desire are formed beyond the confines 
and limits of previous models.  
 
This concern for a micro-politics of power has clear implications for 
the governance and understanding of modern sexuality and is particularly 
relevant for our present study in that, for Foucault, the phenomenon of 
fetishism was the archetype and model for all the other perversions 
(Foucault 1990, p. 154). In accordance with techniques of power-
knowledge that operate via a disciplinary procedure of inclusion and 
exclusion that legitimates a normative model, the notion of sexual 
perversion provided a means for culturally endorsed forms of sexuality to 
legitimize themselves against that which has the potential to threaten their 
dominance. Foucault stresses that such a concern for legitimation against 
that which threatens dominant interests should not be confused for the 
repressive hypothesis theories of sexuality generated by the likes of 
Wilhelm Reich and Herbert Marcuse4. Such hypotheses proposes that a 
free sexuality and economy of desire would be possible if only it was not 
subject to distortions and repressions performed on it by dominant 
economic and social interests. As already pointed out, if all subjective 
positions are subject to power-knowledge relations, there can be no 
position outside of such relations from which to be liberated. Repressive 
hypothesis theories of sexuality presuppose that the concept of sex and 
sexuality is something that exists both independent and external to 
repressive power structures. Without denying that modes of exclusion and 
repression exist, Foucault points out that the discourse of sex and 
sexuality is itself constituted via a range of historical power interests, and 
that to discuss exclusion, liberation and repression in relation to the 
categories within this discourse is to collude with powers with a vested 
interest in maintaining the body as a site of social control. As Foucault 
writes in The History of Sexuality Volume 1: An Introduction (1976): 
 
One must not suppose that there exists a certain sphere of 
sexuality that would be the legitimate concern of a free and 
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disinterested scientific inquiry were it not the object of mechanisms 
of prohibition […] If sexuality was constituted as an area of 
investigation, this was only because relations of power had 
established it as a possible object; and conversely, if power was to 
take it as a target, this was because techniques of knowledge and 
procedures of discourse were capable of investing it. Between 
techniques of knowledge and strategies of power, there is no 
exteriority [.] (Foucault 1990, p. 98) 
 
Given that Foucault perceives all relations to be subject to power-
knowledge, resistance to coercive and prohibitive models of sexuality can 
be more effectively understood as the production of new forms of 
knowledge and practice that rearticulate and harness ‘deviant’ excess at 
the limits of established discourse – alternative practices can then be 
created which contest dominant models. As Jon Simons points out: 
 
The assault on the citadel of bio-power requires radical tools. It 
begins by converting what is scientifically defined as sexual 
perversion into the invention of new pleasures, utilizing the 
unruliness of desires that might be denounced but cannot […] be 
governed (Simons 1995, p. 100) 
 
Such a view of desire in relation to power, with resistance being 
understood as the invention of ‘new pleasures’, will become important in 
our later explanation of fetishism as the archetype of desire: an immanent 
productive process that generates objects of desire, rather than being 
perceived as an act of substitution within a restrictive economy. For 
Foucault then, power-knowledge relations can both produce and destroy a 
new subject of desire that is ‘made and unmade by that excess which 
transgresses it’ (Foucault 1977, p.32). In such instances, ‘erotic practices 
all lead to ‘little deaths’, or the death of the subject as a consolidated unit’ 
(Simons Op CIt). As we shall see, whereas death within a restrictive 
economy of desire requires mourning for an original lost object of desire, 
 56 
and a notion of the fetish as a memorial to it, a notion of death from the 
viewpoint of immanent productive desire perceives it as both a necessary 
and complementary component within the life process – for the subject of 
desire to be born anew, a transgression is required in which the death of 
its previous manifestation occurs.  
 
Foucault proposes that notions of sexuality were legitimized 
precisely through discourses that categorised what, according to dominant 
social interests, should be perceived as normal sexual practices, as 
opposed to deviant sexual behaviour.  Such discourses, whether 
psychoanalysis, psychiatry or modern medicine, defined legitimate 
sexuality as a reproductive practice that satisfied the function and interests 
of the bourgeois family – it both guaranteed the maintenance of bourgeois 
family lineage whilst controlling the reproduction and economic efficiency 
of the working class5. As such, for Foucault, sex and sexuality is not 
something that is primarily repressed, it is something that is produced as a 
social construct via relations of power - knowledge. So whereas the 
dominant class may have repressed and pathologized forms of sexuality 
that were surplus to the needs of its own reproduction and interests, it 
must have first produced a notion of sex and sexualities that both defined 
their bodies whilst setting a standard to differentiate itself against; as 
Foucault states: 
 
[T]his was far from being a matter of the class which in the 
eighteenth century became hegemonic believing itself obliged to 
amputate from its body a sex which was useless, expensive, and 
dangerous as soon as it was no longer given over exclusively to 
reproduction; we can assert on the contrary that it provided itself 
with a body to be cared for, protected, cultivated, and preserved 
from the many dangers and contacts, to be isolated from others so 
that it would retain its differential value [.] (ibid, p.123) 
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Foucault identifies two systems that define the power and knowledge 
relations of sex: the deployment of sexuality and the deployment of 
alliance. Whereas the former focuses upon the control and categorisation 
of sexual practices, the later focuses upon the maintenance and order of 
sexual alliances centred around the family. The medicalisation and 
categorisation of sexuality revolved around the interplay of these two 
systems that defined the relationship between the individual body and the 
social population. For Foucault, discourses that addressed this interplay 
converged upon four strategic unities aimed at the production and control 
of sexual practices: the hysterization of women's bodies, the 
pedagogization of children's sex, the socialization of procreative behavior 
and the psychiatrization of perverse behavior. In each case, the notions of 
sex and sexuality were seen as mutually informing categories – as 
Foucault points out: 
 
We must not make the mistake of thinking that sex is an 
autonomous agency which secondarily produces manifold effects of 
sexuality over the entire length of its surface of contact with power. 
On the contrary, sex is the most speculative, most ideal, and most 
internal element in a deployment of sexuality organized by power in 
its grip on bodies and their materiality, their forces, energies, 
sensations, and pleasures. (ibid, p. 155) 
 
Such a dialogue between these notions allowed the production of an 
artificial unity generating a causal fiction that justified the idea of normal 
sexuality based upon underlying biological functions – Foucault states:  
 
[B]y presenting itself in a unitary fashion […] it was able to mark the 
line of contact between a knowledge of human sexuality and the 
biological sciences of reproduction; thus, without really borrowing 
anything from these sciences, except a few doubtful analogies, the 
knowledge of sexuality gained through proximity a guarantee of 
quasi-scientificity; but by virtue of this same proximity, some of the 
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contents of biology and physiology were able to serve as a principle 
of normality for human sexuality. (ibid) 
 
This artificial unity created the circumstances in which sex was described 
as being ‘caught between a law of reality (economic necessity being its 
most abrupt and immediate form) and an economy of pleasure which was 
always attempting to circumvent that law’ (ibid, p.154). The oscillation 
within this artificial unity was perceived as symptomatic of a socialized and 
excessive divergence of desire from a biological function and instinct that 
underlay it. As such, sex appeared as an economy of desire based upon 
the interplay of ‘whole and part, principle and lack, absence and presence, 
excess and deficiency, by the function of instinct, finality, and meaning, of 
reality and pleasure’ (ibid). As the bourgeoisie exercised its power over life 
as a means to more effectively order and administer the social body, the 
discipline and regulation of the body became increasingly important. Sex 
was seen as the focal point at which these two areas converged whilst 
also providing a concept for understanding and controlling them - thus sex 
was to be found in evidence everywhere the discipline, regulation and 
reproduction of the body occurred – as Foucault puts it,  
 
the notion of “sex” made it possible […] to make use of this fictitious 
unity as a causal principle, an omnipresent meaning, a secret to be 
discovered everywhere: sex was thus able to function as a unique 
signifier and as a universal signified. (ibid, p. 154) 
 
Discipline and regulation required the monitor of bodily pleasures, 
whereas the biological and reproductive function provided a foundational 
alibi for an endorsed normative sexuality from which a perverse sexuality 
could be differentiated; as Foucault states:  
 
Sex – that agency which appears to dominate us and that secret 
which seems to underlie all that we are, that point which enthralls 
us through the power it manifests and the meaning it conceals, and 
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which we ask to reveal what we are and to free us from what 
defines us – is doubtless but an ideal point made necessary by the 
deployment of sexuality and its operation. (ibid, p. 155) 
 
To view heterosexuality as a normative model premised upon a notion of 
sex requires that perverse practices must therefore be defined as 
developmental failures or remain outside the realm of logical possibilities 
in terms of sex or gender. As Judith Butler describes in Gender Trouble 
(1990): 
 
The heterosexualization of desire requires and institutes the 
production of discrete and asymmetrical oppositions between 
“feminine” and “masculine”, where these are understood as 
expressive attributes of “male” and “female”. [Here there exists] a 
political relation of entailment instituted by the cultural laws that 
establish and regulate the shape and meaning of sexuality. Indeed, 
precisely because certain kinds of “gender identities” fail to conform 
to those norms of cultural intelligibility, they appear only as 
developmental failures or logical impossibilities from within that 
domain. (Butler 1990, p. 24) 
 
 Against normalized, legitimate forms of sexuality, fetishism was 
recognized as being at the centre of the psychiatrization of perversity. 
Foucault describes fetishism as the ‘model perversion […] which served 
as the guiding thread for analyzing all the other deviations’ (Foucault 1990, 
p.154). Perversions were constituted via a medical and psychiatric notion 
of normal sex, based upon a biological and reproductive function, tied to 
an instinct whose object was subject to transformation. As Foucault states:  
 
In the psychiatrization of perversions, sex was related to biological 
functions and to an anatomical-physiological machinery that gave it 
its “meaning”, that is, its finality; but it was also referred to an 
instinct which, through its peculiar development and according to 
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the objects to which it could become attached, made it possible for 
perverse behaviour patterns to arise and made their genesis 
intelligible. (ibid, p.153)  
 
Fetishism was therefore the model for the perversions due to the 
fact that it allowed one to ‘clearly perceive the way in which the instinct 
became fastened to an object in accordance with an individual’s historical 
adherence and biological inadequacy’ (ibid, p.154). Freud’s analysis of 
fetishism corresponds to this view – fetishism is allocated to the realm of 
perversions and is perceived as symptomatic of a failure to accept sexual 
difference and the consequent engendering of conventional sexual roles 
that follows the Oedipus Complex. Freud and Lacan’s notion of what 
constitutes sexual difference corresponds to Foucault’s proclamation in 
which a discourse of sexuality entailed an artificial unity between a notion 
of biological necessity and an economy of pleasure which exceeds and 
circumvents this notion. Whereas coitus and the reproductive heterosexual 
act constitute a prescribed normal sexual aim, the propensity for the 
subject to find surplus pleasure from objects in pursuit of that which it 
lacks (the Other) provides opportunities where deviation can occur which, 
according to this view, is ultimately understood as a deviation from the 
normal sexual aim. In these terms, deviation is a refusal to recognize the 
lack which is believed to signal sexual difference – presence is to be 
recognized in the body of the father who has the signifier (phallus) the 
mother desires and lacks. This signifier also signifies a singular male 
sexual economy understood as the penetrative act of coitus; as Freud 
describes: 
 
Maleness combines the [factors of] subject, activity and possession 
of the penis; femaleness takes over [those of] object and passivity. 
The vagina is now valued as a place of shelter for the penis; it 
enters into the heritage of the womb. (Freud 1923, p.394)  
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If fetishism was perceived as a deviant superfluous erotics, beyond 
the remit of functional reproduction, then it shared a similar designated 
erotic excess allocated to that of the female body – an excess most clearly 
illustrated by the cases of female hysteria. For Foucault, the hysterization 
of women's bodies performed within medical discourses during the 
nineteenth century positioned the female as ‘being thoroughly saturated 
with sexuality’ (ibid, p.104). This saturated nature was deemed to exist 
due to woman’s alignment with the womb and reproduction. Ironically, as 
we have commented upon, such a position was at odds with a dominant 
sexuality designated through male genitality – an economy of desire in 
which a male has and a woman lacks. As Foucault describes: 
 
[I]n the process of hysterization of women, “sex” was defined in 
three ways: as that which belongs in common to men and women; 
as that which belongs, par excellence, to men, and hence is lacking 
in women; but at the same time, as that which by itself constitutes 
woman’s body, ordering it wholly in terms of the functions of 
reproduction and keeping it in constant agitation through the effects 
of that very function. (ibid, p.153) 
 
As such, hysteria was interpreted as a pathological excess, outside the 
realm of a male sexual economy organized around the phallus. Such an 
excess was perceived as being constituted via woman’s biological 
condition as a reproductive organism – as such, the hysterical woman was 
deemed to be subject to symptoms associated with the womb.6 In both 
cases, woman is positioned within the terms of patriarchy in which her 
sexuality is only viable as a means for functional reproduction, anything 
else is defined as an incoherent, pathological excess within the terms of 
this discourse; as Tina Chanter states: 
 
at the material level of signification, the feminine is admitted only 
insofar as it can contribute productively to the society or the state, 
the ends of which are defined by an invisibly white, patriarchal 
 62 
capitalism. Anything that cannot be converted into assets from this 
point of view is discarded as incoherent, insane, nonsensical, 
outside the bounds of reason, as defined by a logic that is taken to 
be universal. To be admitted into the system as meaningful is to 
signify within its terms. (Chanter 2008, p.5) 
 
 As the above recognizes, the woman as hysteric and the fetishist 
are therefore both positioned outside a restricted sexual economy, whilst 
being defined by its terms - in each case, the extent of their deviancy is 
defined by their position in relation to the phallic signifier. Rather than 
perceiving difference and active production at the heart of these ‘deviant’ 
sexualities, the omnipresence of the phallus must be vindicated in which to 
keep sexual desire tied to its socially endorsed reproductive role. This has 
clear consequences for a notion of the fetish; it must be perceived as a 
deviation from, yet aligned with, the realm of the phallus, and not allowed 
to be perceived as a productive act of desire within its own terms. As such, 
fetishism becomes a response to the anxiety induced by the fear of phallic 
lack and woman, as already castrated, must remain outside of its realm. 
Woman, which lacks the phallus, is in each case a determining factor in 
defining these pathologies in that she acts as a signifier of lack to verify 
the presence that the phallus represents. It will therefore come as no 
surprise to recognize that she is affiliated with the non-western Otherness 
which, as we have seen, comes to figure the fetish as an irrational 
deviation from a notion of rational universal value. As Chanter points out,  
 
the trope of fetishism is also implicated in a racialized discourse. If 
femininity is figured as lack – the horrific, abject, unthought ground 
of castration anxiety – its abject status is articulated in terms of an 
imaginary racing of subjectivity that subtends the more overtly 
thematic organization of psychoanalysis by sexual differentiation. In 
this sense one might say race is the real, that which stages the 
psychoanalytic oedipal narrative, but which itself remains unvoiced 
or unrepresented by it. (Chanter 2008, p.8) 
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Whereas the body in Europe was subjugated to a mutually informed 
deployment of alliance and sexuality that organized desire around notions 
of reproductive utility in which to affirm and maintain the relations of the 
bourgeois family, there was a converse perception of the non-European 
body that was perceived as excessively erotic and uncivilized. Given the 
perception of woman’s body as ‘saturated with sexuality’, femininity was 
closely related to the assumed instinctual and erotic nature of so-called 
‘primitive’ peoples. As Colin Rhodes points out:  
 
[T]he ‘normal’ woman was regarded in biological terms to be 
altogether more primitive than her male counterpart. A large body of 
theory purporting to deal with the ‘woman problem’ [was] invariably 
written by men [...By] drawing comparative material from a wide 
variety of cultural sources they implied a racial commonality 
between civilized and primitive women that was never argued for 
the European male […W]omen were generally typed as being 
essentially instinctive as opposed to rational thinkers. This 
conveniently situated them in a position closer to nature and so in 
this way the generic woman was defined, silenced and contained in 
male discourses of culture in precisely the same way as the 
savage. (Rhodes 1994, p.62) 
 
The correlation between women and the primitive in terms of a 
perceived instinctual and erotic nature finds its epitome and ultimate 
conflation in the form of the non-western woman. As Anthony Shelton 
describes: 
 
The de-eroticisation of sex at home coincided with the 
objectification and eroticism of the non-European female body. The 
construction of the erotic Other, while embodying different ‘natures’, 
followed an essentially similar strategy and created like effects in all 
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the lands that succumbed to European domination (Shelton 1995, 
p.26). 
 
In The Chameleon Body (1995), Shelton describes the relationship 
between this eroticisation of the non-European female body and the 
incorporation of fetishism - a term used to define non-western religious 
practices - within psychosexual discourses. Shelton states that the 
perception of the foreign female body between Europe and Africa 
mimicked that between Europe and the Orient:  
 
Whereas in Orientalism, the sexual submission and possession of 
the foreign female body mirrored the subordinate and dominant 
position between East and West, African exoticism transcribed near 
identical power relations between the geography of South and 
North. (ibid, p.26) 
 
In such a view, the African female body was perceived as irrational, 
wild and excessively erotic7; Shelton states: 
 
Africa remained the ‘Dark Continent’ impenetrable both territorially 
and intellectually, medically and morally deleterious, menacing on 
both the mind and the body. Within such ‘waste-land’, the 
archetypal woman was degenerate, untamed and promiscuous[.] 
(ibid) 
 
 An excessive erotics, as personified by the female body, has 
connotations within the etymology of the word fetishism itself – as Pietz 
points out, the ‘earliest fetish discourse concerned witchcraft and the 
control of female sexuality’ (Pietz 1985, p.6), evident in the Portuguese 
word feitico, from which the notion of fetishism is derived. For Shelton, the 
fetish provides a focal point in which to equate an excessive erotics 
maligned by European society – epitomised by the African female body - 
and the perceived primitive, instinctual and irrational nature of African 
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culture. In both cases, that which is surplus to the values of western 
society in terms of its reproduction, organization and administration are 
allocated to the realm of the Other. Such a correlation between the erotic 
and the primitive allowed Europe to deflect its own sexual and aggressive 
instincts onto that outside its own culture – in other words, the west was 
able to allocate its own internal Other onto cultures subordinated to itself.  
 
The wild, dangerous, potentially polluting and exotic qualities that 
European writers, travellers and colonial servants ascribed to 
African sexuality were not dissimilar to the distillation of their 
religious, intellectual or moral beliefs in the ‘fetish’ figure – perhaps 
not surprisingly given that religious ‘fetishism’ provided the 
intellectual model through which sexual behaviour could be related. 
In both cases what was important was not the figure or the body 
itself, but the prejudices about motivations and understanding, 
intolerance and the deflection of sexual, aggressive and emotional 
instincts that had been denied and exiled from Europe to foreign 
territories. (Shelton Op Cit, p.29) 
 
Given that the notion of the fetish was appropriated within western 
psychosexual accounts of desire, its association with irrational 
investments of value points to a concept of desire that is capable of 
deviating from the “normal” sexual aim – that of coitus and reproduction. 
As such, sexual fetishism is seen as a polluting agent in relation to desire 
and corresponds to a similarly perceived notion of African sexuality, 
especially in its female form, that was deemed a degenerate and polluting 
element in relation to the civilized West. As we shall see, such crude 
prejudices, in which fetishism is positioned as a radically non-western 
Other, can be easily exposed as unfounded.  
Whereas Foucault’s writing on sexuality gives a clear explanation of 
the part played by psychosexual notions of fetishism in the production of 
legitimate and perverse forms of sexuality, there is no similar address to 
socio-economic forms of fetishism. As we have seen, Foucault stresses 
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the ways in which sexual practices can legitimate themselves in opposition 
to a lacking Other – our exploration so far has identified the phallus as the 
singular signifier of a male sexual economy in which sex appears as 
belonging ‘par excellence to men, and […] lacking in women’ (Foucault Op 
CIt, p.153). For Foucault, the socio-economic realm was similarly subject 
to historical episteme changes that legitimated themselves via the 
exclusion of their Other. Three main epistemes are identified by Foucault 
in which the study of the economic realm corresponds to that within the 
study of language and nature: the Renaissance, the Classical and the 
Modern. Foucault also hints at the possibility that we could be entering a 
fourth episteme where ‘man would be erased, like a face drawn in sand at 
the edge of the sea’ (Foucault 1994, p.387). 8 
According to Foucault, the understanding of wealth within the 
Renaissance period was determined by an episteme based upon the 
principle of resemblance. Given this principle, money had value and was 
able to act as an equivalence for other values precisely because the metal 
(Gold, Silver etc.) from which it was made was seen to have an intrinsic 
value in itself. As Foucault states, ‘[f]ine metal was, of itself, a mark of 
wealth; its buried brightness was sufficient indication that it was at the 
same time a hidden presence and a visible signature of all the wealth of 
the world’ (ibid, p. 174). During the Classical episteme, Foucault proposes 
that the principle of resemblance was replaced by a principle of 
representation. Given this viewpoint, objects within the world were 
categorized according to their commonalities and dissimilarities. For 
example, in the analysis of the natural world, ‘[a]ll that existed was living 
beings, which were viewed through a grid of knowledge constituted by 
natural history’ (ibid, p. 128). In the realm of economics, exchange was 
prioritized due to the fact that the equivalences and differences involved in 
monetary transactions corresponded to the categorization of 
commonalities and dissimilarities within this episteme. As Foucault points 
out, ‘[a]ll wealth is coinable; and it is by this means that it enters into 
circulation – in the same way that any natural being was characterizable, 
and could thereby find its place in a taxonomy […] in a system of identities 
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and differences (ibid, p.175). In both epistemes, money acts as the 
universal representation of wealth, but in each case, how money as a 
representative is understood is different. As Kologlugil states: 
 
Unlike in the Renaissance episteme, however, the representative 
power of money (its function as a sign) was not linked to the 
intrinsic preciousness and value of gold and silver. The relationship 
was reversed in the classical period: whereas in the Renaissance 
episteme gold and silver could represent wealth due to their 
intrinsic value, in the classical period they had value as monetary 
instruments due to their function in the realm of exchange to 
represent wealth. (Koluglugil 2010, p.14) 
 
Finally, in the Modern period, the principle of representation was 
replaced by the principle of historicity. Unlike the Classical period in which 
things were understood in terms of a non-historical categorization, the 
Modern period understood things in terms of historical laws of 
development. As such, the ‘mode of being of economics is no longer 
linked to a simultaneous space of differences and identities, but to the time 
of successive productions’ (Foucault Op Cit, p256). For Foucault the 
economist Ricardo made the decisive break with the Classical episteme; 
he states that ‘ after Ricardo, the possibility of exchange is based upon 
labor; and henceforth the theory of production must always precede that of 
circulation’ (ibid, p. 254).  
Foucault identifies three important consequences of seeing 
historical production at the heart of Modern economic theory. Firstly, value 
is determined through historical developments within the organization of 
production. Secondly, due to the expenditure involved in historical 
production and consumption, labour is organized around the notion of 
scarcity in which human beings satisfy their needs within the context of 
diminishing resources and their propagation. Finally, because human 
beings recognize their finitude in relation to historical scarcity, man can 
recognize himself as a unified, rational subject within economic relations 
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and can reflect on his historical destiny. Foucault places both Ricardo and 
Marx within the same episteme given their concern for historical 
production and its consequences for the analysis of wealth. In both cases, 
Foucault perceives history as the labouring human in confrontation with 
scarcity and therefore believes ‘Marxism introduced no real discontinuity’ 
(ibid, p. 261) in relation to the Modern episteme.  Ricardo is considered a 
pessimist in relation to historical economic destiny – following Malthus, he 
believed in a notion of diminishing returns in which, as the population 
outstripped food production, subsistence wages would rise leading to a fall 
in profit resulting in the economy reaching a static state where ‘[l]ife and 
death will fit exactly one against the other […h]istory will have led man’s 
finitude to that boundary-point at which it will appear in its pure form’ (ibid, 
p.260). Marx’s optimistic view works in the opposite direction – whereas 
history leads humanity to face its condition in scarcity for Ricardo, for Marx 
it is History itself that creates the conditions of scarcity via exploitation and 
accumulation within capitalist economic relations. On recognizing the 
historical condition of scarcity  
 
a whole class of men experience, nakedly, as it were, what need, 
hunger, and labour are. What others attribute to nature or to the 
spontaneous order of things, these men are able to recognize as 
the result of a history and the alienation of a finitude that does not 
have this form (ibid, p.261).   
 
Regardless of their contrasting optimism or pessimism, Ricardo and 
Marx’s shared concern for scarcity, finitude and historicity position both 
thinkers within a nineteenth-century mode of thought such that ‘[t]heir 
controversies may have stirred up a few waves and caused a few surface 
ripples; but they are no more than storm’s in a children’s paddling pool’ 
(ibid, p. 262).  
The idea that notions of truth and knowledge are subject to 
historical determinations within a given discourse seems valid; however, 
the notion that a Marxist concern for scarcity is ultimately a mere variation 
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from Ricardo in that both belong to the same episteme seems to belittle 
the differing import and intentionality behind their theories – whereas 
Ricardo views scarcity as inevitable and ‘natural’, Marx, views it as a 
social construction and therefore a condition which can be surpassed. 
Critically, there is clearly a greater affinity between Foucault and Marx in 
terms of a concern for social determination than can be perceived 
between the work of Marx and Ricardo9. Given Marx’s critique of 
Malthus10, it should also be pointed out that for Marx and (as we shall see 
later) for Bataille, an understanding of economic wealth and value is less a 
problem of scarcity and more a problem of surplus once society is capable 
of producing beyond need. The key factor to emphasize in a Modern 
episteme of economic thought – an economics of production – is the role 
of scarcity within a historical model. Whether scarcity as a historical 
necessity (Malthus and Ricardo) or scarcity as a transcendable historical 
construction (Marx), the fact that it appears as an essential element in an 
economic discourse revolving around a privileged signifier demonstrates 
the restrictive nature of value within such an economy. The fact that 
human potential, as well as access to resources and materials, is dictated 
by the restrictive circulation of capital, prevents any heterogeneous 
expenditure and limits our legitimate choices to notions of utility and 
accumulation. 
What is clear from Foucault’s account of economics is that each 
model within a particular episteme still revolves around a notion of money 
being a  universal signifier of value – it is how value comes to be 
embodied and perceived within this form that has been subject to change. 
Though the mercantilists were not concerned with value in terms of it 
being universally recognized in its resemblance to precious metal, its 
significance as an object for exchange allowed it to be perceived as a 
‘universal instrument for the analysis and representation of wealth’ (ibid, 
p.175). Likewise, in the Modern episteme, money becomes the universal 
signifier of value determined by the time invested by labour power. In all 
cases, however interpreted, value has its manifestation within money as a 
universal sign – it then becomes a problem of how it attains this value that 
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each epoch attempts to translate. Whereas there is no direct consideration 
of the commodity fetish in Foucault’s writing in the same way that there is 
in relation to psychosexual fetishism, one can deduce a similar concern for 
how homogeneous thinking revolves around a term invested with value – 
be it money or the phallus. It is from this legitimated notion of value that 
other values can be perceived as deviant, excluded or lacking.  
Though Foucault’s theories have been subject to criticism11, they 
ultimately have value in pointing out the relativity of knowledge and the 
extent to which it legitimates itself via the exclusion of that which is 
incompatible with its assertions. This exclusion generates an artificial 
realm of Otherness that prevents difference and heterogeneity from 
flourishing within homogeneous modes of thinking. Given that Foucault 
has identified the means by which value is legitimated by both defining 
and excluding that which is Other, we now need to consider the movement 
which vindicates the presence of value and defines an Other as deficient 
in such value. To do this we can turn to Jacques Derrida’s critique of the 
metaphysics of presence.  
 
The privileged signifier and the metaphysics of presence 
 
The process we have identified, in which a privileged signifier 
comes to legitimate a homogeneous economy by positioning itself as a 
self-present value from which other values are excluded, clearly resonates 
with Derrida’s critique of logocentrism and the metaphysics of presence. 
Metaphysics attempts to explain the origin of truth by defining its 
foundations. To define the foundation of philosophical truth, presence 
needs to be affirmed - this can only be achieved by contrasting it against 
its other that is absent. Derrida confronts the metaphysics of presence in 
three ways.  
Firstly, Derrida criticises logocentrism, which is described as the 
primacy of the spoken word over the written form within western thought. 
Derrida points out that western metaphysics privileges speech as a self-
evident origin to thought and knowledge; truth is to be found in dialogue 
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with the authoritative voice of the protagonists to guarantee its presence. 
In contrast, writing is perceived as derivative – at best, a necessary evil 
used to record thoughts. Beyond the realm of the presence of speech, 
writing is subject to an absence that risks distortion of its intended 
meanings that can be easily taken out of context.  In opposition to 
traditional metaphysics, Derrida demonstrates that the matter of presence 
and absence, or the privileging of speech over writing, is ultimately 
undecidable. Following Saussure’s proposition that all language and 
meaning is governed by the differential play of signifiers – where each 
signifier and signified distinguishes itself through the trace of all others 
signifiers within its system – Derrida suggests that such a model, most 
evident in the differential marks visible within writing, negates any ultimate 
presence or foundation to meaning and truth. 
It is thus the idea of the sign that must be deconstructed through a 
meditation upon writing which would merge, as it must, with the 
undoing of onto-theology, faithfully repeating it in its totality and 
making it insecure in its most assured evidences […] That the 
signified is originally and essentially […] trace, that is always 
already in the position of the signifier, is the apparently innocent 
proposition within which the metaphysics of the logos, of presence 
and consciousness, must reflect upon writing as its death and its 
resource (Derrida 1976, p.73). 
 
Secondly, Derrida criticises dualism – the manner in which 
everything is explained in terms of binary oppositions once a metaphysics 
of presence and absence has been put into place. A metaphysics of 
presence begins by initially privileging a term from which all presence and 
meaning is centred around. To posit a term as having a privileged relation 
to presence and meaning, an opposite, subordinate term needs to be 
allocated as negative or lacking (i.e. Being and Non-Being). All 
metaphysical thinking therefore proceeds from a positive, present origin 
that is then used to explain its negative, lacking other. This procedure, 
 72 
which sets up a duality within a metaphysics of presence, is apparent in 
Derrida’s analysis of the binary opposition between speech and writing 
within Plato’s Phaedrus. 
 
Plato thinks of writing, and tries to comprehend it, to dominate it, on 
the basis of opposition as such. In order for these contrary values 
(good/evil, true/false, essence/appearance, inside/outside, etc.) to 
be in opposition, each of the terms must be simply external to the 
other, which means that one of these oppositions (the opposition 
between inside and outside) must already be accredited as the 
matrix of all possible opposition. And one of the elements of the 
system (or of the series) must also stand as the very possibility of 
systematicity or seriality in general. (Derrida 1972, p. 130) 
 
To challenge the self-certainty of metaphysics, Derrida uses a range of 
strategies and concepts to undermine the foundations on which binary 
oppositions rest, including trace, différance and dissemination – all 
designed to expose the perpetual play of difference within language that 
precludes any appeal to presence or absence within meaning. 
Thirdly, Derrida criticises phallogocentrism, a neologism defined as 
the privilege accorded to the phallus – sign of sexual difference – as a 
mark of presence. Derrida believes that phallocentrism is intimately 
linked with the prejudices of logocentrism in that, by being the privileged 
signifier of presence and absence, the phallic signifier becomes the 
origin from which the single (male) sexual economy is put in place.  
 
[The] determination of the proper, of the law of the proper, of 
economy, therefore leads back to castration as truth, to the figure of 
woman as the figure of castration and of truth. Of castration as truth 
[…] The phallus, thanks to castration, always remains in its place, in 
the transcendental topology [.] (Derrida 1980, p. 466-7) 
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For Derrida, sexual difference is always implicit within western thought. 
Here, ‘sexual difference has been brought to reason, which has also 
meant, almost without exception, that social, political, economic forms of 
the differentiation of the sexes have been grounded, and thus legitimated, 
in reason, by reason’ (Kamuf 1991, p.313).  
In Derridean terms, it is clear that both the phallus and gold operate 
as privileged terms that act as an original presence that posits a binary 
systematicity which positions an Other as lacking to legitimate its own 
economy. The psychosexual fetish can appear as a deviation from an 
original economy of desire because it acts as a substitute for a maternal 
phallus – it is thus not only a denial of sexual difference in its binary form 
which woman-as-lack represents of sexual difference, it is also a refusal of 
the possibility of heterogeneous desire in which the Phallus is not the only 
term. Likewise in socio-economic terms, money acts as a substitute for an 
original signifier of gold that is the chosen privileged commodity that 
makes all others into its equivalent within a homogeneous economy – 
anything that eludes its clutches in a system of exchange and 
accumulation lacks legitimate value (practices of production that do not 
serve economic efficiency, acts that have no discernible utility or escape 
commodification). It is no coincidence that both Freud and Marx refer to a 
primordial myth in which to verify the presence at the heart of these 
economies of production.  
In the case of Freud, the Oedipal drama positions woman’s lack 
and the desire for the Phallus at the heart of exchange within a 
homogeneous sexual economy. Following a Derridean critique of binary 
oppositions that operate via notions of inclusion and exclusion in order to 
justify a metaphysics of presence, the feminine comes to represent lack in 
order to privilege the presence of the monolithic phallic economy of value. 
This movement relies on an appeal to a mythical past in order to justify its 
legitimacy. As Tina Chanter recognizes: 
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In their attempt to legitimate themselves, psychoanalytic narratives 
produce sites of excess or irrationality that are posited as exterior 
and interior to their own coherence and logic. The feminine comes 
to stand for a mythical past, relegated to a time that predates the 
Oedipal narrative, the terms of which are formulated in a way that 
precludes the entry of the feminine […] The Oedipal configuration 
thereby surreptitiously acknowledges what it repudiates. Phallic 
privilege comes to determine what constitutes value, the 
contingency of which is occluded through a conflation of the values 
that are instantiated by the ideal of masculinity and those that are 
taken as a representative of humanity. A symbolic system of 
meaning and its values is established by way of a compensatory 
narrative that covers over its lack, finitude, or frailty, by positing this 
inadequacy as outside itself, an outside that is projected into a 
mythical past that comes to be associated with the feminine. 
(Chanter 2008, p.4) 
 
  According to the Oedipal myth, the child recognizes his mother’s 
desire outside itself, embodied in the form of the father. The child 
consequently resents the father and fears a reprisal via an act of 
castration by the father – the guilt and anxiety surrounding such 
resentment and perceived reprisal results in the male child giving up its 
claim for the mother and wanting to be like the father; because the female 
child is already considered castrated, she decides to become like the 
mother in which to receive the love of a father figure and received that 
which she is considered lacking. According to Freud, such adoption of 
socially generated gender norms and values is installed via the notion of 
the superego that generates a sense of guilt through a tyrannical 
injunction to keep our unconscious incestuous desires at bay. This taboo 
against incest with its corresponding sense of guilt is also positioned within 
another primordial myth regarding the notion of the primal horde. In Totem 
and Taboo (1913), Freud speculates about the origin of the paternal law 
against incest. Freud describes a scene in which the father has sole 
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access to women which he denies his sons. Out of jealousy, the brothers 
band together and murder their father. Freud describes the consequences 
of such an act: 
 
Though the brothers had banded together in order to overcome 
their father […e]ach of them would have wished, like his father, to 
have all the women to himself. The new [social] organisation would 
have collapsed in a struggle of all against all, for none of them was 
of such over-mastering strength as to be able to take on his father’s 
part[.] Thus the brothers had no alternative if they were to live 
together, but […] to institute the law against incest. (Freud 1999, 
p.144) 
 
Despite any evidence to verify this myth – as Freud points out, this 
‘earliest state of society has never been an object of observation’ (ibid, 
141) -  it does serve the function of illustrating one of the functions of the 
superego: to inflict guilt for desiring that which belongs to the father and to 
uphold the taboo against incestuous desire. This paternal myth is found in 
both Freud and Lacan in which there is an appeal to ‘a single, male 
narrative of origins – the paternal threat of castration – [drawn] from 
nineteenth century anthropology’ (McClintock 1993, p.12).  Anne 
McClintock points out that, for Lacan, there is ‘a cultural imperative (rooted 
in ‘primordial law’) that the mother-child embrace be severed’ (ibid). For 
McClintock, this cultural imperative is put into question. The perceived 
paternal intervention against incest can be viewed as denying women 
social agency in the process of separation. McClintock points out that the 
paternal myth places women in a position where they are ‘seen to have no 
motivation for weaning or preventing incest, no social interest in guiding 
children into separation, no role in helping children negotiate the intricate 
dynamics of interdependence, nor any capacity for doing so’ (ibid). Yet, 
ironically, as McClintock describes, the ‘activity of overseeing the 
dialectics of interdependence is precisely what constitutes the gendered 
division of labour of western cultures’ (ibid).  
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Whereas Lacan’s writing purges psychoanalysis of some of its 
more mythological explanations and biological determinations via a 
semiotic interpretation of Freud’s theories through the system of language, 
a primordial event is still prescribed via our entry into the symbolic order 
and our adoption of the Name-of-the-Father which forever alienates us 
from the unconscious phantasy of an original object of desire. According to 
Lacan, it is this alienation that ultimately generates a notion of sexual 
desire within us. Because the Phallus serves the function of symbolizing 
both sexual difference and language associated with the external figure of 
the father, the male takes up his position of having the phallus and the 
woman becomes associated with being the phallus (as the quintessential 
symbol of lack at the heart of desire). The assumption that subjectivity and 
desire are born from our recognition of the privileged signifier of the 
phallus, which signifies both sexual difference and our entry into both the 
realms of language and reason, has justifiably come under criticism due to 
the fact it assumes the privileged signifier is still something associated with 
a male signified and therefore aligns reason and presence with the male, 
whilst positioning woman to the realm of lack. The fact that the phallus in 
Lacan’s writing has moved away from a biological determinant, in terms of 
the penis, to a cultural signifier within the symbolic order of language, 
allows some writers, such as Jacqueline Rose, to claim that the power that 
it entails can be appropriated by either sex, whether male or female. 12 In 
opposition to such a view, Elizabeth Grosz has argued that even though 
the phallus is a signifier in language, this does not make it neutral for 
whichever gender may choose to claim it. Grosz claims that the 
conventional relationship between the ‘penis and phallus is not arbitrary, 
but socially and politically motivated […] It is motivated by the already 
existing structure of patriarchal power, and its effects guarantee the 
reproduction of this particular form of social organisation and no other’ 
(Grosz 1990, p.124). Following Derrida’s critique of phallogocentrism, 
Grosz recognises that because the phallus is identified as privileged 
signifier, it can define all the other relations within psychosexual exchange 
by defining itself as (positive) masculine presence against (negative) 
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feminine absence. Following Derrida’s lead in criticising binary 
oppositions, Grosz states that: 
 
The two sexes come to occupy the positive and negative positions 
not for arbitrary reasons, or with arbitrary effects […] They are 
distinguished not on the basis of (Saussurian ‘pure’) difference, but 
in terms of dichotomous opposition or distinction; not, that is, as 
contraries (‘A’ and ‘B’), but as contradictories (‘A’ and ‘not-A’) […] 
Distinctions, binary oppositions, are relations based on one rather 
than many terms, the one term generating a non-reciprocal 
definition of the other as its negative (Ibid). 
 
Contrary to this position, Grosz gives us another option in which no 
privileged signifier exists, allowing each term within an exchange to be 
defined by all the others. 13 For Grosz it is  
 
surely arbitrary, in the sense of social or conventional, that the 
continuum of differences between gradations of sexual difference 
[…] is divided into categories only according to the presence or 
absence of the one, male, organ’ (Ibid).  
 
As we shall see later, by appealing to a notion of feminine difference, Luce 
Irigaray also criticizes the notion that subjectivity and desire should be 
associated with a singular male homogeneous economy. A similar 
criticism can be made of the work of Slavoj Žižek whose analysis of 
fetishism will become important later for a revised notion of the concept.14  
 Whereas Lacan and Freud endorse the inevitability of these primal 
ahistorical events in the generation of human subjectivity, Marx takes a 
more critical approach to the notion of an origin at the heart of our socio-
economic relations. For Marx, bourgeois economists and thinkers appeal 
to a notion of ‘primitive accumulation’ when attempting to legitimate the 
naturalness and inevitability of capitalist relations of exchange and 
accumulation. He states: 
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[T]he accumulation of capital presupposes surplus-value; 
surplus-value presupposes capitalist production; capitalist 
production presupposes the availability of considerable masses of 
capital and labour-power in the hands of commodity producers. The 
whole movement, therefore seems to turn around in a never-ending 
circle, which we can only get out of by assuming a primitive 
accumulation (the ‘previous accumulation’ of Adam Smith) which 
precedes capitalist accumulation; an accumulation which is not the 
result of the capitalist mode of production but its point of departure. 
This primitive accumulation plays approximately the same 
role in political economy as original sin does in theology. Adam bit 
the apple and thereupon sin fell on the human race. Its origin is 
supposed to be explained when it is told as an anecdote about the 
past. Long, long ago there were two sorts of people; one, the 
diligent, intelligent and above all frugal elite; the other, lazy rascals, 
spending their substance, and more, in riotous living. The legend of 
the theological original sin certainly tells us how humankind came to 
be condemned to eat his bread in the sweat of his brow; but the 
history of the economic original sin reveals to us that there are 
people to whom this is by no means essential. Never Mind! Thus it 
came to pass that the former accumulated wealth and the latter 
finally had nothing to sell but their own skins. Since then has 
existed the poverty of the great mass of people who, despite their 
labour, have nothing to sell but themselves, and the wealth of the 
few, which increases constantly, although they have long ceased to 
work (Marx 1990,p.873). 
 
Again, as with a sexual economy of reproduction, a homogeneous 
economy of production is explained in terms of an origin that legitimates its 
circuit. The accumulation of capital, and the class relations that are its pre-
condition, are justified and naturalized via a mythological origin in which a 
frugal and diligent elite accumulated, whilst a lazy majority consumed. 
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Marx criticizes this account of the pre-conditions of capitalist relations. 
Marx identifies the historical conditions for capitalist accumulation in the 
move towards production based on wage-labour, corresponding with the 
expropriation of workers from ownership and land. It is only at this point 
that the law of value comes into effect. It is the law of value that regulates 
competition and drives accumulation through the extraction of further 
surplus-value. It is only under these conditions that capital accumulation 
can exist. As such, a notion of value organized around the principle of a 
monetary sign – which allows commodities to attain a fetishistic character 
– is falsely justified anachronistically around a mythological accumulation, 
an accumulation and determinant of value that could not have existed in 
any other circumstances than the development of capitalism.  
 The legitimacy and inevitability of capitalist monetary relations, 
along with its corresponding accumulation, is also evident within 
enlightenment philosophy. For Hegel, civil society is constituted by the 
economic wants and needs of ‘private persons, who pursue their own 
interests’ (Hegel 2001, p.157). The economic activities of private 
individuals come to satisfy the needs of others through exchange, ‘by 
which one special means of subsistence is given for others, chiefly 
through money, the general medium of exchange, in which is realized the 
abstract value of all merchandise’ (ibid p.166).  Though the general form 
for realizing civil society is money, Hegel argues that its universal principle 
can only be found outside itself: in the state that regulates the economic 
system for the good of the whole. For Hegel then, monetary relations are 
but a general form for a universal principle on the road towards Absolute 
spirit, and the union of the individual with the state. Though Marx’s notion 
of fetishism has been criticized due to a presumed complicity with the idea 
of the non-western Other as ‘primitive’.15 Marx’s use of the notion can be 
seen as an attack on this idealistic universal principle. For Marx, a free-
market civil society whose universal principles are to be found in God and 
the state can only be criticized by refuting such principles. As we have 
described, for Hegel, fetishism was a primitive mode of thought that never 
transcends the sensuous, material world, never entering the realm of 
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universal principles - it was therefore a concept analogous to the notion of 
civil society: both are comprised of the sensuous desires of concrete, 
embodied individuals. For Marx, this comparison provided a means for 
refuting the universal principles legitimated by state and church. As Pietz 
describes: 
 
Marx’s materialist critique sought to debunk the claim of universalist 
social institutions (the Christian church and the state) to a superior 
ontological status by affirming the untranscendable reality […] of 
particular sensuous desires and concrete, embodied individuals 
proper to fetish worship and civil society. For Marx, then, fetishism 
and political economy are closer to the true world than monotheism 
and statism [and can] be used to criticize the fantastic pretensions 
of monotheism and statism to some sort of transcendent reality 
(Pietz 1993, p.142). 
 
As such, the criticism of the practice of religious fetishism was to prove to 
be the same criticism of fetishistic worship within political economy - in the 
former, objects appeared to have innate powers which were in fact a 
projection of human intentionality, in the latter capital appears to have 
innate causal powers of value when, in reality, it has no real power outside 
its socially generated power to command exchange relations and the 
labour activities of individuals. In both the sensuous realm of ideas 
(religious fetishism) and practice (production and exchange), socially 
constructed signs and values come to alienate and restrict human agency 
by bearing the seal of their own authority. In each case, the material that 
bears the seal – in the case of political economy, gold and its monetary 
form – are but an arbitrary choice.   
 This fraudulent appeal to a notion of origin and presence at the 
heart of value in both socioeconomic and psychosexual economies has 
clear repercussions for a notion of fetishism. On the one hand, fetishism 
can be perceived as the means by which arbitrary values are endorsed in 
order to include or exclude that which is either beneficial or detrimental to 
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a given restrictive economy. Those that are excluded (excessive and 
perverse subjects beyond the realms of utilitarian productivity) remain 
internal to the logic of such an economy in order to verify and substantiate 
value. This move is legitimated via an appeal to a mythical past that 
determines value as opposed to excess, waste and lack. As Chanter 
describes: 
 
By casting fetishism as only a moment of an ongoing process […] 
we can draw attention to the logic of abjection that grounds 
fetishistic discourses, a logic that such discourses utilize more or 
less consciously. There is an ambivalent inclusion of subjects, who 
are on the one hand situated outside of representation, in a 
mythical, indeterminate past that is mythologized as prior to 
civilized society, and on the other hand granted access to forms of 
representation that are nevertheless shaped and informed by their 
exclusion. Access is granted to these forms of representation only if 
those that are excluded acquiesce to their representation as 
subjects who conform to the imaginaries of dominant narratives. 
(Chanter 2008, p.11)  
 
On the other hand, as we have found, if there is no self-present origin, with 
any appeal to one being entirely mythical, then the notion of the fetish 
being a illegitimate deviation derived from an authentic value is found to 
be erroneous. The psychosexual fetish can no longer be tied to the idea of 
being a disavowal and substitute for a maternal phallus that never existed; 
the inevitability of the commodity fetish is found to lack secure foundations 
once the arbitrariness of its value is recognized. The notion of Otherness 
that infects the concept of fetishism becomes redundant once it is 
recognized that all values are the effect of a surplus that is subject to 
relations of difference rather than an economy of the same.  
  This criticism of presence and authenticity at the heart of value, 
from which the fetish is said to deviate, can also be extended to the very 
ethnographic definition of fetishism from which modern notions derive. The 
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idea that the African practice of fetishism is an inferior absolute other to 
western notions of value and rationality is found to be specious. Not only 
was the notion of fetishism a western projection that silenced the cultural 
significations of its native population, the very division between European 
and the non-western values that the fetish is perceived to embody is found 
wanting when subject to further examination. Anthony Shelton points out 
that it is highly likely that the fetishes referred to by writers and explorers 
were not of purely native inspiration. Given the numerous European 
colonial and missionary interventions within the African Kongo - firstly by 
the Portuguese in 1482  – it can be plausibly speculated that the practice 
of inserting nails into African fetish figures is as an act of mutilation akin to 
the Christian symbolism of the crucifixion; as Shelton states:  
 
The origins of the justly renowned minkisi minkondi […] or ‘nail 
fetishes’, remain enigmatic, but it is probable, though historically 
unproven, that they emerged from a synthesis of Kongo and 
Christian beliefs. Not only the style, but equally the constellation of 
beliefs appertaining to the body, mutilation and power may have 
been derived from the variety of Christian experiences introduced 
during the intermittent periods of European influence. (Shelton Op 
Cit, p. 20).  
 
The clear division between European and African values is further blurred 
when we consider that the term is ‘so imprecise and inaccurate that it 
could equally be applied to many European beliefs and current 
superstitions such as palmistry’ (ibid, p.16). As John Mack points out 
 
sub-Saharan Africa is not alone in the production of such images. 
Yet, it would seem distinctly odd to talk of broadly similar objects 
from the Pacific Islanders, Native Americans, Asians and 
Europeans, let alone North African Muslims, Jews and Christians in 




 On further examination, the practice of fetishism is not simply some 
superstitious spiritual investment in a material object, as opposed to a 
western allegiance to a set of universal values. According to Mack, 
fetishism was in fact part of a sophisticated symbolic network that aided 
the organisation and functioning of a particular culture; he writes:   
 
Minkondi [nail fetishes] have a variety of identified functions […] the 
principal approach to minkondi is to render oaths and undertakings 
authoritative and binding – hardly the conventional expectation of a 
‘fetish’. As such they are called upon to ratify treatises between 
opposed communities, to endorse attestations of innocence where 
someone asserts their wrongful accusation, to confirm initiation 
vows, and other such oath-taking. (ibid, p.59)  
 
For Mack, the act of inserting a nail into the fetish was a symbolic act that 
‘fix[ed] an individual intention or affirm[ed] an undertaking’ (ibid). The fetish 
is also perceived as providing a means of communication between the 
spiritual world of the dead and the living, as such ‘so complex an object as 
the [fetish] is anything but the impulsive product of a self-regarding 
obsession’ (ibid, p.62). What is embodied in the fetish is therefore a ‘whole 
series of on-going transactions between the living and the dead, 
assembled, contained in one powerful image’ (ibid). By understanding the 
fetish as an object embedded within a symbolic network of cultural 
practices, it can be seen as equivalent to such western practices as taking 
the Eucharist, worshipping idols and swearing upon the bible within courts 








Baudrillard, privileged signifiers and the logic of the code  
 
In Baudrillard’s Fetishism and Ideology: The Semiological 
Reduction (1972), fetishism is interpreted as providing a clear illustration 
of the reifying and ‘restrictive logic’ of the system of commodity exchange 
organized around the imposition of a universal privileged signified. His 
analysis is also important in recognizing the affinity between the function 
of the privileged signifier in both socioeconomic and psychosexual 
economies.  
 Baudrillard’s solution to the problem of accounting for values 
attributed to commodities, without resorting to an occidental myth of 
western rationality in opposition to false consciousness, is achieved via 
reference to structuralist semiotics. Baudrillard believed that the political 
economic theories of Marx failed to account for the contemporary 
influence of signs within consumer culture, thereby leaving important 
instigators of social meaning and cohesion neglected within social 
analysis. The success of semiotics in providing coherent and effective 
explanations of meaning within contemporary culture was considered by 
Baudrillard to be an appropriate corrective model to be used in conjunction 
with Marxist analysis. The relationship between these theoretical models 
was focused around the concept of exchange, making the integration of 
the concept of commodity fetishism within a post-structuralist paradigm a 
necessary requirement if such a synthesis was to be viable. Baudrillard 
therefore dedicates a whole chapter to this topic within A Critique of the 
Political Economy of the Sign (1972).  
Baudrillard proposes an alternative theory of fetishism via the 
adoption of techniques from the structuralist anthropology of Levi-Strauss 
– techniques that, in turn, were inspired by the structural linguistics of 
Ferdinand de Saussure17. In correspondence to Saussure’s theory, Levi-
Strauss had interpreted the totems of other cultures not as magical 
symbolic objects, but as signifiers that operated through a system of 
difference to generate meaning18.  For Baudrillard, this was a ’radical 
breakthrough that should be developed, theoretically and clinically, and 
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extended to social analysis in general’ (ibid). Baudrillard extends this 
‘radical breakthrough’ to an analysis of fetishism through an explication of 
the etymological origin of the word. As previously discussed, the word 
fetishism has its etymological origins in the Latin word factitius, which 
means “artificial” or to be “manufactured”. Baudrillard points to this fact to 
demonstrate that what is apparent in the phenomenon of fetishism is the 
‘aspect of faking, of artificial registering – in short, of a cultural sign labor – 
and that this is at the origin of the status of fetish objects, and thus also 
plays some part in the fascination it exercises’ (ibid, p.91). On this 
account, the fetish – in either its “primitive” or contemporary manifestation 
- can therefore be described as an artificial application of signifiers to 
produce a cultural system of meaning, an account that correlates with 
Levi-Strauss’ analysis of the totem. Such an interpretation has 
consequences for our understanding of objects - an original use value 
cannot be appealed to when criticising the supposedly distorting effects of 
commodity fetishism upon an object; where would such a critical stance 
come from if the value and meaning of an object is always already 
generated through the differential play of signifiers? Baudrillard applies 
this interpretation to the contemporary “fetishist” theory of consumption in 
which both marketing strategists and consumers see objects ‘given and 
received everywhere as force dispensers (happiness, health, security, 
prestige,etc.)’ (ibid). He reminds us that these “magical” substances are, in 
fact, firstly a  
 
generalized code of signs, a totally arbitrary code of differences, 
and that it is on this basis, and not at all on account of their use 
values or their innate “virtues”, that objects exercise their 
fascination (ibid).  
 
 Baudrillard’s endorsement of post-structuralist semiology as a 
method of analysis, as well as his denial of both false consciousness and 
a separate superstructural realm, allow him to claim that fetishism is a 
‘fascination for a form (logic of the commodity or system of exchange 
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value), a state of absorption, for better or for worse, in the restrictive logic 
of a system of abstraction’ (ibid, p. 92). It can no longer be claimed that it 
is a ‘force that returns to haunt the individual severed from the product of 
his labor’ (ibid). The form is therefore still subject to the logic of commodity 
production and exchange value, but is to be interpreted through the signs 
produced through such a logic, without residual appeal to false 
consciousness, innate human nature or original use value.  As such, 
fetishism ‘is no longer an unreal object, believed to have properties it does 
not really have, but is a means of mediating social value through material 
culture’ (Dant 1996, p. 497). 
 Baudrillard’s argument against Marx’s conception of fetishism rests 
upon his need to refute a perceived western humanist ideology at the 
heart of this notion – such a rebuttal is required for a post-structuralist 
paradigm that advocates system rather than subject in the generation of 
meaning within society.19 Although problems have been identified within 
Baudrillard’s analysis of Marx’s account of commodity fetishism, the 
recognition of a reifying impulse constituted by a privileged signifier is 
important for an understanding of fetishism as an effect of a ‘restrictive 
logic’.  
Despite theoretical differences, the writings of Foucault and 
Baudrillard, share a similar concern for value as relative to its inscription 
within a cultural code.20 Baudrillard elucidates the function and similarity 
between the universal signified in psychosexual and socio-economic 
discourses. In the case of money, accumulation, surplus and profit are 
provided by its mechanisms in which to ensure a focus for value and 
exchange; in the case of the phallus, a singular sexuality is secured 
around male genitality (what Irigaray describes as a hom(m)osexualité) 
that assigns women to a position of lack and desire to the realm of 
reproduction. Baudrillard eloquently describes this process whereby a 
system of value and exchange is maintained through the allocation of a 
fetishistic privileged signifier to mediate each economy; he states: 
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[…] the (ambivalent) fascination for a form (logic of the commodity 
or system of exchange value), a state of absorption, for better or for 
worse, in the restrictive logic of a system of abstraction. Something 
like a desire, a perverse desire, the desire for the code is brought to 
light here: it is a desire that is related to the systematic nature of 
signs, drawn towards it, precisely through what this system-like 
nature negates and bars, by exorcising the contradictions spawned 
by the process of real labor – just as the perverse psychological 
structure of the fetishist is organized, in the fetish object, around a 
mark, around the abstraction of a mark that negates, bars and 
exorcises the difference of the sexes (Baudrillard 1981, p.92). 
 
For Baudrillard, our fascination with the form of the fetish exists due 
to our placement within a ‘restrictive logic of a system of abstraction’: 
money and the imperatives of capital. Our complicity or desire for the 
commodity values instigated within this restrictive system exist due to its 
‘exorcising’ and negation of the process of ‘real labor’. In other words, we 
partake in a reified, restrictive realm of value, precisely because the 
commodity value within our system of exchange appears inherent to itself, 
hiding its real determination through the process of labour. Baudrillard 
equates this socio-economic phenomenon to that of the psychosexual 
fetish – again, desire is constituted ‘around a mark’ that simultaneously 
puts a system of exchange into play, whilst it ‘negates […] and exorcises 
the difference of the sexes’. Whereas the fetish object bears the mark of 
the phallus that puts a system of sexual exchange into place, the 
commodity bears the mark of money / capital that puts a system of 
economic exchange into motion – both objects therefore rely on a system 
of exchange put into play by privileged signifiers. The act of negation in 
both systems is crucial, for without it desire and labour  – the principle 
agencies of these systems - escape the regulatory function that these 
systems of exchange perform. Behind the system of exchange established 
by the Phallic order, is the realm of unregulated so-called ‘polymorphously 
perverse’ desire;21 behind the system of exchange established by capital / 
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money is, as we shall see, prodigal expenditure – labour which, if it was 
not always already a commodity itself, would be unregulated without the 
totalizing restrictions of accumulation and utility which relations under 
capitalism require. The abstract coherence of value, instigated by the 
Phallus and money as privileged signifiers therefore acts as an operation 
of power, hiding all that contradicts it beneath its mechanisms of 
exchange. As Baudrillard points out, this ‘coherence is found in the erotic 
system as well as […] the system of exchange value […permitting] signs 
to function ideologically, that is, to establish and perpetuate real 
discriminations and the order of power’ (Ibid p.101).  
 
In Symbolic Exchange and Death (1976), Baudrillard elaborates 
this shared notion of general equivalence between socioeconomic and 
psychosexual economies. According to Baudrillard, the ‘body and 
sexuality can be analysed in terms of everything that preceded it’ 
(Baudrillard 1993, p.115) – in this case, the political and economic 
categories of use-value and exchange-value are the determining factors. 
In the same way that there is a separation between use value and 
exchange value in political economy, for Baudrillard there is a separation 
between ‘sexual needs’ and the play involved in sexual exchange. 
 
[S]exuality is reduced […] to use-value (the satisfaction of 'sexual 
needs') and exchange-value (the play and calculation of the erotic 
signs governed by the circulation of models). [S]exuality [also] 
becomes separated as a function: from the collective function of the 
reproduction of the species, it passes to the individual functions of 
physiological equilibrium (part of a general hygiene), mental 
equilibrium, 'self-expression' or the expression of subjectivity, 
unconscious emanations, the ethics of sexual pleasure (what 
else?). In any case, sexuality becomes an element of the economy 
of the subject, an objective finality of the subject itself obedient to 
an order of finalities [.] (ibid, p.115) 
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Sexuality then is separated in terms of a functional reproduction and an 
exchange governed by a code of erotic play. In turn, this code is 
determined by the Phallus as privileged signifier which acts as a general 
equivalence which not only distinguishes the biological sexes but also 
reduces erogenous possibilities to the play of presence and lack inherent 
to its economic circuit; Baudrillard states: 
 
The Male/Female structure becomes confused with the privilege 
granted to the genital function (whether reproductive or erotic). The 
privilege of genitality over all the body's erogenous virtualities 
reverberates in the structure of a male dominated social order, for 
structure hinges on biological difference. This is not merely in order 
to maintain a genuine difference, but, on the contrary, to establish a 
general equivalence, the Phallus becoming the absolute signifier 
around which all erogenous possibilities come to be measured, 
arranged, abstracted, and become equivalent. (ibid, p.116) 
 
By reducing the possibilities of erotic play to a realm of either functional 
use value or restricted exchange, Baudrillard perceives sexuality as 
mirroring the laws of value and general equivalence within political 
economy. In each case, the coherence and equivalence of value is 
determined by a privileged signifier that organizes its economic circuit. 
 
The emergence of the phallus as the general equivalent of 
sexuality, combined with the emergence of sexuality itself as the 
general equivalent of the virtualities of symbolic exchange, 
delineates the emergence of a political economy of the body [and 
sexuality], a sign of their integration with the law of value and 
general equivalence […] From both angles the promotion 
of sexuality as function or the promotion of sexuality as structural 
discourse the subject turns out to be back with the fundamental 
norm of political economy: it thinks itself and locates itself sexually 
in terms of equilibrium (an equilibrium of functions under the sign of 
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the identity of the ego) and coherence (the structural coherence of 
a discourse under the sign of the infinite reproduction of the code). 
(ibid)  
 
 Our exploration so far has identified that restrictive economies of 
production and reproduction have defined the fetish as that which is both 
in excess of, and Other to, an endorsed legitimate notion of value. These 
values have the effect of reproducing an economy of the same in which 
value is always determined via a singular term: the phallus and money. 
These singular terms have been found to justify their legitimacy by 
endorsing a notion of original presence which creates the illusion that such 
economies are natural and eternal entities from which a notion of 
Otherness and deviation can be defined – the notion of primitive 
accumulation and the Oedipus Complex generates a mythical original 
stage upon which the relations created by privileged signifiers, with their 
accompanying investments and corresponding values, are inaugurated 
and reproduced. As Chanter points out: 
 
Whether the value to be tapped is reproductive capacity, labour 
resources, a market for consumer products, raw materials, energy 
sources, or land for cultivation, the logic of appropriation consigns 
to prehistory that which is discarded, and designates it as an 
inassimilable other. Women are rendered unthinkable by patriarchy 
except as reproductive vessels or maternal caretakers, while the 
humanity of workers cannot be registered within the logic of 
capitalism, which acknowledges them only as labor power or 
consumer power […] At the same time there is a usurpation, 
exploitation, and appropriation of precisely that which is only 
admitted insofar as it is capable of conforming to such logics. 
(Chanter 2008, p. 3-4) 
 
As we have found, if we examine the point at which privileged signifiers 
are constituted, we find that in both cases, they rely upon a notion of 
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surplus in which to obtain value. In the previous section, we described how 
desire is generated through the production of sexual drives which are 
themselves directed towards arbitrary objects once the function of 
instinctual need as been removed – in Freud’s example, the case of 
breast-feeding and nourishment is used. It is upon the basis of a surplus 
that these drives will then choose their objects within Oedipal relations. 
Likewise, in the case of commodity exchange, objects can only obtain 
value once society has produced a surplus beyond need and can 
therefore enter a mode of production where exchange predominates – 
economic relations can then choose an arbitrary object to act as an arbiter 
and equivalent of value.   
We have identified how a notion of Otherness within the concept of 
fetishism has acted as a means of excluding that which is considered 
surplus to a sanctioned economy of value. In the case of psychosexual 
economies, it has been demonstrated how a deployment of alliance and 
sexuality have mutually informed each other within a discourse of sex in 
which to vindicate a functional erotics aimed at reproduction; those erotic 
acts that diverge from this function are classified and denigrated as a 
pathological and deviant activity – in Foucault’s study, both hysteria and 
perversion, of which fetishism is the archetype, are considered as these 
types of activity. In the case of socio-economics, it is precisely the problem 
of value that occurs at the point of surplus that allows commodities to 
appear as being arbitrarily invested with value at the point of exchange – 
in this case, excess is understood as surplus production beyond need that 
allows objects to be produced for the function of exchange. As Baudrillard 
points out, it is surplus exchange orientated around a privileged signifier 
that allows all objects and human activity to become assimilated to a code 
that negates all expenditure that would stand outside its restricted logic of 
exchange, accumulation and production. As we have seen, for Baudrillard, 
both socioeconomic and psychosexual economies follow this same logic in 
which all relations are reduced to a general equivalence of value where 
utility and exchange are circumscribed within its codes – as we will see 
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later, Baudrillard goes on to subvert notions of production, accumulation 
and utility via notions of symbolic exchange and seduction.  
In the relationship between the constitution of privileged signifiers 
and the consequent exclusions of all that is in excess to their economies, 
we can recognize an ironic move in which the surplus upon which 
exchange is based becomes filtered, categorized and reproduced within a 
relation that claims that any subsequent surplus should be understood as 
emanating from its own restrictive economy, and that any surplus that 
does not serve the function of its own reproduction (‘perverse’ pleasures 
and expenditure without accumulation) is to be recognized as a deviation 
from its origin within such a relation. As such, the surplus that inevitably 
occurs as a result of all forms of activity and production, becomes 
alienated within restrictive economies that claim legitimacy for certain 
modes of production and exchange via the arbitrary and artificial 
endorsement of value which both excludes relations as much as 
sanctioning them. This has profound consequences for our notion of the 
fetish.  
The fetish has been described as an artificial investment in an 
object that subsequently appears to have inherent value in itself; it has 
been perceived as a disavowal of, and substitute for, real underlying 
relations of exchange between subjects. If the fetish is an artificial 
investment, a construction predicated upon a surplus, and we can no 
longer substantiate a notion of a self-present origin of value from which the 
fetish deviates, we can perhaps start to perceive the fetish as the 
archetype of value, rather than its substitute. Given that the fetish has 
always been considered an artificial production predicated on a surplus 
excess, we can consider the possibility that the usual prescription for the 
fetish should be reversed, rather than being seen as derivative of relations 
governed by a privileged signifier, this signifier can itself be perceived as 
but one more example of a fetish – this will become more apparent when 
we examine the concept of the objet petit a within the work of Žižek. The 
surplus that allows the fetish to be produced is the same that allows the 
privileged signifiers and their corresponding economies to take hold. In 
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fact, the notion of disavowal attributed to the fetish can be perceived as 
the means by which privileged signifiers retain both their legitimacy and 
agency – it is the means by which the production process is assimilated 
into an economy of the same.22  
 If an origin of presence is denied privileged signifiers within 
both socio-economic and psychosexual economies, and the fetish can 
therefore no longer be seen as a deviation from such an origin, then the 
notion of the fetish needs to be constituted upon a new premise. Given 
that both the privileged signifier and the fetish are the effect of an 
underlying surplus production that has no foundation beyond a given set of 
immanent productive relations, we can consider the possibility that both 
the fetish and the privileged signifier are the result of an excess within 
such a relationship. Because there can be no universal origins that 
generate the outcomes of these productive relations, the outcome cannot 
be understood in terms of an economy of the same in which value is 
understood through a restricted notion of identity and non-identity. Objects 
invested with value outside a restricted economy – which we will 
understand as fetishes given a revised notion of the term - will instead be 
understood through a different criteria: difference.  
To understand how a notion of the fetish and value can be 
constructively constituted upon difference rather than identity within an 
economy of the same requires an examination of the notion of death. As 
we shall see, this concept is found to provide a shared notion of Otherness 
for both socioeconomic and psychosexual realms and provides the origin 
and foundation to legitimate their corresponding values. By reconfiguring a 
notion of death that is not perceived in opposition to life, from which it must 
therefore be radically excluded, death can be recognized as a positive 
attribute within the cycle of the life process, allowing new relations, 
creations and values to be formed. A notion of surplus and exchange 
beyond a restricted economy can be understood through George Bataille’s 
notion of a general economy – here death provides the means to 
understand activity, desire and exchange outside the restrictive realms of 
utility, accumulation and reproduction. In a later chapter, death as a 
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process of eternal rebirth and renewal within the work of Gilles Deleuze 
will provide a notion of difference as a means for understanding and 
generating productive relations – here, knowledge based upon the 
immanent play of difference is asserted in opposition to knowledge based 
upon an underlying notion of identity and presence. In each case, a notion 
of death which is no longer radically excluded from life, will allow us to 
acknowledge fetishism as a productive and generative act, freed from its 



























Part Three: Fetishism, Death and the General Economy. 
  
In this section, the notion of death will be explored – it will be found 
that it is the exclusion of this concept as an integral part of life that ties the 
socio-economic and psychosexual realms together as homogeneous 
economies, whilst barring that which is in excess to their utilitarian and 
reproductive roles. An exploration of the Freudian and Lacanian notion of 
the death drive allows us to recognize that it is premised on a metaphysics 
of presence orientated around a homogeneous economy of the same. 
Whereas the Lacanian concept of the objet petit a describes the eternal, 
repetitious and ultimately futile search for the lost object of desire, its 
position as a substitute for this object allows us to consider the possibility 
that all objects of desire, including the phallus, are but fetishes that serve 
the function of constituting value. This conception reverses the usual 
psychoanalytic interpretation of the fetish in which the phallus exists as 
presence first (if only in phantom form), followed by a substitution. Such a 
consideration points to a notion of the fetish as an immanent object of 
desire artificially produced rather than being anchored to an original causal 
relationship in which an object is lost. To perceive such a notion of the 
fetish outside an economy of the same requires a revaluation of the notion 
of death without recourse to an illusionary moment without tension prior to 
our entry into the Symbolic Order.  
By examining the work of Jean Baudrillard, the notion of the 
psychosexual death drive is found to exclude the notion of death as an 
integral part of life – it is therefore found to remain as a radical Other. 
Likewise, the exclusion of death is found to provide the alibi for the 
mechanism of accumulation and exchange within a restrictive capitalist 
political economy. An exploration of the writings of Georges Bataille is 
found to provide a means by which the cycle of communication between 
life and death can be reinstated. By reconfiguring a notion of death that is 
not perceived in opposition to life, death can be recognized as a positive 
attribute within the cycle of the life process, allowing new relations, 
creations and values to be formed. Such an interpretation will provide a 
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means for understanding the fetish as an untransposable object of desire, 
constituted through difference rather than through presence, identity and 
origins.   
   
Death-drive and the fetish. 
 
Before we can consider an immanent notion of the fetish that is no 
longer constituted upon myths of origin, presence and Otherness, we must 
consider how restricted economies with reified values are reproduced. As 
we have seen, in psychosexual relations, the production and exchange 
involved in desire is reproduced via the mediation of the phallus. To 
understand this process we need to consider the role of repetition within 
the death drive – a process in which desire is anchored to phallic presence 
and a corresponding lack. Later, we will consider the relationship between 
the reproduction and repetition of value in psychosexual economies and 
that within political economy. 
Our earlier examination of Freud’s essay Fetish (1927), described 
the way in which the fetish functioned as a means to disavow the 
perceived castrated state of women via the ordination of a substitute for 
the maternal phallus. According to this view, the fetish allows us to have it 
both ways – to acknowledge woman as castrated whilst disavowing this 
condition through the use of the fetish object. As such, the ‘horror of 
castration has set up a memorial to itself in the creation of this substitute’ 
(Freud 1927, p.154). In Cultures of Fetishism (2006), Louise Kaplan has 
identified how such funereal imagery draws our attention to the underlying 
theme of death within the essay. As Kaplan states: ‘Freud’s likening of 
fetishism to death sounds the note of destruction that will be echoed in his 
concluding remarks on the mutilations of women’s bodies’ (Kaplan 2006, 
p.27-8). The fetish understood as a funereal memorial to castration allows 
Freud to explain destructive fetishistic acts, such as the cutting of female 
hair and the practice of Chinese foot-binding.23 Kaplan’s argues that 
Freud’s denigration of the female sexual organs as castrated perhaps 
suggests more about his own unconscious attitude towards femininity and 
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less about the validity of his claims. According to Kaplan, whenever man is 
subjugated and made to feel vulnerable by the conditions inflicted upon 
him in society, he recognizes this position as corresponding to the 
condition of femininity within patriarchy. Given this recognition, a ‘popular 
response to these social humiliations is the desire to silence the sexuality 
of females’ (ibid, p.31).  As Kaplan states: 
 
The fears of the female body, and the mutilations that men 
sometimes inflict on women’s bodies to counteract these fears, are 
not figments of Freud’s imagination. Many men do fear the female 
body and they do sometimes participate in the mutilation of 
women’s bodies to alleviate this fear […Freud’s] unrelenting attack 
on the so-called castrated female genitals, reveal some of his own 
aggression toward the female body. (ibid, p.16) 
 
To substantiate the vulnerable physical and mental state of Freud during 
the time he wrote his essay, Kaplan draws our attention to the painful and 
humiliating operations he suffered whilst being subject to mouth cancer: 
 
[T]he mutilating surgeries performed on his mouth had stimulated 
an unconscious feminine identification that was intolerable to a 
proud man like Sigmund Freud. These feminine identifications, 
which are unconscious aspects of every man’s masculine identity, 
are frightening to most men, often inducing a defensive misogynist 
coloration to their erotic life, imbuing it with a degree of destructive 
aggression toward the female body. (ibid, p.18) 
 
The death of his beloved grandson Heinz, the son of his deceased 
daughter Sophie, further accentuated thoughts of his own mortality and 
the suffering caused by mouth cancer during the writing of this essay. 
Kaplan also draws our attention to Freud’s concern with death several 
years earlier in his elucidation of the death instinct in Beyond the Pleasure 
Principle (1920).  
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 In addition to an unconscious association of death with the feminine 
in the essay, Kaplan challenges the view that fetishism is symptomatic of 
castration anxiety by identifying the ambiguities within the case studies 
used to support the claim. Kaplan makes reference to the man that used 
an athletic support-belt as a fetish to aid arousal; the ambiguous 
significance of this fetish is thus described: 
 
[Freud does not] help us decide who is wearing the fetish […] 
According to Freud, the transformation of this ordinary supporter 
into a fetish was inspired by a fig leaf seen on a statue when the 
fetishist was a little boy. But this solution just leads to another 
conundrum. Although we might presume that a fig leaf on a statue 
is intended to cover up the male genitals, this is not necessarily the 
case. On some statue, the fig leaf masks the reality of female 
genitals. Thus the fig leaf solution, though clarifying with regard to 
the accidental circumstances that lead to the choice of the fetish, 
only deepens the ambiguity with regard to which sex is having his 
or her genitals covered up. (ibid, p.28) 
 
As such, the sex of the wearer of the athletic support-belt and the sex of 
the statue remain ambiguous. Kaplan relates this ambiguity with to a 
common trait associated with fetishists: 
 
Most fetish objects are adopted to allow a man to express his 
shameful and dangerous wishes to be female and yet remain male. 
In many typical fetishistic fantasies, where the male or his sexual 
partner is wearing a fetishized female garment, the fetishist 
unconsciously (or consciously) imagines he is a woman, but a 
woman with a penis. But what about a man who is wearing a male 
garment? Is he then a male impersonator? As Freud would point 
out in later years, the repudiation of femininity – a man’s struggle 
against his feminine attitude towards another male – is the bedrock 
of male psychology. (ibid, 28-9) 
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Kaplan uses the term ‘Venus envy’ to describe this hidden desire to be 
feminine. According to Kaplan, this desire demonstrates the actual 
significance of the female genitals that are disavowed: 
 
The female genitals are the emblem of that unwelcome news that 
Mother and Father share a desire that excludes the little child. The 
Mother does have some genitals of significance and the father does 
desire her for having them, The little boy, of course, is competitive 
with his mother for his father’s love. He wishes to be in her 
submissive position with the dominating father. He envies her the 
power she has over his beloved and mighty father and would just 
as soon imagine her genitals as insignificant and puny – castrated, 
if necessary, and definitely inferior to his own. (ibid, p.29-30) 
 
Freud’s theory that anxiety towards a woman is caused by a perceived 
lack rather than envy is therefore put in doubt. For Kaplan, there is an 
irony in Freud’s essay – his description of the process of disavowal in 
fetishism is itself subject to this process. Freud’s denigration of the female 
to a position of lack is  ‘tantamount to a disavowal of the enormous and 
terrifying and humiliating significance of the actual female genitals’ (ibid, 
p.29). Kaplan speculates that Freud’s vulnerability, fragility and 
submissiveness with regard to the surgical procedures endured whilst 
producing the essay may have caused him to disavow his own association 
with the feminine position. As such, it is not unreasonable to assume that 
Freud’s notion of fetishism may have been infected by ‘a defensive 
misogynist coloration […imbued] with a destructive aggression toward the 
female body’ (ibid, p.18).  Such destructive aggression therefore orientates 
around the idea of woman as submissive and lacking – to acknowledge or 
be associated with this position is to realize the possibility of one’s own 
castration. This funereal image of castration – in which the phallic woman 
is recognized as lacking and the unity of mother and child is broken – 
occurs as a memorial in the fetish; as we shall see, it also appears on a 
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more fundamental level in psychoanalysis in the form of the death drive. 
By understanding the death drive as an unconscious and repetitious wish 
to return to a state without tension, prior to the anxiety caused via 
separation from the mother, we find yet another appeal to an origin that 
positions desire under the authority of the singular economy of the phallus. 
Here, desire is the desire to be the phallus – the lost object of desire one 
lacks.  
The death drive is the concept in which the core psychoanalytic 
themes of drive, repetition and desire are encapsulated. In the work of 
Freud, the death drive illustrates the process whereby an individual 
repeats both pleasurable experiences and traumas in an attempt to reduce 
bodily tension to a minimum level of tension. For Freud, the existence of 
such a tendency means that ‘instincts are conservative […] and tend 
towards the restoration of an earlier state of things’ (Freud 1920, p. 245); 
as such, the ‘aim of all life is death’ (ibid, 246). Freud illustrates the 
repetition involved with reference to the fort – da game. Freud interprets 
an account of a child repeatedly throwing a cotton reel from its cot as 
evidence of the death instinct. Within this account, the child is interpreted 
as saying ‘fort’ (German for ‘gone’) and ‘da’ (German for there) each time 
the cotton reel is thrown or returned (ibid, p.224-5). The oscillating cotton 
reel is described as a substitute for the mother, allowing the child to 
reduce the tension experienced through the trauma of separation. Whilst 
retaining the importance of repetition, Lacan reinterprets the fort da game, 
emphasising the linguistic element of the activity and its significance for 
the split between the symbolic subject and the Real.24 The repetition 
involved in the fort-da game is therefore no longer a demand for the return 
of the physical mother, it is rather a repetition inaugurated by our entry into 
the realm of the signifier; here we are compelled to repeat an insatiable 
demand for that from which we are eternally alienated: the Real as that 
realm outside the symbolic order. As such, for Lacan the death drive is to 
be understood as a repetition of the desire to return to an imagined state 
before the acquisition of language and our subsequent alienation from the 
world; as Lacan puts it, if ‘we want to get at what was before […] speech in 
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the subject and what is prior to the birth of symbols, we find it in death[.]’ 
(Lacan 2006, p.263) Through a repetition governed by the edicts of the 
symbolic order, the subject seeks a return to an earlier state prior to its 
inauguration in language – evident in the subject’s continuous search for 
the elusive lost object of desire symbolised by the Phallus.  
This conception of the death drive has consequences for a notion of 
desire. If we are radically alienated from a lost object of desire, then all 
subsequent desire must be based upon that which is surplus to this object. 
For both Freud and Lacan, human desire can only exist beyond the realm 
of biological need – it is beyond this realm that desire and sexuality 
become subject to cultural factors, social demands and language. A realm 
beyond biological need can, in turn, only exist if there is a surplus that can 
be subject to such social determinations. To understand desire as a 
process that exists beyond the realm of biological need, let us again clarify 
the status of sexual drives within psychoanalysis.  
As we saw earlier, Freud differentiates between sexual drives and 
biological instincts. The original satisfaction found in a biological function 
becomes a drive to repeat through the replacement of another object at 
the same erotogenic zone. This need to repeat through such a 
replacement is constituted through the absence of the object associated 
with the given biological need. This autoerotic repetition therefore 
inaugurates the autonomy of the sexual drive and can be defined by their 
departure from their original biological goal. As Elizabeth Grosz succinctly 
puts it, ‘drives […] are a deviation of the (natural) instinct’ (Grosz 1990, 
p.55). In contrast to biological instincts that thrive on the presence of their 
object (milk, food), drives are perceived as thriving on absence and lack: 
 
The emergence of erotic and libidinal relations from self-
preservative instincts is a function of lack or absence, the lack or 
absence of a given or predetermined object. Such a lack would be 
intolerable and constitute a life-endangering denial in the case of an 
instinct proper; yet it is the precondition of the drive (ibid, p.55-6).  
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The sexual drive is therefore determined less by the satisfaction of some 
biological need or instinct (in the above example, the gaining of milk as 
nourishment) and more by the displacement of the object of these 
biological processes (the pleasure gained through sucking directed 
towards an object other than milk / nourishment). Because sexual drives 
are established through lack, any object can become the object of desire - 
though no object will ever satisfy the drive because an object of desire is 
always the presence of a void produced through this fundamental 
absence.25 
As we have described, the condition in which an object of desire is 
always a substitute for the lack of the real, is given a formulaic expression 
by Lacan – referred to as the objet petit a. Because the objet petit a 
always remains an object substitute for an irredeemable loss, it should be 
understood as the object-cause of desire – an object substitute will always 
remain a failed attempt to fill the void which is the object of our sexual 
drives. In Lacanian psychoanalysis, no object is ever enough to satisfy our 
sexual drives because they cannot fill the void created by a condition of 
lack. The fact that the object of desire is always a substitute for that which 
we lack clearly relates to the repetitions involved within the death drive – 
when Lacan refers to the cotton reel involved within the fort da game, he 
states: ‘To this object we will later give the name it bears in the Lacanian 
algebra – the objet petit a’ (Lacan 1991, p.62). Our insistence to achieve 
enjoyment inaugurated through the opening of a void means that this 
process will be forever repeated. As we have discussed, for Freud 
pleasure is obtained by the repetition of a sensation beyond the confines 
of self maintenance – the example of thumb-sucking to repeat the 
sensation of receiving nutritious breast milk is given (Freud 1905, p.322); 
for Lacan, this fracture between sensations experienced for self 
maintenance and the pleasure obtained through external repetition is 
explained in terms of the difference between need and demand26. Through 
the repetition of a sensation via external stimuli, both of these views 
consider objects of desire to be firstly, a surplus produced beyond the 
remit of instinctual need (no nourishment or self maintenance is required 
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within such a repetition) and secondly, an effect of lack in that the original 
source of pleasure (the mother’s breast for example) is no longer available 
and therefore a replacement object is found: Lacan’s objet petit a.  
Given the psychoanalytic notion of the death drive – in both its 
Freudian and Lacanian forms – we can recognise a clear metaphysics of 
presence evident within its movements. The drive towards that which is 
beyond the symbolic order is instigated by a desire born of a radical 
separation from the Real inaugurated by our entry into the realm of the 
signifier; such an entry is subject to the dictates of the phallus – that 
signifier which represents the lack at the heart of desire, which, in turn, 
determines our gendered subjectivity. The death drive then, requires a 
repetition within the economy of desire that is always striving towards a 
realm beyond the symbolic; paradoxically, such an aim is always 
instigated by the realm of the signifier: the Super-Ego. As the path towards 
jouissance is only to be found via the symbolic order, the subject can only 
move towards it, without reaching it, in a metonymic movement from one 
signifier to the next.27 The sexual economy we have described is therefore 
subject to repetitions fuelled by the currency of the phallic signifier. The 
repetitions of the death drive are therefore subject to the same 
metaphysics of presence, with its appeal to some origin at its foundation 
from which we are separated. As such, the death drive is tied to a notion 
of the repetition of the same in which the possibility of difference is 
excluded. Although the death drive posits desire as being anchored to an 
economy of the same, it does allow us to revise a notion of the fetish that 
has been traditionally understood as a deviation from a legitimate desire 
determined by phallic presence. 
If the objet petit a is a substitute for the lost object of desire for 
which we are in a repetitious and eternal search for, then we have to 
consider the possibility that all objects of desire, including the phallus, are 
but fetishes that serve the futile function of attempting to fill the lack at the 
heart of desire. This notion reverses the usual psychoanalytic 
interpretation of the fetish in which the phallus exists as presence first (if 
only in phantom form), followed by a substitution. Here, all objects of 
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desire are substitutions for that which is forever lost. This connection 
between lack, the objet petit a and the fetish is recognized within the 
writings of Žižek. Žižek uses the concept of the objet petit a as a 
theoretical model to explain our fetishistic desires within culture28, Žižek 
highlights the fact that desire is of itself fetishistic, that what we desire has 
no original object.29 For Žižek, our substitution of an object for the lost 
object-cause of desire – the objet petit a – means that there is always 
some impossible, elusive Thing that we desire beyond the object; it is this 
elusive Thing that gives desire its insatiable character and always leaves 
that which we desire beyond the Symbolic, within the realm of the Real. 
For Žižek then, all objects of desire are in themselves fetishistic; he points 
out that the difference between normal sexual desire and sexual fetishism 
is that one deludes itself that the object is an obstacle for gaining 
satisfaction, whilst the other recognises this object as the cause of desire 
and embraces it as such. As Žižek states in The Fragile Absolute (2000): 
 
This is the difference between ‘normal’ sexual repression and 
fetishism: in normal sexuality; we think that the detail-feature that 
serves as the cause of desire is just a secondary obstacle that 
prevents our direct access to the Thing – that is, we overlook its key 
role; while in fetishism we simply make the cause of desire directly 
into our object of desire [.] (Žižek 2001, p.20-1) 
 
For Žižek, all objects of desire are fetishes in that each is an arbitrary 
substitute for that which is lacking - one should be reminded that Lacan 
himself considered the desire for the phallus to be fetishistic; in his 
discussion of the phallus in relation to female sexuality, Lacan states: 
 
[Woman] finds the signifier of her own desire in the body of the 
person to whom her demand for love is addressed. It should not be 
forgotten […] that the organ that is endowed with this signifying 
function takes on the value of a fetish thereby. (Lacan 2006, p. 583) 
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If sexual drives differ from biological need in terms of an assumed 
deviation from function towards a surplus pleasure, we can interpret such 
activity as an act of artifice – a creative movement in which the outcome 
can have no prior predisposition for the subject. As we have described, 
according to psychoanalysis, sexual drives move us from the realm of 
need to that of lack. Yet there appears to be no reason to assume that the 
creative movement we are describing should fundamentally involve an 
initial departure from biological function – this becomes important in our 
later consideration of desiring-machines in the work of Deleuze and 
Guattari. The question has to be asked, why cannot an erotic object be 
produced via the play of the body within the material world without 
recourse to some previously prescribed biological function? It would seem 
to be the case that the theory of sexual drives, and its corresponding 
notion of the death drive, are yet another example of the tendency to 
equate normative sexual practice with heterosexual notions of 
reproduction and utility – as we have described, according to these 
theories, though erotic pleasure may be an excess it must always have 
biological necessity and utility at its origin. This repetition of the same 
within the death drive will be later subject to criticism in a discussion of 
difference and repetition within the work of Gilles Deleuze. If the object-
cause of desire – the objet petit a – allows us to interpret all objects of 
desire as fetishes once we recognize them as substitutes for that which 
has been lost, we then need to consider their status as fetishes once we 
negate the causal notion of lack from the equation. Such a consideration 
points to a notion of the fetish as an immanent object of desire artificially 
produced rather than being anchored to an original causal relationship in 
which an object is lost. To perceive such a notion of the fetish outside this 
causal relationship requires a revaluation of the notion of death. To 
understand how desire operates outside this economy of the same, we will 
now refer to the writings of Jean Baudrillard and Georges Bataille. 
Baudrillard criticizes the death drive as yet one more example of a 
tendency to homogenize economies via exclusions. Baudrillard also 
connects the notion of death within this drive to that which is excluded 
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within political economy. Bataille’s notion of eroticism and the general 
economy allows us to perceive a conception of death as an integral part of 
the life cycle. By understanding death and life as cyclical rather than 
viewing death as an origin to which we incessantly wish to return, the 
possibility of perceiving the fetish as an untransposable object of desire 
becomes viable.  Within such a cyclical relationship, repetition offers the 
potential of a circuit of desire that can be reproduced and repeated without 
an appeal to some origin of presence. 
 
Death and Symbolic Exchange 
 
For Baudrillard, the convergence of psychosexual and 
socioeconomic restricted economies around privileged signifiers, is 
founded upon a fundamental binary opposition which puts all other 
restricted economies of value into play - this binary is the opposition 
between life and death, in which life is posited as positive value and death 
is that which must be excluded. According to Baudrillard, the series of 
exclusions and inclusions that constitute western thought can be 
understood by examining our relation to death. As Baudrillard states: 
 
At the very core of the 'rationality' of our culture, however, is an 
exclusion that precedes every other, more radical than the 
exclusion of madmen, children or inferior races, an exclusion 
preceding all these and serving as their model: the exclusion of the 
dead and of death. (Baudrillard 1993, p.126) 
 
Whereas death is clearly an integral part of our biological condition, 
Baudrillard argues that the way death is managed symbolically in culture is 
subject to cultural determinations. Baudrillard proposes that a historical 
trend exists in which the dead are increasingly excluded from symbolic 
circulation. In earlier societies, the dead have a role to play within cultural 
symbolic exchange; as Kellner points out: 
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In these societies, symbolic exchange between life and death 
continuously took place, with gifts and ceremonies honoring the 
dead and favors or hostilities being visited on the living by the dead. 
In such societies, there need be no fear of death or obsession with 
death, for it is an integral part of everyday life. (Kellner 1989, p.103) 
 
In contrast to this, there is an increasing move towards the exclusion of 
the dead as society evolves. As Baudrillard states,  
 
[t]here is an irreversible evolution from savage societies to our own: 
little by little, the dead cease to exist. They are thrown out of the 
group’s symbolic circulation. They are no longer beings with a full 
role to play, worthy partners in exchange, and we make this 
obvious by exiling them further and further away from the group of 
the living. (Baudrillard Op Cit) 
 
Baudrillard describes the cemetery as the first ghettoes, prior to any 
exclusion based upon race, ethnicity or religion. In modernity, death is 
perceived as the ultimate deviancy, against which the normal functioning 
human can be defined.  
 
In the domestic intimacy of the cemetery, the [dead remain] in the 
heart of the village or town, becoming the first ghetto, prefiguring 
every future ghetto, but are thrown further and further from the 
centre towards the periphery, finally having nowhere to go at all, as 
in the new town or the contemporary metropolis, where there are no 
longer any provisions for the dead, either in mental or in physical 
space […] Strictly speaking, we no longer know what to do with 
them, since, today, it is not normal to be dead, and this is new. To 
be dead is an unthinkable anomaly; nothing else is as offensive as 
this. Death is a delinquency, and an incurable deviancy. (ibid) 
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For Baudrillard then, death is to be radically excluded in which to 
legitimize the value of life – its very exclusion both valorizes life and 
provides an alibi for its legitimation. According to Baudrillard, the very 
notion of survival is itself tied to the exclusion of death which, in turn, 
legitimates an intensified valorization of life - in survival, ‘death is 
repressed; life itself, in accordance with that well known ebbing away, 
would be nothing more than a survival determined by death’ (ibid, p.127). 
Baudrillard perceives a correspondence between death as a value, as a 
radical Other, political economy and the psychosexual. As we saw earlier, 
Foucault identified notions of scarcity that, in turn, were associated with 
the idea of human finitude, as a determining factor in modern political 
economy. Baudrillard goes further than Foucault in identifying death as the 
common determinant in the inclusions and exclusions associated within 
both psychosexual and socio-economic discourses. Baudrillard perceives 
death as the blindspot of political economy, the ‘absence haunting all its 
calculations, [where the] absence of death alone permits the exchange of 
values and the play of equivalences’ (ibid, p.154). The mechanism of 
accumulation and exchange within a capitalist political economy is 
therefore perceived as a means to guarantee survival, deflect scarcity and 
ward off death. Baudrillard contemplates the possibility that a prodigal 
waste and expenditure within the system would upset the circuit of 
accumulation and exchange to the point that it could no longer function – 
an ‘infinitesimal injection of death would immediately create such excess 
and ambivalence that the play of value would completely collapse’ (ibid). 
Baudrillard ties this notion of equilibrium and equivalence to the 
psychoanalytic concept of the death-instinct. Baudrillard criticizes the 
Freudian concept of the death-instinct in its endorsement of death as an 
absolute finality in opposition to life – an absolute horizon to which we are 
repeatedly drawn. As such,  
 
the psychoanalytic vision of death remains an insufficient vision: the 
pulsions are constrained by repetition, its perspective bears on a 
final equilibrium […] eliminating differences and intensities following 
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an involution towards the lowest point […] (ibid, p.154). 
 
The death-instinct therefore conjures a notion that is radically in opposition 
to life, rather than being perceived as complementary, in which ‘death is 
not at all a breakdown of life […] it is willed by life itself’ (ibid, p.155).  
Whereas political economy attempts to ward off death as its radical Other 
via accumulation and exchange, the death-instinct within the psychosexual 
economy does the opposite – rather than shy away from death, it is 
declared as the ‘insurmountable finality’ (ibid, p.154). According to 
Baudrillard, Freud’s mistake was not recognizing death as integral to life 
as a process of becoming, an excess in which static states are dispersed; 
he points out that ‘Freud missed […] seeing the curvature of life in death, 
he missed its vertigo and its excess [...]’ (ibid, p.156). Baudrillard argues 
that this deficit in Freud’s account placed ‘life’s final economy under the 
sign of repetition and missed its paroxysm’ (ibid). Perceiving a repetition of 
the same in which to resolve and reduce tension is symptomatic of seeing 
death as a radical Other, rather than complementary to the life process; 
the Freudian death-instinct therefore fails to perceive the excess of 
becoming which dissolution can entail.  Though there is an opposite 
movement between socioeconomic and psychosexual economies in 
relation to death, both are tied to a division that strictly excludes one term 
from the other. As such, though the ‘death drive is the current system’s 
most radical negative […] it simply holds up a mirror to the funereal 
imaginary of political economy’ (ibid, p.154).  
 
 Baudrillard’s concern for symbolic exchange and death becomes 
important for a discussion of restricted and general economies, as well as 
a consideration of the death instinct in relation to difference. Baudrillard 
appeals to the work of Georges Bataille in which to illustrate a relationship 
to death which is not a ‘regulator of tensions and an equilibrium function’ 
(ibid, p. 154) – a condition that Baudrillard believes to exist within 
economies that are based upon privileged signifiers that perceive life and 
death in oppositional terms. According to Baudrillard, Bataille offers us a 
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vision of death that negates its regulative function – from this viewpoint, 
death gives us a ‘paroxysm of exchanges, superabundance and excess [in 
which] life only exists in bursts and in exchanges with death’ (ibid p. 154-
5). Instead of death and life confronting each other as antagonistic 
principles, neither ‘has its own specific economy: life and death only fall 
under the sway of a single economy if they are separated; once they are 
mixed, they pass beyond economics altogether, into festivity and loss’ 
(ibid, p.155). Whereas political economic concerns for scarcity and 
accumulation ‘imposes the linear economy of duration’ and the 
psychosexual economy ‘augurs no other issue than the repetitive 
involution of death’ (ibid, p.155), Bataille reinstates the cycle between life 
and death – here there is a ‘vision of death as a principle of excess and an 
anti-economy [in which only] the sumptuous and useless expenditure has 
meaning’ (ibid). From such a perspective, the ‘economy has no meaning, it 
is only a residue that has been made into the law of life, whereas wealth 
lies in the luxurious exchange of death: sacrifice, the ‘accursed share’, 
escaping investment and equivalence’ (ibid, p.156). As Baudrillard points 
out, if life is only a ‘need to survive at any cost, then annihilation is a 
priceless luxury. In a system where life is ruled by value and utility, death 
becomes a useless luxury, and the only alternative’ (ibid). To understand 
the cyclical relationship of life and death and how ideas of surplus and 
excess offer an alternative to restrictive economies which strictly delineate 
that which is to be included and excluded, we must turn to Bataille’s 
notions of eroticism and the general economy. By examining these 
notions, the relationship between surplus, artifice and fetishism, identified 
earlier, will be further elucidated. It will be found that rather than being tied 
to a notion of equivalence, in which each object becomes a substitute for 
the privileged signifier of value in both socioeconomic and psychosexual 
economies, Bataille’s ideas offer us a means to view the fetish as an 
untransposable object of desire and exchange which forges value rather 




Restricted economy versus the general economy 
 
George Bataille identifies a clear relationship between the socio-
economic and psychosexual realms. In many ways this relationship 
mirrors that recognized by Foucault in that a convergence of work and 
sexuality is identified and a link is made with the notion of death. For 
Bataille, death and reproduction are intimately related and come together 
within the sexual act. Bataille points out that the development of life 
requires a separation with a subsequent fusion of differentiation. Finally 
death is needed in which to assure the continuity of the life process. Given 
this situation, death and reproduction both negate and affirm the life 
process. For Bataille, eroticism is the point at which the polarities between 
birth and death meet. According to Bataille, a conscious awareness of 
death and separation produce an anguish in being that does not exist 
within plants and animals. This anguish has the dual effect of making us 
want to return to a state of non-differentiation, where separation and 
otherness do not exist, whilst also making us want to surpass our limits 
and unite with the feared otherness in which to transcend separation. For 
Bataille, the desire for such transcendence exists in our wish to overcome 
death and return to the continuity of the life process via our merging with 
the Other and the consequent reproduction and renewal of life. Our 
consciousness of the relationship between birth and death within sexual 
reproduction gives the act its erotic sense – it is this that defines human 
sexual reproduction from that of the animals. As Bataille points out: 
 
Sexual reproductive activity is common to sexual animals and men, 
but only men appear to have turned their sexual activity into erotic 
activity. Eroticism, unlike simple sexual activity, is a psychological 
quest independent of the natural goal […] From this elementary 
definition […]:  eroticism is assenting to life even in death. (Bataille 
1998, p. 11) 
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On being aware of death, humans attempt to postpone its inevitability. 
Such attempts require the production of clothing, food and shelter, as well 
as developments in science and technology – in a word, the avoidance of 
death requires work. To protect the sanctity and efficiency of work required 
the expulsion of all that generates disorder – for Bataille, such disorder is 
created via the exuberance and violence of the life process. Such an 
expulsion required the idea of a collective crime upon which a collective 
sense of guilt could be founded. As such, taboos were instigated in which 
to structure society and prevent the disruptions to activity which disorder 
could cause. As Bataille states: 
 
The feeling of anguish responsible for the earliest taboos showed 
man’s refusal or withdrawal in face of the blind surge of life. The 
first men, their conscience awoken by work, felt uneasy before the 
dizzy succession of new birth and inevitable death. Looked at as a 
whole, life is the huge movement made up of reproduction and 
death. Life brings forth ceaselessly, but only in order to swallow up 
what she has produced. The first men were confusedly aware of 
this. They denied death and the cycle of reproduction by means of 
taboos. (ibid, p.86) 
 
For Bataille, the necessary imposition of a taboo also requires the 
need to transgress it. As such, society included rituals and periods of 
festivities in which all that was denied by work was brought back into the 
social sphere. Transgression is therefore to be perceived as an integral 
part of the taboo – it did not subvert or stand outside it, rather, it function 
was to ensure its efficacy. As Bataille indicates, the ‘transgression does 
not deny the taboo but transcends it and completes it’ (ibid, p.63). For 
Bataille, whereas transgression is to be found in both ritual and festival 
forms within society, when it comes to the realm of the personal, 
transgression is to be found in eroticism instead. According to Bataille, 
eroticism requires an equal sensitivity to both the taboo and the 
transgressive act: the ‘inner experience of eroticism demands from the 
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subject a sensitiveness to the anguish of taboo no less great than the 
desire which leads him to infringe it’ (ibid, p.38-9). As Michael Richardson 
points out: 
 
In sexual activity the assertion of the life process and its 
concomitant need to build, to accumulate its resources, is 
maintained by reproduction, but the sexual act contains within it at 
the same time a total effusion of pleasure that simultaneously 
denies this utilitarian function. Sexual activity at once affirms and 
denies the principle of work[.] (Richardson 1994, p.103) 
 
Eroticism therefore allows us to transcend our own limits and that of 
society’s taboos via a pleasurable merging of one’s body with that of 
another and a continuation of the life process; as it does this, we are also 
simultaneously reminded of death and our discontinuity of being required 
by the process of differentiated reproduction. Eroticism therefore provides 
an intimate communication with the life process in both its continuous and 
discontinuous forms. 
 Bataille claims that the denial of eroticism is strong in our culture 
and asserts that such a denial occurs as a consequence of our need to 
evade and disavow death. The agency of this denial is found to be the 
same as that which denies the sacred and the heterogeneous – it is to be 
found within Christianity and its corresponding work ethic. As Paul Hegarty 
points out, the ‘sacred and eroticism are part of the same process: they 
are not just pure threats, but are seen as threats because they threaten 
the world of work, i.e. the putative restricted economy’ (Hegarty 2000, 
p.107). Whereas taboo and transgression were previously viewed as 
complementary, Christianity is perceived as judging them as strict 
opposites in which one is inherently good and the other inherently evil. 
Such determinants are governed by the notion of an original sin (the fall) 
for which we are to seek penitence through abstinence and good deeds. 
For Bataille, because penitence is required for Christian guilt, it also 
implies that there can be salvation: a state in which sin no longer exists. 
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Rather than recognizing guilt as an inherent part of our condition at the 
crossroads between taboo and transgression – a position at which there 
can be no redemption - Christianity seeks to strictly adhere to legitimated 
taboos whilst denying transgression in the hope of salvation. Man’s 
position at this crossroad is denied in favour of obedience to a 
transcendental deity whose divinity is a guarantor of the promise of an 
afterworld without anguish, guilt or sin. As Bataille states: 
 
Christianity rejected impurity. It rejected guilt without which 
sacredness is impossible since only the violation of a taboo can 
open the way to it […Christianity] defined the boundaries of the 
sacred world after its own fashion. In this fresh definition impurity, 
uncleanness and guilt were driven outside the pale. Impure 
sacredness was thenceforth the business of the profane world. In 
the sacred world of Christianity nothing was allowed to survive 
which clearly confessed the fundamental nature of sin or 
transgression. (Bataille Op Cit, p.121)  
 
Given Christianity’s denial of transgression and the need to assert 
continuity in the form of an afterlife, sexual activity had to be divided into 
that which had utility in terms of the reproductive act, and that which 
threatened the idea of continuity of being: the fact that its pleasures 
carried the life process beyond the borders of the individual and reminded 
the subject of the possibility of its own death. Bataille indicates that 
Christianity therefore asserted the sexual act as a principle of life whilst 
denying those aspects that equated it with death; sex was therefore 
reduced to its utilitarian function, whilst all that gave sex its eroticism – 
orgies, rituals and individual acts of transgression – was to be repudiated. 
The intimate act of sex was therefore reduced to a thing and completed 
the equation of all things of value in life to the realm of work and utility. As 
we have seen, in this respect Foucault concurs with Bataille in recognizing 
modern sexuality as being divided into the utilitarian function of 
reproduction, whilst perceiving its excesses as being ‘perverse’.30  
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If a Bataillean notion of eroticism provides us with an understanding 
of the intimate communication between life and death, allowing us to 
understand the life process in both its continuous and discontinuous 
forms, a consideration of Bataille’s conception of the general economy will 
allow us to perceive how fetishism can be both a means to transgress and 
constitute given values. 
 
Much can be illuminated in our attempt to understand the 
relationship between restricted economies, eroticism and surplus by 
exploring Bataille’s notion of the general economy. Much of the work of 
Bataille deals with the interrelations between normalized codes of 
production and utility and the realm of excess, surplus and waste. In 
Bataille, this relationship is connected to the ideas of taboo and 
transgression, which contributes towards a further understanding of the 
connection between socioeconomic and psychosexual economies and 
helps illuminate how the fetish operates both within and outside restrictive 
economies. George Bataille clearly recognizes that restrictive economies 
are founded upon, and prioritize, notions of production and utility. As we 
have identified earlier, modern political economy was founded upon the 
principle of scarcity – the assumption that the need to protect scarce 
resources is fundamental to human society. Bataille recognizes that 
notions of scarcity are tied to the idea of production and utility; he states: 
 
On the one hand […] material utility is limited to acquisition (in 
practice, to production) and to the conservation of goods; on the 
other, it is limited to reproduction and to the conservation of human 
life (to which is added, it is true, the struggle against pain, whose 
importance itself suffices to indicate the negative character of the 
pleasure principle instituted, in theory, as the basis of utility). 
(Bataille 1933, p.116-7) 
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For Bataille then, restricted economies are concerned with channeling 
human activity for the means of the production and reproduction of a 
socially endorsed notion of value that designates that which deviates as 
illegitimate, taboo or worthless. As Bataille puts it, within restricted 
economies, ‘any general judgment of social activity implies the principle 
that all individual effort, in order to be valid, must be reducible to the 
fundamental necessities of production and conservation’ (ibid, p.117). 
Bataille criticizes such restrictive economies due to the fact they reduce 
the capacity of humanity to expend surplus energy in prodigal and 
expressive ways.  
 
Pleasure, whether art, permissible debauchery, or play, is 
definitively reduced, in the intellectual representations of in 
circulation, to a concession; in other words it is reduced to a 
diversion whose role is subsidiary. The most appreciable share of 
life is given as the condition – sometimes even as the regrettable 
condition – of productive social activity. (ibid). 
 
George Bataille champions the notion of a general economy that is 
contrasted against the reductive nature of modern restrictive economies 
within western societies. In The Accursed Share (1949), a new conception 
of the economy is forged in which a homogeneous financial system is 
overturned in favour of a heterogeneous economy founded on the need to 
give. Bataille subverts the notion of production and utility by asserting that 
the needs of a prodigal consumption and expenditure are of primary 
importance, rather than a typical concern for the notion of accumulation – 
as Bataille states: 
 
Changing from the perspectives of restrictive economy to those of 
general economy actually accomplishes a Copernican 
transformation: a reversal of thinking […] If a part of wealth […] is 
doomed to destruction or at least to unproductive use without any 
possible profit, it is logical, even inescapable, to surrender 
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commodities without return. Henceforth […] the possibility of 
pursuing growth is itself subordinated to giving [.] (Bataille 1989, p. 
25) 
 
By appealing to anthropological data that addresses societies other 
than capitalist ones, Bataille indicates that though concerns of subsistence 
are necessary, such societies were primarily structured around the notion 
of expenditure.   
For Bataille, humans inherently produce surplus energy that goes 
beyond that needed for mere subsistence – the problem for both the 
individual and society was how to expend this surplus. As Bataille states: 
 
The living organism, in a situation determined by the play of energy 
on the surface of the globe, ordinarily receives more energy than is 
necessary for maintaining life; the excess energy (wealth) can be 
used for the growth of a system […] if the system can no longer 
grow, or if the excess cannot be completely absorbed in its growth, 
it must necessarily be lost without profit, it must be spent, willingly 
or not, gloriously or catastrophically. (ibid, p.21) 
 
 Given such a problematic, Bataille makes a distinction within the 
concept of consumption. On the one hand, there is that which is needed 
for ‘the conservation of life and the continuation of individuals’ productive 
activity in a given society’ (ibid, p.118); on the other hand, there is a 
surplus generated for ‘unproductive expenditure […which] has no end 
beyond themselves’ (ibid) – this is what Bataille refers to as the accursed 
share. Like Marx, Bataille is intent on exposing the fraudulent myth at the 
heart of classical political economy, which perceives that exchange is 
founded upon the need to accumulate – but whereas Marx exposes the 
myth of primitive accumulation, Bataille points out that primitive exchange 
relied not on a process of barter, but on the need to expend uselessly; he 
states that the ‘means of acquisition such as exchange might have as its 
origin not in the need to acquire that it satisfies today, but the contrary 
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need, the need to destroy and lose’ (ibid, p.121). To support his argument, 
Bataille resorts to examples of expenditure found within other cultures.31 
Unlike modern western economies, wealth and power is found to be 
associated with a prodigal loss; as Bataille describes:  
 
It is the constitution of a positive property of loss – from which 
spring nobility, honour, and rank in a hierarchy – that gives the 
[potlatch] its significant value […] wealth appears as an acquisition 
to the extent that power is acquired by a rich man, but it is entirely 
directed toward loss in the sense that this power is characterized as 
power to lose. It is only through loss that glory and honour are 
linked to wealth. (ibid, p.122) 
 
Though Bataille’s interpretation of anthropological evidence to 
support his arguments has been subject to much criticism, his 
assumptions about the nature of the general economy are both still 
plausible and verifiable.32 Against this notion of expenditure as loss, 
modern market relations are described as restricted economies in which 
expenditure has now become linked with accumulation and frugality. For 
Bataille, the fundamental obligation to expend prodigally has disappeared 
within modern societies. According to Bataille, the modern bourgeoisie is  
 
characterized by the refusal in principle of this obligation. It has 
distinguished itself […] through the fact that it has consented only to 
spend for itself, and within itself […] The hatred of expenditure is 
the raison d’etre of and the justification for the bourgeoisie[.] (ibid, 
p.124-5) 
 
The relationship between restricted economies of accumulation and an 
economy of free expenditure and loss is summed up by Bataille in an 
analogy that has clear psychoanalytic overtones, linking a notion of 
individual desire to the wider economy. Bataille points out that the 
contradiction between restricted economies and what he perceives as the 
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real needs of society (the general economy) recalls the ‘narrowness of 
judgment that puts the father in opposition to the satisfaction of his son’s 
needs’ (ibid, p.117); he states: 
 
This narrowness is such that it is impossible for the son to express 
his will. The father’s partially malevolent solicitude is manifested in 
the things he provides for his son: lodgings, clothes, food, and, 
when absolutely necessary, a little harmless recreation. But the son 
does not even have the right to speak about what really gives him a 
fever; he is obliged to give people the impression that for him no 
horror can enter into consideration. In this respect, it is sad to say 
that conscious humanity has remained a minor; humanity 
recognizes the right to acquire, to conserve, and to consume 
rationally, but it excludes in principle nonproductive expenditure. 
(ibid) 
 
The opposition between the two types of economy is further explicated by 
the terms homogeneity and heterogeneity. The homogeneous is the realm 
of the restricted economy, consisting of all that is normalized and subject 
to control within society: money, the realm of work, utility, laws, taboos, 
reproductive sex and knowledge. In contrast to this, the heterogeneous is 
the realm of excess beyond the restricted economy: eroticism, death, 
festivals, transgression, drunkenness, laughter and the dissolution of 
knowledge. The heterogeneous is described as the general economy in 
that it not only refers to an excess beyond the realm of the restricted 
economy, but also refers to how such excess interacts with the 
homogeneous realm. As Paul Hegarty states: 
 
[The] realm of excess is the general economy, but the general 
economy is also the process whereby the homogeneous realm 
interacts with excessive phenomena. The general economy 
redefines the economic such that not everything is under the 
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economic, but everything is part of one economy among many – 
this many is the general economy. (Hegarty 2000, p.33) 
 
 This process of considering a homogeneous order in relation to the 
heterogeneous excess and surplus that escapes its economy is part of 
Bataille’s wider method of heterology33.  
 
Bataille’s opposition between the homogeneous and the 
heterogeneous is also explicitly compared to the contrast made between 
the sacred and the profane. For Bataille, the sacred is that excess which 
exists beyond the conventions and controls within society. The sacred is 
that which transgresses social taboos, it therefore includes carnivals, non-
reproductive sexuality, laughter, sacrifice, excretion and other states of 
excess. In contrast, the profane is the everyday norms and protocols 
within society that enforce taboos. The taboos instigated within the 
profane world are prohibited in which to distinguish the world of the sacred 
as a realm separate and subject to special, socially endorsed means of 
entry. For Bataille, the sacred was a necessity for a healthy society in that 
it allowed for the free creation and expenditure of a surplus beyond the 
tutelage of notions of production and utility.  
 Bataille concurs with the ideas of Max Weber in identifying the 
origins of the restrictive economy of modern capitalism with the rise of the 
Protestant work ethic. In such a view, an association of individual work 
and asceticism with salvation, found in Lutheran and Calvinist forms of 
protestant Christianity, led to the precedence of the virtues of production, 
accumulation and utility within society.34 For Bataille, the ideological 
importance of Protestantism was to individualize property and undermine 
traditional ties to the notion of the sacred – a notion that had remained 
intact via the medieval idea of sovereignty. In giving the individual the right 
to property, Protestantism also gave the subject control over his 
environment and wealth. As such, the traditional social role of the 
individual became obsolete and the accumulation of wealth became its 
own justification. On losing its association with the socially and 
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symbolically sanctioned idea of the sacred, expenditure was to become 
something to serve calculated private interests. Like Weber, this move 
towards the ‘iron cage’ of modern capitalism has led, for Bataille, to a 
situation where there is ‘an unreserved surrender to things, heedless of 
consequences and seeing nothing beyond them’ (Bataille 1989, p.136).  
   
To summarise, without an experience of the sacred as a necessary 
surplus waste, allowing us an intimate communication with the life 
process, both erotic and material exchange are destined to remain caught 
within a restrictive economy in which utility and accumulation become 
ends in themselves; consequently there is no possibility allowed for 
transgression – everything must be a thing: an object of utility, a 
commodity. As we have seen, to escape the homogeneous realm of the 
restrictive economy, Bataille proposes the general economy in which an 
allowance is made for prodigal expenditure. The question now remains as 
to how Bataille’s notion of general economy relates to the notion of the 
fetish. Let us now consider Bataille’s own thoughts on fetishism.  
 
The fetish as an untransposable object of desire. 
 
According to Bataille, the fetish is an untransposable object of 
desire. In his essay The Big Toe (1929), Bataille points out that ‘classic 
foot fetishism leading to the licking of toes categorically indicates that it is 
a phenomenon of base seduction’ (Bataille 1929, p.23). Later in the essay, 
Bataille indicates that  
 
a return to reality does not imply any new acceptances, but means 
that one is seduced in a base manner, without transpositions and to 
the point of screaming, opening his eyes wide: opening them wide, 
then, before a big toe. (ibid) 
 
In this essay, Bataille reveals a notion of the fetish that doesn’t rely on its 
seductive effects via a process of substitution in the way that classical 
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psychoanalysis would imply. The contrast between the two conceptions 
can clearly be seen in their explanation of foot fetishism. According to 
Freud,  
 
the Chinese custom of mutilating the female foot and then revering 
it like a fetish after it has been mutilated […] seems as though the 
Chinese male wants to thank the woman for having submitted to 
being castrated. (Freud 1927, p.157) 
 
In this view, the simultaneous castration and reverence placed upon the 
female foot is interpreted as an example of the concurrent 
acknowledgment and disavowal of female castration that, according to 
psychoanalysis, is said to reside in the fetish. In this interpretation the foot 
is an equivalent to the missing maternal phallus – as such, the 
omnipresent economy of the phallus, as privileged signifier, reigns 
supreme.  
 
In contrast to this, Bataille perceives the seduction of the fetish 
precisely in its ability to transgress and enter the realm of the sacred; as 
such, the fetish is aligned with eroticism in its ability to enter into 
communication with the world across the boundaries of the sacred and 
profane. Bataille recognizes the interplay between the two realms and 
perceives the foot as an exceptional example in that it is the point at which 
the boundary between the human and the earth most clearly break down. 
In this respect, Bataille emphasizes that such a move towards 
transgression should not befall to a simplistic sexual interpretation. 
 
Human life entails, in fact, the rage of seeing oneself as a back and 
forth movement from refuse to the ideal, and from the ideal to 
refuse – a rage that is easily directed against an organ as base as 
the foot […] Man’s secret horror of his foot is one of the 
explanations for the tendency to conceal its length and form as 
much as possible […T]his uneasiness is often confused with a 
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sexual uneasiness; this is especially striking among the Chinese, 
who, after having atrophied the feet of women, situate them at the 
most excessive point of deviance. (Bataille Op Cit, p.20-1) 
 
To illustrate his argument further, Bataille uses the example of the Count 
of Villamediana’s obsessive desire to touch the feet of Queen Elizabeth. 
Here, the boundary between the profane and sacred realms are 
transgressed: 
 
If a seductive element is to be attributed to the big toe, it is evidently 
not one to satisfy such exalted aspirations as, for example, the 
perfectly indelible taste that, in most cases, leads one to prefer 
elegant and correct form. On the contrary […] one can confirm that 
the pleasure [the count] derived from touching the queen’s foot 
specifically derived from the ugliness and infection represented by 
the baseness of the foot […] Here one submits to a seduction 
radically opposed to that caused by light and ideal beauty [.] (ibid, 
p.23) 
 
For Bataille then, the fetish is untransposable in the sense that it is 
not a substitute for something else in a dialectical movement that would 
raise the trauma at the heart of desire into a higher form – i.e. phallic lack, 
negation of lack via the maternal phallus equals substitute fetish object. In 
contrast, fetishism was never to escape such a trauma, its objects always 
repeat an eternal return of transgression in the face of a taboo. For 
Bataille this movement was inescapable and no transposition could ever 
take place; attempts to sublimate and resolve this movement within 
cultural forms were destined to fail - to tame what was essential to its 
movement would be to destroy the possibility of its manifestation, hence 
Bataille’s remark in The Modern Spirit and the Play of Transpositions 
(1930): ‘I defy any lover of painting to love a picture as much as a fetishist 
loves a shoe‘ (Bataille 1930, p.242). For Bataille, that which transgresses 
must remain silent, it must always be that outside the discourses of the 
 124 
everyday with their conventional meanings and cultural taboos. As such, 
the fetish is implicated in Bataille’s wider project of heterology that defines 
his method and informs the movement within his general economy. Here 
lies Bataille’s dilemma: to talk of the fetish, or any other perversion for that 
matter, requires assimilating the subject within a system of thought in 
which, by definition, it cannot take affect. The perverse must always 
remain an illegitimate excess of pleasure beyond the realm of a restricted 
economy and its homogenous order - as Denis Hollier states: 
 
[P]erversion whose very principle is that it cannot be subsumed by 
concept and escapes nosological taxonomy. An unformulatable 
abnormality[…] perversion marks the locus of illegitimate 
jouissance – but is there any other kind? Modes of reproduction 
can, perhaps, like forces of production, be socialized. Desire cannot 
be. (Hollier 1998, p.114) 
 
The impasse inherent to this dilemma within heterological thought, in 
which the ‘perverse’ cannot be incorporated within discourse without 
destroying its affect, will be resolved later when we consider the writings of 
Deleuze in relation to the fetish.  
 If the fetish, according to Bataille, can no longer be considered a 
transposable object which acts as a substitute for some equivalent object, 
then the question needs to be asked how can the reified equivalent values 
that manifest themselves as the commodity fetish and the phallus as fetish 
(in its numerous manifestations) retain their fetishistic status? As we have 
seen, for Marx, Freud and Lacan these fetishes were defined as such 
precisely because they appeared to inherently embody a value that was 
itself socially defined. The solution to this dilemma can be solved by 
considering the concept of artifice contained within the notion of fetishism, 
and how the fetish can, in turn, be seen as either transgressive or 
restrictive depending on its position within a general economy. How a 
Bataillean notion of fetishism could possibly bridge both a restrictive and 
transgressive position becomes apparent by considering the writing of one 
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of his contemporaries and collaborators in the Documents journal that 
Bataille edited. In an article entitled Alberto Giacometti (1929), Michel 
Leiris elaborates on the theme of an untransposable fetish and draws a 
distinction between what he perceives as a good fetish and a bad fetish – 
as we shall see, these can be translated as corresponding to the 
homogeneous and heterogeneous elements within the restrictive and 
general economy. In this article, written the same year as Bataille’s The 
Big Toe, Leiris describes true fetishes as ‘the ones that resemble us and 
are the objectivized form of our desire’ (Leiris 1929, p.250). As such, for 
Leiris, the fetish is an impassioned movement from the inside of ourselves, 
projected onto that which resides outside – he states: 
 
[T]he demands of this true fetishism, which is to say to the love – 
really in love – of each other, projected out from within and bearing 
a solid carapace that traps it between the limits of a precise thing 
and situates it, like a piece of furniture for us to use, in the vast 
unknown room we call space. (ibid, p.249). 
 
In other words, the fetish is that which we invest with value in an otherwise 
indifferent world. For Leiris, works of art - those objects of artifice - are 
only true fetishes if they meet the criteria of being personal projections of 
desire, at least as personal as the water of tears: 
 
Drops of water, those pretty liquid spheres that can at least remind 
us of the shape, if not the taste, of our tears, and that moisture, that 
fluidity corresponding to the sweetness that flows through out limbs 
when we love or else when we feel ourselves being touched (ibid). 
 
Leiris further elaborates on the nature of these personal projections – as 
the analogy of tears implies, such personal investments occur at the point 
of crises in which the identity of self is put at risk:  
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There are moments one might call crises, and in any life they alone 
matter. In such moments the outer realm seems suddenly to 
respond to the summons we serve upon it from within, when the 
external world opens up so that a sudden communication is set up 
between it and our heart. I have a few such memories from my life, 
and they all relate to events that appeared meaningless as well as 
bereft of symbolic value and that came, one might say, unbidden [.] 
(ibid) 
 
Here we can see a clear comparison with Bataille’s notion of the fetish and 
his wider concern for the general economy. That which is ineffable and 
meaningless comes to enter the profane world via our investment in it – as 
such, the heterogenous enters. In turn, this movement generates a 
‘communication’ between our desire and the world that corresponds to that 
described within Bataille’s general economy. In each example given by 
Leiris of moments within his life that equate with the fetishistic experience, 
it is the prodigality and excess of life that generates the inner investment 
of the heart. For Leiris, true art – which he equates with the fetish in this 
article – can ‘only arise from such ‘crises’, and the only works which count 
are those that offer their equivalent […Like] the real fetishes one might 
idolize […] everything in it is prodigiously alive’ (ibid, p.250).  
 In opposition to this, Leiris identifies a ‘wretched’ fetishism that is 
opposed to that generated via a spontaneous personal investment of 
desire. For Leiris, this ‘wretched’ fetishism is inferior for two reasons. 
Firstly, it is a transposed form in that it has become a reified object that is 
invested with a socially endorsed, ‘legitimate’ notion of value within a 
restricted economy. Secondly, precisely because of its reified and 
legitimated form, it is subject to an act of deception in which, as we have 
seen in both the case of psychosexual and socioeconomic examples, the 
artificial basis upon which the value of the fetish is formed - whether 
manifested in gold to reflect an equivalent value in commodity exchange, 
or manifested in the phallus to reflect an equivalent exchange in sexual 
relations – is disavowed. The creative artifice inherent to human agency 
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that allows us to produce, transform and desire, is therefore denied in 
such a reified form of fetishism. As Leiris states: 
 
As worshippers of those wispy ghosts that are our moral, logical 
and social imperatives, we thus cling to a transposed fetishism, 
counterfeiting the one that moves us so profoundly, and this 
wretched fetishism absorbs the greater part of our actions, leaving 
almost no space for the genuine fetishism which alone is truly worth 
pursuing because it is entirely conscious of itself and in 
consequence does not rely on any kind of deception. (ibid, p.249). 
 
Leiris’ notion of the fetish can therefore be considered as either 
transgressive or restrictive depending on its position within a general 
economy. If it is subject to the ‘moral, logical and social imperatives’ of the 
restricted economy, the fetish remains as a stable reified form that 
disavows the possibility of its other: a fetishistic investment in productive 
desire neither directed towards ‘useful’ commodity production and 
accumulation or coital acts of reproduction. On discussing Leiris’ essay on 
Giacometti, Pietz recognizes this double-sided character to the fetish and 
offers us an explanation of how both sides of the fetish come to manifest 
themselves within culture. Pietz argues that fetish discourse has always 
been a ‘double consciousness of absorbed credulity and degraded or 
distanced incredulity’ (Pietz 1985, p.14). Because of its cross-cultural 
position, it is recognized that the concept of the fetish has always had a 
special critical relation to the notion of value in which to expose the degree 
to which beliefs are culturally and artificially created. As PIetz describes: 
 
The discourse of the fetish has always been a critical discourse 
about the false objective value from which the speaker is personally 
distanced […] “Fetish” has always named the incomprehensible 
mystery of the power of material things to be collective social 
objects experienced by individuals as truly embodying determinate 
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values and virtues, always as judged from a cross-cultural 
perspective of relative infinite degradation (ibid). 
 
Given that the concept has a critical function that both criticizes and 
degrades established determinate values, Pietz contends that such a 
function also, by implication, allows the ‘radical creation of value’ (ibid). Its 
double-sided character therefore revolves around both exposing the 
artificial nature of value and explicating the means by which objects are 
invested with value.  
Pietz puts forward a conception of the fetish that incorporates the 
notion of it being both a personal investment of desire whilst also 
becoming a socially endorsed and reified value. Pietz points out that the 
fetish can be viewed as  
 
the locus of a sort of primary and carnal rhetoric of identification 
and disavowal that establishes conscious and unconscious value 
judgments connecting territorialized social things and embodied 
personal individuals within a series of singular historical fixations. It 
would thus be the site of articulation both of ideological reification 
and hypostasis, and of impassioned spontaneous criticism. (ibid).  
 
From this notion, PIetz proposes the following fundamental categories that 
define the fetish: ‘historicization, territorialization, reification, and 
personalization’ (ibid, p.12). For Pietz, the category of historicization refers 
to the fact that the fetish is ‘always a meaningful fixation of a singular 
event […] the enduring material form and force of an unrepeatable event’ 
(ibid) – this unrepeatability will become important when we consider the 
notion of time and repetition in relation to the fetish later. The category of 
territorialization positions the context and meaning of the fetish within a 
‘material space (an earthly matrix), whether in the form of a geographical 
locality, a marked site of the human body, or a medium of inscription or 
configuration defined by some portable or wearable thing’ (ibid). The 
concept of reification describes the fixation of historical meaning within a 
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‘self-contained entity identifiable within the territory’ (ibid). This has the 
affect of allowing the fetish to be ‘recognizable as a discrete thing […] 
because of its status as a significant object within the value codes proper 
to the productive and ideological systems of a given society’ (ibid). Finally, 
the fetish can be said to be ‘personalized’ in that it ‘evokes an intensely 
personal response from individuals’ (ibid) that is ‘incommensurable with 
[…] the social value codes within which the fetish holds the status as a 
material signifier’ (ibid). For Pietz, it is this intensely personal response 
that allows the possibility for an individual to either embrace an ideological 
disavowal or forge a new value invested with desire; as Pietz states: 
 
It is in those “disavowals” and “perspectives of flight” whose 
possibility is opened by the clash of this incommensurable 
difference that the fetish might be identified as the site of both the 
formation and the revelation of ideology and value-consciousness. 
(ibid, p.13) 
 
Within this section, we have identified how an immanent and 
untransposable notion of the fetish may be forged via a renegotiation of 
the concept of death in which it appears complementary and integral to the 
life process. The notion of the general economy has illustrated the 
possibility of exchange and value outside the logic of homogeneity and 
equivalence within restrictive economies. By expending surplus prodigally, 
the notion of the general economy offers us a means to understand the 
artifice of production and desire beyond socially endorsed taboos and the 
realms of utility and reified value. In such circumstances, desire is 
interpreted as that which transgresses the profane world of the everyday 
and the taboo, offering us a means of communication with that which is in 
excess of ourselves and society – it therefore allows a communion with 
death on the road to becoming Other. Transgression allows the death of 
identity in favour of difference – it is the constant negotiation between 
these two realms that gives us a sense of becoming. The fetish as an 
object of desire bridges these two realms and is therefore to be viewed as 
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untransposable.35 The fetish is found to seduce via its appeal to the 
transgressive and excessive realm of the sacred, outside the exclusions 
constituted by taboos and the reified values within a restricted economy. 
By transgressing the taboo, the fetish has been found to enter into the 
realm of the ineffable – as we have seen, from this perspective desire, in 
its excess, remains outside the realms of socially endorsed categories of 
utility, production and reproduction.  
Though Pietz’s proposed categories and functions of the fetish are 
illuminating in terms of describing the bridge between both transgressive 
and restrictive values within the notion, it does not clarify how and why 
these values manifest themselves in terms of either a restrictive or general 
economy. Likewise, such categories do not address how the fetish as an 
untransposable and ineffable movement can come to represent value 
within social discourse and activity. Pietz’s concern is to distill a model 
from the various historical meanings and uses of the notion of fetishism, 
as such, the application and workings of this model has yet to be explored. 
For Pietz, the ‘ultimate usefulness of this model depends on its 
applicability outside the historical field of fetish discourse as presently 
constituted’ (ibid, p.15). The workings of his model therefore lie ‘outside 
the scope of [his] present study’ (ibid).  
As we have seen, Baudrillard makes a clear appeal to Bataille’s 
notion of a general economy in which to break the logic of restrictive 
economies of value. However, Baudrillard’s notion of fetishism remains 
tied to a notion of death, it is therefore always a reified value inherent to 
the system of production and reproduction. As described, Baudrillard’s 
earlier writings explained fetishism in terms of an effect of the restrictive 
code within commodity production – the fetish is therefore subject to 
exchange value, despite use value being relative to the simulations 
produced within a post-modern consumerist society. Whereas Baudrillard 
refers to the general economy to demonstrate how ‘sumptuous and 
useless expenditure’ evades the priorities of production and utility, his 
notion of the fetish ‘remained curiously unchanging’ (Gane 2011, p.371) – 
the fetish persists as a reifying force within a culture that prevents 
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communication between the realms of life and death that, according to 
Baudrillard, are perceived in oppositional terms. In Seduction (1979), 
Baudrillard describes the fetishist as follows:  
 
The pervert always gets involved in a maniacal universe of mastery 
and the law. He seeks mastery over the fetishized rule and absolute 
ritual circumscription. The latter is no longer playful. It no longer 
moves. It is dead, and can no long put anything into play except its 
own death. Fetishism is the seduction of death, including the death of 
the rule in perversion. (Baudrillard 1990, p.128) 
 
For Baudrillard then, the ritualistic value of the fetish is not the subject of 
play, it is a frozen, deathly relation. In opposition to this, Baudrillard 
proposes a notion of seduction – a concept that endorses the idea of a 
ritualistic game based on artifice. The notion of seduction is related to the 
idea of symbolic exchange within the general economy in that a challenge 
occurs that orientates around an exchange and counter-exchange with its 
own rules. Against a singular restrictive economy of production and desire, 
seduction sees a prodigal expenditure in which agents are vertiginously 
seduced via the artifice of appearance, signs and fascination outside a 
pre-ordained logic. As Kellner speculates, the term seduction is used 
rather than general economy because ‘symbolic exchange has overtones 
of pre-capitalist ‘primitivism’ which would expose Baudrillard to charges of 
nostalgia for bygone eras’ (Kellner 1989, p. 149). However, the term 
‘preserves the emphasis in symbolic exchange on reversibility, play and 
exchange on the level of the symbolic, expenditure and waste, excess and 
aesthetic display’ (ibid). Despite an earlier recognition of the fetish as 
artifice, it remains an ossified relation in contrast to seduction; as 
Baudrillard states: 
 
Perversion is a frozen challenge; seduction, a living challenge. 
Seduction is shifting and ephemeral; perversion, monotonous and 
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interminable. Perversion is theatrical and complicit; seduction, 
secret and reversible. (Baudrillard Op Cit) 
 
Baudrillard’s notion of seduction reminds us of the seduction Bataille 
refers to in his description of the fetish as that which seduces us beyond 
the profane – it is that which is in excess of order and the restricted 
economy. It also reminds of Leiris’ notion of the good fetish and bad fetish, 
or that which transgresses and that which deceives itself as a legitimate 
value. It is surprising then, that Baudrillard does not consider this double-
sided aspect of fetishism – fetishism can be a dead value or that which 
annihilates value in a life-affirming process that constitutes value anew. 
Tim Dant criticizes Baudrillard’s analysis of fetishism by pointing out that 
objects only appear ‘to have two dimensions; function and ostentation. 
[Whereas] there are a number of forms of social relations with objects that 
could lead to fetishisation’ (Dant 1996, p. 509). According to Dant, other 
forms of consumption can be involved in the fetishisation of objects, 
including knowledge, aesthetics and mediation (ibid, p. 512). For Dant, It is 
also not clear in Baudrillard’s work ‘to what extent all commodities are 
fetishes and, if they are, whether they have the same fetish quality’ (ibid, 
p. 510). What is apparent is that the fetish for Baudrillard remains at the 
level of the differential exchange of signs within restricted economies, it is 
not discussed as a means of transgression that allows us to generate new 
values outside its restricted mechanisms.  
As we shall see, how the fetish is manifested in both a restricted 
and transgressive form can be elucidated via an examination of the 
writings of Gilles Deleuze in relation to the fetish. The notion of the fetish 
as an untransposable object of desire generated through an act of human 
artifice can be explained by his theories in relation to the concept. Equally, 
Deleuze’s writings offer us a means to understand how the 
untransposable fetish attains value within social discourse. Though Pietz 
does not pursue the implications of Deleuzean ideas for the notion of the 
fetish, some of the functions and categories he prescribes for the notion 
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are informed by concepts derived from the writings of Deleuze and 
Guattari that hint at a potentially productive dialogue.36 
 
An exploration and extension of Deleuze’s ideas will further 
demonstrate how an immanent notion of the fetish can exist without an 
appeal to some inherent origin or presence that gives it value. Such a 
revised notion of the fetish can be understood as either a repetition of the 
same within a restricted economy or a repetition of difference in which a 
novel object of desire is produced and exchanged within a general 
economy. As such, though the fetish has the potential to disavow its origin 
as an artifice of productive desire, it is not determined by the notions of 
substitution associated with such a renunciation. An engagement with 
Deleuze’s ideas will also demonstrate how a flight into the realm of excess 





















Part Four: Fetishism, Difference and Deleuze. 
 
 In the last section, the fetish as an untransposble object of 
desire was recognized, as such the fetish can no longer be understood as 
a substitute that could be subsumed by some initial origin or presence. 
The immanent and untransposable nature of the fetish was found to 
manifest itself in a revalorization of the notion of death and its relationship 
to the general economy – here surplus and excess are to be expended 
prodigally into the ineffable realm of the sacred, beyond the profane realm 
of everyday utility, function and reproduction. Although the potential of the 
fetish to bridge the realm of the restricted and general economies (the 
profane and the sacred) has been recognized, how and why the fetish 
manifests itself at the crossroads of these complementary, yet 
irreconcilable realms has yet to be accounted for. On the one hand, 
fetishistic forms have been traditionally associated with a reifying tendency 
that reinforces an economy of the same, on the other hand, the fetish can 
be understood as an untransposable object of desire, which demonstrates 
an opposing transgressive tendency.  
 
 In this section, the ideas of Deleuze and Guattari will be explored in 
which to provide an understanding of how desire productively invests in a 
fetish object without necessarily having recourse to a restricted economy 
of value. Conversely, their ideas will also explain how such an 
unprecedented investment has the potential to become an ossified 
equivalent value. Such explanations will generate an understanding of the 
mutual relationship that exists between both the reified and transgressive 
worlds that inhabit the fetish.  
 By examining the relationship between difference and repetition 
within the work of Deleuze, a cyclical movement of becoming that 
incorporates the complementary elements of life and death will be 
recognized that no longer has recourse to an initial origin and state of 
being. This rebuttal of origins refuses the self-present movement and 
repetition inherent to the death drive and is found to subvert western 
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conceptions of rational linear time with its ideas of progress. Deleuze’s 
concern for difference and repetition is then positioned within the context 
of the Body Without Organs – a concept adopted by Deleuze and Guattari 
to explain the production and cycles of desire conducted within and upon 
the body. In contrast to the death drive, the repetitions and reductions of 
intensity performed upon the Body Without Organs is manifested via a 
play of difference. By exploring a series of syntheses performed upon the 
Body Without Organs, desire can be understood as a productive and 
liberating force, as well as a means for forging recognition and identity – 
as such, it offers a means to account for the manifestation of desire within 
both restrictive and general economies.  
 The relevance of Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of the Body Without 
Organs to a revised conception of the fetish is then explored via a reading 
of Deleuze and Deleuze and Guattari’s writings on the topic of fetishism. 
Such a reading provides a novel interpretation of fetishism that is 
understood as an artificial production premised on a notion of difference – 
it therefore negates the notion of fetishism based upon substitution, 
presence and disavowal. In this new interpretation, fetishes are to be 
understood as invested fragments that have the potential to dislocate and 
rupture in which to reinvest objects with new values and possibilities. 
 
Difference and Repetition. 
 
In Difference and Repetition (1968), Deleuze draws our attention to 
the role of repetition within a metaphysics of presence. By replacing a 
notion of the ideal – a self present origin that provides a model of the 
Same - with that of difference, Deleuze opposes the pre-eminence of 
identity as a notion within western metaphysical thought from Plato 
onwards. Deleuze suggests that multiplicity and difference should be 
considered as the primary categories within thought, with identity being 
secondary and dependent upon them. According to Deleuze, such an 
insistence on difference has implications for a notion of time and 
repetition. If we are to accept the traditional notion of repetition as 
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repeating something over a sequence of moments, each understood as 
identical to the next, then based upon this convention, we would fall back 
into a notion of identity. To solve this problem, Deleuze proposes a 
conception of repetition based upon the notion of the eternal return of 
difference. 
For Plato, truth and its imitations can be defined through a triadic 
system of idea, copy and simulacrum. For Plato, the idea is the essence of 
an object; it is what remains when all particular differences between a type 
of object have been removed to reveal its universal form. As such, Plato 
proposes there is a dualistic epistemology of perfect forms and imperfect 
copies in which the ideal essence of a form is never realized within the 
actual world.37 Such a hierarchical system is motivated by the idea of an 
identity that is identical in itself; it therefore mediates all objects and views 
difference as a superfluous negative, as a not this. As Deleuze points out:  
 
[Plato’s thought turns] upon a particularly important distinction: that 
between the original and the image, the model and the copy. The 
model is supposed to enjoy an originary superior identity […] 
whereas the copy is judged in terms of a derived internal 
resemblance. Indeed, it is in this sense that difference comes only 
in third place, behind identity and resemblance, and can be 
understood only in terms of these prior notions. (Deleuze 2004, 
p.154) 
 
Deleuze believes that the determining distinction behind Plato’s system of 
identity is not that between the ideal model and its image, but between the 
two kinds of images: the copies (icones) and the simulacra (phantasmes). 
For Deleuze the ‘model-copy distinction is there only in order to found and 
apply the copy-simulacra distinction’ (ibid). By proposing the model-copy 
distinction, based upon a notion of internal resemblance, Plato is able to 
justify a notion of ‘good images, the icons which resemble from within, 
[whilst] eliminat[ing] the bad images or simulacra’ (ibid, p.155). As such, 
Plato ‘splits the material world in two, holding copies to have an internal 
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resemblance to their Ideas, while the deceptive simulacrum simply 
‘produces an effect of resemblance’’ (Widder 2011, p.99). Only in this way 
‘can copies raise themselves above simulacra and claim legitimate 
participation in their Ideas’ (ibid). Deleuze indicates that by distinguishing 
the good image or copy to the bad image of simulacra, Plato is able to 
subordinate ‘difference to the supposedly initial powers of the Same and 
the Similar’; this has the effect of ‘declaring difference unthinkable in itself’ 
(Deleuze Op Cit, p.155). In contrast to Plato’s intentions, Deleuze points 
out that simulacra ‘are not simply copies of copies […] involving infinitely 
relaxed relations to resemblance’; they ‘have externalised resemblance 
and live on difference instead […taking] the form of an illusion, not an 
internal principle’ (ibid). Given that simulacra are generated through their 
reference to the difference inherent to particulars, they would not be 
‘endowed with the ideal identity of the Same but, on the contrary, […would 
be] a model of the Other, […] the model of difference in itself’ (ibid, p.156). 
As Deleuze describes in the Logic of Sense (1969): 
 
The simulation is built upon a disparity or upon a difference. It 
internalizes a dissimilarity. This is why we can no longer define it in 
relation to a model imposed on the copies, a model of the Same 
from which the copies’ resemblance derives. If the simulacrum still 
has a model it is another model, a model of the Other (l’Autre) from 
which there flows an internalized dissemblance’. (Deleuze 
2004b,p.295) 
 
Therefore for Deleuze, ‘the different, the dissimilar, the unequal […] may 
well be not merely defects which affect copies […] but rather models 
themselves’ (ibid). Deleuze proposes that if simulacra are models 
generated through difference, then they ‘provide the means of challenging 
both the notion of the copy and that of the model’ (ibid); for if simulacra 
provide us with a model self-constituted through difference, then all 
models ‘collapse into difference’ (ibid), whilst copies become one of a 
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series ‘such that one can never say that one is a copy and the other a 
model’ (ibid).  
 If simulacra provide us with a model constituted through difference, 
then models are immanent ‘becomings’ relative to external relations of 
disparity and transience; as Widder states: 
 
If simulacra elude the power of Ideas […] it is because they exceed 
the order of identity and resemblance. They are therefore 
characterized by a ‘pure becoming’, one that moves not in a single 
direction, as is the case with legitimate copies guided by their 
participation in Ideas, but in two directions (senses) at once.  
(Widder 2011, p.99-100) 
 
Whereas Plato recognizes that things participate in this world via transient 
external relations, he ‘remains largely uninterested in the implications of 
this pure becoming’ (ibid). In contrast, Deleuze perceives the duality of 
becoming in positive terms; as Widder states:  
 
Deleuze holds this duality to be the positive trait the simulacrum 
displays when it is no longer denigrated as a copy of a copy. Seen 
affirmatively, simulacra are multiplicities […] They are structured by 
a ‘disjunctive synthesis’ in which divergence is affirmed. (Widder 
2011, p. 100)  
 
This idea of a disjunctive synthesis becomes important when we come to 
consider the idea of the body without organs, upon which identity is 
constituted via a combination of multiplicities.   
 
 For Deleuze, an insistence on difference in itself – as that which is 
constituted through its relationship to difference – has implications for a 
conception of repetition and time. As we shall see, the notion of repetition 
of difference over time has important implications for an understanding of 
both the role and the goal of desire, such that it no longer remains subject 
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to the dictates of presence and lack. Deleuze relates repetition to three 
different notions of time.  
Firstly, Deleuze describes a conception of time as circular. Such a 
relationship is based upon habitual patterns, such as the natural cycle of 
day and night – this Deleuze refers to as a passive synthesis in that time is 
understood as being constituted by the passing repetition of present 
moments.38 
In contrast to this, Deleuze identifies another notion of time, 
understood in terms of an active synthesis. Deleuze links this notion of 
time to the work of Kant, whose Critique of Pure Reason (1781) identified 
time as a separate category imposed upon sensory experience. Given the 
notion of time as a separate category, it is perceived as the active placing 
of events within time as a straight line, as such, Kant frees us from a 
cyclical notion of time in that it is no longer perceived as a passive 
repetition of moments.39 Whereas the cyclical view of time saw the return 
of events within the present, this conception of time returns nothing in that 
it repeats something in the memory that did not exist before. Deleuze 
points out that both the passive and active synthesis place repetition within 
the realm of the identical with regards to time. The passive synthesis sees 
the return of the identical within the present, whereas the active synthesis 
can only produce memory through the constitution of a dual identity: the I 
of memory and the self that undergoes experience.  
To avoid this return to the identical, Deleuze proposes a third model 
of time in which time and repetition are not conceived as separate entities, 
but repetition is itself conceived as the form of time. To do this, Deleuze 
refers to the Nietzschean concept of the eternal return. The eternal return 
is comprehended as the repetition of difference – it is the repetition of 
being as becoming; as Deleuze points out, the ‘subject of the eternal 
return is not the same but the different, not the similar but the dissimilar, 
not the one but the many, not necessity but chance’ (ibid, p.153). 
According to this view, the eternal return implies no static identity, there is 
neither a final or initial state of being, if this were the case, no repetition 
would ever occur – if there was a final state, it would have already been 
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reached; if there was an original state, we would have never left it. As 
Deleuze describes, the eternal return ‘relates to a complicated, properly 
chaotic world without identity’ (ibid, p.69). The repetition involved in the 
eternal return is therefore to be understood as the constancy of the state 
of becoming. As such, the ‘present is no more than an actor, an author, an 
agent destined to be effaced; while the past is no more than a condition 
operating by default’ (Deleuze 2004, p. 117). Whereas the eternal return 
implies being as becoming, a sense of identity can still be retained due to 
the subject maintaining an ego-ideal – a coded territory by which the 
subject recognizes their self. Whereas this identity is the vantage point 
from which a transformation takes place, paradoxically, this sense of 
identity is subject to dispersion and transformation during an act of 
becoming. As Keith Faulkner describes:  
 
The heroic metamorphosis requires the ego to maintain an ideal of 
itself, by which it finds its identity in the image of action […yet] the 
ideal image of ourselves does not return since it remains fictional; 
only the real returns; only the singularities that compose sensations 
return, rather than the object’s image, form, or idea’. (Faulkner 
2006, p. 124) 
 
This ego-ideal is therefore an identity subject to deterritorialization and 
reterritorialization; as Deleuze states: ‘For ‘one’ repeats eternally, but ‘one’ 
now refers to the world of impersonal individualities and pre-individual 
singularities’ (Deleuze 2004, p. 372). As such, the subject lacks a final 
image, an origin from which to ascertain and control the flows of desire – 
such an image is always an attempt to assert a restrictive economy and 
control the acts of exchange. As Faulkner points out:  
 
This impersonal world of the “unequal”, or of the dice game of 
existence, lacks a final aim or an image; it consists of a continuous 
metamorphosis of energy. The heroic metamorphosis is misguided 
when it seeks equality with an image […] Becoming-equal to the 
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unequal requires enough strength to affirm chaos and to forsake 
our ideal ego’ (Faulkner Op Cit, p. 125). 
 
The repetition of difference in an eternal state of becoming gives us an 
understanding of the phenomenon that is immanent to the processes that 
produced it - therefore it can neither be subject to some original state or 
ideal model from which one can ascertain meaning. The essence of a 
phenomenon is therefore ‘always an encounter; it is an event; it is neither 
stable nor transcendental nor eternal; it is immanent to the dynamic 
process it expresses […]’(Massumi 1992, p. 18). As such, for Deleuze, all 
phenomena are unique happenings, part of a continuous process in a 
monistic single field of matter; even reproduction does not negate this fact, 
for reproduction is ‘a transformational carrying-over to another site or 
substance’ (ibid, p.19). On the one hand, this process of becoming has 
profound consequences for thought – thinking is no longer to be perceived 
as a process in which identity is recognized via a transcendental subject, it 
is rather the effect of a discordance and shock to current states of being. 
As Claire Colebrook describes, the task of thinking is not to establish the 
truest or highest world but to think the multiplicity of perceptions that 
unfold divergent worlds’ (Colebrook 2006, p.140). On the other hand, as 
will be described, this process of becoming can be fettered by restricted 
economies of social exchange in which relations between territories are 
‘over-coded’ by an external system: the privileged signifier of value that 
produces such economies.  
 
Deleuze’s notion of difference and repetition has clear implications for the 
repetitions involved in the psychoanalytic notion of the death drive. The 
repetitions within the death drive in psychoanalysis can be perceived as 
yet another example of the repetition of a self-present identity – in this 
case, the phallus-as-fetish is that which the economy of desire revolves 
around in a futile attempt to find unity and reduce bodily tension with a 
substitute for an original lost object. Louise Kaplan clearly identifies this 
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tendency to equate the strategy of fetishism with death. With reference to 
the death drive, Kaplan quotes Derrida: 
This impression of erogenous color draws a mask right on the skin. 
In other words the [death drive] is never present in person, neither 
in itself nor in its effects. It leaves no monument, it bequeaths no 
document of its own. As inheritance, it leaves only erotic 
simulacrum [.] (Derrida 1996, p.11) 
Here the death drive is perceived as a phenomenon at the heart of 
fetishism. Behind the fetish is always the repetitive desire to return to a 
state of death in which neither tension or lack exists. Because such a 
desire is unconscious, it never manifests itself and is only apprehended 
via a series of erotic masks (fetishes) that act as monuments to death in 
an attempt to control and ossify value and desire. For Kaplan, this trait of 
the fetishism strategy is a ‘corollary to the necrophilic principle, an 
extension of it that exposes the death drive hidden in the folds of the erotic 
object’ (ibid, p.7). As such, by perceiving the repetition of desire as a 
yearning towards a lost original state prior to lack, the death drive can be 
perceived as another means by which functional heterosexual relations 
are confirmed within a restrictive economy of lack which excludes excess 
and difference; as Judith Butler points out in relation to the performative 
repetition of heterosexual gender norms: 
 
[…] heterosexuality is itself a constant and repeated effort to imitate 
its own idealizations. That it must repeat this imitation, that it sets 
up pathologizing practices and normalizing sciences in order to 
produce and consecrate its own claim on originality and propriety 
[…] and that it is consistently haunted by that domain of sexual 
possibility that must be excluded for heterosexualized gender to 
reproduce itself. (Butler 1993, p. 125)  
 
To perceive repetition in desire as a process of becoming therefore 
disrupts the regressive and functional nature of normative heterosexual 
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relations. Deleuze’s critique therefore challenges us to consider the 
possibility of a circuit of desire without an appeal to some form of self-
present identity; such a possibility would perceive desire as an immanent 
process manifested and repeated through the eternal return of difference. 
In contrast to psychoanalysis, death is here understood as ‘not the 
repetition of some form or identity, but a perverse and ‘deathly’ repletion 
that destroys sameness and unity, that abandons the self’ (Colebrook 
2006, p.135).  Whereas the death drive in psychoanalysis requires a move 
towards an original state prior to the tensions caused by the trauma of 
separation that defines our identity, death in Deleuze and Guattari is an 
obliteration of unity and a move towards multiplicity. Deleuze and Guattari 
suggest that  
 
one moves beyond death as a model – death as defined in relation 
to the bounded organism – to the experience of death […] Such an 
experience would shatter the bounded body, and occur not as the 
body’s other or limit but as a pure predicate, potentiality or intensity 
taken away from the coordinates of the organism’. (Colebrook 
2011, p. 18) 
 
As will be elaborated, the repetition of difference involved in Deleuze’s 
conception of time has implications for a notion of the fetish as an 
untransposable object of desire.  
 
If the notion of difference and repetition subverts the self-present 
identity manifest in the concept of the death drive, then the notion of the 
eternal return of difference reverses what was previously described as a 
debased relationship between historical time and the fetish. As Anne 
McClintock points out: 
 
Fetishism […] flagrantly rebutted the idea of linear time and 
progress. The fetish – embodying, as it does, contradiction, 
repetition, multiple agency and multiple time – exemplifies 
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repeatable time: time without progress. (McClintock 1995, p.188) 
 
The notion of fetishism then corresponds to the idea of the eternal return – 
a time which is not linear and absorbs multiple and arbitrary agencies. As 
such, it correlates to time understood as a return of difference. The only 
variance here is that from this perspective, a denial of linear progression 
and universality is not to be perceived as a matter of denigration, it is now 
to be viewed as a prospect for liberation and transgression in which new 
objects of desire are formed.40  
The relationship between Deleuze’s notion of repetition and 
difference and the repetitions involved within the circuit of desire are 
elucidated within his collaborative work with Felix Guattari – their notion of 
the Body Without Organs provides an account of such a relationship. By 
conceiving a circuit of desire that operates through difference and 
repetition, Deleuze and Guattari offer us a means to effectively understand 
the fetish as a process of excess, difference and becoming. The notion of 
the Body Without Organs also offers us a means of understanding how the 
immanent production of fetishistic forms can have the potential to become 
reified within a restrictive economy without recourse to a notion of original 
presence and lack.  
 
Desire as production and the Body Without Organs. 
 
Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of the Body Without Organs can be 
usefully contrasted to the psychoanalytic concept of the death drive, of 
which it shares certain characteristics – namely a concern for repetition 
and a reduction in intensity. Whereas for Freud and Lacan such repetition 
is governed by a logic of identity, a return of the same, for Deleuze and 
Guattari, such repetition is governed by difference. Given the importance 
Deleuze places upon difference and repetition as a means of critiquing the 
pre-eminence of identity within western metaphysics, it will come as no 
surprise that he is critical of any notion of a death drive that is constituted 
upon a return of the same.  
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As we have seen in the writings of Baudrillard and Bataille, the 
exclusion of death as a principle of life provides the alibi for the 
valorization of the subject which lacks – the manifestation of the Father, 
the Super-ego and the phallus which provides this symbolic function, 
generates a singular economy that endorses a transcendental law that 
excludes difference within desire, in which to legitimate notions of 
production and reproduction that serves to ward off death as the radical 
Other. For monotheistic cultures of a Judeo-Christian and Islamic tradition, 
eroticism is therefore separated into that which is functional and 
reproductive and that which threatens the continuity of being and its 
corresponding notions of the soul, individual ‘conscience’ and subjectivity 
(we all stand alone before the presence of God). For Deleuze and 
Guattari, the merit of psychoanalysis is that it ‘demonstrated that desire is 
not subordinated to procreation, or even genitality’ (Deleuze / Guattari 
1996, p. 154-5). Despite this recognition, Deleuze and Guattari contend 
that psychoanalysis remains tied to a singular economy of presence and 
lack, in which it ‘found new ways of inscribing in desire the negative law of 
lack, the external rule of pleasure, and the transcendental ideal of 
phantasy’ (ibid, p.155). It does this by distinguishing the normal path of 
desire from its perverse other. In contrast, Deleuze and Guattari propose 
that there is 
  
a joy that is immanent to desire as though desire were filled by itself 
and its contemplations, a joy that implies no lack or impossibility 
and is not measured by pleasure since it is what distributes 
intensities of pleasure and prevents them from being suffused by 
anxiety, shame and guilt (ibid).   
 
Against a notion of desire constituted upon the loss of an original object - 
simultaneously the goal of pleasure and impossible aim – Deleuze and 
Guattari present a conception of desire as immanent.   
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By restoring difference to the idea of repetition, Deleuze denies that 
any reduction of intensity that constitutes the death-instinct necessarily 
requires a mechanical repetition of a prior state. Deleuze’s notion of the 
Body Without Organs, gives us the conceptual apparatus to view such a 
reduction, not as a return to something prior, but the culmination of 
connective syntheses generated through difference and multiplicity. This 
has consequences for a concept of desire: if, for psychoanalysis, the 
ultimate aim of desire is a reduction of tension directed towards the past 
(and ultimately death), then for Deleuze and Guattari, the aim of desire is 
to generate a multitude of intensive states directed towards the future. As 
Eugene Holland describes in relation to the Body Without Organs:  
 
Restoring difference to repetition does not diminish the importance 
of repetition in psychic life as the principle of pleasure, but frees 
pleasure from mechanical repetition and a strictly linear temporality: 
whereas repetition of the same constitutes a static neurotic form of 
pleasure fixed on the past, the repetition of difference takes 
pleasure in variation, ramification [and] improvisation. (Holland 
1999, p.28) 
 
The ‘Body Without Organs’ is the body from the point of view of its 
potential, outside of any determinate state.41 Deleuze and Guattari claim 
that if we were to freeze an organ in terms of its typical movements, to 
intensity degree zero (the intensive state of the body-without-organs), 
everything would stop dead for a moment, ‘escaping the wheel of 
continual birth and rebirth’ (Deleuze / Guattari 1984, p.7). Given such a 
circumstance, the component parts would ‘fall apart to such a point that 
they will return to nothingness’ (ibid, p.8); as such, by stopping the 
automata ‘dead [it sets] free the unorganized mass [it] once served to 
articulate’ (ibid). This is the Body Without Organs, the ‘unproductive, the 
sterile, the unengendered, the unconsumable’ (ibid). The Body Without 
Organs then, is the equivalent to the death drive without resorting to the 
retrogressive desire for a lost object (either to have or to be the phallus); it 
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instead allows for an immanent production of states of intensities. As 
Deleuze points out: 
 
[T]his is the point at which death turns against death; where dying is 
the negation of death, and the impersonality of dying no longer 
indicates only the moment when I disappear outside of myself, but 
rather the moment when death loses itself in itself, and also the 
figure which the most singular life takes on in order to substitute 
itself for me. (Deleuze 2004b, p. 173-4) 
 
As such, the concept of the body without organs corresponds to 
Deleuze’s notion of the eternal return described above. As Philip 
Goodchild describes: 
 
[T]he body without organs meets the test of the eternal return: the 
death that it announces is not that of the organs or drives but its 
own death – oscillating between the model and experience of 
death, it constitutes desire itself. (Goodchild 1996, p.79) 
 
Deleuze and Guattari describe the production of states of intensities 
upon the Body Without Organs in mechanic terms, therefore implying an 
immanent connection of matter without a distinction between the self and 
the other and the body and the world. Deleuze and Guattari use the 
metaphor of the machine to describe the relationship between the 
movement, potential and functions of the body to those of the universe: 
‘Everywhere it is machines – real ones, not figurative ones: machines 
driving other machines, machines being driven by other machines, with all 
the necessary couplings and connections’ (Deleuze / Guattari 1984, p. 1). 
Given this analogy, Deleuze and Guattari claim that the binary oppositions 
of man / nature, self and non-self and outside and inside no longer have 
any coherent meaning:  
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There is no such thing as either man or nature now, only a process 
that produces the one within the other and couples the machines 
together. Producing machines, desiring-machines everywhere […] 
all of species life: the self and non-self, outside and inside, no 
longer have any meaning whatsoever. (ibid, p.2) 
 
Given this mechanic understanding of man in relation to the world, 
Deleuze and Guattari revise Freudian and Lacanian notions of erotogenic 
zones (the gaps within the body (mouth, eyes, anus, vagina etc.)) as 
organ-machines, rather than zones constituted on the basis of lack. As 
such, desire does not need to be ‘stimulated by an exogenous force such 
as need or want, it is a stimulus in its own right’ (Buchanan 2008, p.47). 
Deleuze and Guattari state that for each organ-machine there corresponds 
an energy-source-machine in which ‘one produces a flow that the other 
interrupts’ (ibid, p. 2).42 These connections constitute what Deleuze and 
Guattari refer to as desiring-machines. Such a revised notion has 
implications for a notion of pleasure, as Anna Powell states: 
 
Pleasure for Deleuze and Guattari is immanent, and materially 
based within sensation itself. Desire is not the product of lack or 
negativity, but is itself productive. Machinic desire is automatic or 
auto-erotic […and] is experienced not by subjectivities, but through 
intensive states, or ‘haeccities’: things-in-themselves. The desiring-
machine experiences an intense feeling of transition without the 
static final positionality of psychoanalysis (Powell 2005, p.93) 
 
Desire understood as production is therefore self-constituting; pleasure is 
to be recognized as immanent to the productive process and is no longer 
to be comprehended as the result of the reduction of tension generated via 
lack and castration.  
 
For Deleuze and Guattari, desiring-machines are both binary and 
linear in that ‘one machine is always coupled with another’ (ibid, p.5). Such 
 149 
binary connections create a productive synthesis - referred to by Deleuze 
and Guattari as the connective synthesis of production. As Deleuze and 
Guattari describe: 
 
The productive synthesis, the production of production, is inherently 
connective in nature: “and…” “and then…” This is because there is 
always a flow producing machine, and another machine connected 
to it that interrupts or draws off part of this flow (the breast-the 
mouth). And because the first machine is in turn connected to 
another whose flow it interrupts or partially drains off, the binary 
series is linear in every direction. (ibid, p.5)  
 
Connections that are constituted are capable of themselves producing 
new arrangements and flows of desire, so that as such, there can be no 
centre, lack or origin from which desire can be understood, desire is 
therefore self-constituting. 
 
[…] the synthesis of connection snaps our organs together in a new 
arrangement of its own making and its own design. On this view of 
things, organs are any parts of the body which seen from the 
perspective of the unconscious are capable of […] producing a flow 
themselves, but also of turning the ceaseless flow of libido into an 
affect […], that is to say both an interruption and conversion of 
desire. (Buchanan Op Cit, p.49) 
 
Deleuze and Guattari designate another two syntheses performed upon 
the Body Without Organs that generate both a sense of recognition and 
identity within the circuit of desire; firstly, the disjunctive synthesis of 
recording, as a point of anti-production upon the Body Without Organs, 
allows the recording of a level of intensity upon the body and, secondly, 
the conjunctive synthesis of consumption – consummation, a neutral state 
in between both production and anti-production, which allows the body to 
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recognise itself as these recorded intensities, thus generating a sense of 
identity.  
Deleuze and Guattari claim that our bodies record, or memorise, 
intensities (pleasure or pain) generated by the connective syntheses of 
production. Deleuze and Guattari call this process the disjunctive 
synthesis of recording. The point at which an intensity is recorded is 
referred to as a state of anti-production; this is because an intensity is only 
achieved as an end result of the connective synthesis. At this point, an 
organ is able to differentiate itself from other objects and functions; as 
Buchanan describes, the disjunctive syntheses are ‘the means whereby 
the 'subject' differentiates itself from sheer matter and indeed from the 
smooth surface of the body without organs on which it stands. It takes the 
form of an 'either/or'judgement […]’ (ibid, p.61). For example, when the 
mouth feeds from the breast, the satisfaction obtained is an end product 
that is not productive in itself – this intensity is thereby recorded in the 
body’s memory.  At such a point of anti-production, the mouth as organ is 
released from one connective synthesis, ready to be applied to a potential 
range of others connections: an organ for speaking, smiling, vomiting or 
expelling and inhaling air. Alternatively, some other stimulus may interrupt 
a current connection before achieving a final state of intensity – something 
may catch our eye and forge a new connection, in which case one 
connection is suspended in favour of another – such a circumstance is 
also an instance of anti-production in that a connection becomes 
separated or ended (hence the term disjunctive). This stage within the 
binary-linear series, in which a connection becomes separated, leaving the 
body in a state of potential and indetermination, is what Deleuze and 
Guattari refer to as the Body Without Organs – the point at which the 
intensity level generated through connective productions is reduced to a 
minimum. As Deleuze and Guattari state: 
  
The Body Without Organs is nonproductive; nonetheless it is 
produced, at a certain place and a certain time in the connective 
synthesis, as the identity of producing and the product […] It is the 
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body without an image. This imageless, organless body, the non-
productive, exists right there where it is produced, in the third stage 
of the binary-linear series. (ibid, p.8) 
 
Attached to these two modes, there are two corresponding rhythms of 
attraction and repulsion. When anti-production dominates, the Body 
Without Organs - as disjunctive synthesis - acts as a barrier in order ‘to 
resist linked, connected, and interrupted flows’ (Deleuze / Guattari Op Cit, 
p.9) – this is referred to as a paranoiac machine in that ‘the Body Without 
Organs repels [desiring-machines…] experience[ing] them as an over-all 
persecution apparatus’ (ibid); when desire as production prevails – as 
connective synthesis – machines attach themselves to the Body Without 
Organs as ‘so many points of disjunction, between which an entire 
network of new syntheses is now woven, marking the surface off into 
coordinates’ (ibid, p.12) – this is referred to as a miraculating machine in 
that ‘desiring-machines seem to emanate from it’ (ibid, p.11). Desiring 
production then, is the point at which desire takes flight from the arena of 
anti-production; as Ian Buchanan points out, ‘desiring-production is that 
aspect of desire that the body without organs as the agent of anti-
production is unable to contain, unable to force onto its smooth surface 
and thereby repress it’ (Buchanan 2008, p.44). Which of the two rhythms 
dominates depends upon the particular social mode of production we are 
subject to and how we are positioned in relation to it.  Given this dynamic 
between production and anti-production, it is important to recognise that 
whilst connections are made, suspended and interrupted upon the Body 
Without Organs, it at the same time records these diverse possibilities 
which, in turn, adds to the potential relations to be made amongst them.  
The relationship between production and anti-production brings us 
to a final synthesis in the process of desire which Deleuze and Guattari 
call the conjunctive synthesis of consumption – consummation. This 
synthesis describes the process whereby the subject appears as an 
identity, an object of consciousness, only as a retrospective effect 
generated through the interaction between connective and disjunctive 
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syntheses. This synthesis is referred to as a celibate-machine – celibate 
by the fact it is an in between state, an intensity that remains neutral with 
respect to both production and anti-production; as Deleuze and Guattari 
state: 
 
Let us borrow the term “celibate machine” to designate this 
machine that succeeds the paranoiac machine and the miraculating 
machine, forming a new alliance between the desiring-machines 
and the Body Without Organs so as to give birth to a new humanity 
or a glorious organism. This is tantamount to saying that the subject 
is produced as a mere residuum alongside the desiring-machines, 
or that he confuses himself with this third productive machine and 
the residual reconciliation that it brings about: a conjunctive 
synthesis of consummation in the form of a wonderstruck “So that’s 
what it was!” (ibid, p. 17-8) 
 
 The subject is ‘consummated’ then by a process of identifying with 
the intensities produced and recorded within the disjunctive synthesis. 
This occurs through a process whereby a part of the surplus energy 
created through production is not only used for recording, but is used for 
recognition also. As Deleuze and Guattari put it, just ‘as a part of the […] 
energy of production was transformed into energy of recording […] a part 
of this energy of recording is transformed into energy of consummation’ 
(ibid, p. 17).43 This final synthesis has clear consequences for a notion of 
identity and the desiring subject. Whereas psychoanalytic accounts 
describe the origins of desire as emanating from a lack constituted via the 
relations of the Oedipal triangle – Child, Mother and Father – Deleuze and 
Guattari propose that such identities and relations are already an effect of 
productive desire. As Claire Colebrook describes,  
 
intensities or relations of desire precede the extended bodies or 
terms of mother-father-child of the [Oedipal] family. Before there are 
extended relations among terms […] there must be a surplus or 
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excess of desire. ’ (Colebrook 2006, p.132) 
 
From the point of view of the Body Without Organs then, bodies are ‘not 
yet organized into interchangeable units that can be exchanged […] 
bodies are not yet differentiated into coded forms – mother , father, child – 
but are intensively different’ (ibid, p. 131). As such, desire is not to be 
understood as a relation between pre-given bodies in which one is striving 
for what one does not have (lack) – Deleuze and Guattari state: 
 
Desire does not lack its object. It is, rather, the subject that is 
missing in desire, or desire that lacks a fixed subject […] Desire and 
its object are one and the same thing: the machine, as a machine of 
a machine. (Deleuze / Guattari Op Cit, p. 26)  
 
In Anti-Oedipus, Deleuze and Guattari describes how the immanent 
flow of desire across the body without organs has come to be 
territorialized within the restrictive relations of exchange evident in 
capitalism and Oedipal man. To explain this, Deleuze and Guattari refer to 
the potentialities of gift and theft that underlie the processes of exchange; 
as Colebrook points out,  
 
before there is exchange there is the gift and theft; before there is 
private ‘man’ there is collective investment and group fantasy; and 
before there are relations and systems of persons there is an 
‘intense germinal influx’, a life irreducible to its mediated forms. 
(Colebrook 2006, p. 124-5) 
 
 In accordance with Bataille, Deleuze and Guattari draw our attention to 
desire as the production of a surplus that has the potential to be expended 
prodigally rather than accumulated and invested in a restricted model of 
exchange. With reference to Marcel Mauss’ notion of the gift, Deleuze and 
Guattari propose that our potential is given less in a restricted economy 
that maintains notions of sameness and equivalence, and is more 
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apparent in a prodigal expenditure that manifests itself in an excess of life 
that surpasses mere maintenance and utility. Such a consideration allows 
us to go beyond notions of privatized man and equivalence. Such a 
description is premised on the production of an excessive surplus that is 
characteristic of all desire – it is therefore related to the notion of the 
general economy. Deleuze and Guattari start from the proposition that 
desire is collective and intensive, it’s effects manifest themselves through 
the relations of intensive flows between society and the world. Deleuze 
and Guattari refer to the primitive socius as a territorial machine. Deleuze 
and Guattari describe how the primitive socius creates territories for desire 
that are recorded as relatively stable forms – as such, desire produces 
certain anti-productions that generates limits in which to form regular, 
stable flows of alliance. In such societies, there is a collective investment 
that allows desire to become coded. Territories within the primitive socius 
are coded and marked explicitly in rituals performed upon the body 
(tattooing, scarring and painting). Deleuze and Guattari state: 
 
All the stupidity and the arbitrariness of the laws, all the pain of the 
initiations, the whole perverse apparatus of repression and 
education, the red-hot irons, and the atrocious procedures have only 
this meaning: to breed man, to mark him in his flesh, to render him 
capable of alliance[.] (Deleuze / Guattari 1984, p.180) 
 
Such a process therefore implies that there are not individuals that are 
then marked and signified, rather such collective marking produces 
territories of bodies which are then identified as individuals; as Buchanan 
states, primitive rituals ‘must suppress biological memory and transform it 
into memory for man […]’ (Buchanan 2008, p. 95). The body of the 
individual therefore becomes recognized and orientated towards the 
collective flows of the socius:  
 
For it is a founding act—that the organs be hewn into the socius, and 
that the flows run over its surface—through which man ceases to be 
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a biological organism and becomes a full body, an earth, to which his 
organs become attached, where they are attracted, repelled, 
miraculated, following the requirements of a socius. (ibid, p.144) 
 
As we saw earlier, Deleuze and Guattari split the flow of desire into three 
syntheses: the connective syntheses of production, the disjunctive 
syntheses of recording and the conjunctive synthesis of consumption – 
consummation. By designating desire as productive, Deleuze and Guattari 
already pose a challenge to a model of exchange within restrictive 
economies. From this point of view, desire is not to be understood as an 
exchange between given objects – mother, child, father - as these objects 
are themselves the result of the intensive connective flows of desire which 
produce relatively stable terms and codes. Productive desire is rather the 
process of becoming via the production of connections that generate a 
surplus, it is therefore a means to expand what one is, rather than 
reinforce a notion of sameness and equivalence. It is only through the 
process of a repetition and recording – the disjunctive synthesis – that the 
flows of desire oscillate around points of relative stability. For Deleuze and 
Guattari, a problem only occurs when these points effected from immanent 
desire appear as given laws to which we should submit. Rather than 
viewing desire as a connective this and this, desire becomes a relation of 
either this or this. A relationship of inclusivity is thereby replaced by one of 
restrictive exclusivity; as Deleuze and Guattari state:  
 
The system in extension is born of the intensive conditions that 
make it possible, but it reacts on them, cancels them, represses 
them, and allows them no more than a mythical expression. The 
signs cease to be ambiguous at the same time as they are 
determined in relation to the extended filiations and the lateral 
alliances: the disjunctions become exclusive, restrictive (the 




According to Deleuze and Guattari, the notion of exchange within society 
originates from the idea of extended alliances: there are familial relations 
of bodies – mother father and child – that enter into relations with other 
families in which to extend one’s powers and create a stable network of 
exchange. Deleuze and Guattari believe that prior to modernity, the 
privileged object of exchange was woman. As such, a society of exchange 
orientates around a notion of debt – to give up desire for one’s own family 
or tribe requires the expectation of a return of another body. From this 
view, Oedipal relations can be interpreted as a mode of social exchange in 
which woman is firstly the object prohibited and then exchanged – as such 
desire is produced as desire for a lost object. For Deleuze and Guattari, it 
is wrong to interpret desire from these oedipal relations in that the 
condition for such relations is an intensive desiring production that 
exceeds the relations it generates. 
Deleuze and Guattari explain how the tendency to code desire within the 
territorial machine (primitive socius) has the potential to lead to overcoding 
which, in turn, defines restrictive economies governed by privileged 
signifiers. According to Deleuze and Guattari, the move towards restrictive 
economies of value can be interpreted as a historical tendency towards a 
‘surplus value of code’. This tendency is related a notion of theft. Theft in 
this context is interpreted as a seizure of what one has not produced and 
does not need. Deleuze and Guattari chart this confiscation of surplus 
from the despot to the circulation of money within a capitalist economy. As 
Colebrook states: 
 
Whereas coding produces connections of desire as relatively stable 
and regular, excessive consumption produces a surplus value of 
code – the despot is placed as bearing a divine relation to the 
system, just as capital is regarded as the meaning or reason of our 
systems. (Colebrook 2006, p. 134) 
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For Deleuze and Guattari, the despot is the body that directs the surplus 
within the socius towards itself; by doing so, the despot appears as the 
centre from which all social relations emanate. As Buchanan describes:  
 
The despot […] becomes the full body on which the socius 
inscribes itself, replacing the territorial machine's earth […]The 
territorial machine's components continue to exist, but only as the 
cogs and wheels of the despotic machine that has overtaken them 
from within and without. The new regime overcodes all the previous 
codings of desire and in this way extracts its requisite share of 
surplus value. (Buchanan 2008, p.105) 
 
The despot is described as powerful and socially valued precisely due to 
their capacity to seize the excess within society. Rather than the social 
being premised on notions of exchange and utility then, society is founded 
on an intensive, excessive desire that can then be appropriated. The 
disjunctive syntheses that form a social territory becomes deterritorialized 
when one point within the territory becomes a nexus of flows, therefore 
generating a point that exceeds relations, becoming a surplus value of 
code. Deleuze and Guattari claim that within despotic societies, the 
privileged body that seizes the surplus is removed from the territorial flows 
of collective life and appears as the origin of such flows – as such, this 
privileged despotic body is over-coded. Money is the means by which the 
flows of the primitive socius are deterritorialized and overcoded – metal 
therefore becomes an abstract sign by bearing the sign of the despot. 
Money can then be used as a form of exchange and a means for the 
despot to extract a surplus from the populace in the form of taxes. At this 
point, debt is ‘rendered infinite in the form of tribute to the despot’ (ibid). 
Whereas alliances proceeded from marked debts within the primitive 
socius, exchange now proceed through the generation of the surplus value 
of a single code, money. This has consequences for a notion of the body, 
as Goodchild points out, 
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bodies no longer belong exclusively to the tribe; they also belong to 
the State. The despot functions as a quasi-cause of all production, 
the source of all blessings; this is because all the processes of 
production are represented in terms of the overcoding given by the 
State. (Goodchild 1996, p.95) 
 
Such over-coding has to be internalized if ‘man’ is to recognize 
himself as a private individual for capitalism – it is through the recognition 
of debt in terms of both a despotic threat and the promise of rewards that 
the private individual internalizes a sense of morality and notion of the self. 
This process is mirrored in the Oedipal drama via the threat of castration 
and the internalization of the law of the father. For Deleuze and Guattari, 
the history of capitalism is the history of the privatization of desire. 
According to Deleuze and Guattari, the decoding of flows and the 
internalization of the over-coding of desire prepare society for the potential 
transition from a despotic machine to a capitalist society.  
 
Decoded flows—but who will give a name to this new desire? Flows 
of property that is sold, flows of money that circulates, flows of 
production and means of production making ready in the shadows, 
flows of workers becoming deterritorialized: the encounter of all these 
flows will be necessary, their conjunction, and their reaction on one 
another […] in order for capitalism to be born [.] (Deleuze / Guattari 
Op Cit, p. 223-4) 
 
From this point of view, the deterritorialization of private individuals (both 
workers and capitalists) in conjunction with the flow of surplus capital 
allows production to become consumed by the deterritorialized body of 
capital itself, rather than primarily consumed and enjoyed by despotism. At 
this point, capital becomes the new socius, the quasi-cause that 
appropriates all productive forces. Under capitalism, privatized individuals 
become labouring beings whose force is no longer invested in a coded 
flow directed towards specific objects or privileged subjects, they are, 
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instead, subject to the effects of decoding and deterritorialization achieved 
via the flow of money. In capitalism, the flow of money that was initially a 
means of coding exchange (the representation and exchange of two non-
equivalent items via an external value) becomes a force of 
deterritorialization: the flow of money is itself desired and is the sole goal 
of the economy. According to this point of view then, money that was once 
a flow of alliance, becomes filiative and appears as the origin and ground 
from which all relations emanate. This has the effect of subjugating all 
forms of culture to systems of exchange – here, private man is nothing 
more than an agent for the flow of money and labour.  
 
 For Deleuze and Guattari, the over-coding of capital and its function 
within society is internalized by the individual via the reproduction of 
Oedipal relations. The roles of father, mother and child within this relation 
reflect the functioning of capitalism – the father as phallus reflects the role 
of capital, the mother the role of the earth and its resources and the child 
reflects the role of the worker. As Deleuze and Guattari state: 
 
[A]lliances and filiations no longer pass through people but through 
money; so the family becomes a microcosm, suited to expressing 
what it no longer dominates. In a certain sense the situation has not 
changed; for what is invested through the family is still the economic, 
political, and cultural social field, its breaks and flows […]But in 
another sense everything has changed, because the family, instead 
of constituting and developing the dominant factors of social 
reproduction, is content to apply and envelop these factors in its own 
mode of reproduction. Father, mother, and child thus become the 
simulacrum of the images of capital ("Mister Capital, Madame Earth," 
and their child the Worker), with the result that these images are no 
longer recognized at all in the desire that is determined to invest only 
their simulacrum. The familial determinations become the application 
of the social axiomatic. (ibid, p.264) 
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The channeling of desire via capital is therefore internalized by the 
individual, resulting in the postponement of pleasure for the benefit of 
production. The phallus as signifier is therefore equivalent to the flow of 
capital – there is no desire allowed that is not mediated by the code. 
Desire must therefore invest in capital and repress all desiring production 
that cannot be overcoded or bought. Indeed, capital expels 
deterritorialized flows that it cannot integrate into its system.  
 Deleuze and Guattari are able to criticize restrictive economies of 
value by appealing to immanent desiring productions, the body without 
organs, that underlie extended relations based upon the notions of alliance 
and exchange. As with the general economy, such productions recognize 
the primacy of surplus before any extended relations can take effect. As 
we pointed out earlier, if subjects were only directed to self-maintenance 
then they would only act or expend energy for the sake of reproduction. 
Our previous discussion of psychoanalysis and drives recognized that it is 
precisely the possibility of the organism to form relations beyond necessity 
that creates sexuality as a surplus (the child that replaces the nourishment 
provided by sucking the breast with the thumb generates a desiring 
production as a surplus pleasure). For Deleuze and Guattari, it is precisely 
society’s relation to surplus that defines the degree to which relations are 
governed by a restrictive or general economy. This is evident in capitalism 
in which the flow of capital relies on the appropriation of a surplus that 
allows the circulation of money to appear as the reason and system from 
which all other relations flow.  
 
 In summary, the concept of the Body Without Organs offers 
us a theory of desire that is outside of a notion of presence, identity and 
lack. For the Body Without Organs, desire and its objects are produced 
immanently through the play of difference; the repetitious, continuous flow 
of desire is therefore not predetermined by the phallus or any other object 
that could constitute a metaphysics of presence. The concept fuses 
Deleuze’s notion of difference and repetition with the idea of desire as a 
productive process outside the dictates of some initial presence or origin. 
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Importantly, any sense of recognition or sexual identity within the terms of 
the Oedipal family can only occur at the end of the productive process – 
the conjunctive synthesis of consumption-consummation - rather than 
being perceived as a ‘natural’ given form that both justifies and functions 
through a restrictive, determinate economy. Given this view, Deleuze and 
Guattari champion the idea of a nomadic subject in which the connective 
and disjunctive syntheses at play upon the Body Without Organs generate 
multiple states of being: an eternal return of difference in which the subject 
is constantly under a process of renewal.   
 
The notion of the Body Without Organs has clear consequences for 
a conception of fetishism - if desire no longer has its foundation within a 
notion of some fundamental presence from which a conception of lack can 
be defined, then the fetish can no longer be a disavowal of castration and 
a substitute for that which is perceived as lacking. It can neither be a 
conceptual tool to impose a restricted economy of value substantiated by 
some mythical origin. By perceiving desire as immanent to the 
connections made upon the Body Without Organs, it can also be 
perceived as aligned to the notion of manufacture and artifice which exists 
within the etymology of the concept of fetishism – here desire constructs 
its object, rather than appealing to an ideal: an origin which is both 
impossible and forever lost. As such, the fetish as artifice has the potential 
to appear as the archetype of value, rather than its derivative.  
 
Deleuze and Fetishism 
 
 Contemporary interpretations of fetishism in relation to the work of 
Deleuze and Deleuze and Guattari view the concept in terms of an 
ossifying relationship that homogenizes desiring-production within a 
restrictive economy of value. Whereas much of Deleuze and Guattari’s 
work coincides with this view, there are also other alternate perspectives 
to be found within Deleuze’s writing that suggest fetishism can be both 
generative and productive of value. It will be argued that rather than 
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viewing fetishism as a means to obscure the underlying determinations of 
value, the fetish can be perceived as an archetype in terms of which 
desiring-production can both constitute and disperse value upon the body 
without organs. Such a perspective has the advantage of being able to 
account for modes of fetishism that either coincide with previous values or 
transgress and form new relationships. 
In Difference and Repetition (1968), Deleuze follows Marx’s lead in 
designating the fetish as  
 
an absurdity, an illusion of social consciousness, so long as we 
understand by this not a subjective illusion borne of individual 
consciousness but an objective and or transcendental illusion borne 
out of the conditions of social consciousness in the course of its 
actualisation’ (Deleuze 2004, p. 259) 
 
Fetishism is therefore not false consciousness in terms of an individual 
false belief system, it is an effect of real social conditions within a capitalist 
economy based on the exchange of commodities for money. As such, the 
reality of historical and material social conditions is the arena of non-sense 
(the arbitrary and illusory nature of value) and meaning. Given the social 
reality of such illusions, in which productive relations remain hidden, the 
problem of the commodity and reification escapes consciousness – the 
object of social consciousness therefore manifests itself as a fetish; as 
Deleuze  states: 
 
[H]istory is no less the locus of non-sense and stupidity than it is the 
process of sense or meaning. While it is the nature of 
consciousness to be false, problems by their nature escape 
consciousness. The natural object of social consciousness or 




Deleuze proposes that when social activity disrupts the objects of social 
consciousness via revolution, the unity of fetishistic common sense is 
disturbed: 
 
Social problems can be grasped only by means of a rectification 
which occurs when the faculty of sociability is raised to its 
transcendental exercise and breaks the unity of fetishistic common 
sense. The transcendental object of the faculty of sociability is 
revolution. (ibid). 
 
On this interpretation, fetishism remains the bad agent of illusory value 
that dominates social relations and disavows real relations existing below 
the surface. In Anti-Oedipus, Deleuze and Guattari reiterate a tyrannical 
and restrictive interpretation of the fetish. Here, the fetish functions as a 
means of over-coding social relations in which to give the impression that 
all activity within society emanates from its movement; as such the fetish 
acts as a quasi-cause:  
 
 […] the essential thing is the establishment of an enchanted 
recording 
or inscribing surface that arrogates to itself all the productive forces 
and all the organs of production, and that acts as a quasi cause by 
communicating the apparent movement (the fetish) to them. 
(Deleuze / Guattari 1984, p.11-12) 
 
For Deleuze and Guattari, the fetish has historically manifested itself in a 
variety of forms: the earth, the despot and money. In each case the fetish 
operates as a full body that inscribes value as emanating from itself which, 
in turn, both restricts and reproduces the circuit of a given economy: 
 
What is specifically capitalist here is the role of money and the use 
of capital as a full body to constitute the recording or inscribing 
surface. But some kind of full body, that of the earth or the despot, 
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a recording surface, an apparent objective movement, a fetishistic, 
perverted, bewitched world are characteristic of all types of society 
as a constant of social reproduction. (ibid, p.11) 
 
For Jason Read (2009), a Deleuzean notion of the fetish is similarly 
interpreted as a universal despotic term that appropriates productive 
relations, whilst also appearing to be the form from which all social values 
emanate. As Read states: 
 
[…] the fetish becomes the socius. It is not just that the product, 
society, obscures the productive relations that generate it, it actively 
appropriates them […] Just as the despot appears to be the cause 
and not the effect of subjection, capital appears to be the cause and 
not the effect of labour. (Read 2009, p.88) 
 
As with Baudrillard, the over-coding that occurs in fetishistic relations is 
not a misrepresentation of some innate needs existing within 
predetermined subjects. According to Read, such homogenizing codes 
misrepresent and conceal the immanent and indeterminate relations of 
production that underlie fetishistic value: 
 
[…] society is a fetish (albeit one with incredibly pervasive effects), 
but what it misrepresents is not some underlying reality of ‘individuals 
and families’ but an abstract subjective activity, which is another way 
of saying that what is real is the indetermination and transformative 
nature of activity itself. (ibid, p.99) 
 
For Fadi Abou-Rihan, a Deleuzean notion of the fetish is related to the 
concept of the miraculating machine in that the body without organs, in a 
paranoid state of anti-production, appears as the means by which all other 
circuits of desire flow: the body without organs as money and the phallus. 
Fadi Abou-Rihan states that the fetish can be understood  
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not as a commodity or body part standing in for the absent phallus 
as, presumably, the only legitimate object of desire, but as the 
movement, event and relationship that reverse the connective 
synthesis and fix the machine as fatefully miraculated, as, in other 
words, owing its existence to some body without organs without 
which it cannot survive. The logic of Oedipus is a telling example of 
such a fetish; without, presumably, sanity is impossible. To put it 
bluntly, the logic of the fetish here is the intolerant and singular logic 
of the ‘without me, you are nothing’ […] (Abou-Rihan 2008, p.65) 
 
Under the conditions of patriarchy and capitalism, the fetish can function 
according to this ‘intolerant and singular logic’, however, this does not rule 
out the possibility that a Deleuzean model of the fetish can also generate 
new values that disrupt, deviate and dispense with those values 
associated with restrictive economies. In contrast to the above 
perspectives, a Deleuzean notion of an immanent fetish can be articulated 
that meets the challenge of becoming an untransposable object of desire, 
one that constitutes new values and defies the rule that ‘without me, you 
are nothing’.  
Though Deleuze does not focus on fetishism as a specific topic 
within his work, by examining those points at which the concept occurs, a 
notion of the fetish can be generated that avoids the imposition of a 
restricted economy of value that is substantiated by some mythical appeal 
to an origin that justifies its movement. By conducting such an 
examination, we can take a Deleuzean line of flight beyond some of his 
own writing on the topic. As such, the fetish can act as a means to both 
produce and disperse value without it being confined to an ossified 
singular circuit. This is not to say that fetishism cannot perform the above 
function of generating a restricted and illusory model of value, but it affords 
the fact that this is only one possibility in a multitude of potential values 
that such a revised model of the concept is capable of producing. 
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  Deleuze comments on fetishism in his essay Coldness and Cruelty 
(1967). This essay, written five years prior to Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and 
Schizophrenia (1972), discusses the work of Leopold von Sacher-Masoch 
and identifies the differences in kind between Sadistic and Masochistic 
economies. Deleuze aligns Masochism with the processes of disavowal 
inherent to fetishism44. The process of disavowal in masochism can be 
found in its aim to delay gratification – it neither wishes to succumb to the 
law of the father or the desire for the mother; it therefore illustrates the 
suspension inherent to fetishism:  
 
[O]n the one hand the subject is aware of reality but suspends this 
awareness; on the other the subject clings to his ideal […] The 
Masochistic process of disavowal is so extensive that it affects 
sexual pleasure itself; pleasure is postponed for as long as possible 
and is thus disavowed. The Masochist is therefore able to deny the 
reality of pleasure at the very point of experiencing it, in order to 
identify with the “new sexless man.” (Deleuze 1989, p. 33).   
 
It is in this sense that a relationship between masochism and fetishism can 
be understood. Deleuze refers to Sacher-Masoch’s The Divorced Woman 
(1870) to illustrate this point; on desiring to see his mistress naked, the 
hero of the novel invokes ‘a “need” to “observe,” but finds that he is 
overcome by a religious feeling “without anything sensual about it’ (ibid, 
p.21-2). Deleuze claims that ‘we have here the two basic stages of 
fetishism’ and states that the ascent from the human body to the ideal  
‘must take place under the shadow of the whip’ (ibid, p.22); the whip 
therefore becomes an object of fetishism, alongside Sacher-Masoch’s 
other favourite fetish items: ‘furs, shoes […] the strange helmets that he 
liked to adorn women with […]’ (ibid, p.33). When referring to Freud, 
Deleuze describes the fetish as a ‘frozen, arrested, two-dimensional 
image, a photograph to which one returns repeatedly to exorcise the 
dangerous consequences of movement, the harmful discoveries that result 
from exploration’ (ibid, p.31). Here again, we see a concern for the death–
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instinct and its repetitions – the analogy of suspension with the photograph 
reminds us of Roland Barthes’ declaration that the photograph is the 
‘image which produces Death whilst trying to preserve life’ (Barthes 1984, 
p. 92). This sense of suspense evident in fetishism - where one ‘suspends’ 
our awareness whilst arresting the moment, as in a photograph - is also 
apparent in the masochistic acts described in Sacher-Masoch’s novels: 
 
[…] the masochistic rites of torture and suffering imply actual 
physical suspension (the hero is hung up, crucified or suspended) 
[…] the woman torturer freezes into postures that identify her with a 
statue, a painting or a photograph. She suspends her gestures in 
the act of bringing down the whip or removing her furs; her 
movement is arrested as she turns to look at herself in a mirror’ 
(ibid, p.33). 
 
For Deleuze, this sense of arrest evident in the relationship between 
masochism and fetishism, allows the masochist to generate a suspended 
subjectivity in potential – by disavowing the conventional gendered roles 
within the Oedipal relationship in an attempt to recreate the pre-Oedipal 
world before subjectivity, the masochist renders reality absurd in favour of 
fantasy.  
 
[The Masochist] does not believe in negating or destroying the 
world nor in idealizing it: what he does is to disavow and suspend it, 
in order to secure an ideal which is itself suspended in fantasy. He 
questions the validity of existing reality in order to create a pure 
ideal reality [.]’ (ibid, p. 32-3)  
 
By contesting the validity of existing relations, the masochist therefore 
‘suspends belief in and neutralizes the given in such a way that a new 
horizon opens up beyond the given and in place of it’ (ibid, p. 31).  This 
new horizon – in suspense and in potential – can be clearly related to 
Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of the Body Without Organs, therefore 
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bridging the gap between this concept and Deleuze’s understanding of 
fetishism. As discussed, the Body Without Organs, or anti-production, is a 
notion in which the organs of the body are suspended at degree zero, in 
which the body is at a state of pure potential: a culmination of connective 
syntheses generated through difference and multiplicity. In a state of 
becoming, the Body Without Organs can be identified as the “new sexless 
man”, in that it has no given form, gender or sex prior to the connections 
made within the connective synthesis. In correspondence to the Body 
Without Organs, for Deleuze’s masochist, there is ultimately no static 
identity to be found, whether inside or outside the projected phantasy.45  
In a later discussion of masochism, Deleuze and Guattari make an 
overt relationship between this phenomenon and the Body Without 
Organs. In this latter examination, masochism is also expunged of the 
residues of Freudianism with its emphasis upon Oedipal relations 
revolving around guilt and the father - here, the very notion of a unified 
subjectivity is criticized, as well as the typical phantasies associated with 
an identity inaugurated by lack. In their essay How do you make yourself a 
Body Without Organs? (1980) – written thirteen years after Coldness and 
Cruelty - Deleuze and Guattari state: 
 
[t]he BwO is what remains when you take everything else away. 
What you take away is precisely the phantasy, and signifiances and 
subjectifications as a whole. Psychoanalysis does the opposite: it 
translates everything into phantasies, it converts everything into 
phantasy, it retains the phantasy. It royally botches the real, 
because it botches the BwO. (Deleuze / Guattari 1996, p.151) 
 
In Freud’s later theory of masochism, the condition is viewed as a 
response to the death drive in that, by repeating and containing the level 
of pain received, the subject is able to simultaneously reduce tension and 
control the self-destructive urges that are inherent in its aim to destroy the 
subject. As Freud states: 
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 The libido has the task of making the destroying instinct innocuous, 
and it fulfills the task by diverting that instinct to a great extent 
outwards […] A portion of the instinct is placed directly in the 
service of the sexual function, where it has an important part to 
play. This is sadism proper. Another portion does not share in this 
transposition outwards; it remains inside the organism and, with the 
help of the accompanying sexual excitation […], becomes libidinally 
bound there. It is in this portion that we have to recognize the 
original, erotogenic masochism. (Freud 1924, p.163-4) 
 
As discussed, whereas the Freudian view of the death drive is a desire to 
return to an earlier state without tension (death), Deleuze offers us a 
means whereby a reduction of bodily tension (the Body Without Organs) is 
constituted through difference and the multiplicity of bodily intensities in 
potential. Again, in discussing the relationship between masochism and 
the Body Without Organs, Deleuze and Guattari point out that the 
condition is less about satisfying some archetypal original Oedipal anxiety 
(gaining pleasure through the appeasement of guilt via the infliction of 
pain), it is more to do with the annulment of subjectivity and the generation 
of a Body Without Organs that can channel new forms of becoming. As 
such, this later notion of Masochism that considers the role of the Body 
Without Organs avoids falling into the trap where a maternal pre-Oedipal 
realm is opposed to a paternal symbolic law. When Deleuze and Guattari 
refer to Masochism, they describe two phases: a creation of the degree 
zero of the Body Without Organs, in which previous circuits of ‘subjectivity’ 
are rescinded ready for a second phase in which the generated state is 
prepared for the flow of new intensities. 
 
One phase is for the fabrication of the BwO, the other to make 
something circulate on it or pass across it; the same procedures are 
nevertheless used in both phases, but they must be done over 
twice. What is certain is that the masochist has made himself a 
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BwO under such circumstances that the BwO can no longer be 
populated by anything but intensities of pain, pain waves. It is false 
to say that the masochist is looking for pain but just as false to say 
that he is looking for pleasure in a particularly suspensive or 
roundabout way. (ibid, p. 152) 
 
As such, masochism denies typical libidinal routes and frees desire to 
generate new productions. Deleuze and Guattari use the example of the 
masochist-as-horse. Whereas a conventional psychoanalytic account 
might confine an interpretation of this phenomenon to Oedipal origins, a 
schizoanalytic account denies this reading in favour of a notion of 
becoming.  
 
What is the masochist doing? He seems to be imitating a horse, 
Equus eroticus, but that’s not it. Nor are the horse and the master-
trainer or mistress images of the mother or father. Something 
entirely different is going on: a becoming-animal essential to 
masochism. (ibid, p.155) 
 
For Deleuze and Guattari, the Body Without Organs is generated in which 
to forge new intensities borrowed from those imposed and repeated on 
horses. An inversion of signs is therefore committed – that which tames 
the beast is integrated onto the human body.  
 
The masochist effects an inversion of signs: the horse transmits its 
transmitted forces to him, so that the masochist’s innate forces will 
in turn be tamed […] One series explodes into the other, forms a 
circuits with it: an increase in power or a circuit of intensities […] 
The masochist constructs an entire assemblage that simultaneously 
draws and fills the field of immanence of desire; he constitutes a 
Body Without Organs or plane of consistency using himself, the 
horse, and the mistress.  (ibid, p.156) 
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By referring to the mistress-rider’s boots, a Deleuzean notion of 
masochism from the point of view of the Body Without Organs is clearly 
correlated with a conception of fetishism. The fetish here appears as a 
zone of intensity – a bodily fragment invested with significance via its 
memorization within the disjunctive synthesis. Here the fetish is a zone, an 
imprint, within the culmination of a new subject; as Deleuze and Guattari 
point out:  
  
[L]ittle by little all opposition is replaced by a fusion of my person 
with yours […] In this way, it will no longer be women’s legs that 
have an effect on me, […] you will give me the imprint of your body 
as I have never had it before and would have had it otherwise […] 
Legs are still organs, but the boots now only determine a zone of 
intensity as an imprint or zone on a BwO. (ibid, p.156) 
 
Fetishism as becoming, in which boots and a becoming-horse constitute 
zones of intensity, can be usefully compared to Deleuze and Guattari’s 
relation to sorcery. Sorcery is related to fetishism in that an irrational 
investment in objects and animals occurs within its rituals. Joshua 
Delpech-Ramey argues that Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of becoming 
provides a means to counter the enlightenment’s deprecation of sorcery. 
Delpech-Ramey describes Deleuze and Guattari’s series of becomings in 
A Thousand Plateaus (1980) in terms of a strategy, aligned to sorcery, 
which escapes masculine restricted economies. Deleuze and Guattari 
identify 
a series of thresholds in becoming: becoming-woman, becoming-
animal, becoming-molecular, becoming-intense. As one can 
observe in the ordering of this series, the movement of becoming is 
quite specific: it is a movement away from the stereotypically “male” 
ego, fixated on its isolated body, paranoid about its fragile identity [.] 
(Delpech-Ramey 2010, p. 10-11) 
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For Delpech-Ramey, becoming animal offers the opportunity to adopt 
characteristics of a creature in which to activate an intensity which allows 
the self to subvert and extend its previously restricted limits. Delpech-
Ramey states: 
Sorcerors have affinities for animals and packs of animals because 
a sorcerer’s power inheres in the relations that are possible for her 
to activate between herself and the animals. What is important is 
not that the sorcerer identifies with a snake or a crow, but that in the 
process of relating to those animals, the sorcerer is able to activate 
powers in herself that would otherwise be blocked by the fixations 
of the self upon the self. (ibid, p.14) 
 
New alliances, such as becoming-horse, therefore afford the opportunity to 
subvert filiative notions of identity and value in favour of new intensities; as 
such, established hierarchies of power often resist these alliances. 
Sorcery is 
mysterious, elusive, evasive, “fetishistic,” which is why sorcery often 
appears when alliances are formed. The sorcerer is constantly 
accused of deception or sedition, of betraying the interests of 
society, the family or the state. And there is always an attempt by 
society to corral or break the sorcerer, to re-integrate her and 
confine her to a social role (ibid, p.15)  
 
Whereas established forces in society endorse the repetition of 
conventional  relations, the sorcerer’s fetishistic pacts transgress typical 
limits in a process of becoming; as Delpech-Ramey describes: 
It is selection that is the poetic or religious act of institution. 
Whereas authority figures in society enforce the particular 
contraction that society is, mystics […] expand the aperture of 
human awareness in order to enter into communication with other 
levels of duration—states in which the energies of the virtual whole 
can be given new shape […] What Deleuze and Guattari see in the 
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sorcerer is a particularly condensed ability to “go beyond” the 
normal plane of development. (ibid, p.12-13) 
 
The generation of new alliances, which constitute novel states of 
becoming, therefore allow us to understand fetishistic relations as 
productive points of transgression. Fetishistic relations can therefore be 
understood as either a repetition of a conventional value system or the 
generation of a novel form - it is a matter of selection dependent on their 
relation within or beyond the circuit of a restrictive economy.  
 
 The relationship between masochism and fetishism within 
Deleuze’s Coldness and Cruelty has been explored by Amanda Fernbach. 
In Fantasies of Fetishism: From Decadence to the Post-Human (2002), 
Fernbach argues that masochism can be recognized within the category of 
‘decadent fetishism’ – a category that shares a similar concern for artifice 
that is to be found in the Deleuzean model. Decadent fetishism is 
characterized by both the superficial and the artificial. For Fernbach, 
decadent fetishism can occur in two ways: 
 
Either by disavowing one’s own cultural lack from a position of 
cultural marginality, or by disavowing the cultural lack of the Other 
from a position of cultural centrality. The latter is often 
demonstrated in idealizations of and identifications with the Other; 
the woman, the non-white, the homosexual. (Fernbach 2002, p. 
26). 
 
Such occurrences therefore derive from the artificial creation and 
performance of anti-normative subjectivities. These manufactured 
subjectivities transgress conventional social hierarchies and binary 
oppositions; as Fernbach states: 
 
Decadent fetishism can be transgressive of hegemonic hierarchized 
binaries, either by inverting the binary, or by celebrating non-
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hierarchized difference. Rather than disavowing difference by 
making the Other the Same, decadent fetishism tends to proliferate 
differences. (ibid, p. 27) 
 
Decadent fetishism therefore shares with a Deleuzean methodology a 
concern for difference rather than an appeal to the Same. Fernbach points 
out that for Deleuze, masochism involves ‘ not only a turning away from 
the paternal signifier, but a killing off of the father and the creation of a 
female symbolic’ (ibid, p.208); masochism therefore ‘involves a positive 
idealizing of [the mother] as representative of culture and law’ (ibid, p.209). 
This subversion is achieved via the creation of an artifice situation in which 
punishing woman, as representative of the law, lacks nothing whereas the 
father, as represented by the masochist, is degraded and reduced to 
nothing; as Deleuze states: 
 
There is a disavowal of the mother by magnifying her (“symbolically 
the mother lacks nothing”) and a corresponding disavowal of the 
father by degrading him (“the father is nothing”, in other words he is 
deprived of all symbolic function). (Deleuze 1989, p. 64) 
 
Masochism therefore ‘parallels the process of decadent fetishism, 
whereby anti-normative subjectivities are created through illegitimate 
identifications’ (Fernbach Op Cit, p. 208). Fernbach reiterates that, 
according to Deleuze, the masochist is trying to create ‘a pre-symbolic, 
pre-phallic realm, holding the arrival of the father and the Law in 
abeyance’ (ibid, p.219). The sexuality of the ‘new man’, in the form of the 
masochist, is therefore ‘not genital like the father’s but ‘interrupted’ and 
diffuse’ (ibid, p.221).  
Fernbach rightly criticizes Deleuze for perceiving woman’s role as 
passive within the masochistic contract. In Coldness and Cruelty, Deleuze 
breaks with convention by perceiving Sadism and Masochism as two 
completely different psychic phenomena; however, this separation is 
realized at the expense of female agency by reducing the ‘role of woman 
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torturer purely to an effect of the masochist’s will and imagination’ (ibid, 
p.216). As Deleuze states: 
 
The woman torturer of masochism cannot be sadistic precisely 
because she is in the masochistic situation, she is an integral part 
of it, a realization of the masochistic fantasy […] Whenever the type 
of the woman torturer is observed in the masochistic setting, it 
becomes obvious that she is neither a genuine sadist nor a 
pseudosadist but something quite different. She does indeed 
belong essentially to masochism, but without realizing it as a 
subject; she incarnates instead the element of “inflicting pain” in an 
exclusively masochistic situation (Deleuze Op Cit, p.41-2).  
 
By examining sadomasochistic practices within contemporary culture, 
Fernbach negates the perceived lack of agency within the dominatrix; 
contra Deleuze, she states that ‘rather than existing in parallel worlds that 
never intersect, contemporary sadists and masochists seek each other out 
in order to negotiate a consensual arrangement for mutual satisfaction’ 
(Fernbach Op Cit, p.217-8). Despite this corrective, Fernbach maintains 
that Deleuze’s interpretation of masochism, as a form of decadent 
fetishism, provides an opportunity for the ‘spectacular resignification of 
bodies and subjectivities in terms of social power through non-hegemonic 
identifications’ (ibid, p. 223). As such, masochism maintains the possibility 
for the generation of fetishistic relations that generate novel values that 
transgress conventional codes.  
  
 In Cinema 1: The Movement Image (1983), Deleuze again makes 
reference to fetishism, this time in the context of the impulse–image. The 
impulse-image is identified as part of a typology of cinematic images. The 
impulse-image is recognised as an image type fitting in between the 
affection-image and the action-image. Deleuze describes the affection-
image as ‘power or quality considered for themselves, as expresseds’ 
(Deleuze 2008, p.99). The particular qualities, or intensities, of form, 
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colour, sound and movement are all instances of affect within a cinematic 
scene.46 In its focus on the stylistic affect of an image, the affect-image 
can be described as ‘any-space-whatevers’ in that the affect is separate, 
or can be abstracted, from the particular determined context of the image 
– as such, affects are ‘pure singular qualities or potentialities – as it were, 
pure possibilities’ (ibid, p.105).  
The action-image is the ‘incurving of the universe, which 
simultaneously causes the virtual action of things on us and our possible 
action on things’ (ibid, p.67). As such, action ‘relates movements to ‘acts’ 
(verbs) which will be the design for an assumed end or result’ (ibid). The 
action-image is therefore that which provokes its meanings and effects for 
us through the progression of elements through space-time – whether 
these are movements within a discrete mise en scene or those generated 
through montage. As elements progressing within a given space-time, 
they are situated within a determined milieux in that they ‘are actualised 
directly in determinate, geographical, historical and social space-times’ 
(ibid, p.145).  
For Deleuze, the impulse-image is ‘not an any-space-whatever 
(although it may resemble one), because it only appears in the depths of a 
determined milieux; but neither is it a determined milieu, which only 
derives from the originary world’ (ibid, p.127). The ‘originary world’ is 
‘composed of unformed matter, sketches or fragments, crossed by non-
formal functions, acts, or energy dynamisms […]’ (ibid, p.128) – it is an 
environment occupied by impulses (drives and forces) that lack categorical 
differentiation; Deleuze gives the example of characters that are like 
animals, not because ‘they have their form of behaviour, but because their 
acts are prior to all differentiation between [them]’ (ibid). Such lack of 
differentiation allows impulses to ‘seize fragments in [this] originary world’ 
(ibid) in which appear ‘heads without necks, eyes without faces, arms 
without shoulders, gestures without form’ (ibid). This originary world has 
unity, ‘not in an organisation, but […in the sense that] all parts converge in 
an immense rubbish-dump or swamp’ (ibid); as such, this world is both 
‘radical beginning and absolute end’ (ibid) in that it plays upon repetition 
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and difference. Given this, the impulse-image corresponds to the themes 
of both the death-instinct and the eternal return discussed earlier. 
Whereas the death-instinct aims to reduce all tension to zero degree, thus 
eradicating any static intensities, Deleuze’s interpretation of the eternal 
return allows a repetition of a state of becoming. Given that the impulse is 
the energy that seizes upon the fragments drawn from this originary world 
from which a determined milieu is derived, it is comparable to the Body 
Without Organs upon which connective syntheses are made which are 
then recorded to constitute recognisable identities. Deleuze divides the 
impulse-image into two elements: symptoms and fetishes. The impulse 
energies are symptoms, whereas the fragments are the partial objects 
towards which these energies are directed. It is the investment of energy 
into these fragments that constitute these partial objects as fetishes. 
 
To explain the relationship between the fragment and fetishism, 
requires an understanding of the fragmented body in relationship to desire 
within the work of Deleuze and Guattari. This relationship can be 
understood by clarifying the differences between psychoanalytic notions of 
the fragmented body and those within the schizoanalytic theories 
proposed within Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia.  
Prior to a perceived loss of an original object of desire, Lacan 
envisages a fragmentary bodily experience within the Real; such an 
experience exists before the subject recognises a coherent, unified self 
that comes into being during the Mirror Stage of development that 
constitutes the Imaginary. This perception of a fragmentary bodily 
experience is informed by Melanie Klein’s insight into partial-objects47 
Klein believed that during the pre-oedipal years of an infant’s life, feelings 
of love and aggression are fantasised onto parts of the mother’s body. For 
Klein objects could be designated as either good or bad – often both of 
these attributes could be manifest in the same object. During the oral-
sadistic phase, the breast is perceived as a good object at the point it 
offers the pleasure of nourishment and a bad object if it is withdrawn or 
fails to provide milk. As Klein points out, ‘the ego introjects objects ‘good’ 
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and ‘bad’, for both of which its mother’s breast is the prototype – for good 
objects when the child obtains it and bad when it fails him’ (Klein 1935, 
p.116).  The part-object is therefore subject to processes of attraction and 
repulsion. The sadistic element in this stage exists in the child’s 
aggressive desire to incorporate and devour the breast – a desire driven 
by both the child’s envy of the breast which it perceives as ‘giv[ing] him all 
he needs’ (Klein 1956, p.212) and its longing ‘for an inexhaustible and 
always present breast […] which would not only satisfy him but prevent 
destructive impulses and persecutory anxiety’ (ibid). During the anal-
sadistic phase, the child enters into a stage of self-mastery in which 
faeces is either retained or ejected. For the child, faeces become an object 
of exchange that can be either ejected to satisfy the will of the mother or, 
alternatively, can be retained as a means of autoeroticism that 
simultaneously asserts the will of the child. In both cases, the part-object is 
both an object of pleasure and an object of frustration.48  
For Lacan, Klein’s notion of the part object is useful in that it 
emphasizes the partial nature of all drives – for Lacan, part-objects exist 
‘not because [...they] are part of a total object, the body, but because they 
represent only partially the function that produces them’ (Lacan 2006, 
p.693). As we have seen, whereas objects have their biological role, their 
function in desire relies on the surplus of pleasure generated – as such, 
they are represented in the unconscious as partial with their original 
biological function being ignored. Further to this, for Lacan, part objects 
are partial in that they become subject to signifiers within the symbolic 
order: 
 
[W]hether part-objects or not, but certainly signifying objects – the 
breast, excrement, and the phallus – are no doubt won or lost by 
the subject; he is destroyed by them or preserves them, but above 
all he is these objects […] This form of identification merely 
demonstrates the pathology of the path down which the subject is 
pushed in a world where his needs are reduced to exchange values 
 179 
– this path itself finding its radical possibility only in the mortification 
the signifier imposes on his life […] (ibid, p.513) 
 
For Lacan, the part object is therefore something produced and negotiated 
within an inter-subjective relationship within the Imaginary, which is then 
subject to the alienating function of the symbolic; as such the part object 
becomes an object of exchange within an economy of desire based on 
lack. Whereas Lacan uses Melanie Klein’s insight into partial-objects49 to 
support his claim that a fragmentary perception of bodies exists prior to 
Oedipalisation within the Symbolic Order, Deleuze and Guattari critique 
Klein’s notion in which to indicate that, though a conversion to whole 
objects takes place, a unified subjectivity is an effect of repression and 
such an identity is never complete: unified subjectivity is but a provisional 
state generated upon the Body Without Organs. Though indebted to 
Klein’s notion of partial-objects, Deleuze and Guattari question the 
assumption that such objects can only be understood as a stage of 
development towards the unified Oedipal subject:  
 
Melanie Klein was responsible for the marvellous discovery of 
partial objects, that world of explosions, rotations, vibrations. But 
how can we explain the fact that she has nonetheless failed to 
grasp the logic of these objects? […] She does not relate these 
partial objects to a real process of production – of the sort carried 
out by desiring machines, for instance. [S]he cannot rid herself of 
the notion that schizoparanoid partial objects are related to a whole, 
either to an original whole that existed earlier in a primary phase, or 
to a whole that will eventually appear in a final depressive stage 
(the complete Object). […] Partial objects unquestionably have a 
sufficient charge in and of themselves to blow up all of Oedipus and 
totally demolish its ridiculous claim to represent the unconscious, to 
triangulate the unconscious, to encompass the entire production of 
desire. (Deleuze / Guattari 1983, p.44) 
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For Deleuze and Guattari then, part objects are those disjunctive 
syntheses produced upon the Body Without Organs – the point at the end 
of a productive connective synthesis in which a surplus, or anti-production 
occurs, giving the resulting organ the opportunity to make new 
connections. As such, part objects have their own self-sufficient economy 
detached from the edicts of the Oedipal symbolic order with its emphasis 
upon presence and lack. As Brian Massumi points out:  
 
The fragmentation exhibited by the “pre-Oedipal” body is in fact the 
fractality of part-objects […] – not the debilitating lack of an old unity 
but a real capacity for new connection. It is not a negativity in 
contrast to which a plenitude might be desired. It is a positive 
faculty for the production of connective syntheses [.] (Massumi 
1992, p.85)  
 
 For Deleuze and Guattari, the part object is therefore a fragment 
which exhibits a ‘real capacity for new connection’ - it is an immanent 
creation with the potential to generate new pathways of desire; such 
fragments are therefore not a residue from an old perceived unity in which 
differentiation is yet to occur, neither is it a precursor to the differentiated 
unity of the symbolic subject that is contingent on lack.  As we have seen, 
for Lacan, the notion of the part object is useful in that it emphasizes the 
partial nature of drives; for Deleuze, the concept of the part object is useful 
in that it demonstrates the operation of connective syntheses at the heart 
of desire. In each case, desire and its objects exist as a surplus: a 
temporary connection, or organ, in an otherwise fragmented body.  
 
These fetishes-as-fragments within the impulse-image exist through 
an act in which the impulse shatters the cohesion of previously identified 
objects. As examples of connective syntheses, the impulse is the eternal 
state of becoming that constitutes our condition; as such, for Deleuze 
these fragments as fetishes are not deviations from our nature, but 
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desire’s genuine expression within specific social and historical conditions. 
As Deleuze states: 
 
The object of the impulse is always the ‘partial object’, or the fetish; 
a haunch of meat, a raw morsel, a scrap, a woman’s briefs, a shoe 
[…] The impulse is an act which tears away, ruptures, dislocates. 
Perversion is therefore not its deviation, but its derivation, that is, its 
normal expression in the derived milieu’. (Deleuze 2008, p.132) 
 
The task of the impulse-image then, corresponds to that of desiring-
machines – in both cases, a deterritorialisation occurs before any 
reconstitution comes into affect; as such, the impulse is productive and 
has the same aim as the death-instinct: to reduce tension (intensities) to a 
minimum level. As we have seen, in Deleuze’s view such a reduction is 
achieved not through a return to some prior original state, but through a 
repetition of difference and multiplicity.  
 
[I]mpulses have the same goal and the same destiny: to smash into 
fragments, to tear off fragments, gather up the scraps, form the 
great rubbish dump and bring everything together in a single and 
identical death impulse. (ibid, p.134) 
 
Whereas earlier we recognized a ‘becoming-animal essential to 
masochism’, we have identified a similar phenomenon in the impulse-
image. In both cases, such an occurrence represents a denial of the unity 
of the subject and a lack of differentiation between the body and the world 
– here we are a Body Without Organs simmering with potential. The 
masochist ‘subject’ is invented anew via harnesses, straps and a 
commanding mistress in boots, the impulse-image is a fragmented partial 
object in potential, independent of any unified sense of subjectivity. 
Becoming-animal therefore reduces us to a Body Without Organs ready to 
be retrained / tamed via new paths of potential which establish fetishistic 
zones that generate new identities.  
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On examining Deleuze’s writings on the fetish, we have recognised 
a clear relationship between his notion of this concept and the Body 
Without Organs. For Deleuze, the fetish is the production of a new object 
of desire akin to those produced upon the Body Without Organs. In the 
case of Deleuze’s comparison with masochism, the fetish appears as a 
means of suspending subjective relations and putting them in potential, 
ready for the production of new zones of intensity; the fetish therefore 
corresponds again to the Body Without Organs in that there is no 
determined state prior to the connections made within the connective 
synthesis. In the case of the impulse-image, fetishes are those part-
objects invested with energies that dislocate such entities from their 
previous contexts; as such, the fetish of the impulse-image corresponds to 
the disjunctive synthesis achieved upon the Body Without Organs. Given 
the correspondence between the Body Without Organs and fetishism 
within Deleuze’s work, a conception is determined in which the fetish is 
generated through immanent desire without the determination of a 
fundamental presence or lack. This revised conception of the fetish 
manifests itself in terms of fragments; as we have seen, for Deleuze, both 
the connective synthesis and the impulse-image have the potential to 
rupture, dislocate and fragment in which to reinvest objects with new 
possibilities. These new manifestations are then recorded and memorised 
as so many coordinates of desire within the disjunctive synthesis. Finally, 
the conjunctive synthesis of consumption – consummation allows us to 
recognise these coordinates as a given state of subjectivity - an identity 
always subject to transformations generated by further flights of desire.  
In this section, an exploration of Deleuze’s notion of difference and 
repetition has given us a means of viewing the repetition of desire as an 
immanent and productive process that is no longer tied to a self-present 
identity – the phallus - that instigates lack within its economy. The notion 
of the Body Without Organs has demonstrated how desire operates in a 
cyclical rather than linear motion in which new pathways of desire are 
simultaneously forged and dispersed via a series of syntheses. These 
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syntheses provide a means to recognize the constitution of identity without 
recourse to some initial origin or presence.  
Desire understood as a cyclical play of difference has been found to 
have implications for a revised notion of the fetish. By examining 
Deleuze’s writing on the topic, fetishes can be understood as fragments 
constituted by desire which have the potential to suspend, rupture, 
dislocate and connect, allowing new values and possibilities for desire to 
be formed through a process of deterritorialization. A revised Deleuzean 
notion of the fetish therefore corresponds to Bataille’s concept of the fetish 
as an untransposable object of desire. As with Bataille’s notion, a 
Deleuzean concept of the fetish traverses the realm of life and death, of 
the sacred and profane – the process of becoming enacted upon the body 
without organs witnesses the death of one state in the life-affirming 
production of another. Unlike the Bataillean account, a Deleuzean 
conception has the advantage of allowing us to interpret and understand 
the fetish at the point of excess – whereas Bataille believes the fetish must 
remain ineffable in its affect, a Deleuzean account views the excess 
associated with its affect as a stage towards the forging of a new identity: 
the conjunctive synthesis of consumption – consummation. Whereas 
Bataille is suspicious of any theory of the fetish that transposes it back 
within social codes and conventions, a Deleuzean conception avoids this 
retrogressive movement by premising any subsequent identity and value 
upon a notion of difference within a continuous cycle of becoming. Given 
this, a Deleuzean account also has the advantage of allowing us to 
understand how desire manifests itself in both restrictive and general 
economies – it operates as either a reified or transgressive force 
depending upon the stage it appears within the series of syntheses and, 
also, which stage is endorsed via the social relations of power at a given 
point in time. Either way, the fetish is to be understood as artifice, a 
productive outcome of desiring machines constituted upon the body 
without organs. In turn, the body without organs can itself be understood 
as a fetishism machine, upon which value can be both constituted and 
dispersed. Whereas contemporary writers have described the fetish in 
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Deleuzean thought as a reifying tendency towards anti-production, they 
have not considered the possibility that the lines of flight that constitute 
desiring-production can themselves be considered as fetishistic modes of 
transgression which can forge new values. If, as described, the fetish as 
socius (the earth, despot and money) was initially a term which 
deterritorialized itself and then appropriated given surplus relations, then 
the transgressive act should itself be considered a fetishistic mode of 
desire – one that is untransposable and immanent to the relations it 
generates. 
Given a revised interpretation of the fetish, the conventional notion 
of disavowal within the concept can also be challenged – it is not so much 
a refusal to acknowledge the ‘true’ determinants of value within the object 
(this risks leaving reified relations of utility, presence and lack in place), it 
is more a refusal to acknowledge the artifice and socially constructed 
nature of such relations. As Jason Read argues, revolutionary desiring 
production is positioned against a Deleuzean notion of the ‘fetish as 
socius’ that disavows and conceals this underlying and determining force. 
This relationship can be understood in terms of ‘the creative activity 
constitutive of society and its actual articulation and concealment within a 
specific society’ (Read 2009, p.100). In the analysis of political economy 
conducted by Marx, this lack of acknowledgement of underlying productive 
relations is clearly recognized, whereas the rigidity of the phallic economy 
in psychoanalysis prevents the role of excess and artifice (both premised 
on a notion of human agency) from being given warranted attention in the 
construction of fetishistic relations. This modified notion of disavowal is 
foregrounded once a revised notion of the fetish as a fragment invested 
with productive desire is recognized.  
As we have described, fetishism has previously been discussed in 
terms of an “unnatural” and perverse desire in contrast to legitimate 
“natural” needs associated with utility and (re)production. Debra Curtis 
argues that we need to ‘break free from this legacy’ (Curtis 2004, p. 108). 
Curtis’ anthropological study of commodities in relation to sexual 
subjectivities proposes that contemporary sexual practices cannot be 
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sufficiently understood in terms of previous categories of sexual identity. 
The fetishisation and consumption of commodities within sexual practices 
has instigated a plethora of new sexual subjectivities that disrupt 
conventional notions of sexual identity. Curtis states that fetishism allows  
 
us to explore the contingent nature of the erotic as well as the 
social and economic structures shaping it […F]etishism also 
encourages us to look at the flux and variability of desire 
[…allowing us to] resist cataloguing the varieties of sexual practices 
around sexual identities. (ibid).    
 
As we have argued, a Deleuzean theory of the fetish constituted upon 
difference and becoming proposes that the notion cannot be understood in 
terms of a predetermined set of identities, it is therefore suggested that 
such a theory will have greater efficacy in analyzing new forms of 
subjectivity constituted via a fetishistic engagement that generates new 
forms of desire. Let us now consider contemporary models of fetishism in 
which to ascertain the degree to which such theories compare in their 
efficacy for interpreting modes of fetishism that transgress conventions 
and establish new values. 
 
Deleuze and Contemporary Theories of Fetishism 
 
 Contemporary theories of fetishism attempt to avoid the narrow 
confines of the Oedipal family romance when discussing the fetish. For 
these writers, a taxonomy or strategy for the notion is identified that 
recognizes wider cultural trends and implications for a theory of the 
concept. As will be suggested, by interpreting the fetish from the 
perspective of traditional and, in some cases, unsubstantiated principles 
that have remained persistent throughout the history of the concept, such 
revisions continue to focus on notions of presence, lack and the 
oppositions a restrictive economy puts in place, despite their intention to 
widen the scope of concept. It is proposed that a Deleuzean notion of the 
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fetish has greater efficacy in that it allows the notion to be understood as 
productive of value, operating outside the realm of origins, presence and 
lack. 
 
 For Amanda Fernbach (2002), fetishism can be understood via a 
range of strategies that either assimilate the Other, negate the self / other 
distinction or transform the self into an image of otherness. Fernbach 
produces a taxonomy of fetishism that includes:  
 
[M]aking the Other over in the image of the self (classical fetishism), 
merging with the Other (pre-oedipal fetishism) in a partial (matrix 
fetishism) or complete annihilation of the self (immortality fetishism), 
and transforming the self into an image of Otherness (decadent 
fetishism). (Fernbach 2002, p. 228) 
 
 Fernbach’s taxonomy has the benefit of celebrating ‘the 
fluidity of meaning [and] deconstructing the binary categories that classical 
psychoanalysis works within’ (ibid, p.223). However, by subscribing to a 
notion of lack and disavowal, based upon traditional psychoanalytic 
notions of phallic presence, it can be argued that Fernbach’s 
deconstruction of typical binary oppositions remains tied to the limited 
terms of play determined within a singular phallocentric economy. As we 
described earlier, Fernbach argues that masochism can be recognized 
within the category of ‘decadent fetishism’ – a category that shares a 
similar concern for artifice that is to be found in the Deleuzean model. 
Identifying its initial occurrence at the fin de siècle, decadent fetishism 
describes the tendency to subvert social norms via the use of artifice and 
masquerade within culture. At a time when social roles and values within 
modernity were being challenged, especially around notions of gender and 
sexuality, ‘decadence’ can be described as a ‘pejorative label applied by 
the bourgeoisie to everything  that seemed unnatural, artificial, and 
perverse, from Art Nouveau to homosexuality’ (Showalter 1991, p.169).  
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Given a shared emphasis on difference and artifice, the post-modern age 
is aligned with the decadence of the fin de siècle. Fernbach describes this 
correspondence: 
 
Postmodern narratives […] recycle this decadent desire for the 
artificial over and above the natural body […] It is partly because of 
this fetishistic celebration of artifice and debunking of the self as 
natural that decadence and postmodernism can emphasize the 
potential for transformation and flaunt the generation of new 
identities, for if the self is not bound by nature, it can continuously 
be redesigned, recreated. (Fernbach Op Cit, p.43) 
 
When discussing sadomasochism within contemporary fetish 
cultures, Fernbach argues that they have subversive potential because 
they ‘suggest power is not natural, but arbitrary and artificial; they 
theatricalize power relations and so destabilize hegemonic cultural codes 
that naturalize the prevailing relations of power’ (ibid, p. 193). According to 
Fernbach, such a phenomenon therefore coincides with Deleuze’s notion 
of masochism. Fernbach acknowledges that ‘fetishism provides a way to 
productively theorise postmodernism’s generation of new subjectivities 
and reconcile this with its narratives of exhaustion’ (ibid, p. 229). As such, 
it is suggested that a ‘better understanding of fetishism in all its multiplicity 
can enable us to survive this lack of a sense of wholeness and 
completeness that pertains to the postmodern condition, and reminds us 
that this is the loss of something that never was’ (ibid). Fernbach therefore 
recognizes that in an age in which identity is increasingly fragmented and 
shared universals are both unsustainable and refuted, fetishism offers us a 
means of understanding the production of new values, desires and 
identities. Unfortunately, Fernbach’s recognition of hybridity and artifice in 
the construction of fetishism is always understood via the traditional 
framework of presence and absence. Despite Fernbach’s largely positive 
assessment of Deleuze’s theory of fetishism, her own analysis remains 
tainted by psychoanalytic concerns for presence and lack which are 
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ultimately tied to a singular phallocentric sexual economy. For Fernbach, 
there are two kinds of decadent fetishists: 
 
[T]he dominatrix who uses her role to disavow women’s cultural 
lack and fantasize into being an omnipotent feminist figure, and the 
male masochist who renounces orthodox masculinity for a non-
phallic yet male heterosexual subject position. (ibid, p. 223) 
 
In both cases, the subject position is taken by either adopting or 
renouncing the phallic role. Subversion is therefore tied to a privileged 
signifier, despite the emphasis on ‘masquerade, the shifting of identities in 
terms of gender and sexuality between male and female, homosexuality 
and heterosexuality’ (ibid). Fernbach composes a taxonomy of fetishism 
that defines how value and difference between subjects can be 
negotiated, these include: 
 
[M]aking the Other over in the image of the self (classical fetishism), 
merging with the Other (pre-oedipal fetishism) in a partial (matrix 
fetishism) or complete annihilation of the self (immortality fetishism), 
and transforming the self into an image of Otherness (decadent 
fetishism). (ibid, p. 228) 
 
Within each of these categories, the fetish ‘disavows some kind of lack as 
it transforms identity and offers the subject satisfaction, even though this 
satisfaction is somewhat illusory’ (ibid). The emphasis on the disavowal of 
lack and the illusory nature of satisfaction is symptomatic of an analysis 
that subscribes to an original presence and is therefore deficient of a 
means to account for difference outside of its terms. Though this 
interpretation endorses a difference that transgresses typical binary 
oppositions and power relations, it is a limited difference that remains tied 
to the limited terms of play defined and determined within a singular 
economy of value. Fernbach’s analysis and taxonomy ultimately remains 
tied to a psychoanalytic model premised upon the privileged phallic 
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signifier and is completely blind to the socio-economic realm (notice the 
lack of commodity fetishism within the above taxonomy) which influences 
the degree to which conventional social and gender roles are reified or 
transgressed.  
 Fernbach’s analysis of masochism does not acknowledge Deleuze 
and Guattari’s later interpretation of masochism in relation to the Body 
Without Organs – this would have been a corrective to her own theory of 
decadent fetishism. Deleuze and Guattari’s account offers us a means to 
understand transgression and the generation of novel values without being 
tied to a premise of presence and lack. Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of 
paranoid machines and desiring machines offers the means to understand 
the tendency for either reification or transgression, depending on our 
relation to a particular social mode of production that determines which 
machine dominates upon the Body Without Organs. At no point is the 
resulting condition of subjectivity and value determined by an original 
relation to lack. By always tying her taxonomy of fetishism to the palette of 
roles offered by a singular economy of value, even the most radical 
transgressions are limited to prescriptive positions, even though these 
positions might be subverted or reversed.   
 In Cultures of Fetishism (2006), Louise Kaplan generates five 
principles, defined as the fetishism strategy, which distinguishes it from the 
reductive notion of fetishism as ‘somehow similar to sexual fetishism’ (ibid, 
p.2). For Kaplan, the notion of the fetishism strategy allows us to consider 
the wider implications of the term as a means to control life forces and 
drives that would otherwise threaten established forms of value and 
desire. As Kaplan states,  
some essentially unknown, intangible, spiritual, and ambiguous 
“someone” or “something” that seems to have a will and energy of its 
own, is transformed into something tangible and concretely real and 
therefore capable of being controlled and manipulated. (ibid, p.5) 
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According to Kaplan, such a means of control is achieved through duplicity 
in which the value of the fetish, used to manipulate, orientate and 
determine economic value in all its forms, is found to ultimately lack 
substantial foundation. For Kaplan, the belief that such forces can be 
‘controlled through the possession and manipulation of a fetish is 
misleading and duplicitous. It is a false belief. And this false belief 
underlies the principles of the fetishism strategy’ (ibid). To use the term 
“fetishism” is therefore to be aware, ‘consciously or unconsciously, of the 
implicit duplicity, falsehood, and fakery that is inherent to the term’ (ibid, 
p.4). Ultimately the fetishism strategy is a  
 
powerful defense that can be evoked, whenever there is a need to 
exercise control over what is experienced as an enigmatic and 
uncontrollable force – a force of nature, a force of human creativity, 
a force of human vitality, a force of violence and aggression’. (ibid, 
p. 178) 
 
Kaplan defines five principles that illuminate this defensive control 
strategy.50 Kaplan’s principles of the fetishism strategy are not to be 
understood as entirely distinct, they are to be perceived as ‘shades and 
reflections of one another’ (ibid, p.5). However, these five principles all 
orientate around the key themes of death, duplicity and disavowal. The 
fifth principle, which concerns itself with the death instinct, is described as 
‘the key to the strategy of fetishism’ (ibid). Despite being a horrifying and 
bizarre perversion, Kaplan believes that necrophilia is intimately related to 
fetishism in that it  
 
expresses succinctly a facet of the fetishism strategy […because in] 
its larger, more encompassing meaning, fetishism is about the 
deadening and dehumanization of otherwise alive and therefore 
threateningly dangerous, unpredictable desires. (ibid) 
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For Kaplan, disavowal is closely associated with the death drive in its 
relation to the fetishism strategy. It is the means by which the 
contradictions at the heart of socio-economic and psychosexual 
economies are assuaged. In each case, the fetish manifests itself at the 
point where one attempts to control the uncontrollable and destructive. 
The surplus inherent to human desire and productivity must be channeled 
into forms that are safe and manageable: money, the phallus or some 
chosen material object. Fetishism, as an act of disavowal, allows us to 
have it both ways – we acknowledge that below singular economies of 
equivalence, there inevitably remains difference, but we deny it in which to 
quell such unruly forces that might destroy these conventional circuits of 
production and reproduction. As Kaplan points out: 
 
The fetishism strategy is habituated to partnering death and 
following its lead. Disavowal, having it both ways, seems to be built 
into the fetishism strategy. Therefore, as the fetishism strategy 
attempts to regulate the full strength of potentially murderous 
impulses, it simultaneously gives some expression to these 
impulses [.] (ibid, p.178) 
 
The belief that disavowal and death are ‘built in’ to the fetishism strategy 
leads Kaplan to conclude that such a strategy might be intrinsic. This, in 
turn, sends Kaplan on a circular path of uncertainty and ambiguity; she 
states:  
 
Is it because the death drive tints itself in erotic colors that we 
become susceptible to the deceptions of the fetishism strategy? Or, 
do our susceptibilities to the deceptions of the fetishism strategy 
arise from the fantasy of Eros holding Thanatos – the death drive – 
in abeyance? (ibid, p.189)  
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Kaplan appears undecided as to whether the reification and alienation of 
human relationships at the start of the twenty first century are entirely the 
result of commodity fetishism or are merely an exaggerated form of an 
essential condition. Kaplan poses the question: 
 
In order to understand the transformations of human existence […] 
at the beginning of the twenty first century, we have to examine the 
susceptibilities of human beings. Why are human beings so 
vulnerable to the allure of the machine? What makes us so 
accepting of dehumanization, alienation, and commodification? 
(ibid, p.176) 
 
Elsewhere, Kaplan hints that these ‘susceptibilities’ to the fetishism 
strategy might be universal and inherent: 
The contradictions have been there for centuries – and possibly for 
all of human history, ever since the first human societies came into 
existence. The fetishism strategy is inherent to the human mind. 
(ibid, p.178) 
Ultimately, Kaplan views the fetishism strategy as an inevitable curse on 
our condition that is more or less exaggerated given certain changing 
social conditions. Kaplan believes we must be ‘friendly to uncertainty and 
ambiguity’ (ibid, p.190) if we are to avoid the trappings of the fetishism 
strategy. At the very least, ‘we should be alert to the danger of repeating 
the traumas of the past each time we venture forth to create something 
different and new’ (ibid).  
 Kaplan criticizes psychoanalytic models that denigrate manifest 
content in favour of deeper and ‘truer’ latent content. According to Kaplan, 
such models proceed as if 
the surface could not itself be psychologically deeper than what lies 
beneath it; as if one surface did not always contend with another; 
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as if depth might not be a screen for what is a painful or frightening 
psychic reality of the manifest present. (ibid, p.125) 
In contrast to such models that are based upon notions of repression, 
Kaplan endorses a methodology borrowed from fetishism, that of 
disavowal. For Kaplan, disavowal has the virtue of encouraging a 
‘collaboration and simultaneity of manifestly antithetical forces that coexist 
in a play of shifting surfaces’ (ibid, p.126). As such, therapy can have it 
both ways, both acknowledging some latent and manifest surfaces whilst 
identifying those that have been disavowed. It is therefore not a process of 
presuming an original latent truth behind manifest images, but rather the 
need to ‘comprehend how this conspicuously foregrounded narrative is 
systemically related to the discordant or latent elements that have been 
cast into the shadows, margins, and background’ (ibid). Such a process 
has the benefit of protecting the ‘patient’s psychic reality by creating an 
atmosphere that gives free rein and expression to the interplay between 
manifest and latent’ (ibid). Kaplan gives an example where the traditional 
latent-manifest hierarchy would be ineffective: ‘a patient might introduce a 
dream in order to obscure and marginalize the painful latent affects and 
thoughts that are threatening to emerge in the transference-
countertransference interaction’ (ibid, p.125). The function of analysis 
then, is not to uncover a repressed narrative according to reified and 
prescribed narrative, it is to recognize the interplay and connection 
between the manifest and latent images which constitute the individual’s 
symptoms, anxieties and desires.  
Whereas there are clear merits to the procedure that Kaplan 
describes, it remains tied to a reductive notion of fetishism. Kaplan’s use 
of the fetishism strategy may not blindly follow the dogma of prescribed 
narratives which could circumvent any recognition of trauma, but such an 
analysis still gives a conventional interpretation of the strategy as a 
duplicitous means to disavowal lack at the heart of trauma – therapy 
therefore remains a search for lack at the heart of desire. When discussing 
desire, Kaplan ridicules some American psychoanalysts for having ‘no 
room for desire, which evokes feelings of absence, lack and longing […] 
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Desire is about suspended excitement and a longing for something not yet 
there.’ (ibid, p.124).  Kaplan’s analysis is possibly still guilty of searching 
for that elusive object of desire at the origin of absence.  
The focus on, and repetition of death in Kaplan’s five principles of 
the fetishism strategy is symptomatic of this retrogressive need to return to 
an original site of trauma, regardless how much this site deviates from 
prescribed psychoanalytic clichés. It is worth reminding ourselves of our 
earlier discussions of the death drive, difference and repetition – here it 
was suggested that the repetitions within the death drive were yet another 
example of the repetition towards an original lost unity: the futile search for 
the elusive original object of desire. By perceiving repetition within desire 
as a process of becoming - a repetition of difference rather than a 
repetition and return – Deleuze offers us a means to view the fetishism 
strategy as creative and productive, rather than a deadening, reifying 
experience.  
Kaplan’s understanding of fetishism misses the opportunity to fully 
explore the flip-side of desire: the desiring machines which are not always 
already prescribed within given modes of production and reproduction; 
desire which forges new connections not constituted on the basis of 
absence and lack. By not giving due consideration to this aspect of desire, 
Kaplan simultaneously reduces the fetishism strategy to a duplicitous 
means for disavowing traumas based upon absence and lack. Kaplan’s 
interpretation therefore fails to recognize this corresponding flip-side of 
fetishism: the artifice that is able to constitute value rather than reductively 
disavowing absence where value cannot be found. Such a reductive 
interpretation perceives the strategy as a resistance to be overcome within 
therapy rather than a potentially positive and productive process.51  
 
 In The Picture of Abjection: Film, Fetish and the Nature of 
difference (2008), Tina Chanter implies that fetishism is complicit with 
narratives and practices that operate via exclusion and inclusion. By 
examining the medium of film, Chanter questions the efficacy of theories 
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that focus on the specular logic of fetishism (Metz 1982 / Mulvey 2009). 
Chanter argues that even when the illusory effects of fetishism are 
unveiled via its exposure as a construction, as in avant-garde cinema, the 
authority of a phallocentric economy of desire still remains – its is either 
uncritically enjoyed or interrupted, no other space for pleasure is allowed; 
as Chanter points out: 
 
At every moment I am reminded of my knowledge that the film is 
not “reality”: I am not allowed to forget its illusory dependence on 
increasingly sophisticated technology. Yet even as such reminders 
debunk the fetishistic strategy, they confirm its authority. Pleasure 
can either conform to the fetishistic model, or it can be interrupted, 
dislocated – there is, apparently, no way of understanding filmic 
pleasure differently. (Chanter 2008, p.42) 
 
The logic of fetishism within these theories is therefore accused of 
assuming an underlying social cohesion in which all are subject to the 
authority of the same restrictive economy, regardless of social position or 
unique specificity; Chanter states:  
 
There is an important sense in which the fetishistic model, and the 
exposure of its logic, fail to acknowledge precisely the extent to 
which identification operates according to a logic as already in 
place socially cohesive communities, whose collective, imaginary 
body images are indeed reflected back to them as invisibly similar – 
or as noticeably dissimilar. The fetishistic disavowal that consists of 
bracketing the fact that I know the fantasy unfolding onscreen is not 
real […] is thereby undercut by a communal recognition that allows 
spectators to read filmic images in terms of a shared imaginary that 
is coded as always already familiar – or marked as unfamiliar, 
different, exotic. (ibid) 
 196 
 
By leaving a shared imaginary in place, theories focused on the logic of 
fetishism risk being complicit with racist narratives and a phallocentric 
economy of desire, despite their critical and emancipatory intentions. As 
previously mentioned, traditional accounts of fetishism have been tied to a 
notion of the civilized west with its universal values and the uncivilized 
non-western other which has been deemed irrational and arbitrary. The 
irrationality of the non-western other has likewise been made analogous to 
the feminine – western societies own internal other. This has been clearly 
apparent in the psychoanalytic discourse of fetishism in which the 
irrational and ‘deviant’ substitution of an object of desire exists as a means 
to negate the horror of femininity – a sexuality perceived as lacking which 
reminds us that there might be a sexuality outside the confines of the 
phallic economy.  As Chanter describes:  
Civilization is assumed to be masculine, white, and heterosexual, 
but in ways that are unmarked by psychoanalytic discourse 
[…Fetishism] fails to acknowledge both that the abjection of women 
remains a model for the abjection of racialized others, and the 
accessory status that blackness accrues in relation to whiteness is 
fashioned by a deeply embedded and institutionally endemic racism 
that is in fact constitutive of whiteness. The exclusion and 
denigration of blackness has helped to make both sexuality and 
whiteness what they are. (ibid, p. 41) 
 
Given the complicity of traditional conceptions of fetishism with a white, 
western and phallocentric viewpoint, Chanter argues for an alternative 
model of analysis based around the theory of the abject. A similar focus 
upon the implications of abjection for a theory of fetishism is also to be 
found in the work of Laura Mulvey.52 Chanter’s theory is informed by 
Kristeva’s notion of abjection in The Powers of Horror (1980). In this work, 
Kristeva argues that abjection is that which disturbs social order and 
borders. It is that which ‘disturbs identity, system, order. What does not 
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respect borders, positions, rules. The in-between, the ambiguous […]’ 
(Kristeva 1980, p.4). Kristeva’s understanding of abjection is informed by 
the work of Mary Douglas. In Purity and Danger (1966), Douglas describes 
how communities identify themselves by delineating that which is 
considered human, pure and clean and that which is considered animal, 
unclean and taboo. Kristeva situates these oppositions in an initial 
abjection of the maternal body, it is argued that this abjection instigates a 
separation that will eventually inaugurate a subject with a desire for 
objects that it recognizes as being other than itself. The abjection of the 
maternal occurs as the child learns to recognize that which pleases and 
displeases it – that which brings pleasure comes to be contained within 
the body, that which brings displeasure is expelled outside. As Chanter 
points out, 
 
abjection functions in a way that privileges the maternal body as a 
site of abjection that facilitates the child’s separation from the other 
by instituting an initial and unstable boundary between subjects and 
objects. It works to set up a tentative subjectivity for the infant, who 
sets itself up as an I through rejecting what comes to be figured as 
the abject maternal body, while remaining beholden to, desirous of, 
and fascinated by the pleasure and gratification provided by the 
maternal body. (Chanter Op Cit, p. 18) 
 
Abjection is therefore viewed as a precondition to narcissism and the 
mirror stage due to the fact it is an attempt to delineate a sense of a 
borderline between the body and its pleasures and an outside. The horror 
in abjection exists in the attempt to expel that from which it cannot be 
excluded – the maternal body operates as an archetype of abjection 
because it is not clearly excluded from the child, it offers an ambiguous 
point of both pleasure and danger; abjection is therefore  
 
above all ambiguity. Because, while releasing a hold, it does not 
radically cut off the subject from what threatens it—on the contrary, 
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abjection acknowledges it to be in perpetual danger. (ibid, p.9) 
 
For Kristeva, the corpse is the ‘utmost of abjection. It is death infecting life. 
Abject’ (ibid, p.4). The corpse has this privileged position due to its 
reduction of identity to refuse and materiality. It reminds us that death is 
always a part of our materiality and being, an inescapable Real that 
threatens to infiltrate the identity of the living.  
 
[R]efuse and corpses show me what I permanently thrust aside in 
order to live. These body fluids, this defilement, this shit are what 
life withstands, hardly and with difficulty, on the part of death. 
There, I am at the border of my condition as a living being. (ibid, 
p.3) 
 
According to Chanter, abjection allows us to conceptualise identity and 
otherness beyond the confines of a restrictive phallocentric economy 
instigated by the Symbolic Order. It is able to do this because it appeals to 
divisions, inclusions and exclusions that predate the phallic Symbolic 
Order and its separation of sexual difference into an economy of having or 
lacking – fantasies of identity and the other are therefore affiliated with the 
pre-oedipal maternal body. 
 
Kristeva’s elaboration of the dynamic of abjection as the projection 
of the mother’s body as that which must be rejected in order for a 
love relation to be conceptualized as such – which is to say, initially, 
in order for any relationship at all to be figured – admits the 
significance of fantasies that do not always already adhere to the 
phallic contours of Oedipus, fantasies that are not always destined 
to be, for example, castration fantasies. (Chanter Op Cit, p. 38) 
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As such, the theory and practice of abjection, with its ambiguities and 
disruptions, has the benefit of being able to both account for, and subvert, 
a variety of social divisions - this is in contradistinction to fetishistic theory, 
which already designates sexual difference, in its phallocentric 
manifestation, as the privileged realm of opposition, despite relying on 
racist assumptions based on notions of irrational primitivism.  
 
The imaginary symbolics fueling racialized, nationalist myths can 
also be thought in terms of the defensive maneuvers of abjection. 
As a protection against emptiness, narcissism is elaborated as a 
defense against abjection, one that precedes the mirror stage, and 
is elaborated by Kristeva in a sensorial register, not limited to the 
scopic drive that fuels either the mirror stage or fetishistic 
disavowal. (ibid, p.21) 
 
Abjection is perceived as allowing an eruption of the real that unsettles 
boundaries and exposes the oppositions upon which our social and 
cultural orders are based. As Chanter describes:    
 
By rendering unfamiliar the familiar, or by rendering familiar the 
unfamiliar, film can produce identifications against the grain of 
familiarity. It can do so by engaging in abject maneuvers, bordering 
on the uncanny […T]hrough the operation of abjection film can 
unsettle the boundaries of subjects and objects, as subjects 
experience a disruption of the identificatory models that have 
served to consolidate the knowledge that allows […the] prototypical 
male subject [to say] that “he knows himself and he knows his like”. 
(ibid, p.42-3) 
 
Chanter’s criticism of fetishism is undoubtedly valid if we perceive 
fetishism in its traditional form – notions of substitution and the disavowal 
 200 
of lack undeniably position fetishistic discourse within the realm of a 
restrictive phallocentric economy in which the myth of the maternal phallus 
emerges. However, as we have argued, if the fetish is no longer premised 
upon the original trauma of the Oedipal scene and is understood to be an 
immanent creative act, in which desire forges new values, then the fetish 
is no longer subject to such criticism. From this point of view, the value of 
the fetish is no longer positioned in terms of a singular ‘universal’ 
restrictive economy and is as arbitrary as those fetishistic values of 
‘primitive’ cultures described by Hegel.  An immanent notion of the fetish, 
generated through difference without recourse to an origin, therefore 
overturns the principle of universal value and endorses an arbitrariness 
that was previously considered other. In fact, the perceived deviancy of 
the fetish can be perceived as corresponding to the conditions of abjection 
– the fetish, as artifice, always exists on the borderline between value and 
its dispersal. Whereas death is, according to the logic of the abject, the 
ultimate recognition that the boundary between identity, self, other and the 
object is tenuous, for the immanent fetish, though death remains 
ambiguous, it is a positive ambiguity – a nausea and vertigo of becoming.  
On this interpretation, disavowal within fetishism is a disavowal of 
becoming that occurs within certain socio-economic or psycho-sexual 
circumstances – in such circumstances the paranoiac machine of anti-
production dominates.  
There is also a potential danger in Chanter’s argument. Chanter 
suggests that ‘abjection be understood as an inscription of negativity that 
functions as a precondition of fetishistic disavowal […]’ (ibid, p.21). By 
describing abjection as an origin to anxieties about sexual difference and 
all anxieties where ambiguity threatens to disrupt conventional social 
oppositions, Chanter risks fetishizing the maternal body – one that still 
remains as an ‘outside’ to Oedipal logic and therefore operates within its 
terms. Chanter, herself, warns us that us by situating ‘abjection within an 
Oedipal narrative in which the phallic order is “traversable”, [such a] 
traversibilty still testifies to privileging sanctioned forms of hegemonic 
authority […]’ (ibid, p.38). Kristeva’s appeal to the maternal body as an 
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original abject moment, therefore risks falling into the same pattern of 
inclusions and exclusions that define some as acceptable and others as 
unacceptable. Chanter points out, the ‘construction of the maternal body 
as abject might be read as inseparable from the devaluation of 
motherhood that pervades […] modernity’ (ibid, p.20). As such, one can 
consider the advantages of a theory of fetishism based upon multiplicity 
and difference – abject moments become the points at which the 
paranoiac machine ‘repels [desiring-machines…] experience[ing] them as 
an over-all persecution apparatus’ (Deleuze / Guattari 1984, p.9); it is the 
point at which the ‘authority’ of value threaten to become indeterminate. 
Abjection from a Deleuzean point of view can also be interpreted as 
moments of becoming themselves – after all, to become via immanent 
relations is to also become indeterminate. This is illustrated by Anna 
Powell, who also criticizes abjection from the point of view of Kristeva; 
Powell states:   
According to Kristevan abjection, the designated ‘other’ functions to 
uphold, whilst contesting, human ethical and cultural norms […] The 
horrific impact of the monst[rous] partly depends on its coding as 
anomalous, against nature in some sense. Becomings themselves 
are traditionally positioned as the source of horror. For Deleuze, 
however, rather than the horror of an abject, polarized other, both 
beauty and terror are located in the transformative condition. The 
process of becoming is experienced and effected by the body-
without-organs. (Powell 2005, p.77-8) 
 
As we stated at the outset of our examination, the inadequacy of 
previous conceptions of fetishism is no more apparent than in the example 
of female fetishism – here novel forms of desire take flight beyond the 
boundaries of conventional restrictive economies. As we shall see, though 
there is evidence that such a phenomenon exists, theories of this subject 
continue to resort to a notion of fetishism tied to a phallic economy of 
presence and lack. As we shall demonstrate, to perceive fetishism in such 
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a conventional fashion is to thwart the possibility of modes of desire 
beyond a given restrictive economy. Such a notion therefore operates 
within a Foucauldian power / knowledge model – power produces 
knowledge that delineates the terms in which a phenomenon can be 
discussed. If fetishistic desire is to be understood beyond restrictive 





























Part Five: Fetishism, Femininity and the critique of lack 
  
Earlier, we stated that the Otherness ascribed to woman and 
fetishism is an integral part of the modern episteme – they are necessarily 
placed in a negative position in which to provide presence to those 
concepts advocated within society. As such, these negative terms are 
prescribed an absence of the substance that gives an object or subject a 
value. This became apparent when we considered the metaphysics of 
presence in relation to phallogocentrism.  Such an alignment between 
woman and the fetish gave an insight into why the fetish is described as 
being a substitute for a maternal phallus that never existed, now perceived 
as lacking. Such an alignment is not just an apparent thematic similarity 
with regard to the theme of excess, it is a structural fusion to uphold the 
integrity of a singular male economy of desire. As we have described, 
within modern psychosexual discourse, it is precisely within the topic of 
fetishism that the woman and the phallus become one in the form of the 
maternal phallus: that which was perceived but never existed. In fact, one 
can state that it is this phantom object that resides at the origin of the 
singular sexual economy of desire – without it, there could be no 
castration and therefore no lack, all that would remain would be difference. 
Without ascribing a phallic status to ‘deviant’ objects of desire, fetishes 
would indicate the possibility of a desire radically separate to that 
proscribed within a male sexual economy. To fetishize must be to fear and 
disavow the loss of phallic status (castration anxiety), not to choose a 
different mode of desire in an act of pure difference. As such, the phallus 
must be ascribed to the site of lack: the female body is thus said to contain 
the maternal phallus allowing male deviation to remain anchored to a 
phallocentric economy of desire. Likewise it is to place woman within a 
phallic economy, rather than being a subject in a relation of difference, that 
requires her to be positioned as lacking that which she must desire within 
men. Given this, it is no surprise that woman is described as incapable of 
fetishizing; to admit this, when already positioned as lacking, would be to 
accept that there is a desire separate to the dominant economy.  As we 
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shall see, the above paradox in which woman is simultaneously phallic, 
lacking and excessive, gives the lie to the notion of the fetish as substitute.  
As stated, according to traditional psychoanalytic accounts, woman 
is considered incapable of fetishizing. For Freud fetishism is a reaction to 
castration anxiety in which the male child disavows his mother’s lack of a 
penis by choosing a substitute object as a replacement.  Because a 
female infant already lacks a penis, she has no reason to fear the threat of 
castration; as such, female fetishism is considered to be an impossibility. 
Likewise for Lacan, fetishism is considered to be a reaction to the threat of 
castration and therefore predominantly a male preserve with few female 
practitioners. Whereas Freud perceived the fetish to be a disavowal of the 
mother’s missing penis, Lacan perceives it to be a desire to preserve the 
maternal phallus within the subject of the mother:  
 
Since it has been effectively demonstrated that the imaginary 
motive for most male perversions is the desire to preserve the 
phallus which involved the subject in the mother, then the absence 
in women of fetishism, which represents the virtually manifest case 
of this desire, leads us to suspect that this desire has a different 
fate in the perversions which she represents. (Lacan 1958, p.96) 
 
 In this section, the possibility of a potential female fetishism outside 
the restrictive phallocentric model is considered. Arguments in favour of a 
notion of female fetishism are examined in dialogue with traditional 
phallocentric psychoanalytic models. The occurrence of female fetishism, 
where women invest desire ‘perversely’, raises the issue of an inadequacy 
of classical notions of fetishism in which women are already viewed as 
lacking. Such a phenomenon therefore raises the possibility of desire 
outside of the binary oppositions of presence and lack, whilst exposing the 
deficiency of traditional models. By following the trajectory of a Lacanian 
viewpoint, interpretations of female fetishism are found to risk replicating 
the pattern of reducing desire and its objects to a pregiven set of 
oppositions that perceive difference and identity in gendered terms.  
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 By following Derrida’s critique of logocentrism and Lacan’s 
proclamation that phallic desire is an effect of our entry into the symbolic 
order of language, feminist writers have attempted to rethink desire 
outside of the terms of a metaphysics of presence epitomized by the 
phallus. Whereas such theories have been criticized for failing to escape 
the logic of presence and absence associated with an economy of the 
same, the prospect of a theory of sexual difference based upon women’s 
morphology challenges the authority of a theory of fetishism from the 
viewpoint of phallocentrism. A comparison of a Deleuzean concern for 
immanence in relation to such a theory is found to demonstrate the greater 
efficacy of generating a notion of fetishism based upon difference and 
multiplicity outside the terms of a restrictive economy. A Deleuzean model 
is found to explain traditional accounts of fetishism, whilst interpreting 
those occurrences in which the fetish transgresses conventional notions of 
sexual difference and morphological types.  
 
Fetishism Reconsidered: The Case of Female Fetishism  
 
As described earlier, in traditional accounts of fetishism, it is 
considered extremely rare, if not impossible, for women to be fetishists. 
Though Freud and Lacan denied that fetishism could be a female 
perversion, other writers have identified numerous examples of women 
fetishists and have refuted or revised the psychoanalytic model. 
Elizabeth Grosz cites an account of female fetishism given by the 
psychoanalyst Juliet Hopkins who describes a girl with a shoe and foot 
fetish that also used a tobacco tin as fetish object for sexual purposes 
(Grosz 1990, p109). In their review of psychoanalytic literature, Lorraine 
Gamman and Merja Makinen found that at least a third of the recorded 
case studies of fetishism were female practitioners – these included a 
female kleptomaniac who would masturbate with the silk she had 
stolen; female mackintosh and rubber fetishists; a female who fetishised 
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string and a woman who derived pleasure from herself whilst holding a 
non-erotic book (Gamman, L and Makinen, M 1994, p. 96-7).  
If, as has been implied, fetishism is better understood as both the 
archetype and artifice of value that lacks any origin of presence, then there 
is the suspicion that the denial of female fetishism functions to support a 
male heterosexual restricted phallic economy. To admit the artificiality of 
fetishistic value and, in turn, the fetishistic status of the phallus, is to 
expose the artifice, or masquerade, of all modes of sexuality, including 
that of the male; as Marjorie Garber points out in regard to the fetishisation 
of the phallus: 
 
Is it possible that this overt acknowledgment of artifice […] masks 
another […] concern - about the artifactuality and the detachability 
of maleness? What if it should turn out that female fetishism is 
invisible or untheorizable because it coincides with what has been 
established as natural or normal - for women to fetishize the phallus 
on men? In other words, to deny female fetishism is to establish as 
natural the female desire that the male body contain the phallus. 
Heterosexuality here – as so often - equals nature. Female 
fetishism is the norm of human sexuality. That is why it is invisible. 
(Garber 1990, P.54) 
 
Some theorists have attempted to expose the fetishistic ruse of phallic 
power within a male restricted economy by appropriating the phallus 
outside its heterosexual mode of exchange. Both Elizabeth Grosz and 
Teresa De Lauretis propose that female fetishism is, in fact, possible and 
that it can be interpreted as a way of renegotiating the restrictive codes of 
phallocentrism from the point of view of lesbian desire. In each case, both 
writers mutually criticize each other for being complicit within the terms of 
a phallocentric economy.  
In her essay Lesbian Fetishism? (1990) Elizabeth Grosz argues that 
forms of lesbian sexuality can be considered as examples of female 
fetishism. Grosz describes how the disavowal of castration that occurs 
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within the constitution of a fetish also occurs in the construction of 
femininity. Three routes are given for women to enact this disavowal: 
narcissism, hysteria and the masculinity complex. Firstly, by making 
reference to Freud’s paper On Narcissism: An Introduction, Grosz argues 
that many women compensate for their castrated status by treating their 
own bodies as phallic: their bodies become invested with the care and 
attention that lover’s tend to give each other as external love objects. By 
tending to the care and appearance of their bodies through painting, 
plucking, shaving, diets and exercise, women ensure that they are loved 
and retain their position as the object of the Other’s desire. Women’s 
bodies are therefore perceived as being-the-phallus, whereas by having a 
penis, the male perceives himself as having-the-phallus; as such the 
‘man’s penis and the whole of woman’s body are rendered psychically 
equivalent. He has the object of desire while she is the object of desire’ 
(Grosz 1990, p.110). As we have discussed earlier, the artifice invested in 
retaining their position as object of desire, leads both Joan Riviere (1929, 
p. 303-313) and Lacan (2006, p.575-584) to comprehend female sexuality 
as a masquerade.  It is through artifice that woman attempts to deny her 
position as deficient within the phallic economy – woman therefore 
performs a masquerade in which to deny her subject position as lacking. 
The second process of disavowal available to a woman is through 
hysteria. Whereas narcissism involved making the whole of a woman’s 
body into the phallus, hysteria involves investing phallic status into a 
specific part of the body. Through her refusal to except the female passive 
role within the masculine phallic economy, the hysteric does not phallicize 
her whole body in the hope that it may be loved, but decides instead to 
invest her desire onto a body part outside of this economy. This condition 
is therefore seen by Grosz to be a nostalgic wish by the hysteric to return 
to her pre-oedipal attachment to her mother. Grosz refers to Freud’s case 
study of Dora as an example of hysteria. Dora receives pleasure not 
through the genitals but through hysterical choking within her throat – as 
such she ‘phallicizes her throat and uses it to signal her disgust at Herr K’s 
sexual advances’ (Grosz Op Cit., p.111), thus demonstrating her rebellion 
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against masculine sexuality. Grosz indicates that hysteria therefore allows 
a woman to retain an active role, whilst still being subject to a passive role 
in patriarchy.  
 
[H]er own body takes on the function of the phallus (confirming her 
objectlike status in patriarchy) while her subjectivity remains in an 
active position (one which takes her own body as its object). (ibid, 
p.112) 
 
 Finally, Grosz discusses the masculinity complex as a means for 
the female to disavow castration. Following Freud, Grosz describes the 
masculinity complex as involving the refusal of the woman to accept her 
castrated and subordinated role within the masculine sexual economy. 
Whereas an acceptance of the subordinated position usually involves 
the giving up of the clitoris as the leading sexual organ for the passive 
vagina, the woman with the masculinity complex will retain the clitoris 
as leading organ with ‘the position of activity it implies’ (ibid). Though 
not necessarily implying lesbianism, such a refusal of women’s 
castrated status is often followed by the retention of the maternal figure 
as erotic object attachment. This lesbian relationship to the masculinity 
complex allows Grosz to consider the notion of lesbian fetishism.  
 For Grosz the lesbian with a masculinity complex could be 
considered a fetishist in that she disavows women’s castration but, 
unlike the male fetishist, this castration is her own, not that of the phallic 
mother. An external object substitute for the phallus is then selected, in 
this case it is another woman as substitute for the maternal phallus. 
Grosz proposes that by fetishizing another woman as love object, the 
lesbian with the masculinity complex is able to act ‘as if she has rather 
than is the phallus’ (ibid, p.113-4).  
Grosz states that her appropriation of the concept of fetishism intends 
to ‘stretch Freud’s terms in order to show that in themselves they do not 
discriminate against women’ (ibid, p.114).  Such an intention is 
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important for Grosz in that it allows feminist political considerations to 
enter the realm of psychoanalysis, without discarding psychoanalysis 
itself – Grosz claims that to reject the theory would leave us ‘without an 
account of psychic and fantasy life’ (ibid). Grosz proposes a ‘”fetishist’s” 
solution [in which a notion is selected] that is deemed impossible or is 
foreclosed by the theory to show how it may not be as implausible as it 
seems if the terms are stretched beyond their normal confines’ (ibid). 
The fetishist solution that Grosz refers to is the fetishist’s strategy of 
simultaneous disavowal and affirmation. The strategy has been used 
here to weld the psychoanalytic concept of fetishism to the 
phenomenon of lesbianism, whilst simultaneously denying its exclusivity 
as a strictly male perversion. Grosz describes the lesbian with the 
masculine complex as disavowing her own castration rather than her 
mother’s. Though there is no recognition of the fact in Grosz’s writing, is 
it not also the case that when the male fetishist disavows his mother’s 
castration, he is also protecting himself from such a fate? This 
coincidence between the male fetishist and the masculine lesbian 
becomes further apparent when we consider Freud’s account of 
lesbianism in which there is a ‘failure’ in women to convert their ‘love 
object from the maternal to the paternal’ (ibid, p.113). Grosz points out 
that such a failure can often lead to women perceiving their father ‘as 
simply another embodiment of the phallic status of the mother’ (ibid). As 
with the male fetishist, it appears to be the case that the masculine 
lesbian’s castration can be avoided if she believes her mother still 
retains her phallic status. Whereas an external object is chosen to 
disavow both the castration of both the male fetishist and his mother, 
the masculine lesbian chooses another woman as fetish to confirm her 
own phallic status. Such an interpretation of lesbian fetishism 
corresponds to the classic Freudian account of lesbianism in which the 
female refuses her castration, taking ‘refuge in an identification with her 
phallic mother or her father […and following] her inevitable 
disappointments from her father […is] driven to regress into her early 
masculinity complex’ (Freud, S 1933, p.428).  
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Though Grosz’s particular appropriation of psychoanalysis raises 
our awareness of the potential subversive implications of fetishism – 
namely, its possible use for explaining the fetishizing of women by 
masculine lesbians – it fails to allow women, lesbian or otherwise, to 
discuss their sexuality or their potential fetishistic practices outside of 
the confines of the male phallic economy – as such, the sexual 
economy remains singular rather than multiple. Lorraine Gamman and 
Merja Makinen acknowledge this limitation within Grosz’s conception of 
lesbian fetishism and recognise that , ‘ [a]ltough interesting in its 
theoretical argument that women can be fetishists, Grosz’s argument 
clearly still privileges the phallus as the signifier of desire’ (Gamman, L 
and Makinen, M 1994, p.110). By appropriating the psychoanalytic 
concept of fetishism, Grosz remains within a masculine phallic sexual 
economy of presence and lack, where you either have or be the 
phallus. In her criticism of Grosz’s analysis of lesbian fetishism, Teresa 
De Lauretis recognises that by defining masculine lesbians as having 
the phallus and feminine lesbians as being the phallus, Grosz colludes 
with the traditional psychoanalytic view that all forms of sexuality, as 
governed by the phallic economy, are masculine and heterosexual ones 
in which women are perceived as lacking. 
 
[T]he distribution of lesbians into masculine and feminine women, 
respectively having and being the phallus, cannot but uphold the 
latter and all it stands for in psychoanalysis and in the culture at 
large; consequently it colludes with the heterosexual and patriarchal 
purposes for which psychoanalytic orthodoxy was intended, and 
most immediately the foreclosure of lesbian identity (De Lauretis, T 
1994, p.281-2). 
 
Teresa De Lauretis refigures Freud and Lacan’s conception of 
fetishism in an attempt to explain lesbian desire outside the confines of 
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a masculine phallic sexual economy. For Teresa De Lauretis, the 
castration anxiety inherent to psychoanalytic accounts of fetishism 
exists for both males and females. Whereas for the male child, fetishism 
allows the disavowal of his mother’s castration (and therefore the 
refusal of the possibility of his own), for the female child, such a 
disavowal refutes the subjugation of the female body image as lacking 
and castrated. By understanding Lacan’s notion of the phallus as a 
signifier of power relations between the sexes, in which the male is 
favoured as having that signified by the phallus: the penis, De Lauretis 
is able to interpret female castration – or the female position of lacking 
the phallus – as the loss of a powerful image of oneself. As De Lauretis 
states: 
 
[Castration is] a narcissistic wound to the subject’s body-image that 
redoubles the loss of the mother’s body by the threatened loss of 
the female body itself […] The castration complex, in establishing 
the paternal prohibition of access to the female body […] as well as 
the “inferiority” of women, inscribes that lack in the symbolic order 
of culture, in the terms of sexual difference, as a biological, 
“natural”, and irremediable lack – the lack of a penis (ibid, p. 261-2).  
 
For De Lauretis then, penis envy – a condition that Freud believed all 
women suffered from - should be interpreted as ‘the sense of lack or 
dispossession acknowledged by many women privately and in public’ 
(ibid, p. 262). By reframing the mechanism of disavowal within the 
psychoanalytic account of fetishism, De Lauretis attempts to account for 
the adaptation of masculine and feminine gender roles within lesbian 
relationships, without resorting to a model governed by the male phallic 
sexual economy - as with Grosz’s model of lesbian fetishism, De 
Lauretis therefore supports the idea that female fetishism is in fact 
possible. The disavowal that occurs within lesbian desire has less to do 
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with the lost maternal body and phallus – as in the male model – and 
more to do with the loss of a powerful and positive female body image.  
In sum, I am arguing that the disavowal of castration is a force that 
propels the [libidinal] drive away from the original lost object (the 
mother) toward the objects/signs that both acknowledge and deny a 
second, more consequential, narcissistic loss (the subject’s own 
libidinally lost body-image), thus keeping at bay the lack of being 
that threatens the ego (ibid, p. 265).  
For De Lauretis, the acknowledgement and denial inherent in lesbian 
disavowal manifests itself in the appropriation of masculine and 
feminine roles. De Lauretis argues that the fetishisation of masculinity 
and femininity exists within lesbian culture because these gender roles 
are the only available symbols of desire made available within our 
culture. De Lauretis points out that the masculine lesbian fetishes 
masculinity because it is one of the few signs of desire for females 
recognised within society: 
If the lesbian fetishes are often, though certainly not exclusively, 
objects or signs with connotations of masculinity, it is not because 
they stand in for the missing penis but because such signs are most 
strongly precoded to convey, both to the subject and to others, the 
cultural meaning of sexual (genital) activity and yearning toward 
women (ibid, p. 263).  
At the same time that desire for the female body is indicated through 
signs of masculinity, De Lauretis indicates that such fetishisation is also 
a disavowal in that the representation of the disempowered feminine 
body is denied. As De Lauretis states, such ‘signs can also most 
effectively deny the female body (in the subject) and at the same time 
resignify (her desire for) it through the very signification of its prohibition’ 
(ibid).  
In contrast, according to De Lauretis, the feminine lesbian fetishes 
femininity by exaggerating the seductive power of the female body (as 
defined as being the phallus within patriarchy) as a means of signifying 
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her corresponding sexual role within the lesbian relationship. De 
Lauretis clearly indicates that the femininity symbolised through such a 
fetishisation is a masquerade and, as such, is a performance: ‘The 
exaggerated display of femininity in the masquerade of the femme 
performs the sexual power and seductiveness of the female body when 
offered to the butch for mutual narcissistic empowerment’ (ibid, p. 264). 
For De Lauretis, such a play of masculine and feminine roles beyond 
the subjects of conventional heterosexuality allows lesbians to desire 
otherwise. As lesbian fetishism, this play of roles disavows the loss of a 
desirable and powerful female body within patriarchy, it does this by 
appropriating the very signs of gender that have effectively prevented a 
positive female-body image.  
De Lauretis’ theory is subject to criticism. Even though the notion of 
fetishism is reformulated so that a woman is able to disavow her castrated 
and subjugated body-image, such a theory still requires desire to remain 
within the terms of Oedipal relations, determined by a phallic restrictive 
economy of desire. This proves to make a concept of lesbian desire 
problematic as it depends on masculine and feminine binary oppositions, 
constituted upon notions of presence and lack, to make itself understood. 
As Grosz points out: 
 
[I]t is unclear that the fetish is any less phallic in its structure and 
implications. [De Lauretis’] model of the fetish […] entails an 
attempt […] to detach the phallus from paternity and authority and 
thus to render it more mobile. But if the fetish is just as implicated in 
masculinity as the phallus, then a theory that displaces the 
masculinity complex with fetishism does not necessarily leave 
lesbianism any better off. (Grosz 1994, p.289-90)  
 
By using the categories of psychoanalysis, determined by the terms of a 
phallic restrictive economy, De Lauretis’ use of the fetish, and its 
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accompanying ‘transgression of the naturalizing effects of heterosexual 
“gender roles”’ (ibid, p.290-1), is ultimately attempting to  
 
appropriate what has been denied to women and to that extent 
remain tied (as we all are) to heterocentric and masculine  privilege. 
Such modalities remain reactive, compensatory. (ibid, p.291) 
 
Grosz is critical of such a reactive move in which different types of desire 
are still understood via a prescribed model. We are reminded of Foucault’s 
statement that desire and subjectivization are linked to modes of power 
and knowledge with its own interests. Grosz warns us that such a will to 
know ‘may be part of the very taming and normalization (even if not 
heterosexualization) of that desire’ (ibid).  
How can lesbian fetishism be interpreted outside the terms of 
phallocentrism when the roles performed within this fetishistic relationship 
are understood through the terms of a masculine restrictive economy? A 
Deleuzean viewpoint, which suggests perceiving fetishism as a productive 
process of becoming, would seem to have greater efficacy in that it can 
account for both the generation of butch/ femme roles, whilst also 
accounting for lesbian subjectivities outside these modes. According to 
Alison Eves (2004), butch / femme positions are ‘often characterized as 
imitative, unable to imagine an alternative to heterosexual styles, a copy of 
the ‘real’ thing’ (p. 494). In contrast to such a view, Eves argues that butch 
/ femme positions can be perceived as ‘[s]ubversive and transgressive 
gender performances, although framed by the dominant discursive 
formation, [and] may have some transformative impact, establishing new 
subject positions and [sub] cultural spaces’ (ibid, p.495).  Following 
Butler’s analysis of gender as a performance (1990), butch / femme 
positions can be considered as parodies that expose the artifice of 
heteronormative positions; Butler states, ‘the imitative parody of 
‘heterosexuality’ — when and where it occurs in gay cultures — is always 
and only an imitation of an imitation, a copy of a copy, for which there is no 
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original’ (Butler 1991, p. 314). If butch / femme positions can therefore be 
perceived as artifice, then such positions understood as fetishes can be 
reinterpreted as productive transgressions.  
Earlier we described the fetishistic mode of becoming-horse within a 
masochistic relationship. Such a phenomenon was recognized as an 
example of becoming-animal. This, in turn, was found to correspond to a 
series of becoming performed upon the body without organs, including 
becoming-woman, becoming-child and becoming-molecular. In each case, 
becoming involves the appropriation and adaption of characteristics that 
are typically designated outside a phallocentric restrictive economy – such 
becomings therefore provide a line of flight beyond its strictures. From this 
point of view, the mutual ‘narcissistic empowerment’ generated via the 
masquerade of masculine and feminine gendered positions can be 
interpreted as a series of becomings that have no recourse to a 
phallogocentric model that retains a singular and masculine economy of 
desire that denies multiplicity. A Deleuzean perspective has the potential 
to be more radical and revelatory in that the butch–femme conventions are 
not poor adopted surrogates for the lack of more positive images of 
feminine desire, they are instead an act of desiring-production that makes 
an incongruous assemblage of gender and sex to form new subjectivities. 
These subjectivities may be recognized as borrowing given codes and 
conventions in which to resignify desire for a subject of the same sex, but 
the process is to be understood as a productive encounter which, from the 
point of view of patriarchy, appears discordant and disturbs its sense of 
order. A female becoming-masculine for a female or becoming-feminine 
for a female are productive encounters that disturb the logic of patriarchy 
and are productive fetishistic encounters immanent to the relations 
involved, to interpret them through the typical structure of disavowal within 
conventional notions of the fetish, binded to the idea of a omnipresent 
phallus, castration anxiety and a masculinity complex, is to do lesbian 
desire a disservice. 
Gamman and Makinen attempt to propose a more radical conception of 
female fetishism that, unlike Grosz and De Lauretis’ notion, stands outside 
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the roles defined by the phallus within a restricted sexual economy. To 
achieve this, Gamman and Makinen move away from a theory of fetishism 
premised on the phallus and its lack towards a feminine notion predicated 
on pre-Oedipal oral drives.  In correspondence to a wider critique of 
phallocentric psychoanalysis, it is argued that the penis as phallic signifier, 
and the corresponding concept of ‘penis envy’, are themselves fetishes 
used ‘to safeguard the value of phallocentrism within a patriarchal medical 
discourse: the male’s obsessive fixation on his own signifying value cannot 
allow a denial of its importance (or the unimportance of a ‘lack’ within the 
feminine)’ (Gamman / Makinen 1994, p.105). Gamman and Makinen 
contend that psychoanalysis has ‘willfully refused’ to see women as 
practitioners of fetishism because ‘an acceptance of female fetishism 
challenges the very signifier of desire, in a way that none of the other 
perversions do’ (ibid). As we have described, this is because fetishism has 
been understood within psychoanalysis as the archetypal perversion from 
which all other perversions could be understood and has been used to 
corroborate the existence of the castration complex itself – Freud states 
that an ‘investigation of fetishism is strongly recommended to anyone who 
still doubts the existence of the castration complex’ (Freud 1927, p.155). 
As described, to deem women as capable of fetishism undermines an 
explanation of fetishistic desire based upon castration anxiety – how can 
women fetishize if supposedly castrated or, to put it another way, does 
female fetishism demonstrate that a separate form of female desire 
requires recognition outside the confines of the male phallic sexual 
economy? Gamman and Makinen therefore question the authority of the 
phallus: 
 
If a rupture, an absence, is necessary to construct desire, is the 
phallus the only signifier that could make such a break? Might there 
not be some other, as yet unsymbolised, signifier that would allow 
girls access to desire and to the symbolic code? (Gamman / 
Makinen Op Cit, p.107-8) 
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Gamman and Makinen attempt to identify this other, as yet unsymbolised, 
signifier. To do this, Gamman and Makinen make reference to concepts of 
fetishism within the work of Robert Bak, D.W. Winnicott, Phyllis Greenacre 
and Masud Khan53. Each of these writers are from the object-relations 
school of psychoanalysis that subscribes to Melanie Klein’s theory of part 
objects. Klein believes that during the pre-oedipal first year of an infant’s 
life, feelings of love and aggression are fantasised onto parts of the 
mother’s body, primarily the breast. At this point of development the 
mother is perceived as omnipotent. For Klein, it is the negotiation of part 
objects in the mother–child relationship – what Klein calls the ‘feminine’ 
phase – that is central to the process of individuation that prepares the 
constitution of the self during the later Oedipal phase of development. For 
Gamman and Makinen, Klein’s stress on orality and weaning in the 
process of individuation promises the possibility ‘for girls as well as boys to 
develop into sexual fetishists’ (ibid, p. 100).  
Gamman and Makinen do not mean to deny that fetishism could 
arise as a consequence of castration anxiety; what they wish to 
emphasize is that the work of the above writers point to the fact that ‘a 
new positive theoretical model of female sexuality needs to be designed 
[that accounts] for the development of female fetishists’ (ibid, p.117). 
Gamman and Makinen attempt to outline such a model through their 
proposition that bulimia may constitute a form of female fetishism. 
Gamman and Makinen contend that the bingeing and purging of food that 
is characteristic of bulimia corresponds to the processes involved within 
psychoanalytical accounts of fetishism.  
 
[J]ust as sexual fetishism redirects the sexual urge, the element of 
bingeing in bulimia is in fact a pleasurable re-direction (‘perversion’) 
of the drive for nourishment. And just as sexual fetishism makes a 
fetish of an object in the external world, so bulimia fetishes food 
which is only subsequently ingested’ (ibid, p.124).  
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In their failure to successfully separate from their mothers, bulimics make 
a compromise solution much like the sexual fetishist.54 The sexual fetishist 
reaches a compromise solution to the threat of castration in that he has 
‘retained [his] belief [in the maternal phallus] but he has also given it up’ 
(Freud 1927, p.154). Similarly, the bulimic creates a compromise solution 
in which they recognise individuation whilst simultaneously refusing 
separation. The bulimic refuses individuation through excessive bingeing, 
followed by recognition of separation through the purging of that which 
symbolises the maternal breast: food. The excessive consumption that 
symbolises the maternal bond is therefore negated through a ritual purging 
which allows the bulimic to retain a socially acceptable appearance. As 
Dana and Lawrence point out: 
 
It is not just that too much food has been consumed and the fear of 
becoming fat makes vomiting inevitable […] It is that needs have 
been perceived which are so terrifying that they must 
simultaneously be denied […] It is about having a clean, neat good, 
un-needy appearance which conceals behind it a messy, needy, 
bad part, which must be hidden away. (Dana, M and Lawrence, M 
1988, p. 41) 
 
In this account, bulimics negotiate a socially acceptable persona against 
an unconscious wish for unity with their mother through the fetishisation of 
food. Gamman and Makinen claim that such fetishisation helps bulimics 
cope with the anxieties experienced during adolescence. It is often during 
this transition that ‘the regression to the earlier phase of orality seems to 
be activated’ (Gamman, L and Makinen, M, Op. Cit., p. 131).  
For Gamman and Makinen, the continued identification of women 
with the nurturing role, as well as the continued objectification of women’s 
bodies, brings new pressures for women in relation to food. 55 Given 
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Gamman and Makinen’s account, bulimic ‘women ‘pervert’ the oral drive 
for sustenance to assuage narcissistic feelings of inadequacy in relation to 
their self-identity’ (ibid, p. 139). Such a process functions ‘in ways 
analogous to those identified in the models of sexual fetishism’ (ibid). 
Though there are clear similarities between bulimia and traditional models 
of sexual fetishism – both use external objects as a means for sensual 
gratification precisely because such items allow the disavowal of 
uncomfortable realisations – there are aspects to Gamman and Makinen’s 
account that remain problematic. 
As Gamman and Makinen recognise, there are contradictory accounts 
as to whether bulimia should be considered a conservative or subversive 
response to traditional conceptions of femininity56. Though Gamman and 
Makinen are fully aware of these contradictory accounts of bulimia, the 
contradiction is discussed only in terms of highlighting the fact that object-
relations psychoanalysts (those following a Kleinian model) have a clearer 
consensual explanation of bulimia as having ‘a strong relationship to 
unconscious problems with separation’ (ibid). For Gamman and Makinen, 
this is an important point as it identifies the weakness within sociological 
models that are ‘unable to grasp the irrational displacements of the 
unconscious (the fetishism)’ (ibid, p. 140). Because no attempt is made to 
fully resolve these contradictory viewpoints, we are left with an account 
that remains uncertain as to the cultural conditions that trigger the 
separation anxieties believed to underlie this food fetishism. As will be 
described, a Deleuzean model that accounts for the phenomenon in terms 
of an assemblage of pregiven biomedical discourses, social and cultural 
influences and transgressive lines of flight, will have the potential to 
understand bulimia from the viewpoint of relations immanent to particular 
circumstances.  
Although Gamman and Makinen are quite specific in their criticisms 
of phallocentric models of psychoanalysis, and the unhistorical accounts of 
fetishism that exist within such models57, there is no attempt to provide a 
more effective account of fetishism beyond a comparison of bulimia and 
Freudian conceptions of sexual fetishism. Gamman and Makinen criticise 
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phallocentric models of psychoanalysis in much the same way as Derrida, 
Irigaray and Cixous - Freudian and Lacanian models of psychoanalysis 
are perceived as inextricably tied to metaphysical binary oppositions that 
align presence / having with the masculine and absence / lacking with the 
feminine. Gamman and Makinen argue that female fetishism has been 
previously neglected by both male and female critics because of their 
‘theoretical focus on ‘Lack’’ (ibid, p.206). Given this focus, Gamman and 
Makinen suggest ‘that it is now necessary to take what is useful from 
Freud and Lacan (notions about subjectivity, ego identifications and the 
mirror phase, for example) and to be highly critical of the rest’ (ibid). 
Though Gamman and Makinen recognise ‘what is useful’ within 
psychoanalysis, no attempt is made to develop these theories further other 
than to suggest that feminist critics should ‘behave like theoretical 
guerrillas [in which to engage] in theoretical promiscuity – taking on board 
what is helpful and positive […whilst] critically assessing the prescriptions 
that cannot even see, let alone explain female agency’ (ibid).  
As described, Gamman and Makinen continue to subscribe to a notion 
of desire premised on the idea of a ‘rupture’ or ‘absence’. While Gamman 
and Makinen are critical of psychoanalytical models premised upon lack, 
their own work is complicit with this notion, despite shifting the emphasis 
away from the phallus towards maternal separation. On declaring that 
bulimia, as a proposed form of female fetishism, could be perceived as a 
response to separation anxiety, Gamman and Makinen retain the 
discussion of fetishism within a framework of absence. Whether the fetish 
is interpreted as the male child’s disavowal of female castration - as in 
Freud - or is identified as the female infant’s disavowal of its separation 
from the nourishing and nurturing maternal mother, both concepts are 
premised upon a notion in which the fetish becomes a substitute for that 
which is lost. At no point is either a positive theory of difference or 
feminine sexuality proposed that could account for female fetishism on its 
own terms. Such complicity leads Gamman and Makinen to describe 
fetishism as ultimately a conservative phenomenon in which ‘oscillating 
continually between knowing and unknowing, doesn’t exactly create a 
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positive or stable space that can easily accommodate creative 
advancement’ (ibid, p.220-1). Given its final status as a compromise 
solution within the status quo, Gamman and Makinen suggest that the 
fetishist can console themselves with the fact that fetishism ‘is a healthier 
compromise than whatever threatens the individual psyche (since it still 
allows for pleasure)’ (ibid, p.220). For Gamman and Makinen, the fetishist 
– whether a bulimic or a subject classified within the traditional realms of 
psychoanalysis – has ‘found a compromise with society’s construction of 
the gendered self, and that is in itself a celebratory victory’ (ibid, p.167). 
Given that such a compromise requires an oscillation between pregiven 
gender roles – between a traditional feminine role and a masculine one – 
one finds this ‘celebratory victory’ questionable in that it already precludes 
the possibility of generative identities.  
 According to Bray and Colebrook (1998), the idea that women's body 
images, and their associated eating disorders, are ‘determined by a 
precastrated / castrated matrix and that women in general are coerced into 
relinquishing a sympathetic connection to a maternal body image 
reiterates a largely unchallenged Freudianism’ (Bray / Colebrook 1998, p. 
37). In Cultures of Fetishism (2006), Louise Kaplan recognizes the pitfalls 
of fetishizing the feminine pre-oedipal maternal space. Kaplan recognizes 
that there have been two fundamental flaws in psychoanalytic theories of 
sexual difference – ‘the writing out of the mother in classical 
psychoanalysis and the disavowal of female sexuality’ (Kaplan 2006, 
p.59). In an attempt to counter this, Kaplan recognizes, amongst others, 
her own complicity in emphasizing the ‘vital importance of the infant’s 
relationship with the mother’ (ibid, p.60). In turn, this corrective strategy is 
recognized as having its own flaws; Kaplan states: 
 
in this process of resurrecting and elevating the mother, we seem to 
have entombed the sexual woman. The glorification of the maternal 
principle has had the indirect effect of further obscuring the 
intricacies of female sexuality’ (ibid).  
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The idealizing of the unconditional love that is the maternal principle, 
whether emphasizing the role of the semiotic (Kristeva) or the 
importance of the mother-child relationship in the weaning process 
(Klein and Gamman and Makinen), is found to be a fetishistic strategy 
that disavows the erotic powers of the sexual mother outside of this 
relationship. As Kaplan describes: 
The idealized, unconditional love attributed to the primordial 
relationship with the active, caregiving mother is lost in the 
discovery of the reality of the mother’s sexual and procreative 
powers. Indeed, the latter knowledge of the mother’s sexuality 
threatens the image of the mother as redeemer. One outcome of 
this threatening near-knowledge is an attempt to reduce the sexual 
mother to a breast, a haven of milk and honey. With this disavowal 
of the mother’s sexuality, the idealization of some, largely mythical, 
earlier unconditional love is preserved. (ibid) 
 
Kaplan goes on to illustrate how various apocalyptic narratives 
fetishize the maternal whilst disavowing the more traumatic aspects of 
feminine sexuality. In each case, there appears an escape from a 
traumatic scene of destruction towards the ‘Elysium fields or safe 
havens that represent the tender mother’ (ibid, p.61).58 From this point 
of view, Gamman and Makinen’s view of female fetishism could be 
perceived as an instance of fetishism itself – bulimia becomes a 
strategy to disavow a separation from a maternal Eden, rather than a 
more complex phenomenon subject to a range of personal, medical and 
cultural strategies.  
An alternate view of Bulimia could be speculated from the 
viewpoint of the Body Without Organs – here the fetishisation of food 
can be interpreted as a means to renegotiate subjectivity. By both 
bingeing and purging food, the bulimic generates expulsion and 
consumption machines upon the body without organs in which to 
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negotiate a subjectivity via integration and separation.  As such, food 
becomes a fetish to be distributed upon the body without organs – an 
economy tied to other production machines, including those that 
discipline body image and expectations of gender. For Braziel, a 
Deleuzean reading of ‘bulimia offers a way out of a self-abnegating 
discourse / disease by providing a space in which the corpulent body 
can be redefined’ (Braziel 2001, p.245). Here, the bulimic body is not 
necessarily to be understood as a pathological symptom tied to a 
disavowal of separation from the pre-Oedipal maternal realm, it can be 
defined by a range of factors that influence and affect the body without 
organs; it becomes a ‘spatium defined by the desires and intensities 
traversing it: all its food flues, rippling affects, and fleshy intensities’ 
(ibid). Not that we should blur and confuse the distinctions between 
conditions, but bulimia as an affect upon the body without organs can 
be usefully compared to Deleuze’s discussion of anorexia. According to 
Deleuze, the condition is  
 
a question of food fluxes, but combined with other fluxes […] The 
anorexic consists of a body without organs with voids and 
fullnesses […] We should not even talk about alternation: void 
and fullness are like two demarcations of intensity; the point is 
always to float in one’s own body. It is not a matter of a refusal of 
what the organism makes the body undergo. Not regression at 
all, but involution, involuted body. The anorexic void has nothing 
to do with lack, it is on the contrary a way of escaping the organic 
constraint of lack and hunger at the mechanical mealtime. There 
is a whole plane of construction of the anorexic, making oneself 
an anorganic body […] Anorexia is a political system, a micro-
politics: to escape from the norms of consumption in order not to 
be an object of consumption oneself. (Deleuze / Parnet 1987, 
p.109 – 10) 
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Food then, can be a fetishistic fragment circulated upon the body without 
organs in which to resist or accommodate a range of production machines 
that delineate the body as an object of consumption; it is not reducible to 
the Oedipal logic of lack with its corresponding opposition between the 
feminine maternal realm and the masculine Symbolic Order. Against the 
idea that eating disorders represent a ‘repressed, silent, innocent, or 
negated feminine’, a Deleuzean viewpoint would view the phenomenon as 
a ‘site of practices, comportments, and contested articulations’ (Bray / 
Colebrook 1998, p. 37). Here, an appeal to either phallic logic or a 
corresponding maternal realm is unwarranted because, from the point of 
view of the body without organs, thought cannot ‘have an overarching 
identity, logic, or character (and therefore no privileged outside in 
general)’. As such, eating disorders can be understood ‘in terms of bodily 
activity rather than in terms of a repressed or negated "normal" body’ 
(ibid). Bray and Colebrook argue that such disorders might  
 
be seen as productive, as forms of self-formation. This is not to valorize 
[them] as some privileged or authentic form of resistant behavior. On 
the contrary, the point would be to do away with notions of ownness, 
authenticity, autonomy, and the rhetoric of alienation. Anorexia [and 
bulimia] would be one form of self- formation among others, and- -as a 
series of interconnected practices- would need to be considered in 
terms of what it creates or invents. (ibid, p.58) 
 
To move an interpretation away from privileged notions of the masculine 
and the feminine then, is to view such bodily practices as a flight from 
conventional forms of subjectivity. From this point of view, food fetishism 
as a form of self-production  
 
might be better seen less as a failed rebellion or negation of an 
unquestioned ideal body than as the production of a "being 
otherwise." […A] shattering of any general or totalizing account of 
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what constitutes a self or thought. (ibid) 
 
The patient’s body then is not to be perceived as ‘stage or screen on 
which some predetermined cultural neurosis plays itself out yet one more 
time’ (ibid, p.P62), it should be considered in terms of ‘the connections it 
makes, the intensities of its actions, and the dynamism of its practices’ 
(ibid, p. 63). To see the body and its relation to food as subject to 
difference and multiplicity is ‘to forgo the possibility of deciding ethical 
questions in advance, according to a rubric of some general difference or 
negation’ (ibid, p.64). As such, the fetishism of food, or any fetishism 
perceived as female or otherwise, cannot be evaluated in advance, its 
transgressive or conservative status is immanent to its position within a 
wider network of intensities and flows – in this case, a wider range of 
biomedical, social and cultural discourses surrounding the idea of food in 
relation to bodies and gender.  
 
In The Return of Female Fetishism and the Fiction of the Phallus 
(1993), Anne McClintock concurs with Gamman and Makinen that 
weaning and separation is at least equally traumatic to the phenomenon 
of castration in the constitution of the self: 
 
If castration is taken in the most abstracted sense as ‘loss of being’, 
or ‘elision of the self’, then the prolonged trauma of weaning […] 
might serve as a far more fundamental trauma than castration. 
(McClintock 1993, p.14)  
 
Moreover, in the production of a gendered self, McClintock declares 
that a multitude of cultural influences are arguably more influential than 
the threat of castration. 
 
 226 
Arguably, a variety of semiotics – gendered dress codes, hair 
styles, colours, toys, permissible behaviours – play as important, if 
not a more important role, than the implausibly narrow account of a 
single, epochal metamorphosis based on the threat of anatomical 
loss. (ibid)  
 
McClintock identifies the notion of a single masculine economy of desire 
within psychoanalysis as symptomatic of male anxiety for the potential 
loss of sovereignty and the fear that there might exist a feminine 
sexuality that is radically different. The dominant role of the phallic 
signifier within Lacanian theory is particularly singled out for criticism, 
largely due to its prevalence within  feminist theories of sexuality and its 
subsequent hindrance of the development of an alternative to the 
monolithic phallic economy of desire. For McClintock, Lacan’s ‘return to 
Freud’ authorizes a ‘reinvention of the ‘paternalist family’ by appealing 
to a single, male narrative of origins – the paternal threat of castration’ 
(ibid, p.12). As with Freud, the castration scenario posits a paternal 
intervention against incest as a universal law that consequently 
constitutes gendered subjectivity. By doing so, women are  
 
thereby […] denied social agency: we are seen to have no 
motivation for weaning or preventing incest, no social interest in 
guiding children into separation, no role in helping children 
negotiate the intricate dynamics of interdependence, nor any 
capacity for doing so. (ibid)   
 
By designating males as having and women as lacking the phallus 
within the castration dynamic, women are erased as social and cultural 
agents. In fact, with the Symbolic being solely identified with having the 
phallus, the ‘name of the father [becomes] equivalent to the entire 
symbolic realm, to culture itself. [Therefore the] dominant male culture 
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becomes, at a stroke, synonymous with all culture’ (ibid, p.14). By 
perceiving the economy of the phallus as synonymous with culture, 
psychoanalysis crudely reduces all history to a monolithic, eternal event 
to which we are all subject. As McClintock points out: 
 
By appealing in the singular, Lacan erases the theoretical possibility 
of multiple, contradictory, and historically changing symbols of 
desire […] Committed to the economy-of-one, Lacan cannot 
account (either descriptively or analytically) for historical 
contradictions and imbalances in power [.] (ibid) 
 
Such a crude reduction has consequences for subsequent social theory 
that is inspired by a Lacanian model. The theory of ideology proposed 
by Slavoj Žižek has a similar tendency to explain all historical trauma 
via the notion of castration and entry into the Symbolic.59 If the phallus 
in Lacanian theory is a signifier and not therefore equivalent to the 
physical penis, then the use of a singular symbol to determine the 
inauguration of desire has the effect of denying a multiplicity and 
positioning all desire under the one mark of castration with its masculine 
overtones. McClintock states:  
 
If the ‘phallus’ means ‘mark of desire’, and not the royal, fleshy 
penis, castration means something like ‘elision of desire’, or ‘lack-
of-having’ in an abstract formal sense. In which case, the use of a 
single metaphor that (inevitably) denotes male sexual loss, to 
express deprivation or elision in general, is frankly phallocentric. 
Inaugurating desire under one structural mark disavows and annuls 
the differences of women’s desires. (ibid, p.13) 
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Moreover, if the phallus denotes lack in a more general sense as ‘lack-
in-being’, then it is hard to see why this ‘polymorphous lack […] should 
be referred to a single, male logic and an economy of one’ (ibid).  
 Following Derrida’s critique of phallogocentrism, McClintock 
recognises the monolithic phallic economy as symptomatic of a need to 
understand subjectivity through a repetition of identity-through-negation, 
in which the male retains sole agency through a guaranteed logic of 
presence that positions woman as its negative – as that which is 
lacking. McClintock wonders why subjectivity cannot be understand 
through a repetition of identity-through-difference:  
 
There is no room in Lacan’s narrow house for women as social 
agents, nor for mothers to and children to gradually recognize each 
other as both like and unlike, both desired and desiring (identity-
through-difference) in ways that are not reducible to a single, grim, 
castrating phallic logic (identity-through-negation) (ibid, p.12) 
 
Whereas McClintock denies that desire can be reduced to a singular 
masculine sexual economy, a more productive approach to the analysis 
of desire and the phenomenon of the fetish is not proposed. The 
analysis of female fetishism is discussed in negative terms – the failure 
of other theorists to escape the Lacanian narrative of presence and 
lack. The most that McClintock suggests is   
 
[i]nstead of gathering these multifarious fetishes into a single primal 
scene, we might do better to open the genealogies of fetishism to 
more theoretically subtle and historically fruitful accounts. The 
fetishes of other cultures might then no longer have genuflect to the 




Phallogocentrism, Sexual Difference and Deleuze 
 
Our discussion of female fetishism has raised two issues. Firstly, an 
analysis that focuses upon the renegotiation of gender roles within a 
patriarchal society reduces the production of new subjectivities, lesbian or 
otherwise, to the limited roles within a restrictive phallocentric economy – 
from this viewpoint, conformity, masquerade or parody appear to be the 
only options available. Secondly, an analysis that views female fetishism 
from a pre-oedipal, maternal perspective risks reducing the manifestation 
of new subjectivities to pathological origins tied to separation anxieties, 
themselves tied to a wider Oedipal logic of separation and lack. Feminists 
aligned to a French post-structuralist position have been critical of models 
of female desire and value that remain tied to a phallocentric restrictive 
economy. It is worth considering such perspectives in that they illuminate 
the problem of remaining within such a restrictive economy and allow us to 
consider the viability of perceiving desire and value from the perspective of 
‘woman’.  
In an earlier section, the Derridean critique of the metaphysic of 
presence was outlined. Derrida criticizes logocentrism – understood as 
speech as the self-present guarantor of truth - and argues that the priority 
of either speech or writing must remain undecidable once discourse is 
recognized as a differential play of signs – this is Derrida’s famous 
proclamation: ‘There is nothing outside of the text’ (Derrida 1976, p.158). 
Derrida associates the metaphysics of presence associated with 
logocentrism with a notion of dualism. According to Derrida, dualism exists 
throughout western thought in its consistent tendency to generate 
meaning via a series of binary opposites which privileges one term whilst 
subordinating another. By doing this, western thought legitimates a notion 
of self-present truth by defining itself against an absent and lacking other. 
As we described earlier, Derrida recognizes this dualism within the 
restricted economy of the phallus – to describe the relation of binary 
opposites, with its associated presence and absence within this economy, 
Derrida creates a neologism: Phallogocentrism.  This term describes the 
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privilege accorded to the phallus – sign of sexual difference – as a mark of 
presence within logocentric thought.  
 Derrida’s critique of phallogocentrism informs the critique of 
feminine lack generated by a variety of writers, the most notable being 
Helene CIxous, Luce Irigaray and Julia Kristeva. These writers attempt to 
generate a discourse, an economy of desire, that exists outside that based 
upon the binary oppositions that constitutes the normative phallic 
economy.  
In dialogue with Derrida’s thought, Helene Cixous proposes écriture 
feminine (feminine writing) as a means of subverting the patriarchal binary 
oppositions within phallocentric thought. Cixous criticises phallocentric 
binary oppositions - where the phallic signifier is set up as the active 
determining influence within a hierarchy that allocates passivity and 
absence to its opposite feminine other. 60   
The work of Kristeva can be viewed as an appeal to pre-oedipal 
relations with the maternal body in which to disrupt the authority of the 
phallocentric Symbolic Order. In Revolution in Poetic Language (1974), 
Julia Kristeva identifies a distinction between the semiotic and the 
symbolic. For Kristeva, the semiotic is associated with the undifferentiated 
pre-language pulsions articulated within the dyadic chora of mother and 
child. The semiotic realm of the chora therefore exists prior to the 
Symbolic Order: it is perceived as anterior to the sign, representation and 
identity. Kristeva opposes a pre-Oedipal mother and child relationship to 
the Symbolic realm of the Father.  
For Kristeva, the transition from the pre-Oedipal semiotic realm to the 
Symbolic occurs at the mirror stage where a child is alienated within an 
image. Kristeva refers to this as the thetic phase in which the subject must 
recognize themselves as a separate identity before any proposition or 
positionality can be deduced. According to Kristeva, the subject (either a 
woman or a man) can still allow the semiotic to be felt after entering the 
Symbolic – this, Kristeva suggests, is most apparent within modern 
literature.61   
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In Speculum of the Other Woman (1974), Luce Irigaray utilizes the 
binary oppositions inherent within western philosophy and psychoanalysis 
as a means of subverting both the values and desire of a restrictive 
masculine economy that silences the feminine. In The Sex Which Is Not 
One (1977), Irigaray proposes a plural and multiple economy of the 
feminine in opposition to the male single economy of the same – this is 
achieved by appealing to women’s morphological difference to men.  
Despite their intentions to subvert the categories of phallocentric 
thought, the work of these writers has been accused of being complicit 
with the gendered oppositions forged by phallocentrism due to their 
dialogue within the premises of Lacanian psychoanalysis. By conceiving 
écriture feminine as a fluid space to express multiple sexualities, outside 
of the single male economy, Cixous may be perceived as falling into the 
trap of constituting the very metaphysics of presence that is the subject of 
her critique. As Toril Moi states, Cixous’ writing is ‘[f]undamentally 
contradictory […in that] femininity shifts back and forth from a Derridean 
emphasis on textuality as difference to a full-blown metaphysical account 
of writing as voice, presence and origin’ (Moi 1985, p. 119). By accepting a 
Lacanian account of subjectivity as constituted through a phallic signifier 
that privileges the male as having the phallus, Cixous could be subject to 
accusations of essentializing woman by positioning her outside the 
Symbolic Order. Cixous accepts the Lacanian distinction between the 
Imaginary and Symbolic Order and by privileging the female (maternal) 
body as a site from which multiple desires can flow, Cixous therefore 
equates the female body as aligned with the Imaginary realm. Such a 
move can be perceived as dangerous in that it again equates woman with 
a stereotypical feminine attribute: that of being irrational.62  
Likewise, Kristeva’s position leaves the opposition between a 
masculine symbolic and feminine maternal intact. To claim, as Kristeva 
does, that neither Man or Woman exist, that they are positions which 
either gender can adopt, does not deny the fact that the semiotic is 
fundamentally a relation to the maternal and that the symbolic order is 
therefore an inescapable third term associated with the paternal father. By 
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subscribing to a psychoanalytic model, Kristeva could be accused of 
precluding any analysis that might recognize wider or subtler voices other 
than a paternal Symbolic which can only be disrupted, not overturned, by 
the pre-Oedipal pulsions of the semiotic. 63 As Toril Moi points out: 
 
If the Kristevan subject is always already inserted in the symbolic 
order, how can such an implacably authoritarian, phallocentric 
structure be broken up? It obviously cannot happen through a 
straightforward rejection of the symbolic order, since such a total 
failure to enter into human relations would, in Lacanian terms, make 
us psychotic. We have to accept our position as already inserted 
into an order that precedes us and from which there is no escape. 
There is no other space from which we can speak: if we are able to 
speak at all, it will have to be within the framework of symbolic 
language. (Moi 1985, p.170) 
  
Another consequence of appealing to the ‘feminine’ in the terms laid out 
by phallocentric discourse – that which remains in the pre-Oedipal realm – 
is that it risks defining woman as essentially irrational. By remaining 
outside the Symbolic, woman is positioned on the side of psychosis in 
which her condition can only be explained by recourse to the terms of 
phallocentric discourse - as a consequence of Lacan’s conception of the 
Imaginary and the Symbolic Order, a person that repudiates or finds 
themselves outside the Symbolic Order is subject to psychosis; Lacan 
refers to this condition as ‘foreclosure’:  
 
It is an accident in the symbolic register and of what is 
accomplished in it, namely the foreclosure of the Name-of-the-
Father in the place of the Other and in the failure of the paternal 
metaphor which I designate as the defect that gives psychosis its 
essential condition [.] (Lacan 2006,p.576)  
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According to Christine Battersby, the perceived failure of theories of 
feminine difference to move beyond the reified categories of a 
phallocentric order can be seen as symptomatic of a potentially flawed 
epistemology. Despite Lacan providing a means to understand a singular 
sexual economy as an effect of language, and the fact that Derrida 
proposes that such an economy is subject to the play of différance in 
which no metaphysics of presence can be substantiated, these writers can 
be viewed as also complicit with a need to exclude and contain the 
feminine, understood as a process of becoming which has the capacity to 
include Otherness. In her book The Phenomenal Woman (1998), 
Battersby indicates how Lacan’s notion of the self and Derrida’s critique of 
the metaphysics of presence are both tied to Kant’s metaphysical model of 
the self64. According to Battersby, Lacan’s theories are a psychological 
version of the ‘moment whereby the Kantian transcendental subject 
establishes itself as self via a process of displacing the transcendental 
object’ (Battersby 1998, p. 86). Battersby justifies this comparison by 
indicating that Lacan’s concept of the Real can be viewed as analogous to 
Kant’s ‘noumenal’ world in that it cannot be known. The alienating, yet 
necessary, entry into Lacan’s Symbolic Order can then be viewed as 
analogous to Kant’s filtering of the world through the categories of human 
understanding within the transcendental self – both decree the 
impossibility of the self having a self-present union with the world-as-it-is. 
For Kant, the world is relative to the categories, whereas for Lacan, entry 
in the Symbolic Order leaves the world radically lost to a network of 
signifiers and concepts. In the work of both Lacan and Kant, such a 
division between self and external other is needed before recognition of 
the self can occur. For Kant the self is ‘not inherently solipsistic, as was 
the Cartesian soul. It always exists in relation to objects ’(ibid, p.68). For 
Lacan, the concept of the self cannot exist until the subject breaks its 
imaginary unity with the world and enters the Symbolic Order.  
According to Battersby, the constitution and understanding of the self 
within the work of both Kant and Lacan is similarly predicated upon the 
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exclusion of woman from an essentially masculine viewpoint. Everything 
that is woman – fluidity, multiplicity and flesh - is therefore situated outside 
the definition of self. In the work of Kant, the transcendental self acts as 
the determining source of all form within the world – as such, all that is 
knowable is governed by human understanding. Such a theoretical 
position relies upon a clear division between self and external object. It 
also relies upon a notion of external bodies as permanent entities that can 
be identified through the sovereignty of human understanding. A body that 
threatens the distinction between self and other, and which also 
demonstrates matter as self-forming beyond the realm of permanent 
forms, must therefore be excluded from Kant’s system. In its capacity to 
give birth and contain otherness within itself, the female body is such a 
disruptive entity and has been systematically excluded from the masculine 
definition of ‘personhood’ as a realm of pure rationality.  
In the work of Lacan, self-identity within society comes from our 
allocated position in relation to the masculine phallic signifier. Woman is 
positioned as lacking the phallus and is consequently excluded from the 
single male sexual economy, As such, Lacan follows Kant in similarly 
asserting a masculine definition of the self that simultaneously excludes 
and contains its other. The other is situated outside a system of the self by 
designating the other as lacking the presence of its own attributes. 
Derrida’s critique of the metaphysics of presence can be similarly 
described as being caught up within a post-Kantian system of exclusion 
and containment. For Derrida, any form of judgment, analysis or criticism 
is subject to an unsubstantiated metaphysics of presence – including his 
own theory, which designates ‘presence’ as the defining characteristic of 
western metaphysics, identifying this as the permanent factor that persists 
throughout change. As such, Derrida’s ideas are similarly subject to a 
process whereby otherness (that which is seen as absent or lacking) is 
prevented from having any active agency of its own outside of the 
privileged economy of ‘presence’: 
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Derrida is not unlike Lacan – or, indeed, Kant himself. Derrida’s 
insistence that the history of metaphysics closes itself down into a 
single trajectory that privileges ‘presence’ does, in effect, fix 
otherness and fix becoming in ways that prevent a more radical 
engagement with an otherness that is not just ‘feminine’ excess. 
(ibid, p.95) 
 
For Battersby, the metaphysical strategy of exclusion and containment, 
which is similarly evident in Kant, Lacan and Derrida’s work, serves to 
‘render invisible an alternative metaphysics of the fleshy, and of a mode of 
otherness in which bodies, nature and matter are more than the negation 
of the masculinized ‘I’’ (ibid). It is in opposition to a post-Kantian 
metaphysics of exclusion and containment, that Battersby advocates a 
metaphysics of the self which takes the female as its normative model. As 
we shall see, by appealing to notions of natality, nurturing, pregnancy, 
fleshiness and monstrosity, Battersby generates a notion of subjectivity as 
a process of becoming that is inclusive of both self and otherness.  
 
To summarise, the ideas of Lacan and Derrida have been perceived as 
useful by some feminist writers with regard to the fact that presence and 
lack, inclusion and exclusion from the dominant sexual economy, can be 
understood as the effect of our positioning within language and is 
therefore understood to be a social construction rather than a natural 
given. Derrida’s critique of the metaphysics of presence, exposes 
phallogocentrism as a means of maintaining a single masculine sexual 
economy orientated around the phallic signifier whose presence 
determines the relationship between the sexes. The critique of lack 
instigated by writers attempting to find a feminine voice not subjugated to 
the phallic signifier has been found wanting at the point at which such 
voices remain within a phallogocentric discourse. Acceptance of the terms 
of Lacan’s theory of subjectivity – namely, those who have the phallus and 
those that lack it – proves problematic for feminists at the point that 
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liberation from lack becomes complicit with patriarchal definitions of 
femininity - where the masculine ‘I’ defines reason, desire and subjectivity 
and woman is excluded and aligned with an unsymbolisable difference. 
Though Derrida exposes an unsubstantiated call to presence within these 
masculine definitions, his theories do little to provide an agency of 
difference in which desire is understood as something other than an 
otherness that is lacking.  
 
Sexual Difference and Deleuze 
 
Irigaray’s work diverges from Lacan, Derrida and other feminist 
writers in the suggestion that a separate, multiple economy could exist that 
is based upon woman’s morphology. According to these writers there is 
only a pre-Oedipal maternal realm and a masculine Symbolic in 
phallocentric discourse, no mention is made of the vaginal and placental 
economy of woman’s morphology; this is precisely the blindspot of Oedipal 
logic, the zone designated as lacking. It is important to consider the 
possibility of a multiple economy – a recognition of sexual difference - in 
that it may recognise a desire outside the realm of a restrictive 
phallocentric order, whilst offering an alternative view of difference to that 
of Deleuze and Guattari. If it is demonstrated that sexual difference is 
prior, then a multiple economy based upon feminine difference might 
reveal the blindspots in Deleuze and Guattari’s work; this, in turn, might 
affect the credibility of a Deleuzean notion of the fetish, based on the idea 
of difference in general.  
From the point of view of Irigaray, ‘[s]exual difference has been 
feigned by a single term producing itself as subjectivity in general’ 
(Colebrook 2000, p. 111). Irigaray’s work aims to expose the phallic logic 
within patriarchy and metaphysical thought, in which men and women are 
reduced to a repetition of the same: phallic presence or phallic lack. For 
Irigaray, ‘sexual difference is not a topic to be introduced into metaphysics, 
but determines metaphysics as such’ (ibid). From this point of view, the 
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transcendental subject with its categories and concepts that are used to 
reify the world, is symptomatic of a phallocentric viewpoint from which 
becoming and fluidity are negated. In Speculum of the Other Woman 
(1974), Irigaray uses the metaphor of a speculum - a (usually male) 
gynaecologist’s instrument used for penetrating and inspecting the cavities 
within a woman’s body - to expose patriarchal discourse and its ‘negation 
of the maternal ground’ (ibid). Because of the concave shape of its mirror, 
the speculum reverses the image it reflects. The concave shape generates 
a hollow space that mimics the negative space of the woman’s womb 
whilst also concentrating light upon a single focal point. This 
gynaecological instrument acts as an analogy to Irigaray’s method. 
Irigaray positions the light, or focal point (male patriarchal enlightenment) 
within the feminine negative space of the speculum. This reflection of the 
masculine within the feminine also reverses the perceived historical order 
of philosophy – Irigaray’s study starts with Freud and ends with Plato. By 
writing through the voices of male philosophical discourse, Irigaray uses 
this masculine ‘instrument’ of penetration against itself.   
Irigaray points out that Freud’s theory of sexual difference is based 
upon visibility. For Freud, the sexual economy is actively male, evident in 
the visibility of the phallic penis in the male that is lacking in the female. 
Irigaray paraphrases Freud by describing woman as that  ‘black box, 
strongbox, earth-abyss that remains outside’ (Irigaray 1985a, p.20), a 
place in which ‘illumination’ of female sexuality cannot be found; therefore 
‘light must no doubt come from elsewhere’ (ibid), namely the male phallic 
order. As such, sexuality is described from the viewpoint of a single 
economy, that of the same, in which all difference is interpreted from the 
perspective of the male phallus.   
 
[…] for light to be or be spoken in the matter of (so-called) female 
sexuality, we can assume that difference is always already in 
operation […] Out of this difference will be lifted one of the two 
terms [(the Phallus)…] and this one term will be constituted as 
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“origin,” as that by whose differentiation the other may be 
engendered and brought to light (ibid, p.21). 
 
Irigaray creates a neologism for this economy of the same by fusing the 
French words for the same (homo) and man (homme) together to make 
the word hom(m)osexualité. According to Irigaray, this hom(m)osexualité 
economy constitutes woman as a man who is lacking: man minus the 
visible phallic penis; man minus the ability to represent themselves as 
man. Therefore the (fe)male becomes the negative of male 
‘specularization’.  
 
The ‘differentiation’ into two sexes derives from the a priori 
assumption of the same, since the little man that the little girl is, 
must become a man minus certain attributes whose paradigm is 
morphological-attributes capable of determining, of assuring, the 
reproduction-specularization of the same. A man minus the 
possibility of (re)presenting oneself as a man = a normal woman 
(Irigaray 1985a, p.27).  
 
Throughout Speculum of the Other Woman, Irigaray describes how the 
history of western philosophy is complicit with this economy of the same. 
Irigaray deliberately places Descartes at the centre of her Speculum, for it 
is this thinker within the western tradition that most confidently confirms his 
own subjective identity through the phallic signifier – the foundation stone 
to his philosophy is the ‘I’ generated through the Name-of-the-Father65, as 
in the Cogito ergo Sum: “I think therefore I am”. Irigaray traces the 
economy of the same back to the foundation of western thought through 
the writings of Plato. Irigaray describes how patriarchal concepts of truth 
and rationality are based upon associating the masculine with knowledge 
and light and the feminine with non-knowledge and the earth. To illustrate 
her point, Irigaray refers to Plato’s allegory of the cave in The Republic. 
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Within this allegory, the prisoner is brought out of the cave as a child is 
brought out of the womb – here the feminine is described in negative 
terms: the dark earthy cave represents the womb that excludes 
knowledge, whereas leaving the womb is equated with entering the light of 
masculine truth via a recognition of platonic eternal Forms. 
 
“Jumping” out […] of the vault […] and into the eternally present 
ecstasy of the Sun (of the) Idea [,] into the peremptory affirmation 
that cognition and re-cognition can occur only through / in what has 
been defined as such by (the discourse of) truth. Truth is unveiled 
by / for him […] with the full force of law. Passing from the fluid 
darkness, from the shimmering imprecision of reflections […] to the 
neat, clear-cut, immutable, unambiguous categories that 
characterize, divide up, classify, and order everything [.] (ibid, 
p.280-1) 
 
As such, the certainty of masculine knowledge is associated with the 
scopophilic – man is confident in his knowledge through the certainty of 
what is available to vision66. For Irigaray, the analogy of Plato’s cave with 
the womb, and its association with ignorance and mimicry, demonstrates 
western metaphysics orientation towards a hom(m)osexual economy of 
the same that rests upon a negation of our maternal origins in terms of 
being born from a mother. As Rachel Jones states: 
 
By positing the eternal Forms as the only true reality and the origin 
of all that is, Plato’s metaphysics displaces our actual beginnings in 
birth. The ideal ‘father’ of visible offspring supplants birth from a 
mother. In this way, the horizon of metaphysical thought obscures 
the more primordial horizon that orients human beings in the world, 
namely, our relation to our maternal origins. (Jones 2011, p. 47) 
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In The Sex Which Is Not One (1977), Irigaray compares the 
specularisation of women by men to the fetishism of commodities 
analysed by Marx: 
Participation in society requires that the body submits itself to a 
specularization, a speculation, that transforms it into a value-
bearing object, a standardized sign, an exchangeable signifier, a 
“likeness” with reference to an authoritative model. A commodity – 
a woman – is divided into two irreconcilable “bodies”: her “natural” 
body and her socially valued, exchangeable body, which is a 
particularly mimetic expression of masculine values. (Irigaray 
1985b, p.179-80) 
 
Woman then, is fetishized and subject to equivalence and exchange from 
a masculine phallocentric perspective, a separate economy of difference is 
disavowed outside a male economy of the same. In contrast to this 
specular male economy, Irigaray proposes a plural economy of the 
feminine. Irigaray illustrates how male sexuality invests in an economy of 
the same through the visibility and presence of the phallic signifier. This is 
analogous to the way commodities are invested via the visibility and 
presence of monetary value. In contrast to such a singular restrictive 
economy, the feminine body is recognized as offering an economy that is 
plural: 
 
So woman does not have a sex organ? She has at least two of 
them, but they are not identifiable as ones. Indeed she has many 
more. Her sexuality, always at least double, goes even further: it is 
plural. (ibid, p.28) 
 
Unlike the male sexual organ, woman’s sex is composed of many 
elements: lips, vagina, clitoris, cervix, uterus and breasts. As such, Irigaray 
believes woman’s sexual economy is multiple, diverse and endless: 
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Woman “touches herself” all the time, and moreover no one can 
forbid her to do so, for her genitals are formed of two lips in 
continuous contact. Thus, within herself, she is already two – but 
not divisible into one(s) – that caress each other.  (ibid, p.24) 
 
Irigaray believes that this feminine economy, where multiple parts touch 
and embrace endlessly, requires an emphasis upon the sense of touch, 
rather than the sense of vision that is appropriate to the monolithic male 
organ. The prioritizing of the sense of vision in patriarchal culture is seen 
as yet another method for keeping woman passive:  
 
[T]he predominance of the visual, and of the discrimination and 
individualization of form, is particularly foreign to female eroticism. 
Woman takes pleasure more from touching than from looking, and 
her entry into a dominant scopic economy signifies, again her 
consignment to passivity [.] (ibid, p.25-6)  
 
On conceiving feminine sexual economy as multiple, Irigaray proposes 
that such an economy is inclusive, unlike the exclusivity of the male 
economy which operates through an either / or model (either you have the 
phallus or you do not). This conception of a feminine economy allows 
Irigaray to suggest that women have potentially a separate relation to 
language which defies notions of identity and presence that would tie 
language to authority – hence Irigaray’s declaration that ‘there is simply no 
way I can give you an account of “speaking (as) woman”; it is spoken, but 
not in meta-language’ (ibid, p.144). Such a language evades the specular 
logic that reifies concepts to objects in an economy of presence; hers is a 
language of tactility and fluidity in which words, concepts and ideas merge, 
mingle and separate in a never ending movement that has no centrifugal 
force. In woman’s language there is no presence or lack, only movement.  
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[Her] “style” does not privilege sight; instead, it takes each figure 
back to their source, which is amongst other things tactile […] 
Simultaneity is its “proper” aspect – a proper(ty) that is never fixed 
in the possible identity-to-self of some form or other. It is always 
fluid, without neglecting the characteristics of fluids that are difficult 
to idealize: those rubbings between two infinitely near neighbours 
that create a dynamics. It’s “style” resists and explodes every firmly 
established form, figure, idea or concept. (ibid, p.79) 
 
Irigaray’s work has been subject to a range of criticisms. If the 
specular effect of the phallic order dominates all discourse within 
patriarchal culture, how could the work of Irigaray escape its 
omnipresence or find a position from which to criticise it? By miming 
masculine perceptions of femininity, Irigaray can be perceived of viewing 
the feminine within patriarchy’s own terms; as Moi has argued, mimicry 
fails because it ceases to be perceived as such: it is no longer merely a 
mockery of the absurdities of the male, but a perfect reproduction of the 
logic of the Same’ (Moi 1985, p.142). By constructing a notion of the 
feminine upon female morphology, in much the same way that Lacan’s 
phallic signifier comes to represent the visible penis, Irigaray ‘s work has 
been accused of essentializing woman based upon her ‘given’ nature 
which, in Irigaray’s writing, appears to correspond with patriarchal notions 
of the feminine as fluid, intuitive, emotional and irrational. As Monique 
Plaza points out, by  
 
prescribing woman’s social and intellectual existence from her 
‘morphology’ […Irigaray’s] method remains fundamentally and 
completely under the influence of patriarchal ideology. For one 
cannot describe morphology as though it presented itself to 
perception, without ideological mediation […] Every mode of 
existence which ideology imputes to women as part of the Eternal 
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Feminine […] is from now on woman’s essence, woman’s being. All 
that is woman comes to her in the last instances from her 
anatomical sex. (Plaza 1978, p. 31-2) 
 
These criticisms can be considered as misguided. It is not the case that 
Irigaray merely takes the patriarchal view of woman and makes it a virtue 
based upon dubious ideas of essentialized notions of femininity. For 
Irigaray, the metaphysics of presence within the phallic economy should 
not be overturned by creating a simple reversal of given values within a 
restrictive economy based upon a transcendental signified, rather such a 
subversion occurs via the recognition of the multiple rather than the 
singular. As Clare Colebrook points out in relation to Irigaray: 
 
Refiguring metaphysics demands refiguring sexual difference. No 
longer a relation between a subject who can adequately (re)present 
a transcendent object, an ethics of sexual difference would enable 
two transcendences or two modes of relation. This would take the 
form not of representation but of recognition. It would no longer be 
a question of the subject’s relation to the given, but of a relation to 
another mode of transcendence, another mode of givenness. 
Irigaray’s ethics of sexual difference is not just a critique of 
determined gender differences; it is the production and recognition 
of two ways in which determination might be given [.] (Colebrook 
Op CIt, p. 122) 
 
In other words, the question of sexual difference is about the recognition of 
the other as other, not a negative reflection of an economy of the same. 




Relatedness or transcendence is no longer towards the given but to 
another subject. Autonomy is not self-authorship but the sense of 
the embodied specificity of my identity which is gained through 
recognition of the (differently) embodied other. (ibid, p. 123) 
 
Given this, Irigaray is arguing less for an idea of an essential other and 
more for a notion of femininity theorized on its own terms rather than being 
described as the negative of something else.  
Tina Chanter argues that the charge of essentialism against 
Irigaray is symptomatic of an ‘outmoded idea of what feminism should be’ 
(Chanter 1995, p.5). Such an outmoded view of feminism is perceived as 
downplaying sexual difference in favour of emphasizing gender equality. 
Important as the struggle of gender equality and equal legal rights have 
been, Chanter reminds us that it is ‘a mistake to restrict feminism to such a 
goal’ (ibid, p.7).  Chanter draws our attention to the fact that such 
necessary struggles neglect the fact that the realm in which equality is 
fought is itself biased towards a phallocentric restrictive economy: 
 
Insofar as women’s struggle for equality with men accepts the 
terms of classical liberal theory it not only makes certain 
assumptions about the value of individualism and competition in a 
free-market economy, but it also assumes the neutrality of the 
social order […] To the extent that feminism rehearses the rhetoric 
of a tradition that is built on the exclusion of women, it needs to be 
self-conscious and self-critical of the assumptions it makes in doing 
so. (ibid, p. 7-8) 
 
As such, the challenge for Irigaray is to rethink the metaphysical terms on 
which a patriarchal social order is based. Reference to anatomical 
difference is therefore a means by which to recognize that other 
economies can exist outside phallocentrism. If our relation to others is 
 245 
thought in terms of subjectivity, and if the subject is currently understood in 
patriarchal terms, then sexual difference provides us with possibilities for 
thinking subjectivity anew; Claire Colebrook points out: 
 
Sexual difference, for Irigaray, is not a difference among others but 
responds to a certain problem: if we think in terms of a certain 
philosophical plane – that of the subject, and ethics as the 
recognition of other subjects – then sexual difference provides a 
way of thinking through possibilities within this plane. (Colebrook 
Op Cit, p.123-4) 
 
 Rather than reductively position woman as an essential other, such a 
reconfiguration of metaphysical terms aims to recognize woman in all her 
diversity; as Chanter describes: 
 
In order to adequately confront diversity among women in addition 
to the differences between women and men, it is necessary, 
according to Irigaray’s view, to rethink basic assumptions about 
sameness and difference, justice and equality, rationality and 
subjectivity, the whole and its parts, potentiality and actuality, form 
and matter, space and time (Chanter Op Cit, p.8) 
 
The proposition that a different model of metaphysical thinking 
might exist based upon women’s morphology potentially risks falling into 
the trap of appealing to a metaphysical origin that negates such radical 
transformations in value. Despite their differences, Claire Colebrook 
argues that Lacan, Derrida and Irigaray similarly focus on the given 
metaphysical conditions on which sexual difference is constructed, 
whereas Deleuze’s philosophy of immanence allows us the opportunity to 
treat bodily difference as a novel problem in itself: 
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If philosophy is the question of the question (Derrida), an ethics of 
sexual difference would take the form of an enquiry into the 
condition of difference, difference in general. If philosophy has been 
a form of auto-representation (Irigaray), then philosophy’s 
transformation will take the form of the recognition of an other: 
autonomous sexual difference. And if philosophy is an ethics of 
amor fati and the creation of new concepts, then sexual difference 
will be the task of thinking differently. (Colebrook Op Cit, p.125) 
 
 Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of immanence, manifested within the 
theory of the body without organs, is constituted via an immanent relation 
of forces – as such any understanding in thought is also immanent to the 
circumstances any body finds itself in any given situation. As such, it is 
less about what a body is in metaphysical thought, but more about what a 
body does and can become. As Colebrook states: 
 
It would not be a question of deciding a correct theory of the body: 
Lacanian sexual difference, Irigarayan recognition, Derridean 
questions […] Thought takes place in a body, as a body, and so a 
theory of the body in general could not be a true response to the 
problem of the body […] However, if sexual difference is not 
theorized from a metaphysics, but is confronted as a problem, then 
we might take the issues of sexual difference and use them to think. 
(ibid, p. 126) 
 
To counter this line of thought, Irigaray would argue that any direct move 
towards a Deleuzean multiplicity without due consideration of sexual 
difference risks neglecting the values of femininity and ignoring the claims 
feminists might make in the name of women. As Dorethea Olkowski 
states, Irigaray is  
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concerned that without first rearticulating the difference between the 
sexes, women’s pleasure(s) will be blocked or diminished in the 
rush towards multiplicity. In other words, what sense does feminism 
make without making the assertion of sexual difference pre-
eminent? (Olkowski 2000, p.102-3) 
 
From this viewpoint, Irigaray is reluctant to conceive identity as an open 
whole – such a move would diminish the recognition of values within the 
terms of embodied sex relations. Irigaray is therefore not essentialist in 
terms of seeing values as biologically determined, but essentialist in terms 
of positing values that depathologise woman as subject to patriarchal 
discourse. 
 
[Irigaray stops] at the concept of an open whole, dismissing it on 
the grounds that it would rule out in advance any determination of 
values for terms and relations. Instead of conceptualizing relations 
as independent of terms and instead of conceptualizing the world 
as open and changing, Irigaray retains an essentialist (with respect 
to relations) and totalizing framework, even while insisting on 
fluidity. (ibid, p.104) 
 
The different ontological positions of Deleuze and Irigaray cannot 
be resolved, despite having a shared concern for the abolition of 
patriarchal discourse and the predominance of a singular sexual economy. 
Whereas Deleuze perceives multiplicity as ontologically prior to sexual 
difference; Irigaray perceives birth and sexual difference to be our origin 
relation to the world. For Irigaray, birth from a mother constitutes an 
original relation between Being and beings that is disclosed in two different 
ways: we are born as either a different or similar sex in relation to our 
mother. As such, the challenge of sexual difference is to form a positive 
sense of subjectivity in relation to oneself and others, whilst neither 
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appropriating nor subjugating the other to form a singular hom(m)sexual 
economy; such a task requires the recognition of each sex in its own 
specificity and an appreciation of each sex on its own terms. Such a 
recognition requires an acknowledgement of the multiplicity of female 
sexuality and the irreducibility of relations between the sexes; as Rachel 
Jones states: 
 
an ontology founded on ‘being two’ remains attentive to the 
incalculable difference that makes it impossible to quantify beings 
as two, if ‘two’ denotes anything like two ones, or a binary, 
doubling, or duality. In the end […] the ‘two’ marks an incalculable 
difference between beings who are irreducible both to each other, 
and to two times one[.] (Jones 2011, p.232) 
 
In contrast, Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of ‘becoming-woman’ 
designates multiplicity, a becoming, prior to any other relations. According 
to this view, the fundamental challenge is not the forming of a positive 
relation to a sexed body that defies appropriation by the other, it is rather 
the production of fluid multiplicity, a becoming other, against the reductive 
patriarchal dualities that restrict the flow and reify identity. For Deleuze 
and Guattari, to become a girl is to become that which exists beyond 
patriarchal logic – it is therefore a concept that designates a process to be 
attained without the exclusion of either sex:  
 
[T]he reconstruction of the body as a Body without Organs, the 
anorganism of the body, is inseparable from a becoming-woman, or 
the production of a molecular woman […] becoming-woman or the 
molecular woman is the girl herself. The girl […] is defined by a 
relation of movement and rest, speed and slowness, by a 
combination of atoms, an emission of particles: haecceity. She 
never ceases to roam upon a body without organs. She is an 
abstract line, or a line of flight. Thus girls do not belong to an age 
group, sex, order, or kingdom: they slip in everywhere, between 
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orders, acts, ages, sexes; they produce n molecular sexes on the 
line of flight [.] (Deleuze / Guattari 1996, p.276-7) 
 
Given the incommensurable positions of Deleuze and Irigaray with regards 
to ontology and sexual difference, one must recognize the dangers in 
either endorsing a positive account of sexual difference or conflating 
sexual difference into difference in general. For Irigaray, the affinity 
between the body without organs and becoming-woman can itself be 
perceived as symptomatic of the historical condition of women under 
patriarchy – outside of the predominant singular male economy, woman is 
denied any specific subjectivities and pleasures that she can call her own; 
as Olkowski points out: 
 
For Irigaray the body without organs is no more than the historical 
condition of women – no singular organ dominates the woman’s 
body, thus no pleasure belonging specifically to her – thus 
becoming-woman is a presumption, a fantasmatic position for a 
male subject who, once again, supplements his own pleasure. In 
other words, she takes becoming-woman to be another 
appropriation of the woman’s body by the male. (Olkowski Op CIt, 
p.103) 
 
In contrast, Deleuze and Guattari warn us against the potential reductive 
nature of positive accounts of sexual difference, whilst also recognizing 
the need for an acknowledgement of sex in its own specificity: 
 
It is […] indispensable for women to conduct a molar politics, with a 
view to winning back their own organism, their own history, their 
own subjectivity […] But it is dangerous to confine oneself to such a 
subject, which does not function without drying up a spring or 
stopping a flow. (ibid, p.276) 
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Many accounts of desire and becoming are affected by biological 
anomalies or productive and artificial cybernetic encounters – in these 
cases, novel and disruptive modes of subjectivity manifest themselves and 
disturb old certainties. In these cases, discussing identity and desire from 
the point of view of given sexed subjectivities, morphological or otherwise, 
risks producing blindspots where other generative and productive 
possibilities might occur. One is reminded of Donna Haraway’s declaration 
that ‘[c]yborg unities are monstrous and illegitimate’ (Haraway 1985, 
p.154) and that the ‘cyborg skips the step of original unity, of identification 
with nature’ (ibid, p.151). For Haraway, the ‘cyborg is resolutely committed 
to partiality, irony, intimacy, and perversity’ (ibid). In a footnote, Rachel 
Jones recognises that Irigaray does not sufficiently address the issue of 
those born intersexed (Jones Op Cit, p.252) – whereas it is suggested that 
‘those whose sexed specificity embodies both male and female could 
perhaps be seen as occupying a privileged (if highly complex) ethical 
position in terms of their embodiment of alterity’ (ibid), such a position 
proves problematic for a notion of subjectivity based upon the ontological 
relation between two sexes. At the very least, this is an area requiring 
further exploration. 
 
Whereas the work of Irigaray is invaluable in offering insight into the 
recovering and recognition of sexual specificity as sexual specificity, the 
work of Deleuze provides the tools to understand occurrences where an 
immanent productive process generates new subjectivities and desires via 
the play of difference. By providing a model of becoming in which notions 
of subjectivity and desire can be both territorialized (anti-production) and 
deterritorialized (desiring-production) without recourse to original identity, 
Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of the body without organs is versatile 
enough to incorporate notions of relatively stable entities (biological sex is 
such an entity) as well as those generated via novel immanent relations: it 
can therefore be, arguably, inclusive of sexual difference as well as 
difference in general.   
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The present study is concerned with a reconfiguration of the notion of 
fetishism beyond conventional notions of lack, disavowal and value. Due 
to the artificial and productive sense found contained within the idea, it has 
been proposed that the fetish is the archetype of value rather than a 
substitute. As such, the concept of the body without organs is deemed to 
correspond to the need for a model of the fetish that both generates and 
subverts the notion of value without appeal to a transcendental origin; the 
concept is therefore suitable for a notion that is required to account for 
difference in general. 
From the point of view of fetishism, feminist critiques of the notion 
of lack have the benefit of drawing attention to the fact that it is not the 
absence of the maternal phallus that is ultimately disavowed in the fetish, 
but the idea of feminine difference. The economy of the fetish in traditional 
accounts is subject to the authority of phallic discourse – the disavowal of 
the maternal phallus acts as an alibi in which to contain an economy of 
desire within the terms of its economy. As Chanter states: 
 
The trope of fetishism, then, operates as subordinate to phallic 
discourse, which is organized according to a logic of castration that 
confers a univocal value on the phallus. From this point of view, the 
theory of fetishism constitutes a defense against the proliferation of 
meanings, of which women become symbolic. It is women’s 
morphological difference from men that challenges the masculine 
expectation that women’s pleasure should be essentially the same 
as men’s, and that it should be defined according to a narcissistic 
investment in a penis (or penis substitute). The fetish is produced in 
an attempt to ward off the threat that this difference presents [.] 
(Chanter 2008, p.12) 
 
As inferred above, there is a case to be answered in which Deleuze 
and Guattari’s conception of the Body Without Organs, with its 
corresponding notion of immanent desire, can be viewed as being 
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covertly gender biased in which male values are endorsed and 
femininity is ignored. Such a perception therefore risks aligning a 
Deleuzean notion of the fetish with the same phallocentric restrictive 
economy we are trying to avoid. According to Christine Battersby, the 
notion of desiring-production that generates the self via a process of 
becoming, disregards conceptions of the self based upon economies of 
reproduction, care and dependency – precisely those aspects 
traditionally associated with the female. In her book The Phenomenal 
Woman (1998), Christine Battersby reconstitutes metaphysics anew in 
which to generate a theory of subjectivity that moves beyond positions 
designated within a phallocentric Symbolic Order. Battersby generates 
this new theory of subjectivity by asking what would happen if we 
rethought identity in ways that take the female as norm? Through an 
appropriation of Kierkegaard’s account of femininity, Battersby 
discusses five female attributes that provide a means for moving 
beyond the definition of the subject within traditional metaphysics: 
natality, nurturing, pregnancy, fleshiness and monstrosity.  By appealing 
to these attributes, Battersby generates a notion of subjectivity as a 
process of becoming that is inclusive of both self and otherness. 
 Kierkegaard’s notion of becoming, as the repetition and recognition 
of a novel set of patterns, appears to correspond with Deleuze’s writing 
and presents a notion of subjectivity similar to that outlined in Deleuze 
and Guattari’s conception of the Body Without Organs.67 Despite 
similarities between the two positions, Battersby contends that Deleuze 
and Guattari are blind to material differences between the sexes – a 
neglect that risks ignoring economies of reproduction and 
corresponding relationships of dependency.  
In response to such neglect within cultural discourse, Battersby 
proposes a conception of identity based upon the writings of 
Kierkegaard in which notions of birth and dependency affect our sense 
of self. For Kierkegaard, 
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the self is not fixed; but is itself only configured by a play of echoes; 
by patterns of relations; as a kind of harmonic or vibration produced 
by the intersection of present, future and past. There are no 
‘ultimates’ or ‘absolutes’ […] but there is nevertheless a (fluid, 
shifting, uncertain) ‘real’ that is composed by the way the self is 
positioned in the complex dynamics of multiple self / other 
relationships. (Battersby 1988, p.170) 
 
According to Battersby’s interpretation of Kierkegaard’s Stages on Life’s 
Way (1845), the best illustration of the self generated at the intersection 
of self / other is via an analogy with woman’s condition. Starting from a 
typical viewpoint of woman as both a lack and an excess to the notion 
of the rational masculine self, Battersby refers to the character of 
Johannes the Seducer to demonstrate how woman can supply a 
definition of identity beyond such a conception without resorting to the 
idea of woman as pure difference, an unknowable excess that can only 
make itself known through disruptions within masculine discourse. As 
both excess and lack, woman is described as a fiction, a masquerade 
defined within a male economy of desire. As Battersby states, ‘woman 
is trapped within the mirror of male desire. Even when alone and 
apparently careless of her appearance, she constructs herself via this 
internalized male gaze’ (ibid, p.161). For one of Kierkegaard’s 
characters, Victor Eremita, woman is not only a fiction, but exists 
outside masculine notions of time:  
 
What woman lacks […] is not only reflective consciousness, but the 
type of self-identity which can persist and develop through time. 
Woman is understood to be – and indeed, is educated into being – 
no more than a series of unrelated personae. [The] young girl first 
experiences herself as worthless; […] then a ‘marriageable’ period 
in which she is […] treated as all-important and powerful; then, 
finally, there is the period of being married and middle-aged during 
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which woman retreats back into insignificance. As such, there is no 
model of personal development or moral maturation that can 
encompass her life. (ibid, p.159) 
 
Given this, Woman is then compared to a beautiful fruit in that she 
‘does not mature; but suddenly ripens, and then is over-ripe […] she is 
provided with no stable standards of ethical (or monetary) value’ (ibid). 
Woman’s lack of a stable identity therefore places her outside Kantian 
ideas of a steadfast transcendental self that realizes itself and the world 
through linear time. Continuing the metaphor, Johannes the Seducer 
describes the artifice of woman as a display fruit: ‘one of those 
artificially ripe […] in a greengrocer’s window […] there to tempt the 
passer-by inside to buy something more real’ (ibid, p.163). As such, 
‘Woman is a fiction: an idealized figure who ‘bears a world of desire 
within her’ [yet] is not just a fiction […] she is also real’ (ibid). Battersby 
elucidates this paradox. For woman, ‘action emerges not out of 
autonomy but out of an acceptance of dependence [whilst being] not 
allowed to develop as a personality in time’ (ibid). Therefore for woman 
to have value, she must maintain the ‘play of forces of man’s desire: 
unattainable, a fiction, but also real in her fluidity’ (ibid, p. 164). 
Battersby states that if ‘woman steps into the everyday – if she marries, 
develops, has children – the leap into infinitude will no longer be 
possible’ (ibid). Woman must remain outside of masculine time in which 
to maintain her value, but this can only be achieved via the 
interrelationship of self and other. As such, Johannes describes woman 
as a ‘workshop of possibilities’ in which  
 
both seducer and seduced are locked into a relationship of mutual 
dependence, within which each believes her/himself free; but in 
which what freedom there is is controlled and dependent on the gift 
/ existence of the other. (ibid, p. 167-8) 
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The seducer and seduced therefore conduct a play of artifice outside 
the realm of fixed identities within the linear progression of time. Unlike 
conventional post-structuralist accounts, this play does not  
 
take us into a Kantian realm of the noumenal. Instead, it takes us 
towards a different ordering of phenomena; in which depth is given 
to surfaces by temporal folds which are established via the jostling 
of competing narratives. (ibid, p.167). 
 
Here ‘reality is born from ‘multiple possibilities, and in which ‘self’ and 
‘other’ emerge together through repeated movements that never simply 
reproduce a ‘given’ that remains ‘the same’’ (ibid, p.168). Johannes’ 
‘workshop of possibilities’ therefore ‘reverses the values of the Platonic 
[…] allowing infinity (being) to emerge from change and from continual 
motion’ (ibid, p.162).  
Battersby’s interpretation of Kierkegaard offers a ‘radical subversion 
of the concepts of autonomy, self-hood, rational personhood and 
masculinity – using ‘woman’ as a productive point of departure’ (ibid, p. 
175).  Whereas Deleuze and Guattari similarly use the figure of ‘woman’ 
as a productive notion to subvert restrictive patriarchal notions of 
subjectivity, the means by which this is achieved is incommensurably 
different. For Battersby, woman is a ‘workshop of possibilities’ defined 
via a relationship of mutual dependency in which no identity is static. In 
contrast, for Deleuze, becoming-woman is not implicated within a 
relationship of mutual dependency, it is the reconstitution of the 
‘anorganism of the body’ (the body without organs) (Deleuze / Guattari 
1996, p. 276) within which a restoration of becoming occurs and static 
identities are deterritorialized. From this viewpoint, the girl does ‘not 
become; it is becoming itself that is [the] girl’ (ibid, p. 277).   
Battersby criticizes Deleuze and Guattari by drawing attention to 
the notion of ‘becoming-woman’ within A Thousand Plateaus: 
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Capitalism and Schizophrenia (1980). According to Deleuze and 
Guattari, ‘becoming-woman’ involves a move away from static molar 
identities constituted within the paternal Symbolic Order, towards a 
molecular view of subjectivity in a dynamic state of becoming. On the 
surface, such a notion appears to mimic the generic post-structuralist 
view of woman as a site of difference, outside the knowable realm of 
male identity and singular sexual economy  - despite the differences 
between Kristeva, Cixous and Irigary’s work, this is a position which 
they all share. When the notion is positioned within the wider context of 
Deleuze and Guattari’s work, the concept becomes an analogy in which 
the marginal position of women, excluded of agency within the 
phallocentric economy, stands for the realm of difference and becoming 
beyond static identity. As with Kristeva, the concept of woman can 
therefore be aligned with other marginal positions, including those 
occupied by men; unlike Kristeva, the feminine on this account does not 
subscribe to the notion of the inevitability of the Symbolic Order in 
opposition to a pre-oedipal semiotic realm.  
As described, by perceiving identity as the outcome of desiring 
production, Deleuze and Guattari avoid the pitfall of designating identity 
as paternal and transgression as pre-oedipal and maternal. By 
describing desire as a productive surplus, identity also avoids being 
understood as an effect of lack. In both cases, Deleuze and Guattari 
produce an account of subjectivity that cannot be reduced to restrictive 
Oedipal relations. There appear to be two points of contention here 
revolving around Deleuze and Guattari’s use of the feminine: firstly, by 
equating woman with wider marginal positions, the specificity of actual 
women in their material conditions is neglected – this position prevents 
women from having any recognizable political agency; secondly, by 
neglecting woman’s specificity, Deleuze and Guattari’s work unwittingly 
overlooks feminine attributes and succumbs to the conventional notion 
of subjectivity as masculine. As Battersby states:  
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Although Deleuze and Guattari offer a form of transcendental 
materialism that counters the emphasis on being and substance in 
Plato and Kant, their materialism – indeed their emphasis on 
‘woman’ and the ‘girl’ – nevertheless blanks out material differences 
between the two sexes. ‘Becoming-woman’ does not involve the 
mature (fleshy) female body. The flows and intensities of desire 
seem gender-unspecific, but assume maleness as the only possible 
norm for an identity. (Battersby 1988, p.194) 
 
Battersby recognizes that Deleuze and Guattari’s emphasis on desiring 
production prevents their theory from succumbing to the restrictive 
opposition between a paternal symbolic order and the unrepresentable 
pre-oedipal realm. However, their use of becoming-woman as an 
analogy for all that transgresses the dominant social order prevents the 
term from having any import in the understanding of the material 
conditions of women’s lives. 
 
Although ‘woman’ is not simply that which falls outside the horizons 
of representation […] and is instead an attainable intensity, there is 
nevertheless an abstraction from the repetitions and rhythms of 
embodied (sexually specific) lives. (ibid) 
 
For Battersby then, to opt into a Deleuzean notion of identity and value 
would be to opt into a system in which 
 
self is just a surface phenomenon,  and hence agency (and also 
political agency) cannot be thought. It would be also to re-imagine 
the territories of productive labour, whilst simultaneously forgetting 
the rhythms of reproductive labour – the work involved in caring, 
protecting and sheltering dependents. (ibid, p.197)  
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These points of contention with regards to Deleuze and Guattari’s 
immanent theory could also be applied to a revised notion of fetishism - 
whereas a conception of fetishism informed by the work of Deleuze and 
Guattari can be accused of neglecting the specificity of actual women’s 
material conditions, the same can be applied to the specificity of actual 
occurrences of female fetishism. According to Battersby, Deleuze and 
Guattari cannot  
 
consider the fact that the mother’s relationship to her child might 
produce modes of ‘belonging together’ that are neither the bonding 
of two individuals nor a temporary grouping of fragments via 
‘assemblages’ or ‘packs’. (ibid, p. 194) 
 
For Battersby, the metaphor of the ‘pack’ (as in ‘wolf pack’) and 
‘assemblage’ to describe the ways in which heterogeneous elements 
combine to form new pathways upon the Body Without Organs makes 
the theory covertly complicit with a notion of identity which privileges 
male subjectivity. As Battersby states:  
 
[T]he underpinning metaphor still suggests separate parts that need 
to be ‘bundled’ together. And this begs the question of whether this 
underlying heterogeneity of ‘bits’ – temporarily united as a ‘pack’ – 
might still be taking the male subject as norm. (ibid, p.193) 
 
Here, the temporary unity of heterogeneous ‘bits’ appears to 
correspond to Kant’s syntheses in which identities manifest themselves 
as ‘closed ‘unities’ that are ‘formed’ by the imposition of linear space-
time grids onto a material world’ (ibid, p. 185), despite the fact that 
Deleuze and Guattari’s theory seeks to overturn the emphasis on being 
and substance in both Plato and Kant. According to Battersby, this 
failure to dissociate their theory from a notion of male subjectivity and a 
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corresponding metaphysics of presence is due to the fact that 
economies of reproduction are ignored.68  
By comparing the theories of Battersby and Deleuze and Guattari, it 
appears that Battersby’s criticisms might be too severe. Firstly, Deleuze 
and Guattari’s metaphor of ‘the pack’ which ‘suggests separate parts 
that need to be ‘bundled’ together’ is no more a covert sympathy with 
residues of Kantian thought than Battersby’s declaration that ‘identity 
becomes a form of […] possibilities that are perhaps most easily 
grasped as parallel to Kantian spatio-temporal ‘realities’’ (ibid, p. 174). 
Secondly, Battersby admits that Kierkegaard ‘doesn’t write about 
motherhood [but] frequently uses images of childhood, of wombs and of 
weaning in order to stress what is inherited from the past’ (ibid, p. 149). 
In contrast to Battersby’s discussion of Kierkegaard, Deleuze and 
Guattari’s work has the merit of overtly aligning the Body Without 
Organs with maternity and natality by comparing it with an embryonic 
egg: 
 
The BwO is the egg. But the egg is not regressive; on the contrary, 
it is perfectly contemporary, you always carry it with you as your 
milieu of experimentation, your associated milieu. The egg is the 
milieu of pure intensity, spatium not extension. Zero intensity as 
principle of production. (Deleuze / Guattari 1996, p.164) 
 
The egg corresponds here to the Body Without Organs, as well as the 
milieu discussed in relation to Deleuze’s concept of the impulse-image 
– identity and desire is therefore immanent to the relations in which they 
are determined. Notice that the egg as pure potential is referred to as 
the ‘principle of production’ – for Deleuze and Guattari, reproduction is a 
form of production and is a manifestation of a particular relation upon 
the Body Without Organs. Battersby makes no reference to Deleuze 
and Guattari’s use of the egg as a metaphor. In light of this, Battersby’s 
statement that the Body Without Organs is ‘prior to difference, including 
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sexual difference’ (Battersby Op Cit, p. 194), can be rephrased to state 
that the Body Without Organs is inclusive of difference, including that of 
sexual difference.  There is no prior condition of the Body Without 
Organs, it is already inclusive and constituted by all given states – to 
describe it in terms of origins is to return it to the Platonic, a move that 
Deleuze and Guattari would directly oppose; as Deleuze and Guattari 
state: 
 
The problem of whether there is a substance of all substances, a 
single substance for all attributes, becomes: Is there a totality of all 
BwO’s? If the BwO is already a limit, what must we say of the 
totality of all BwO’s? It is a problem not of the One and the Multiple 
but of a fusional multiplicity that effectively goes beyond any 
opposition between the one and the multiple. A formal multiplicity of 
substantial attributes that, as such, constitutes the ontological unity 
of substance. (Deleuze / Guattari Op Cit, p.154) 
Despite the egg providing a metaphor for birth and becoming, Deleuze’s 
theory could still be perceived as neglecting the role of the maternal in 
the generation of subjectivity and desire; it is true that the image of the 
egg remains silent with respect to the role of the mother - as such, it 
can be argued that Deleuze offers little more than Kierkegaard when 
considering motherhood. Despite this, given the coincidence of natality 
and production within Deleuze and Guattari’s theory, it would be unfair 
to perceive the lack of emphasis upon the concept of ‘reproduction’ as 
somehow an indication that their work is blind to relations of birth and 
dependency, especially when Kierkegaard’s stress on the feminine 
follows a similar pattern of using the convention of woman’s marginal 
status as a metaphor for a realm of becoming beyond static identities. 
In fact, it could be argued that Deleuze and Guattari offer a more 
comprehensive theory of becoming that has the capacity to include 
sexual difference whilst moving beyond its confines. Whereas 
Battersby’s interpretation of both Kierkegaard and Deleuze and Guattari 
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offers a view of subjectivity as a process of becoming, the former relies 
on a notion determined by conventions of a restricted femininity. Even if 
it exposes the fallacy of notions of stable masculine and feminine 
identities, a fluid subjectivity based on relations of dependency, that are 
tied to woman’s subordination and lack of agency, is still complicit with 
its terms and, arguably, does not offer a useful method for accounting 
for either the persistence and transgressions of identity and value.  
Battersby makes no reference to the processes in which the Body 
Without Organs either repels or attracts desiring machines depending 
on the degree to which social forces and power relations are reified or 
transgressed. Deleuze and Guattari’s use of machines as a metaphor 
intend to show the artificial and constructed nature of desire and value, 
whether in the form of reproductive or productive relations. As 
described above, Battersby claims that Deleuze and Guattari’s model 
lacks depth and reduces identity and value to mere surface territories. 
This is to ignore the emphasis placed by Deleuze and Guattari on the 
conjunctive synthesis of consumption – consummation (the celibate 
machine). This synthesis of recognition generated via that recorded 
within disjunctive syntheses, allows the repetitions involved in desiring 
production to build upon connections already made within an organism 
– this adds depth to the notion of value and identity without having to 
resort to conventional models of female dependency and the fluid 
negotiations involved.  
 
A comparison can be usefully made between a Kristevean and 
Deleuzean notion of fetishism within literature in which to identify how an 
alignment to feminine difference can be reinterpreted from an immanent 
perspective in which to avoid remaining within the binary terms of a 
restrictive economy. In one sense, Kristeva shares a similar concern as 
Deleuze in that objects and subjectivities are constituted and dispersed via 
the flux of intensities that have no inherent identity or stasis. As we shall 
see, despite this similarity, the differences between Deleuze and Kristeva 
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become apparent when comparing the notion of the Semiotic and the 
Body Without Organs in relation to fetishism.   
 
For Kristeva, the irruption of the semiotic into the symbolic occurs via a 
traumatic relation with both the mirror stage and castration – the formative 
points at which we recognize ourselves as a separate identity within social 
relations. The semiotic’s ‘breach of the symbolic in so-called poetic 
practice’ can be ascribed to ‘disorders in the mirror stage that become 
marked scopophilia, the need for a mirror or an identifying addressee’, or a 
resistance to castration ‘thereby maintaining the phallic mother who 
usurps the place of the Other’ (Kristeva 1974, p.113). As described earlier, 
the tendency to maintain the phallic mother is crucial to the causal 
mechanism of classical fetishism. According to Kristeva, fetishism should 
be understood as a compromise with the thetic because it displaces the 
symbolic that constitutes it onto the realm of the drives.  
 
The instinctual chora articulates facilitations and stases, but 
fetishism is a telescoping of the symbolic’s characteristic thetic 
moment and of one of those instinctually invested stases (bodies, 
parts of bodies, orifices, containing objects, and so forth). This 
stasis thus becomes the ersatz of the sign. Fetishism is a stasis 
that acts as a thesis. (ibid, p.115). 
 
From this perspective, the fetish is therefore a sign constituted 
within the thetic moment that nevertheless remains attached to an 
object invested by the drives. Consequently, the intrusion of the 
semiotic chora disrupts the symbolic order and acts as its substitute. As 
such, modern poetry and literature can be perceived as analogous to 
the process of fetishism – as a semiotic substitute for the symbolic that 
corrupts its law whilst remaining within its signifying practice:  
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[S]ince the symbolic is corrupted so that an object – the book, the 
work – will result, isn’t this object a substitute for the thetic phase? 
Doesn’t it take the thetic’s place by making its symbolicity opaque, 
by filling the thetic with its presence whose pretension to 
universality is matched only by its finite limits? In short, isn’t art the 
fetish par excellence, one that badly camouflages its archaeology? 
(ibid) 
 
Given that, for Kristeva, the semiotic is aligned with the pulsions within 
the maternal realm, the convergence of poetic creation with the 
processes of fetishism is perceived as a desire to disavow the symbolic 
in favour of a belief in the phallic mother. As Kristeva states:  
 
At its base, isn’t there a belief, ultimately maintained, that the 
mother is phallic, that the ego – never precisely identified – will 
never separate from her, and that no symbol is strong enough to 
sever this dependence? (ibid)  
 
The compulsion to return to the semiotic, which is at the origin of the 
signifying process, means that a process of substitution occurs in which 
the symbolic order, which constitutes the thetic, is displaced. 
 
In all its various vacillations, the thetic is displaced towards the 
stages previous to its positing or within the very stases of the 
semiotic […] These movements, which can be designated as 
fetishism, show (human) language’s characteristic tendency to 
return to the (animal) code, thereby breaching what Freud calls a 
‘primary repression’. (ibid, p.117) 
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Given this, Kristeva’s notion of fetishism remains firmly tied to a 
metaphysics of presence in that the intrusion of the semiotic is always a 
desire to retain the notion of the phallic mother, which does not lack, 
and return to a state prior to the recognition of castration – the notion 
therefore subscribes to the usual singular phallic restrictive economy, in 
which the maternal realm is designated as its other. Kristeva’s 
conception is ultimately a repetition of the classic fetish narrative in 
which the fetish is a substitute for a phallus that is perceived as lacking 
– it is a means of warding off castration which entry into the Symbolic 
order signifies. It is important to emphasize that Kristeva describes a 
convergence with fetishism – the intrusion of the semiotic is therefore 
not to be understood as identical to classical fetishism. What 
‘distinguishes the poetic function from the fetishist mechanism is that it 
maintains a signification’ (ibid). According to Kristeva, though a text may 
transgress symbolic codes, it cannot avoid producing meaning. In 
Kristeva’s view, the plurality of meanings generated by the semiotic 
within the symbolic, which disrupts its order, may not be equivalent to 
classical fetishism, but follows its process of substitution – the symbolic 
order is substituted for an object that disrupts its law via the intervention 
of the semiotic. Such a disruption appears in the form of a negation – 
not a negation of contradiction (as in a Hegelian Aufhebung), but a 
radical negativity of the thetic phase and its ensuing symbolic codes.  
 
[The] explosion of the semiotic in the symbolic is far from a 
negation of negation, an Aufhebung that would suppress the 
contradiction generated by the thetic and establish in its place an 
ideal positivity, the restorer of pre-symbolic immediacy. It is, 
instead, a transgression of position, a reversed reactivation of the 
contradiction that instituted this very position. (ibid, p.119) 
 
According to Kristeva, the regulation of the semiotic in the symbolic is 
symptomatic of the thetic break and inherent to language. Semiotic 
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transgressions may allow us to fetishize the various stases generated 
by the drives through the signifiers within language, but these very 
signifiers prevent these impulses from destroying the symbolic order 
and leading us into psychosis. Kristeva states: 
  
What had seemed to be a process of fetishizing inherent in the way 
the text functions now seems a structurally necessary protection, 
one that serves to check negativity, confine it within stases and 
prevent it from sweeping away the symbolic position. (ibid, p.119) 
 
Given that the symbolic remains intact and acts as a defense 
against the failure of the subject69, the semiotic manifests itself in 
language as a ‘second-degree thetic’ – what Kristeva describes as a 
‘resumption of the functioning characteristic of the semiotic chora within 
the signifying device of language’ (ibid, p.103). In other words, the 
semiotic chora, manifested through the movement of the drives, 
disrupts the symbolic in which to recreate it anew. According to 
Kristeva, the semiotic chora follows the logic of the death drive that 
operates to destroy the tensions associated with stases which, in turn, 
regenerates the subject via the discharge of energy. According to 
Kristeva, the semiotic realm of the chora follows the logic of the death 
drive in that it constitutes a ‘path of destruction, aggressivity and death’ 
(ibid, p.95) in its aim to reduce states of tension. As Kristeva notes, 
 
the term ‘drive’ denotes waves of attack against stases, which are 
themselves constituted by the repetition of [energy] charges; 
together, charges and stases lead to no identity (not even of the 
‘body proper’) that could be seen as a result of their functioning. 
This is to say that the semiotic chora is no more than the place 
where the subject is both generated and negated, the place where 
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his unity succumbs before the process of charges and stases that 
produce him’ (ibid).  
 
From this perspective, the semiotic is a realm in which states of 
intensity are both gathered and dispersed; in which identity is constantly 
in flux.  
 
  In many respects the operations of the semiotic chora has an 
affinity to Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of the Body Without Organs in 
which stases continually converge and dissipate. On closer 
examination, this relationship is found to be superficial – whereas 
Deleuze posits an eternal repetition of becoming without recourse to an 
origin, Kristeva’s notion of the semiotic and symbolic remains firmly tied 
to a binary opposition in which the semiotic chora is positioned within 
the maternal pre-Oedipal realm, whilst the symbolic is associated with 
the paternal phallus. Catherine Driscoll describes this tendency within 
Kristeva’s work to remain within the binary oppositions of a phallocentric 
order:  
All of Kristeva’s analyses are negotiations of dualisms, and rely on 
a foundational, and sometimes apparently naturalized, dualist 
structure for subjectification and the linguistic order which 
constitutes it. Gender is central to that structure, and while Kristeva 
calls for the dissolution of gender she also relies on its inevitability 
for the structure of her analyses […] Moreover, Kristeva explains 
such structures and breaches as exchanges between maternal and 
paternal, prelinguistic and linguistic oppositions. Indeed, the 
passionate moments of undoing or threatening order which she 
privileges require that order, exists within that order, and do not 
structurally challenge it. (Driscoll 2000, p.72)  
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Rather than perceiving disruptions within the symbolic order as a 
repetition of difference and becoming, Kristeva perceives a typical 
psychoanalytic move in which the logic of the death-drive within the 
operation of the semiotic chora is a repetition of the same: a compulsion 
to return to a perceived maternal origin from which we are alienated on 
entry into the symbolic. This has consequences for Kristeva’s 
conception of the fetish. Given the dichotomy between the maternal and 
paternal realm, the fetish for Kristeva corresponds to the classical 
interpretation of the notion in which it is a substitute for the lost maternal 
phallus – as Kristeva states: 
 
At its base, isn’t there a belief, ultimately maintained, that the 
mother is phallic, that the ego – never precisely identified – will 
never separate from her, and that no symbol is strong enough to 
sever this dependence? (ibid, p.115) 
 
As such, Kristeva’s notion of the fetish falls into the familiar discourse of 
substitution and disavowal, in which the fetish remains a mere 
substitute for the sovereignty of the phallus and a disavowal of that 
which is lacking beyond its restrictive economy. Though an agency, in 
the form of the semiotic chora, is identified outside this restrictive 
economy, it can only articulate itself within the symbolic realm – though 
its law may be negated and subject to disruptions, its sovereignty is 
never threatened; it therefore produces a substitute for its law without 
supplanting its operation, it thus leaves the chora and the associated 
maternal realm (towards which the drives are directed) beyond 
representation – its effect is only manifest via symptomatic disruptions 
upon the symbolic plane.  
 
[The semiotic] introduces into the symbolic order an asocial drive, 
one yet not harnessed by the thetic. When this practice, challenging 
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any stoppage, comes up, in its turn, against the produced object, it 
sets itself up as a substitute for the initially contested thetic, thus 
giving rise to […] aesthetic fetishism. (ibid, p. 120) 
 
Following this logic, such aesthetic fetishism that acts as a substitute for 
the symbolic, is to be understood as an attempt to preserve the phallus 
within the mother and remain within the maternal realm – as such, the 
disruptions from the semiotic chora are identified as a feminine 
intervention. With reference to the semiotic, Kristeva comments:  
 
Indifferent to language, enigmatic and feminine, this space 
underlying the written is rhythmic, unfettered, irreducible to its 
intelligible verbal translation; it is musical, anterior to judgement, but 
restrained by a single guarantee: syntax. (ibid, p.97) 
 
 In contrast to Kristeva, our revised notion of fetishism via the work 
of Deleuze offers no substitute for an eternal and insurmountable 
symbolic order. The disruptions, absences and breaks that Kristeva 
interprets as an effect of the semiotic can be more satisfactorily 
formulated as an effect of desiring-machines that enact a becoming, 
rather than a wishful return to a maternal origin. Our earlier discussion 
of the death drive, difference and repetition demonstrated that a cycle of 
desire can exist without an appeal to lack and a self-present identity 
generated via the symbolic order. Unlike the psychoanalytic model of 
the death drive, desire has no essential need to return towards that 
which it perceives as being lost. To comprehend the unconscious as the 
eternal flux of desire, not anchored to prior representations and power 
relations, allows us to recognize disruptions within established 
discourses as desiring productions rather than an appeal to archaic 
maternal semiotic pulsions. Comprehending such aesthetic fetishism 
(as Kristeva would call it) from the viewpoint of desiring production has 
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two advantages. Firstly, desiring production allows the reader to ground 
such disruptions in relation to a diverse range of established social 
relations rather than appealing to a restrictive, mythical discourse of 
maternal, pre-Oedipal relations that are beyond representation. 
Secondly, by perceiving desire as a productive surplus, rather than 
being based on lack and insufficiency, desiring production allows us to 
perceive aesthetic fetishism not as a substitute for the symbolic order 
via a negation of its established laws, but as a productive transgression 
of its conventional limits. Deleuze and Guattari’s analysis of the writings 
of Kafka offer an illustration of this process.  
Whereas Kafka is interpreted as an instance of ‘feminine’ writing in 
Kristeva  (Kristeva 1974 / Kristeva 1980)– a negation of Symbolic law - 
in Deleuze and Guattari’s work, his writing reflects a concern for 
productively transgressing the limits of a restrictive economy. According 
to their analysis, Kafka’s writing generates a dialogue between the 
territorializing tendencies of the paranoiac machine and the 
deterritorializing tendencies of desiring machines, demonstrating how 
this immanent schizo-law disassembles the paranoiac law of the 
symbolic. Whereas Kristeva perceives disruptions to the symbolic order 
as a retrogressive return to a maternal semiotic, Deleuze and Guattari 
comprehend such disruptions as unconscious investments generated 
via the immanent productions of desiring machines. As Deleuze and 
Guattari describe: 
 
A Kafka-machine is thus constituted by contents and expressions 
that have been formalized to diverse degrees by unformed 
materials that enter into it, and leave by passing through all 
possible states. To enter or leave the machine, to be in the 
machine, to walk around it, to approach it – these are all still 
components of the machine itself: these are states of desire, free of 
all interpretation. The line of escape is part of the machine. 
(Deleuze / Guattari 1986, p. 7) 
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For Deleuze and Guattari then, these disruptions and transgressions 
are not to be understood as a compromise, within an omnipresent 
symbolic order, they should rather be comprehended as disjunctions 
and connections made between the body, world and society as various 
machines. Examples are given of desire taking flight via paths that are 
less archetypal representations and more material lines of 
experimentation that transgress previous pathways (appeals towards 
typical symbolic and maternal signifiers are avoided)  – as Deleuze and 
Guattari assert, ‘the archetype works by assimilation, homogenization, 
and thematics, whereas our method works only where a rupturing and 
heterogeneous line appears’ (ibid). The difference between the two 
positions becomes clear by comparing the analogy with sound. For 
Kristeva, the manifestation of the semiotic within the symbolic position 
‘gives ‘music’ to literature […] As a consequence, musicality is not 
without signification; indeed it is deployed within it’ (Kristeva 1974, p. 
113-4). For Kristeva, such a manifestation comes from the feminine 
realm of the chora which can only signify via its effect upon the 
symbolic order. The ‘musicality’ that the semiotic gives to symbolic 
representation is therefore always tied to archetypal binary oppositions 
inaugurated by the Oedipal scene. In contrast, Deleuze and Guattari 
view sound as a heterogenous material capable of deterritorializing 
forms in which to become other – sound is a phenomenon without 
delineated boundaries, capable of affecting and infiltrating forms within 
both local and distant space. The occurrence of sound, as an 
unstructured material that traverses and infiltrates current zones and 
distant spaces, is described as a means by which paranoiac symbolic 
laws are escaped and deterritorialized: 
 
What interests Kafka is a pure and intense sonorous material […] – 
a deterritorialized musical sound, a cry that escapes signification, 
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composition, song, words – a sonority that ruptures in order to 
break away from a chain that is still all too signifying. (ibid, p.6) 
 
Whereas Deleuze and Guattari consider the straightened head in 
Kafka’s work as a line of flight from the symbolic law, it also illustrates 
the notion of the impulse-image when considered in conjunction with 
sound. Deleuze and Guattari state that  
 
[sound] serves to express contents that will reveal themselves to be 
relatively less and less formalized; thus, the head that straightens 
up ceases to matter in itself and becomes formally no more than a 
deformable substance swept away by the flow of sonorous 
expression […] it isn’t a question of a well-formed vertical 
movement toward the sky or in front of one’s self, it is no longer a 
question of breaking through the roof, but of intensely going “head 
over heels and away”, no matter where, even without moving […] 
but only a question of a line of escape or, rather, of a simple way 
out […] as long as it is as little signifying as possible. (ibid) 
 
In Kafka’s writing, the head therefore gets carried away by sound, 
allowing the bodily fragment to become an impulse-image – a fetish 
‘composed of unformed matter, sketches or fragments, crossed by non-
formal functions, acts, or energy dynamisms […in which appear] heads 
without necks, eyes without faces, arms without shoulders, gestures 
without form’ (Deleuze 2008, p.128); the head is no longer a 
conventional signifier within the symbolic order in the same way that the 
bent head appears in the formulation: ‘bent head = a blocked, 
oppressed or oppressing, neutralized desire, with a minimum of 
connection’ (Deleuze / Guattari 1986, p. 5). This example illustrates 
how a Deleuzean notion of the fetish serves to move beyond the 
retrogressive notion of Kristeva’s aesthetic fetishism, in which 
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disruptions are interpreted as a maternal semiotic channeled via the 
symbol order – therefore reproducing the inevitability of the maternal / 
paternal opposition through an act of substitution. In contrast to this, 
Deleuze offers not the inevitable repetition of the same, but a repetition 
of difference in which immanent new connections are made without 
recourse to archetypes – such rhizomatic routes without origin avoids 
the trap of allegiance to privileged signifiers: 
 
We will enter, then, by any point whatsoever; none matters more 
than another, and no entrance is more privileged even if it seems 
an impasse, a tight passage, a siphon. We will be trying only to 
discover what other points our entrance connects to, what 
crossroads and galleries one passes through to link two points, 
what the map of the rhizome is and how the map is modified if one 
enters by another point. Only the principle of multiple entrances 
prevents the introduction of the enemy, the Signifier and those 
attempts to interpret a work that is actually only open to 
experimentation. (ibid, p.3) 
 
As a fragmented, fetishistic form akin to that of the impulse-image, 
becoming-animal, becoming-child, becoming-girl and becoming-woman 
are all fetishistic forms that manifest themselves amongst other 
possibilities upon the Body Without Organs – such manifestations 
generate a state from which other potential possibilities can derive.70 A 
revised conception of the fetish from the viewpoint of Deleuze and 
Guattari’s notion of the Body Without Organs has been found to offer a 
means to view fetishism, feminine or otherwise, from the viewpoint of 
immanent desire outside the realm of a singular, restricted economy of 
presence and lack. Such a perspective cannot be premised on a 
discourse of lack in which value is always retrogressive, predicated on 
an origin from which it is initiated. This viewpoint also avoids 
designating a notion of the fetish aligned to a maternal realm which 
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emanates from an essential distinction between the sexes, whether 
biologically or culturally determined. It is better to perceive the phallus, 
woman and the plethora of other objects of desire as fetishistic states, 
more or less stable depending on their position within social relations, 
than to fetishize such relations as origins, no matter how fluid, from 
which relations can be understood – to make an interpretation from the 
latter is to be blind to subtle and immanent pathways of desire that have 
the potential to generate value within a matrix of particular social 
relations. This is not to rule out that some fetishistic forms can be 
understood via established conventions, but it places these conventions 
amongst many other possibilities and states – the point is to understand 
value, whether unprecedented or conservative, as artificial and 
generated.  The fetish is artifice, an archetype of value generated from 
productive desire. As we have argued, the notion of the female fetish, is 
best theorized as a novel flight of productive desire - a site of desiring 
production in which fragments are invested with value upon the Body 
Without Organs. To interpret the fetish in such a way is to be inclusive 
of those circumstances in which fetishistic value is a response to, and 
subversion of, occurrences of cultural lack, as well as the instances in 
which fetishistic value is the manifestation of novel pathways of desire 














This study has offered an original critique of the conventional view 
of fetishism within modernity via a consideration of the role of surplus and 
equivalence within the production of value. Rather than describing 
fetishism in terms of a disavowal of a self-present determination of value, 
this critique has recognized that what is ultimately denied within traditional 
accounts is the artificial surplus production upon which its value is 
premised. 
By examining the roots of the concept in European cultural 
imperialism and its subsequent adoption in socio-economic and 
psychosexual theories, we have found the traditional discourse of 
fetishism to be a key term in distinguishing European rationality from its 
irrational and instinctive Other. The work of Foucault has provided a 
means to perceive how societies upholds a system of value by attributing 
a notion of otherness to that which threatens to disrupt its own legitimacy – 
this is achieved through a process of exclusion in which the other is 
positioned as lacking the presence of that which gives a system its 
legitimacy. Fetishism is a perfect example of this process. Rather than 
being an accurate representation of a non-western practice, it has been 
found that this Other to western culture is, in each case, a reflection of its 
own internal inconsistencies and anxieties towards that which cannot be 
assimilated within its own values. As Anne McClintock points out: 
 
the ‘sciences of man’ – philosophy, Marxism and psychoanalysis – 
took shape around the invention of the ‘primitive’ fetish. Religion 
(the ordering of time and the transcendent), money (the ordering of 
the economy), and sexuality (the ordering of the body) arranged 
themselves around the social idea of racial fetishism, displacing 
what the modern imagination could not incorporate, onto the 
invented domain of the ‘primitive’. Imperialism returned to haunt the 
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enterprise of modernity as its concealed but central logic. 
(McClintock 1993, p.3)  
 
In both psychosexual and socio-economic realms, the notion of the 
fetish has therefore been used to designate a compromise solution to the 
problem of value – it secures a normative privileged signifier of value 
whilst simultaneously disavowing what is in excess to the perpetuation of 
European restricted economies of production and reproduction. As we 
have seen, both these economies function through the allocation of a 
universal privileged signifier that secures the normative propagation and 
flow of each: the phallus and money that determine equivalence for all 
value within each economy. As such, fetishistic value, whether in 
commodity or perverse form, has been deemed a substitute and disavowal 
of value determined by an origin elsewhere – whether in terms of labour 
time or phallic presence. By describing the surplus value upon which the 
commodity form is based and the concept of sexual drives upon which 
desire is premised, the values inherent to these economies are recognized 
as dependent on the production of an excess which manifests itself at a 
point beyond need. The privileged signifiers within the socio-economic and 
psychosexual realms can therefore be perceived as fetishes that secure 
the presence of value whilst disavowing that upon which it is based – 
surplus and difference. This artifice, which underlies the notion of 
fetishistic value, is contained within the etymology of the word – as 
described, the concept of fetishism relates to the Latin adjective facticius, 
which means to be “manufactured”. By referring to Derrida’s critique of the 
metaphysics of presence, the signifiers that constitute value in both 
socioeconomic and psychosexual economies have been recognized as 
being not only arbitrary and artificial, but also premised upon 
unsubstantiated myths of origins and presence that attempt to legitimate 
their agency. It has therefore been argued that the disavowal involved in 
fetishism is to be understood not as a substitute for a pregiven original 
value, as in traditional accounts of fetishism, but as a denial of the human 
agency involved in the artificial and arbitrary production of value within 
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both socio-economic and psychosexual economies. Such a disavowal of 
artifice is also perceived as an omission of the possibility that difference 
underlies the value of the fetish. 
Against a traditional model of fetishism, an original account has 
been proposed in which the concept is perceived as an immanent 
productive process in which difference generates signifiers of value. As 
such, the fetish can be perceived as the means by which established 
measures of value are both endorsed and transgressed in relation to a 
restricted economy. This account supplements the Bataillean notion of the 
fetish as an untransposable object of desire. Whereas Bataille offers a 
means to view the fetish as an untransposable object that transgresses 
the profane world of the everyday, a Deleuzean notion is found to offer a 
means to resolve the contradiction in which fetishes can be perceived as 
both an instigator and transgressor of value. 
By referring to the work of Jean Baudrillard, the disavowal of artifice 
and excess that we have identified as underlying restrictive economies 
was found to be premised upon a fundamental binary opposition that puts 
restricted economies of value into play - this binary is the opposition 
between life and death, in which life is recognized as a positive value and 
death is that which must be excluded. According to this view, the exclusion 
of death is the factor that determines the reduction of value to a play of 
equivalences within both psychosexual and socioeconomic realms. Such a 
play of equivalences, whether in monetary or phallic form, excludes death 
via an incessant cycle of accumulation, exchange and (re)production. In 
contrast to this, it has been argued that it is possible to perceive death as 
a complementary term within the life process – according to Bataille, there 
can be no movement or continuation in life without a recognition of death; 
it is the fusion with otherness that allows us to transcend our current state 
and ultimately reproduce, both of which require an acknowledgment of 
death. For Bataille, it is the consciousness of the relationship between 
birth and death that gives human sexuality its erotic sense – as such, it is 
the mode in which a given society postpones the inevitability of death that 
determines the type of taboos and transgressions to which it is subject. 
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For Bataille, a recovery of eroticism, transgression and symbolic exchange 
is essential if society is to forge relations between its members that do not 
revolve around utility and work within a restrictive economy – such a 
recovery therefore requires the reintegration of death as both a necessary 
and complementary component within the life process. As Baudrillard puts 
it, an ‘infinitesimal injection of death would immediately create such 
excess and ambivalence that the play of value would completely collapse’ 
(Baudrillard 1993, p.154). From this perspective, any fetishistic disavowal 
of excess and sexual difference can be perceived as a means by which 
social relations of surplus production, waste, erotic transgression, death 
and loss are denied in favour of a notion of restricted value that revolves 
around utility, accumulation and reproduction. By understanding death and 
life as cyclical, the possibility of perceiving the fetish as an immanent 
productive process – an untransposable object of desire - becomes 
possible.  Whereas traditional accounts of fetishism are premised on a 
repetitious appeal to an original state without tension (the death-instinct) 
prior to separation and castration, a cyclical relationship between life and 
death offers us a means to perceive a circuit of desire without an appeal to 
such origins. An examination of Bataille’s notion of the general economy 
affords the possibility of comprehending exchange and value outside the 
logic of homogeneity and equivalence within restrictive economies. By 
expending surplus prodigally, the notion of the general economy illustrates 
a conception of production and desire beyond the realms of utility and 
reified value. According to this conception, production and desire is 
interpreted as that which transgresses the profane world of the everyday, 
offering us a means of communication with that which is in excess of 
ourselves and society – it therefore allows communication with death on 
the road to becoming Other. An examination of Bataille and Michel Leiris’ 
conception of the fetish in relation to the general economy proposes that 
the fetish can be understood as an untransposable object of desire that 
bridges the two realms of life and death. Whereas a Bataillean conception 
of the fetish offers a notion that transgresses the profane world of 
restricted economies, it fails to explain and resolve the contradiction in 
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which the fetish can be perceived as both an instigator and transgressor of 
value – whereas fetishistic forms have been traditionally associated with a 
reifying tendency that reinforces an economy of the same, the fetish 
understood as an untransposable object of desire demonstrates an 
opposing transgressive tendency.  
Deleuze’s notion of difference and repetition has proved useful in 
generating an immanent notion of the fetish, rather than appealing to 
some origin that curtails the production of value. Deleuze’s reversal of 
Platonism, in which relations of difference are endorsed in opposition to 
the notion of a foundational idea, allows us to consider a conception of the 
fetish as a value generated through immanent relations. Deleuze and 
Guattari’s notion of the Body Without Organs has been found to provide 
the conceptual apparatus in which to generate a new model of fetishism 
without the need for origins, substitutions or disavowal. As a means of 
describing the immanent and cyclical relations of productive desire, the 
Body Without Organs provides a strategy to reintegrate death (anti-
production) in a complementary relation to life in a process of becoming. 
An original contribution to the corpus of Deleuzean theory has been made 
via an understanding of fetishism from this viewpoint.  
Whereas Deleuze and Deleuze and Guattari have discussed 
fetishism in terms of a reifying tendency within restrictive economies, a 
wider consideration of Deleuze and Deleuze and Guattari’s work allows 
the notion to be considered as an immanent transgressive act. By 
examining Deleuze’s writing on Masochism and the impulse-image in 
relation to the Body Without Organs, fetishism can be understood as a 
generative act of becoming in which intensive fragments are invested with 
value – the constancy of which is determined by the repetitions and 
barriers enacted upon the Body Without Organs by relatively stable or 
changing social relations. As such, the contradiction is resolved in which 
the fetish can be simultaneously perceived as both an instigator and 
transgressor of value. 
 A Deleuzean conception of fetishism, constituted upon difference 
and becoming, has been found to have greater efficacy than current 
 279 
theories of fetishism in that it allows the fetish to be understood as either a 
transgressive or reified value. Contemporary accounts of fetishism have 
been found to subscribe to a notion of lack, despite the concept being 
subject to a crisis of legitimacy via a critique of the metaphysics of 
presence that excludes difference that does not conform to Western 
standards of value. By relying on traditional principles that have remained 
consistent within the notion, contemporary theories continue to subscribe 
to the reified oppositions that a restrictive economy puts in place; as such, 
these theories can be considered to be blind to the full potential of 
fetishism as a productive force. 
This study has used the notion of female fetishism to highlight the 
inadequacy of traditional interpretations of fetishism – this example is a 
poignant one in that female fetishism should not be possible from the point 
of view of conventional accounts. Current interpretations of female 
fetishism have been found to continue to remain tied to a phallic discourse 
of presence and lack in which sexual difference is either an unaccounted 
Other outside the realm of phallogocentric discourse and reason 
(McClintock), a masquerade of gender roles within the terms of a 
restricted singular economy (Grosz and De Lauretis), or a refusal of 
separation-individuation involved in the process of castration (Gamman 
and Makinen). It has been argued that it is better to view fetishism - female 
or otherwise - as a site of desiring production. As we have seen, the Body 
Without Organs provides a model that allows us to understand the notion 
as a process of becoming: a repetition of difference. To interpret fetishes 
in such a way is to include instances in which fetishistic value is 
manifested as new pathways of desire beyond those allocated within 
restricted economies, as well as those circumstances in which it is 
understood as a means to reify and reproduce value. It is better to 
perceive objects of desire, fetishes, as more or less stable entities 
depending on their position within social relations, than to fetishize such 
relations as a permanent presence from which relations can be 
understood – as we have argued, to make an interpretation from the later 
ignores the potential of productive desire upon which all values and 
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differences are based. A Deleuzean conception of fetishism recognises 
the fetish as an act of artifice constituted through a process of desiring 
production; as such, fetishism should be understood as the archetype of 
value, rather than its substitute. It is wrong to understand it as anything 
else. 
A Deleuzean concept of the fetish, constituted on difference and 
becoming, has the potential to rectify and supplement those theories that 
only interpret the fetish from a restricted and ossified point of view, in 
which it is perceived as solely a process of disavowal and / or substitution. 
In contrast to these theories, a Deleuzean notion allows us to interpret 
fetishism as an immanent productive process that has the potential to 
transgress and establish new values; as such, it allows us to interpret 
novel fetishistic investments as immanent and productive assemblages. 
If we can now understand fetishism as an artificial process, in which 
immanent relations of difference have the capacity to produce 
untransposable and novel values, then we can propose that the fetish, as 
the archetype of value, is ineffable at the point at which it manifests itself. 
As such, this new theory of fetishism may have the capacity to explain 
those aesthetic experiences in which we are taken beyond conventional 
categories and expectations – in such cases, the participant is taken 
outside themselves and participates in a process in which new values are 
realized. An application of the theory to the analysis of contemporary 
visual art would be one example: the work of artists as diverse as Louise 
Bourgeois, Orlan and Marc Quinn require us to reassess and question 
conventional boundaries and require us to move beyond accepted 
categories that articulate and define our sense of selves. The overtly 
fetishistic themes of much postmodern work are problematized by the play 
of difference and multiplicity that refuse conventional notions of value. 
Such incongruous and ambiguous work disrupts interpretations based 
upon conventional theories of fetishism and is therefore more suited to an 
interpretation that perceives the fetish as a productive entity.  
By understanding the fetish as the archetype of value, in which 
desiring-production immanently produces its own objects, the notion of the 
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fetish has clear implications for sexual politics in that it can incorporate 
conventional notions of subjectivity and sexuality, as well as new forms of 
sexuality and erotic practice that transgresses previous relations. 
Whereas, conventional forms of sexuality can be perceived as points of 
anti-production upon the body without organs, new forms of erotic practice 
can be perceived as lines of flight that constitute desiring-production. 
According to our new theory of fetishism, such lines of flight are ineffable 
at the point of formation and constitute a creative act – as such, the theory 
provides a radical ethics for sexual practice that resists any categorisation 
of ‘perversion’, whilst endorsing the deviation from convention as a 
legitimate creative principle. As alluded to earlier in relation to the work of 
Debra Curtis (Curtis 2004), it can be suggested that a Deleuzean theory of 
the fetish could be conducive to the analysis of new modes of desire 
instigated via the use of technologies that challenge and change our 
behaviour and practices. From this point of view, traditional theories of 
fetishism are potentially redundant when considering diverse assemblages 
of subjects, technology and practices that generate novel flights of desire 
not predicted upon established relations. By considering desire from the 
point of view of desiring-production, such new fetishistic configurations 
construct new values that are ineffable at the point of constitution. As 
such, the theory also has the capacity to contribute to cyborg theory, 
especially concerning the relationship between artifice and desire - the 
artifice characteristic of new desiring-productions inherently challenges 
conventional bodily boundaries and notions of subjectivity; again, such 
relations are ineffable at the point of constitution and, according to our 
theory, are legitimate in their expression of a primary creativity at the heart 
of desiring-production. 
By understanding value as the product of an immanent process that 
has no recourse to a given origin, the theory may also contribute to an 
ethics of becoming, in which individual differences are endorsed in 
opposition to an instrumental reason that quantifies and measures the 
subject in relation to predefined values and categories; the theory 
therefore has implications for education, work and communities – by 
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understanding values as immanent to given relations which often 
transgress interpersonal boundaries and require the becoming subject to 
be actively involved, a collaborative process is required whereby non-
hierarchical decisions and actions are allowed to be made that nurture 
novelty and multiplicity. Such a process opposes public opinion polls, 
league tables, targets and appraisal systems in which values are 
predefined in advance. The process therefore resists the priorities of a 
singular capitalist restrictive economy. The theory endorses the notion that 
greater potential can be achieved via processes of difference rather than 
standardization. The theory is radical in that it refuses to set out the stakes 
in advance – it requires movement and dialogue without reliance upon the 
safety net of established knowledge and categories. Culturally specific and 
shared discourses may exist in advance, but these will always be a 
starting point for a line of flight that takes subjects somewhere novel where 
new values are generated.  
The theory also has implications for economics and ecology, by 
championing the idea of multiple rather than restrictive economies, the 
notion that all economic decisions have to be subject to the singular flow 
of capital can be put into question. Each economy, whether involving 
ecology or commodities, can be appreciated as having its own specific 
processes, movements and values, each with the capacity to become 
different and affect other economies in novel ways. By perceiving value as 
artificial, arbitrary and subject to transformation, our new theory of 
fetishism provides a means to expose illegitimate reified relations, whilst 
endorsing the possibility that new creative economic relations can be 
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1 For Freud’s description of his patient, see Freud, S (1927) ‘Fetishism’ in Freud, S (2001) 
‘The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud: Volume 
21’. London: Vintage. 
2 For an example in which Freud substitutes the penis for a baby, see Freud, S (1918) 
“On the Transformation of Instinct as Exemplified in Anal Eroticism” in Freud, S ‘ The 
Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud: Volume 17’. 
London: Hogarth Press, p 128-9 and 132-3. For an example in which Freud substitutes a 
woman’s body for the phallus, see Freud, S (1915) “On Narcissism: An Introduction” in 
Freud, S ‘ The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud: 
Volume 14’. London: Hogarth Press. 
3 The realization of a radical separation of self from an other that the recognition of the 
phallic signifier entails, means that the infant’s satisfaction is now subject to what Lacan 
calls Demand – the infant can no longer attain instant gratification from its mother, but 
must request (demand) objects for its satisfaction through its use of language 
conventions. It is because needs are now subject to demand that desire in the child is 
initiated. 
4 See Foucault 1990, p.3-13, Herbert Marcuse’s Eros and Civilization (1955) and Wilhelm 
Reich’s The Sexual Revolution (1936). 
5 For Foucault, the maintenance of the bourgeois family model was primarily to secure 
the health and lineage of its own class and prevent its dissolution through so-called 
‘perversions’ and non-functional forms of sexual activities. As Foucault states:  
The primary concern was not repression of the sex of the classes to be exploited, 
but rather the body, vigor, longevity, progeniture, and descent of the classes that 
“ruled”.  This was the purpose for which the deployment of sexuality was first 
established, as a new distribution of pleasures, discourses, truths, and powers; it 
has to be seen as the self-affirmation of one class rather than the enslavement of 
another. (Foucault 1990, p.123) 
 
As such, the repression of desire for the working classes and their subjection to 
technologies of sex was something that was transmitted to them after the consolidation of 
the bourgeois family and its corresponding sexual practices. This perspective contrasts 
with repressive hypotheses which view the repression of sexuality as something enforced 
upon workers in which to guarantee maximum productivity threatened by the temptations 
of surplus pleasures. For Foucault, the management of sexuality for the working classes 
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only occurred at the point of conflict in which the interests of the bourgeoisie were 
threatened; he states: 
 
Conflicts were necessary (in particular, conflicts over urban space: cohabitation, 
proximity, contamination, epidemics, such as the cholera outbreak of 1832, or 
again, prostitution and venereal diseases) in order for the proletariat to be 
granted a body and a sexuality; economic emergencies had to arise (the 
development of heavy industry with the need for a stable and competent  labour 
force, the obligation to regulate the population flow and apply demographic 
controls); lastly, there had to be established a whole technology of control which 
made it possible to keep the body under surveillance [.] (ibid, p. 126) 
 
6 Hysteria as a medical condition has been increasingly discredited since the 19th century 
– this is largely due to the condition being considered an ‘excess’ of female sexuality 
beyond a normative male model. Male sexuality has traditionally perceives sex as the 
activity of penetrative coitus. Much of the sexual dissatisfaction that was considered an 
‘excess’ to normative sexual relations was in fact a blindness to female sexual needs 
beyond functional reproductive sex. As Rachel Maines points out: 
 
The historically androcentric and pro-natal model of healthy, “normal’ 
heterosexuality is penetration of the vagina by the penis to male orgasm […] 
Because the androcentric model of sexuality was thought necessary to the pro-
natal and patriarchal institution of marriage and had been defended and justified 
by leaders of the Western medical establishment in all centuries at least since the 
time of Hippocrates, marriage did not always “cure” the “disease” represented by 
the ordinary and uncomfortably persistent functioning of women’s sexuality 
outside the dominant sexual paradigm. (Maines 1999, p.3) 
 
7 Anthony Shelton provides us with a range of examples from western culture in which 
the African women is exoticised – these include photographs, picture postcards and the 
literature of Raymond Roussel and William Seabrook (Shelton 1995, p. 27-28) 
8 Here, ‘man’ is understood as the humanist transcendental subject – the erasure of 
which has been equated with our entry into a postmodern period in which the subject is 
understood to be a product of social discourses and practices; as such, the subject can 
no longer be a guarantor of truth and knowledge – these domains are then relativized to 
cultural determinations. 
9 One is reminded of Marx’s statement within the Theses on Feuerbach (1845): 
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The question whether objective truth can be attributed to human thinking is not a 
question of theory but is a real practical question. Man must prove the truth, i.e. 
the reality and power, the this-sidedness of his thinking in practice. The dispute 
over the reality or non-reality of thinking that is isolated from practice is a purely 
scholastic question (Marx 1992, p.422). 
 
10 Marx points out that the problem of scarcity in Malthus and Ricardo was less a problem 
of population outstripping food supply and more an issue of there being more workers 
than capital needs. As Marx states: 
 
[S]ince the demand for labour is determined not by the amount of capital as a 
whole, but by its variable constituent alone [the value of labour power], that 
demand falls progressively with the increase of total social capital […] it falls 
relatively to the magnitude of the total social capital and at an accelerated rate’ 
(Marx 1990, p. 781).  
 
As such, capital accumulation inevitably leads to unemployment of a section of the labour 
force. In turn, this creation of a reserve army of unemployed serves the function of 
preventing wages from rising too high. He states that the ‘general movement of wages 
are exclusively regulated by the expansion and contraction of the industrial reserve army’ 
(ibid, p.791).   
  
11 Foucault’s notion of historically changing and discontinuous epistemes can be 
criticized in a variety of ways. Firstly, Foucault’s notion of epistemes within The Order of 
Things can be perceived as part of a wider structuralist trend in which all notions and 
practices are viewed within the unity of a wider narrative and discourse – as such all 
agencies are unconsciously part of the presuppositions of this narrative. As Merquior 
describes, it was Foucault’s ambition in The Order of Things to ‘lay bare cultural codes by 
describing them in their forms and articulations […] that put [his] archaeology, willy-nilly, 
in the company of structuralism […]’ (Merquior 1985, p. 56). As such, a contradiction 
exists within Foucault’s thought – he wants to champion a post-structuralist notion of the 
relativity of truth subject to a given historical discourse, yet requires us to subscribe to a 
given critical methodology to achieve this. As Peter Dews states,  
 
his theoretical premises render unavoidable the assumption that modes of 
experience, systems of meaning and objects of knowledge are entirely 
determined by ‘rules of formation’ or – later – by operations of power. Yet, in 
order to function as a political critique of these rules or operations, Foucault’s 
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work must appeal to some form of meaning, experience or knowledge which is 
not so determined’ (Dews 1987, p.185). 
 
Equally, the unity of Foucault’s epistemes – determined by a structuralist concern for 
discursive practice – is blind to the nuances of continuity and discontinuity from past, 
present or future modes of thinking. Merquior describes a variety of historical 
inaccuracies and notions that contradict such unity – he states that, ‘taken synchronically, 
Foucault’s epistemes – contrary to their allegedly massive unity – seem to encompass a 
lot of heterogeneity’ (ibid, p. 67).  
 
12 See Rose, J (1982) “Feminine Sexuality: Introduction” in Vice, S, ed. (1996) 
“Psychoanalytic Criticism: A Reader”. Cambridge: Polity Press 
13 Grosz states that in ‘relations governed by pure difference, each term is defined by all 
the others; there can be no privileged term which somehow dispenses with its 
(constitutive) structuring and value in relation to other terms’  (Grosz 1990, p.124)  
14 Slavoj Žižek’s allegiance to Lacanian principles has led to a form of cultural criticism 
that is both ahistorical whilst relying upon the notion of presence and lack that a phallic 
symbolic order entails.  For Žižek our very existence as a desiring subject is dependent 
on our entry into the phallic symbolic order – for Žižek this is an eternal law which he 
describes as that which ‘returns as the same through diverse historicizations / 
symbolizations’ (Žižek 1989, p.50). By reducing our desire to an ahistorical, eternal sense 
of lack, Žižek’s theory is subject to the same neglect of female agency and bias towards 
heterosexuality as the writings of Freud and Lacan. By subscribing to the Freudian / 
Lacanian view that women are the radical other, outside the phallic sexual economy, 
Žižek repeats the pattern of rendering women without an agency that they can consider 
their own. As Rosi Braidotti points out, Žižek's work 'represents an anti-feminist 
regression that reiterates the whole array of symbolic invisibility and specularity which 
feminists have been arguing against since the early days of Lacan's work' (Braidotti 2002, 
p. 54). Likewise, by viewing castration and its ensuing lack as an essential ingredient in 
the production of subjectivity, Žižek upholds not only a patriarchal perspective, but also a 
conventional heterosexual view of sexuality and the production of subjectivity. As Judith 
Butler indicates, Žižek  'tends to rely on an unproblematized sexual antagonism that 
unwittingly installs a heterosexual matrix as a permanent and incontestable structure of 
culture in which women operate as a "stain" in discourse' (Butler 1993, p. 21). As we shall 
see later, though Žižek’s work can be perceived as being complicit with a phallic 
economy, it offers us a means to understanding all objects of desire, including the 
phallus, as fetishistic. 
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15 Marxist uses of the notion of fetishism to expose the irrational and 
superstitious at the heart of western thought have been subject to criticism due to their 
presumed subscription to the idea that the non-western Other is somehow more primitive 
and irrational than their western counterparts. Jean Baudrillard criticises Marx’s adoption 
of the European notion of fetishism, with its connotations of superstition and irrationality 
that are believed to correspond to ‘primitive’ forms of African religion. In the chapter 
Fetishism and Ideology: The Semiological Reduction (1972), Baudrillard describes how 
the fetishism metaphor within the work of Marx corresponds to the Christian and 
humanist ‘condemnation of primitive cults by a religion that claimed to be abstract and 
spiritual’ (Baudrillard 1981, p.88). As such, the concept has never really ‘shed this moral 
and rationalistic connotation [and has] since been the recurrent leitmotiv of the analysis of 
magical thinking, whether that of the Bantu tribes or that of modern metropolitan hordes 
submerged in their objects and their signs’ (ibid). On this point, Baudrillard’s analysis of 
the concept of fetishism does not differ from that described by William Pietz: in opposition 
to the intentionless objectivity known to western reason, fetishism designated a “primitive” 
condition where objects are assumed to have magical powers and meanings in which the 
human agency involved in their generation went without recognition. According to 
Baudrillard, this European notion of fetishism allows Marx to designate such concepts as 
“false consciousness” and “superstructure”  - terms that rely on a notion of an underlying 
objectivity in which an object can be known: 
 
Here we are interested in the extension of this fetishist metaphor in modern 
industrial society, in so far as it enmeshes critical analysis (liberal or Marxist) 
within the subtle trap of a rationalistic anthropology. What else is intended by the 
concept of “commodity fetishism” if not the notion of a false consciousness 
devoted to the worship of exchange value […]? All of this presupposes the 
existence of an object in some “true”, objective state: its use value? (ibid, p.89). 
 
 Baudrillard argues that the complicity of Marxism with this occidental concept has 
ideological consequences that render the concept of “commodity fetishism” redundant as 
a notion capable of analysing the value and meanings that we give to commodities. 
Baudrillard believes that by ‘referring all the problems of “fetishism” back to 
superstructural mechanisms of false consciousness, Marxism eliminates any real chance 
it has of analyzing the actual process of ideological labour’(ibid). The theory of 
infrastructure and superstructure must therefore ‘be exploded, and replaced by a more 
comprehensive theory of productive forces, since these are all structurally implicated in 
the capitalist system – and not only in some cases (i.e, material production), while merely 
superstructurally in others (i.e., ideological production)’ (ibid, p.90). Therefore the problem 
for Baudrillard is how to structurally understand the process by which commodities 
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acquire values without resort to notions of a rational subject capable of distilling  “truth” 
from false consciousness. For Baudrillard, a solution to this problem would involve 
rejecting the idea of magical thinking or false consciousness altogether: 
 
[In] order to reconstitute the process of fetishization in terms of structure, we 
would have to abandon the fetishist metaphor of the golden calf […] and develop 
instead an articulation that avoids any projection of magical or transcendental 
animism, and thus the rationalist position of positing a false consciousness and a 
transcendental subject (ibid) 
 
 Baudrillard appears to have a one-sided view of Marx’s concept of commodity 
fetishism. It is true that Marx uses the metaphor of fetishism, along with its Eurocentric 
connotations, as a means of describing how objects appear to be imbued with values of 
their own, regardless of human agency. However, this does not mean that Marx used 
such a metaphor uncritically or that he championed a notion of innate human subjectivity 
behind the façade of false consciousness. As we have described, Marx’s use of fetishism 
acts as a trope to criticize the concept as part of a project that upholds the categories of 
western thought. It is precisely in Marx’s attempt to ground his analysis in the material 
practice of human beings within a specific social formation that his use of fetishism takes 
place. The use of this analogy is therefore directly opposed to Baudrillard’s claim that the 
concept of fetishism in Marx is but one more example of ‘occidental Christian and 
humanist ideology’ (Baudrillard 1981, p.88). The criticism of the practice of religious 
fetishism proves to be the same criticism of fetishistic worship within political economy - 
in the former, objects appeared to have innate powers which were in fact a projection of 
human intentionality, in the later capital appears to have innate causal powers of value 
when, in reality, it has no real power outside its socially generated power to command the 
labour activities of individuals. The point is that in both the sensuous realm of ideas 
(fetishism) and practice (production and exchange), socially constructed signs and values 
come to alienate and restrict human agency by bearing the seal of their own authority 
(monetary exchange value). Against Baudrillard’s claims, Marx is therefore criticising the 
categories of western thought by exposing the degree to which its assumed Other 
(fetishism) infects its own logic. 
16 Dawn Ades points out that the Surrealists identified this equivalence whilst criticising 
the hierarchies enforced by western imperialism. Within the exhibition La Verite sur les 
Colonies (The truth about the colonies), the Surrealists produced a display entitled 
‘European Fetishes’ which contained ‘three statues including a Catholic image of the 
Virgin and Child, and a charity collecting box in the form of a black child’ (Ades 1995, 
p.68). As Ades points out, to describe these European objects as fetishes ‘expos[ed] the 
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Western ideological assumptions behind the term, and by directing its object backwards, 
as it were, to Western things, serv[ed] to defamiliarise and denude them’ (ibid). 
17 In Saussure’s theory, meaning is constituted through the differential play of signifiers, 
each having an arbitrary relation to a signified. The explanation of Saussure’s structuralist 
theory can be found in de Saussure, F (1959) “Course in General Linguistics”, New York: 
McGraw-Hill. 
 
18 Levi-Strauss’s analysis of Totemism can be found in Levi-Strauss, C (1989) “The 
Savage Mind”, London: Wedenfeld and Nicolson. It is interesting to note that though 
Baudrillard does not comment upon it, “The savage Mind” overtly describes totemism as 
a sophisticated system used to make sense of the world, rather than the occidental 
perception of totemism as a primitive, superstitious belief system. In light of this, 
Baudrillard’s use of structuralist methods seems all the more valid when considering Levi-
Strauss’s recognition of parity between western and non-western modes of thinking. 
 
19 Baudrillard’s criticism of Marx in terms of a supposed appeal to a transparent 
use-value that the logic of the commodity then distorts via the instigation of false-
consciousness, is based on a confusion between value and use-value within Marx’s 
theory. The notion that Marx is complicit with a transcendental rational and unified subject 
that is somehow capable of distinguishing true social relations and conditions from a 
realm of false consciousness can be refuted by an appeal to Marx’s own writing. In his 
Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts (1844), Marx describes the universality and 
species-being of the human subject:   
 
Humanity is a species-being, not only because he practically and theoretically 
makes the species – both its own and those of other things – its object, but also – 
and this is simply another way of saying the same thing – because it looks upon 
itself as the actual living species, because it looks upon itself as a universal and 
therefore free being […] The universality of man manifests itself in practice in that 
universality which makes the whole of nature his inorganic body, (1) as a direct 
means of life, and (2) as the matter, the object, and the instruments of his life 
activity. (Marx  1992, p.327-8) 
 
Here Marx indicates how humanity can be defined as making its species ‘both practically 
and theoretically’ its object which, in turn, makes the whole of nature its ‘inorganic body’. 
The universality of humanity therefore consists of making both itself and nature the object 
and the ‘instruments of [its] life activity’. Therefore, for Marx, the essence of humanity is a 
process of becoming in which we transforms ourselves through our productive interaction 
with nature. As Peter Osborne recognises: 
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For Marx, humans are involved in a quasi-metabolic interaction with nature. Their 
universality does not precede this interaction, but is its result  […] The human is 
in a constant state of becoming more than what it was before […] Furthermore, 
this interaction with nature is so close, so existentially intimate, that nature is a 
kind of ‘inorganic’ extension of the human body. In labour, nature is a human 
prosthesis. (Osborne 2005, p.54).  
 
Marx’s view is contrary to a notion that species-being and universality should be 
understood as designating a static sense of human subjectivity that can judge the world 
from a transcendental point of view. Paradoxically, the essence of humanity turns out to 
be its capacity for transformation. As such, Baudrillard’s accusation that Marx relies upon 
a notion of a rational unified subject is mistaken.  It is not the case that Marx believed that 
a realm of given use-values underlay the system of arbitrary value that appears to be 
inherent to things in themselves as soon as they enter the market as commodities. As we 
have already seen, for Marx, commodities do not contain an atom of use-value when 
considered from the point of view of exchange. As far as Marx is concerned, use-values 
‘are only realized in use or in consumption’ (Marx Op Cit, p. 126) and, when it comes to 
the exchange relation, ‘one use-value is worth just as much as another, provided only 
that it is present in the appropriate quantity’ (ibid, p.127).  As such, the value perceived to 
be inherent to a commodity – that which makes it a fetish - is entirely separate from its 
use-value which is completely relative to its subjective interpretation at the point of 
consumption. Marx therefore makes no appeal to an object’s given use when discussing 
it as a fetish, its use is purely relative to the consumer – ironically, the problem of 
standard, transparent use-values only occurs as an effect of reification in which 
quantitative sales  - the concern of exchange value – attempts to dictate the qualitative 
use-values of a commodity via advertising and marketing; it is thus the priorities of the 
code that Baudrillard identifies within a restrictive economy which ultimately engineers a 
notion of given utility. 
20 See Baudrillard (2007) Forget Foucault. London: Semiotext(e).  
21 See Freud’s Three Essays on Sexuality (1905) in Freud, S (1986) ‘The Essentials of 
Psychoanalysis: The definitive collection of Sigmund Freud’s writing’. London: Penguin, 
p. 330-1. Freud identified an unrestricted realm of polymorphously perverse sexuality that 
exists within children before the onset of the Castration Complex. Here the ‘mental dams 
against sexual excesses – shame, disgust and morality – have either not yet been 
constructed at all or are only in course of construction [.]’ (p.331). 
22 Whereas Marx saw this process at work in the commodity form, in which all objects 
appeared to have an inherent value within a singular economy, Freud and his heirs 
perceive this process in the refusal to recognize sexual difference via the illusionary belief 
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in a maternal phallus and its corresponding phallic economy. Though the two types of 
economy both describe this process, psychoanalysis fails to give due consideration to the 
realm of production which allows for the possibility of an economy of exchange to take 
place; by prioritizing, a priori, the agents within an exchange dynamic without giving due 
consideration to the processes of production that underlie such a relation, psychoanalysis 
finds itself complicit with a phallic economy – it does this by assuming, and artificially 
installing, a phallus in the body of woman – the site of sexual difference. In contrast to 
this, Marx places production at the heart of his theory and sees the commodity-as-fetish 
as the means by which relations of production are reified. 
23 See Freud (1927), p. 157. 
24 As Lacan points out: 
If it is true that the signifier is the first mark of the subject, how can we fail to 
recognise here – from the very fact that this game is accompanied by one of the 
first oppositions to appear – that it is in the object to which the opposition is 
applied in act, the reel, that we must designate the subject […] The activity as a 
whole symbolises repetition, but not at all that of some need that might demand 
the return of the mother […] It is the repetition of the mother’s departure as cause 
of a Spaltung in the subject – overcome by the alternating game, fort-da […] It is 
aimed at what, essentially, is not there, qua represented [.] (Lacan 1991, p.62-3) 
 
25 Though Freud views the sexual instinct as initially being ‘without an object, that is, 
auto-erotic’ (Freud 1905, p. 366) and considers the possibility that ‘any organ […] can 
function as an erotogenic zone’ (ibid), these zones are always already described in terms 
of lack – at ‘its origin [the erotogenic zone] attaches itself to one of the vital somatic 
functions’ (ibid, p. 322) in which the ‘need for repeating […] becomes detached from the 
need of taking nourishment’ (ibid, p.322). Though such a detachment is ‘convenient, 
because it makes him/her independent of the external world’ (ibid, p.322), such auto–
erotic practices, in which a child chooses another part of their body for replicating a 
sensation– and thus a ‘second erotogenic zone’ (ibid) is born - this body part, or zone, 
are considered as an ‘inferior kind’ (ibid) no doubt because it acts as a substitute for that 
which it gained from its mother. This sense of lack orientated towards the mother is then 
destined to find its pinnacle within the Oedipus complex in which the child is radically 
disconnected from the mother via the influence of the father. 
26 For a summary of the differences between Lacan’s concept of Need, Demand and 
Desire, see Grosz 1990a, p. 59 – 67. 
27 This paradoxical and impossible road of desire, in which the goal – to get to a 
beyond of the signifier – is established via the very thing that one aims to escape, leads 
Lacan to set in opposition the pleasure principle and his notion of jouissance. Whereas 
the pleasure principle requires us to enjoy as little as possible - for Freud the pleasure 
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principle is ‘a lowering of tension – that is, with an avoidance of unpleasure or a 
production of pleasure’ (Freud 1920, p.218) - via the channels stipulated within the 
symbolic order, what the subject truly wants is access to that excess of enjoyment 
beyond the symbolic order that is prohibited by the Super-Ego as the Name-of-the-
Father. Jouissance is the term used by Lacan to describe this excess beyond the 
pleasure principle.  According to Lacan, Jouissance is experienced as both pleasure and 
suffering in that it subjects the individual to more enjoyment than it is typically expected to 
endure. This desire for jouissance is the goal of the death drive in that jouissance is the 
path towards death: the dissolution of our subjectivity. The Super-Ego – that which has 
the phallus and is the Symbolic Law – compels us to emulate the father in which to attain 
the enjoyment he receives which we view as having been denied us; as Lacan points out: 
‘Nothing forces anyone to enjoy except the superego. The superego is the imperative of 
jouissance – Enjoy!’ (Lacan 2000,p.3). As we attempt to meet the demands of the 
superego (not to commit incest with our mother), we are simultaneously subject to 
feelings of guilt because we are trying to obtain that which we resent the father for having 
– as Sean Homer points out ‘we are not simply guilty if we break the law and commit 
incest, but rather we are always already guilty of the desire to commit incest’ (2005, 
p.59). This view of the superego is informed by the myth of the primal horde in Freud’s 
Totem and Taboo (1913).  Freud speculates about the origin of the paternal law against 
incest. Freud describes a scene in which the father has sole access to women which he 
denies his sons. Out of jealousy, the brothers band together and murder their father. 
Freud describes the consequences of such an act: 
Though the brothers had banded together in order to overcome their father 
[…e]ach of them would have wished, like his father, to have all the women to 
himself. The new [social] organisation would have collapsed in a struggle of all 
against all, for none of them was of such over-mastering strength as to be able to 
take on his father’s part[.] Thus the brothers had no alternative if they were to live 
together, but […] to institute the law against incest. (Freud 1999, p.144) 
Despite any evidence to verify this myth – as Freud points out, this ‘earliest state 
of society has never been an object of observation’ (ibid, 141) -  it does serve the function 
of illustrating the dual function of the superego: to command us to enjoy (in this case, the 
women) and also to inflict guilt (for desiring that which belongs to the father). Žižek points 
out that the more we attempt to meet the prohibitive demands of the superego, the 
greater we feel its pressure due to it being founded upon the desire it seeks to exclude. 
Paradoxically then, the more we attempt to meet its demands, the more guilty we feel. 
(Žižek 1994, p.67).  
 
28 For Žižek, both instances of psychosexual fetishism and commodity fetishism can be 
understood from the perspective of the objet petit a and the superego. The ideology 
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behind our beliefs and desires ‘exercises its force only in so far as it is experienced, in the 
unconscious economy of the subject, as a traumatic, senseless injunction’ (Žižek 1989, 
p.43). Žižek’s point is that it does not matter whether or not the meaning or truth value of 
our beliefs and desires lack foundation, what is important is that the authority of the letter 
is put in place. Entering the Symbolic Order requires our subjection to the phallic signifier 
and being positioned as either having (male) or being (female) the phallus. As such, the 
value of the phallic signifier – the key to desire and our entry into the Symbolic Order  – 
lies not in its essential truth value, meaning or ethical stance, but in the very fact that it is 
an essential injunction that determines our subjectivity. Žižek believes that beyond the 
Symbolic Order there is no truth to be found, there is only the Real – that realm which 
Lacan designates as the unknowable. As such, the symbolic law – the traumatic 
enunciation that requires no foundation or truth, yet which delivers us from the Real – is 
precisely the condition for subjectivity and ideology. 
‘External’ obedience to the Law is thus not submission to external pressure […] 
but obedience to the Command in so far as it is ‘incomprehensible’, not 
understood; in so far as it retains a ‘traumatic’, ‘irrational’ character: far from 
hiding its full authority, this traumatic, non-integrated character of the Law is a 
positive condition of it.  (ibid p.37) 
Given that on this account, there is no truth beyond the law, Žižek contends that the 
‘function of ideology is not to offer us a point of escape from our reality but to offer us the 
social reality itself’ (ibid p.45). On considering this, Žižek points out that it is impossible to 
free ourselves from the law and see reality as it really is; instead we must break the grip 
of the law and its ideology by confronting the reality of our desires as manifested within 
our dreams – this is analogous to the way the patient in psychoanalysis becomes cured 
of his/her neurosis by gaining an awareness of the mechanisms of desire at work within 
their dreams.  
In vain do we try to break out of the ideological dream by ‘opening our eyes and 
trying to see reality as it is’, by throwing away the ideological spectacles […] as 
the subjects of a look which views the facts as they are, we remain throughout 
‘the consciousness of our ideological dream’. The only way to break the power of 
our ideological dream is to confront the Real of our desire which announces itself 
in this dream. (ibid, p.48) 
 
29 Žižek describes how the objet petit a relates to the fetishisation of commodities 
within contemporary consumerist ideology through the phenomenon of Coca-Cola – a 
commodity which Žižek views as the ‘ultimate capitalist merchandise’ (Žižek 2001, p.22) 
in that it is ‘surplus-enjoyment personified’ (ibid). Žižek states that the surplus-enjoyment 
personified by Coca-Cola is symptomatic of the fact that – in Marxist terms – it 
transcends any immediate use-value: 
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[Coke’s] strange taste does not seem to provide any particular satisfaction; it is 
not directly pleasing and endearing; however, it is precisely as such, as 
transcending any immediate use-value […] that Coke functions as the direct 
embodiment of ‘it’: of the pure surplus of enjoyment over standard satisfactions, 
of the mysterious and elusive X we are all after in our compulsive consumption of 
merchandise (ibid, p.22). 
 
30 For Bataille, the recovery of eroticism was essential. This could only be 
achieved via a reengagement with the realm of the sacred in which intimate 
communication with the world could take place. The libertinism of erotic play experienced 
within our postmodern world could not be perceived as a substitute. According to Bataille, 
libertinism was nothing other than a further profanation of our bodies as things utilized as 
objects of pleasure – it therefore failed to allow transgression to occur. As Bataille states, 
in ‘an entirely profane world nothing would be left but the animal mechanism’ (Bataille 
1998, p.128).  
 
31 In particular, Bataille refers to the practice of the potlatch by North Western American 
Indians to illustrate the notion of an expenditure outside of notions of accumulation. For 
Bataille, variations of the practice of the potlatch, identified by the anthropologist Marcel 
Mauss, can be found amongst the peoples of the Tlingit, the Haida, the Tsimshian, the 
Kwakiutl and the Tchoukchi. The potlatch manifests itself in the form of the gift; it 
excludes ‘all bargaining and, in general, […is] constituted by a considerable gift of riches, 
offered openly and with the goal of humiliating, defying, and obligating a rival’ (ibid). In 
order to reply to the obligation and challenge, the rival must respond with a ‘more 
valuable gift, in other words, to return with interest’ (ibid). Bataille points out that gifting is 
not the only form of the potlatch, that it is also possible to ‘defy rivals through the 
spectacular destruction of wealth’ (ibid). Such a phenomenon allows Bataille to make an 
analogy between the potlatch and religious forms of sacrifice. 
32 Michael Richardson indicates that is unlikely that the potlatch was established 
on an economy of expenditure and waste. Richardson points out that  
 
the potlatch […] represented an extremely efficient use of resources in which 
waste was anathema. The most complex form of the potlatch, that of the 
Kwaikiutl, was certainly not performed for the purposes of the destruction of 
wealth, but for its maintenance and distribution. In so far as it contained 
excessive elements these were incidental. (Richardson 1994, p.82)   
 
Likewise, Richardson indicates how Bataille’s references to practices in Aztec 
culture, which orientate around the sun and sacrifice, are problematic. in The Accursed 
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Share (1949), Bataille refers to such practices in which to illustrate the idea of excess, 
waste and the sacred within a general economy. Firstly, Richardson criticizes Bataille’s 
use of the sun as an analogy of the propensity of all things to uselessly expend their 
energy. According to Richardson,  
 
[t]he earth does not itself produce any energy independently of the sun, whose 
bounteous nature is a pre-requisite for earthly existence. Without the sun, the 
world itself could not even exist as a physical entity. Does this not mean that the 
nature of the sun is fundamentally different to ours? […] Unlike the sun, the 
condition of the world’s existence is dependence: to sustain itself it needs to 
receive energy […] In so far as it has an energy reserve, it is only what has been 
given to it, not what is sovereignly present within it and that it is able to dispense 
when and how it chooses. (ibid, p. 78) 
 
If Bataille’s use of the sun is found to be questionable in terms of an analogy to describe 
the propensity of all things to expend energy uselessly, then the meaning ascribed to 
sacrifice in relation to the sun in Aztec culture is also found wanting. For Richardson, the 
‘whole basis of Aztec society appears founded upon the understanding that the sun did 
indeed require something in return for its gift’ (ibid, p.79). Contrary to Bataille’s notion that 
sacrifice provided an opportunity to expend a surplus uselessly, Richardson points out 
that sacrifice ‘derived not so much from an inner need for expenditure in itself as from an 
overwhelming need to expiate a direct sense of guilt and allay an overwhelming fear of 
retribution’ (ibid). Therefore sacrifice appears to ‘have been more a means by which to 
expel, rather than confront death’ (ibid). As such,  
 
One has to wonder […] if Aztec sacrifice did not serve precisely a homogenizing 
process within their given society. As such it might be considered […] to be an 
example of sacrifice being turned against itself and gaining a profane quality, and 
its purpose may have been to bind together the homogenous elements of Aztec 
society in a conclusive way, so serving the taboo (ibid, p.80) 
 
For Richardson, though Bataille’s use of ethnographic data has questionable accuracy, 
this does not bring his central argument into question. Richardson makes reference to the 
contrast between Spanish and Aztec expansion to point out the opposing homogeneous 
and heterogeneous natures of each society. On the one hand, the fact that Aztec 
sacrifice was performed ‘in public and in full view […] testifies to the strength of the social 
fabric and only takes place within societies which are founded around intimacy and 
heterogeneity’ (ibid, p.83). On the other hand, the massacres performed by imperialistic 
Spanish expansion demonstrate the  
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characteristics of societies which have a weak social fabric and consequently 
tend to reduce themselves to homogeneity. Instead of being placed at the heart 
of society, violence is now hidden away (ibid).  
 
In such homogeneous societies then, violence must be hidden away and any sacred 
quality attached to sacrifice and destruction is removed. To identify with the victim would 
be to make the act criminal. Both the victim and violence must become the Other that 
lack value. As Richardson states: 
 
[S]acrifice can be seen […] as the experience of self-sufficient societies that 
cohere in a heterogeneous way. With the inauguration of massacre, however, 
cruelty and degradation become everyday norms: it is the consequence of the 
determination to reduce everything to utilitarian value, to reduce the world to the 
nature of a thing. (ibid, p.84-5) 
 
33 Bataille gives the following description of this method: 
 
When one says that heterology scientifically considers questions of 
heterogeneity, one does not mean that heterology is, in the usual sense of such a 
formula, the science of the heterogeneous. The heterogeneous is even resolutely 
placed outside the reach of scientific knowledge, which by definition is applicable 
to homogeneous elements. Above all, heterology is opposed to any 
homogeneous representation of the world, in other words, to any philosophical 
system […Heterology] leads to the complete reversal of the philosophical 
process, which ceases to be an instrument of appropriation, and now serves 
excretion; it introduces the demands for the violent gratifications implied by social 
life. (Bataille 1930, p.97) 
 
Heterology then, ‘stands for the way of looking at what is not normally considered, 
especially in the practices of either philosophy or science, these being matters pertaing to 
the sacred, horror, excretion, violent sexuality, states of excess’ (Hegarty Op Cit, p.27). 
Heterology therefore not only considers what has been excluded within a social 
discourse, but also how the excluded comes to be marginalized within the homogeneous 
order. This method places Bataille in a paradoxical situation in which he is committed to 
systematically write against systems. As is evident in the introduction to The Accursed 
Share (1949), this paradox does not escape Bataille’s notice:   
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Writing this book in which I was saying that energy finally can only be wasted, I 
myself was using my energy, my time, working; my research answered in a 
fundamental way the desire to add to the amount of wealth acquired for mankind. 
Should I say that under these conditions I sometimes could only respond to the 
truth of my book and could not go on writing it? (Bataille 1989, p.11) 
 
Denis Hollier points out that heterological practice should therefore be considered critical 
in two senses: 
 
[Hetereology] is constantly in a critical position, to the extent that it does not 
accept the fabric in which, nonetheless, it is forced to produce itself; it is critical of 
this fabric but its criticism is by definition nonviable, its opportunities remain the 
critical thing. Heterology is the inscription in the logos itself of its other (heteros), 
an inscription that can only be sustained by insistently refusing its own mono and 
homological reduction (Hollier 1998, p.114) 
 
As we shall see, the paradoxical nature of heterological thought has implications for our 
later consideration of Bataille in relation to the fetish. 
 
34 See Max Weber’s The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (1905). For 
Protestantism, a person was religiously compelled to labour hard for the good of society 
as an act of individual conscience; individuals were also forbidden from wastefully using 
money on luxuries due to the fact that such expenditure was perceived as a sin. The 
outcome of such a contradiction, in which one labours hard but is prevented from 
exuberant expenditure, was the accumulation and investment of money. As Weber 
states, when ‘asceticism was carried out of monastic cells into everyday life, and began 
to dominate world morality, it did its part in building the tremendous cosmos of the 
modern economic order’ (Weber 2003, p.181). 
35 One is reminded of an earlier observation in which Minkondi fetishes are associated 
precisely with communication with death – a correspondence therefore exists between a 
concept of fetishism and forms of society not based upon the exclusion of the dead. 
36 Firstly, Pietz perceives the desire invested in the fetish as a moment of crisis 
in which the identity of the self is disrupted. Pietz makes reference to Deleuze and 
Guattari’s notion of the Body Without Organs in which to explain this phenomenon – a 
concept that we shall be discussing later. Pietz states: 
 
The fetish is, then, first of all, something intensely personal, whose truth is 
experienced as a substantial movement from “inside” the self (the self totalized 
through an impassioned body, a “Body Without Organs”) into the self-limited 
 316 
                                                                                                                       
morphology of a material object situated in space “outside” […T]he fetish object 
“corresponds” by “recalling” the amorous flow or sense of being touched within 
the embodied self as this was made conscious in singular moments of “crisis” in 
which the identity of the self is called into question [.]  (ibid, p.11-12) 
 
As will be explained later, the Body Without Organs describes a process in which new 
identities are forged or dispersed depending on the various material, biological and social 
intensities situated within and upon the body.  
Secondly, Deleuze’s notion of territorialization clearly corresponds to Pietz’s use of the 
concept within his categories for the fetish. For Deleuze, territorialization ‘programs desire 
to valorize certain organs and objects at the expense of others [whilst deterritorialization 
designates] the process of freeing desire from established organs and objects’ (Holland 
1999, p.19). As we have mentioned, for Pietz the category of territorialization performs 
the similar function of focusing desire upon an object or sign within a particular context, it 
therefore ‘acts as a material space gathering an otherwise unconnected multiplicity into 
the unity of [an] enduring singularity’ (Pietz Op Cit, p. 15). 
37 According to this view, copies can be judged by analogy and internal resemblance with 
the ideal. Finally, there is the simulacra which can be described as the copy of a copy – 
for example, if I was to paint a picture of a particular dog, this would constitute a copy of a 
copy and would therefore be twice removed from the ideal notion of this animal; as such, 
simulacra are viewed as inferior in that they construct an image through their 
resemblance to the differences inherent to copies, referring instead to external 
resemblance rather than any internal principle. 
38 Deleuze describes the passive synthesis as follows: 
 
It is in this present that time is deployed. To it belong both the past and the 
future: the past in so far as the preceding instants are retained in the contraction; 
the future because its expectation is anticipated in this same contraction. The 
past and the future do not designate instants distinct from a supposed present 
instant, but rather the dimensions of the present itself in so far as it is a 
contraction of instants. The present does not have to go outside itself in order to 
pass from past to future. (Deleuze 2004, p 91) 
 
39 Deleuze considers Kant’s view of time to be an active synthesis because in order to 
make meaning of past events, there must be an active process, which is identified by 
Kant as memory. Unlike the passive synthesis of habit, the active synthesis does not 
relate to a present in that memory retrospectively perceives passing moments – as such, 
memory relates to a past that has never been present; it is a form in itself of phenomenon 
that never existed before its operations. 
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40 In her essay Women’s Time (1979), Kristeva similarly draws our attention to a time 
outside of a linear conception. Kristeva recognizes a feminine, maternal time of repetition 
and eternity that opposes a paternal notion of linear time; she states that 
 
female subjectivity would seem to provide a specific measure that essentially 
retains repetition and eternity from among the multiple modalities of time known 
through the history of civilizations. On the one hand, there are cycles, gestation, 
the eternal recurrence of a biological rhythm which conforms to that of nature and 
imposes a temporality […] whose regularity and unison with what is experienced 
as extra-subjective time, cosmic time, occasional vertiginous visions and 
unnameable jouissance. On the other hand, and perhaps as a consequence, 
there is the massive presence of a monumental temporality, without cleavage or 
escape, which has so little to do with linear time (which passes) […is] all 
encompassing and infinite like imaginary space [.] (Kristeva 1979, p. 191) 
 
 In opposition to this maternal conception is the notion of linear time, associated with the 
paternal realm due to its correspondence with the symbolic realm. As Kristeva describes,  
 
[linear] temporality renders explicit a rupture, an expectation or an anguish which 
other temporalities work to conceal […T]his linear time is that of language 
considered as the enunciation of sentences (noun + verb; topic-comment; 
beginning-end), and that this time rests on its own stumbling block, which is also 
the stumbling block of that enunciation – death. (ibid, p. 192) 
 
Linear time is therefore aligned with the rupture and separation that constitutes entry into 
the symbolic order – an entry that requires the recognition of lack, the sacrifice of the 
maternal realm and the relinquishing of incestuous desire; it therefore signals the death of 
the plenitude and fluidity associated with the feminine. Kristeva describes our subjection 
to the symbolic order a submission to ‘’obsessional time’, recognizing in the mastery of 
time the true structure of the slave’ (ibid). To deny such tutelage, via the surfacing of 
maternal pulsions, is therefore also to rebut linear time; as Kristeva points out, the 
‘hysteric (either male or female) who suffers from reminiscences would, rather, recognize 
his or her self in the anterior temporal modalities: cyclical or monumental’ (ibid). This has 
a bearing on the notion of fetishism – as we shall see, for Kristeva, the disavowal of the 
symbolic, with its corresponding notions of castration and lack, is symptomatic of the 
surfacing of the maternal semiotic realm into signifying practice. Such disruptions convey 
the compulsion of the death-drive to return to a maternal realm of plenitude before the 
onset of symbolic lack. As described later, Kristeva repeats the typical narrative of a 
desire to return to maternal origins, along with a strict separation of the paternal and 
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maternal realms – any ‘perversion’ or negation of the symbolic within signifying practice 
will therefore be deemed as nothing more than a substitute of its inevitable law. A 
Deleuzean notion of time as an eternal return of difference, is therefore in direct contrast 
to this – rather than fall into the impasse of an omnipresent symbolic law and the 
perpetual dichotomy of maternal and paternal realms, Deleuze offers us a rhizomatic 
notion of time in which linearity and universality are replaced by an immanent process in 
which a plurality of new connections and deterritorializations become manifest.   
 
41 Deleuze and Guattari borrow the term from Antonin Artaud’s radio play To 
Have Done with the Judgement of God (1947):  
When you will have made him a Body Without Organs, 
then you will have delivered him from all his automatic reactions   
and restored him to his true freedom. (Artaud 1947, p 571) 
Contained within these lines from the play, there is the sense that the Body Without 
Organs is a body of possibilities, outside of conventional habits or regressions to prior 
states. 
42 An example of this would be the breast as an energy-source-machine which the mouth 
as organ-machine interrupts, diverting its flow. 
43 This recognition manifests itself through the consumption of the pleasure 
generated through the production and recording process. Deleuze and Guattari point out: 
It is a strange subject […] with no fixed identity […] being defined by the share of 
the product it takes for itself […] being born of the states that it consumes and 
being reborn with each new state. “It’s me, and so it’s mine…” Even suffering, as 
Marx says, is a form of self enjoyment. Doubtless all desiring-production is, in 
and of itself, immediately consumption and consummation, and therefore, 
“sensual pleasure”. (ibid, p.16)  
 
44 In Coldness and Cruelty (1967), Deleuze describes fetishism in essentially Freudian 
terms:  
[It is] first of all a disavowal (“No, the woman does not lack a penis”); secondly it 
is a defensive neutralization ([…] the knowledge of the situation as it is persists, 
but in a suspended, neutralized form); in the third place it is a protective and 
idealizing neutralization (for the belief in a female phallus is itself experienced as 
a protest of the ideal against the real; it remains suspended or neutralized in the 
ideal, the better to shield itself against the painful awareness of reality). (Deleuze 
1989, p. 31-2). 
 
According to Freud’s latter view of Masochism (described in The Economic Problem of 
Masochism (1924)), this psychological phenomenon is found to have primacy over 
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sadism, of which it is usually associated with, in that it serves the function of eroticising 
tension (Freud 1924, p. 155-170). By eroticising pain, masochism allows us to find 
pleasure in un-pleasure, it therefore negotiates a space between erotic desire and the 
guilt experienced in the wish to defy the incest taboo instigated by the father.  
 
45 Whereas the masochist attempts to control a relationship through a contractual 
agreement in which to attain a dream of absolute submission / denial of subjectivity, the 
fact that such an agreement relies upon mutual dependence makes any truly dominant / 
submissive binary identity impossible; in this sense, the disavowal typically recognized in 
fetishism can be interpreted as serving the function of masking the intersubjective relation 
between both parties.  
46 The autonomy of the affect-image from character and plot within a cinematic scene 
places greater emphasis upon stylistic features in the generation of meaning and effect 
within a film – as such, the affect-image is a conceptual tool that widens the scope of 
analysis beyond typical structuralist interpretations. 
47 Lacan refers to Klein’s notion of partial objects on numerous occasions when 
discussing the fragmented perception of the body prior to Oedipalisation (Lacan 2006, 
p.55, 286, 513). 
48 For Klein these two earlier phases of psycho-sexual development signal the generation 
of the super-ego, not as the effect of the father, but as the effect of the interventions of 
the mother – as Klein states, the mother ‘has frustrated his oral desires, and now […] she 
also interferes with his anal pleasures’ (Klein 1928, p.73). For Klein, it is the negotiation of 
part objects in the mother–child relationship – what Klein calls the ‘feminine’ phase – that 
is central to the process of individuation that prepares the constitution of the self during 
the Oedipal stage. Klein believes that the child fears retribution from the mother for 
wanting to appropriate and destroy her – the child already perceives the castrating power 
of the mother in her ability to remove its faeces; as such, ‘by means of the anal 
frustrations which she inflicts does she pave the way for the castration complex: in terms 
of psychic reality she is also already the castrator’ (Klein 1928, p. 74). During the Oedipal 
development of the child, the fear of the mother is accentuated ‘because there is 
combined with it an intense dread of castration by the father’ (ibid). 
49 Lacan refers to Klein’s notion of partial objects on numerous occasions when 
discussing the fragmented perception of the body prior to Oedipalisation (Lacan 2006, 
p.55, 286, 513). 
50 Kaplan’s five principles of the fetishism strategy can be described as follows. Firstly: 
Fetishism is a mental strategy or defense that enables a human being to 
transform something or someone with its own enigmatic energy and immaterial 
essence into something or someone that is material and tangibly real, a form of 
being that makes something or someone controllable. (ibid, p. 5) 
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To elucidate this first principle, Kaplan refers to the tendency in modernity to reduce 
everything and everyone into a commodity. With reference to Marx, Kaplan recognizes 
the reifying process in which, through the provision of surplus labour for the capitalist, ‘the 
worker is transmogrified into a commodity’ (ibid, p.6).  
Secondly:  
Fetishism transforms ambiguity and uncertainty into something knowable and 
certain and in doing so snuffs out any sparks of creativity that might ignite the 
fires of rebellion. (ibid, p.6) 
According to Kaplan, this second principle is a subtle variation of the first. Here, the 
‘material object, the fetish, is employed to still and silence, bind and dominate, smother 
and squelch the frighteningly uncontrollable and unknowable energies of someone or 
something […]’ (ibid). One can surmise that money and the phallus, as knowable and 
certain signifiers of value, both fall into this category. Deviations from these signifiers is 
then to be perceived as either a perversion, lacking utility or unproductive. The various 
other ‘substitute’ material fetishes would also fall into this category. 
Thirdly: 
Fetishism brings certain details into the foreground of experience in order to 
mask and disguise other features that are thus cast into the shadows and 
margins and background. (ibid) 
For Kaplan, this principle is associated with masquerade. According to this 
principle, the ‘presence of the erotic surface disguises and covers over the absences that 
would otherwise remind us of something traumatic’ (ibid). The obvious example in 
conventional psychoanalytic theory for this would be the use of the fetish to mask the 
perceived lack of the phallus in woman. As in Laura Mulvey’s Visual Pleasure and 
Narrative Cinema (1975), the body of the Hollywood female star can also be perceived as 
a seamless fetishistic façade that disavows the trauma of castration. According to 
Mulvey, the controlling gaze of the male, in which there is a ‘direct scopophilic contact 
with the female form displayed for his enjoyment’ (Mulvey 2009, p. 21), is further 
complicated through the unconscious threat of castration that the male perceives, but 
disavows; as Mulvey states, ‘the woman as icon, displayed for the gaze and enjoyment of 
men, the active controllers of the look, always threatens to evoke the anxiety it originally 
signified’ (ibid, p.22). As such, there are two avenues for the gaze in which to escape 
from castration anxiety:  
 
[P]reoccupation with the reenactment of the original trauma  (investigating the 
woman, demystifying her mystery), counter-balanced by the devaluation, 
punishment, or saving of the guilty object (an avenue typified by the concerns of 
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the film noir); or else complete disavowal of castration by the substitution of a 
fetish object or turning the represented figure itself into a fetish so that it becomes 
reassuring rather than dangerous (hence overevaluation, the cult of the female 
star). (ibid, p. 22)  
 
 Kaplan states that the ‘dramatic and vivid visibility of the fetish object serves to dazzle 
and confuse, blinding the viewer from other potentially more troubling implications that 
are thus cast into the shadows’ (ibid).  
Fourthly: 
The more dangerous and unpredictable the threat of desire, the more deadened 
or distanced from human experience the fetish object must be. (ibid, p.7) 
According to this view, part of the function of fetishism is to ossify and deaden an 
experience in which to control an experience and quell any uncertainty. For Kaplan, when 
the ‘sexual object is alive, with all manner of threateningly, dangerously unpredictable 
vitalities, the desire he or she arouses must be invested in an object that is knowable and 
predictable’ (ibid, p.7). One can assume that the abstractions constituted by the 
objectification of economic value within money and erotic value within the phallus are 
examples of this tendency to deaden vitalities and the potential of human interaction.   
Finally: 
The death drive tints itself in erotic colour. The impression of erogenous colour 
draws a mask right on the skin. (ibid, p.8) 
 
Kaplan’s last principle of the fetishism strategy draws our attention to the relationship 
between fetishism and death. As referred to earlier, for Kaplan the death drive is 
perceived as a phenomenon at the heart of fetishism. Behind the fetish is always the 
repetitive desire to return to a state of death in which neither tension or lack exists. 
Because such a desire is unconscious, it never manifests itself and is only apprehended 
via a series of erotic masks (fetishes) that act as monuments to death in an attempt to 
control and ossify value and desire.  
 
51 For Kaplan, the fetishism strategy is viewed as a cunning mechanism to delude the 
analyst and analysand and should therefore be carefully scrutinized For Kaplan, some 
models of psychoanalysis are exemplars of the fetishism strategy within therapeutic 
practice - the tendency to tie manifest and latent images to preconceived meanings is 
perceived as a means to deaden the vitality of a therapy session. Kaplan states: 
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‘Knowingness, a variant of certainty, inevitably deadens the vitality of the clinical situation. 
It is the core of the fetishism strategy in psychoanalysis’ (Kaplan 2006, p.124). 
 
52 In Fetishism and Curiosity (1996), Mulvey maintains that much of our cultural forms can 
be understood, in terms of affect and content, at which the disavowal inherent to fetishism 
comes into play. At such points there is an ‘oscillation between what is seen and what 
threatens to erupt into knowledge’ (ibid, p14). Mulvey uses the genre of horror movies as 
a particularly good example of how the process of disavowal can break down. Within 
such films, the perfect exterior sheen of ‘feminine beauty collapses to reveal the uncanny, 
abject, maternal body’ (ibid). In such circumstances, ‘it is as though the fetish itself has 
failed’ (ibid). As such, an ‘aesthetics of disavowal […is] an attempt to rearticulate those 
black holes of political repression, class and woman, in the Symbolic Order’ (Mulvey 
1996, p15).  
 
 
53 In his article for the Journal of American Psychoanalytic Association, entitled 
Fetishism (1953), Robert Bak relates the object fixation that occurs during the 
constitution of a fetish to separation anxiety. On recognising the fact that, for Freud, 
the castration complex is the stage of development that the male child ‘detaches 
himself from the mother and turns towards the father’ (Gamman / Makinen 1994, p. 
113), Bak divides the fear of castration and fear of separation into discrete processes. 
By focusing upon the process of individuation – where the child comes to recognise 
their own identity through the process of separation from the mother – Bak identifies 
fetishism as a means to undo ‘the separation from the mother [by] clinging to [a] 
symbolic substitute’ (ibid). For Bak, the mother that the child strives to cling to is the 
‘pre-phallic mother who is thus seen as unthreatening to the little penis’ (ibid). As 
such, Bak situates fetishism in between both separation and castration anxiety, 
allowing a shift of emphasis from an understanding of fetishism as solely the effect of 
castration anxiety.  
While outlining his theory of the ‘transitional object’ (Winnicott, D.W 1975), Winnicott 
discusses the situation in which such an object may develop into a fetish. Winnicott 
describes the process in which the infant develops ‘from a sensation of being 
magically a part of the maternal breast, through to an awareness of itself within an 
outside environment, via the safety or comfort of a transitional object’ (ibid). Winnicott 
goes on to argue that such a transitional object may develop into a fetish. Here again, 
fetishism is recognised as an effect of the separation anxiety associated with the 
mother.  
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Gamman and Makinen point out that, for Greenacre, it is a ‘disturbance in the 
separation process during the first two years which forms the potential for a later fetish 
fixation’ (ibid, p.114). Greenacre goes on to suggest that during the castration 
complex, the potential fetishist ‘regresses to the feeling / thought of the mother’s 
breast as both a direct comfort and a substitute for the castrated penis’ (ibid). Such an 
explanation acknowledges, in relation to the mother, a strong oral component in the 
constitution of a fetish. For Greenacre, the breast becomes ‘the model for the 
transitional object used by the child to bridge the gap between the ‘I’ and the external 
world’ (ibid). A disruption in object relations between mother and child leads to a weak 
body image that, in turn, results to acute anxiety during the castration complex. Given 
this situation, Greenacre proposes that the fetish develops as a stop-gap to ‘enable 
sexual performance, despite the low body-image’ (ibid).  Greenacre thus expands our 
notion of fetishism by relating it not only to separation anxiety, but also to the oral 
stage of development and our relation to transitional objects. By perceiving the oral 
stage of development and transitional objects as constituting elements within fetishism 
– both of which are prior to the Oedipal stage - Greenacre identifies a model of 
fetishism that could be available to both genders.  
Gamman and Makinen make reference to Masud Khan’s Alienation in Perversion 
(1979). Khan believes that a fetish can be constituted if a child is subject to the 
‘excessive impingement’ of the phallic mother – under such circumstances, the infant 
creates an internal object ‘instead of developing via the transitional object’ (ibid, p. 
116). Khan proposes that the phallic mother should not be viewed as a construct that 
denies sexual difference, but should be perceived as our desire to ‘merge with / 
possess the mother’ (ibid). As such, the phallic mother is less about denying sexual 
difference and more about denying individuation: 
 
‘What is […] being rejected here is the ’trauma’ of seeing the female genitals, in 
classic male castration anxiety. Instead, the image of the phallic mother is more 
an excited fixation on desire and fear of annihilation through individuation (ibid).  
For Gamman and Makinen, Khan’s theory offers further support for the notion that 
fetishism is more symptomatic of separation anxiety than the fear of castration. 
54 Gamman and Makinen argue that just as the sexual fetishist is specific about their 
‘chosen’ objects, the bulimic tends to be particular about their choice of foodstuff – the 
chosen food is usually both high in calories and fat; it is the taboo foods that threaten 
the feminine body ideal. Whereas the sexual fetishist uses a specific object to 
disavowal the castrated status of women, the bulimic fetishes food as a way ‘to 
disavow harsher anxieties’ (Gamman / Makinen 1994, p.124). The bulimic firstly 
binges to gain direct sensual pleasure then, secondly, purges as a means of denying 
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the threat of consuming food. For Gamman and Makinen, this practice ‘parallels the 
process whereby the fetish object allows the fetishist to experience direct genital 
gratification, while unconsciously denying the ‘threat of castration’’ (ibid). The split in 
the female ego that exists within eating disorders is explained in Kleinian terms: it is 
perceived as being related to the breast as part object. Gamman and Makinen refer to 
the fact that there is a strong tendency within bulimics to have had domineering 
mothers during their childhood development (ibid p. 129-30). Within such 
relationships, there is a failure to give up the desire for the breast: the need ‘to 
incorporate it, be sure of it’ (ibid, p. 130). Mintz argues that for bulimics, ‘the gorging of 
food and laxatives reflects a loss of impulse control and is related to unsatisfied 
infantile yearnings for food, closeness and security’ (Mintz 1988, p. 87). 
55 According to Gamman and Makinen, women know ‘from cultural messages about what 
it means to be a woman, that they must exercise restraint around food’ (Gamman / 
Makinen 1994, pg 148) and, as such, food often ‘provokes more […] fantasies and 
conversations than sex and is perceived as just as alluring and dangerous’ (ibid). 
Gamman and Makinen claim that the consumer market is aware of such conflicting 
pressures and that it is typical to find in women’s magazines ‘[l]avish recipes and images 
of food [that] are packaged alongside pages which explain how diet or keeping fit can 
discover your new ‘self’’ (ibid, p. 148). For Gamman and Makinen, this ambivalent relation 
to food, combined with an equally ambivalent relationship to identity and individuation, 
explains both how and why food comes to be considered a fetish for the bulimic. 
56 According to the view in Marlene Boskind-Lodahl’s Cinderella’s Stepsisters: A 
Feminist Perspective on Anorexia Nervosa and Bulimia (1976) the ‘anorexic’s painful 
emaciation could be seen to be refusing to injest the feminine role. [In contrast] the 
bulimic, a more secret syndrome hidden behind the façade of a successful, coping 
woman of acceptable size, could be seen as accommodating the societal role’ 
(Gamman / Makinen 1994, p. 128). In opposition to this perspective, Suja 
Srikameswaran, Pierre Leichner and Dan Harper’s research in Sex Role Ideology 
among women with Anorexia Nervosa and Bulimia (1984) claims that women with 
bulimia were more feminist in their views than those with anorexia (1984, p.42). 
Gamman and Makinen believe that the ‘anorexic’s debilitation, and refusal to abandon 
the ‘child’ role, could as easily be read as a bid for dependency [upon the mother]’ (Op 
Cit., p. 129). In contrast, the bulimic can be seen to challenge traditional passive 
female roles:  
 
Her less debilitating compromise, or disavowal mechanism, allows many to have 
successful, high-flying careers both as professionals and as feminist activists. 
Many bulimic feminists are well aware of the significance of slender images in 
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contributing to some women having problems with food, and this points to a view 
that eating disorders arise from irrational unconscious anxieties (ibid).  
 
57 As an example of the historically evolving nature of fetishism, Gamman and Makinen 
point out that the common fetishisation of the ‘sabot’ shoe, worn by female servants 
during the nineteenth century, was replaced by the high heel shoe during the nineteen-
fifties and sixtiesGamman and Makinen describe this development of shoe fetishism by 
referring to Emily Apter’s Splitting Hairs: Female Fetishism and Post Partum 
Sentimentality in the Fin de Siecle in Hunt, L, ed. (1990) “Eroticism and the Body Politic” , 
Baltimore: John Hopkins Press. 
58 Kaplan refers to a range of films in her interpretation of apocalyptic narratives, including 
Niagara (1953), The Misfits (1961), Thelma and Louise (1991) and The Matrix (1999); 
she states: 
 
Like the winged creatures in biblical renditions of apocalypse, the motor launches 
(Niagara), pick-up trucks (The Misfits), the enchanted convertible in Thelma and 
Louise, or any other moving vehicles that regularly appear in contemporary 
apocalyptic narratives, such as the amazing, technologically proficient, digitally 
created space-ships designed for The Matrix and other sci-fi films, represent a 
“method of escape from a scene of destruction” and on the path to the Elysium 
fields or safe havens that represent the tender mother’ (Kaplan 2006, p.61) 
 
59 For Žižek our very existence as a desiring subject is dependent on our entry 
into the symbolic order – for Žižek this is an eternal law which he describes as that which 
‘returns as the same through diverse historicizations / symbolizations’ (Žižek 1989, p.50). 
By reducing our desire to an ahistorical, eternal sense of lack, Žižek’s theory is subject to 
the same neglect of female agency and bias towards heterosexuality as the writings of 
Freud and Lacan. By subscribing to the Freudian / Lacanian view that women are the 
radical other, outside the phallic sexual economy, Žižek repeats the pattern of rendering 
women without an agency that they can consider their own. As Rosi Braidotti points out, 
Žižek's work 'represents an anti-feminist regression that reiterates the whole array of 
symbolic invisibility and specularity which feminists have been arguing against since the 
early days of Lacan's work' (Braidotti 2002, p. 54). Likewise, by viewing castration and its 
ensuing lack as an essential ingredient in the production of subjectivity, Žižek upholds not 
only a patriarchal perspective, but also a conventional heterosexual view of sexuality and 
the production of subjectivity. As Judith Butler indicates, Žižek  'tends to rely on an 
unproblematized sexual antagonism that unwittingly installs a heterosexual matrix as a 
permanent and incontestable structure of culture in which women operate as a "stain" in 
discourse' (Butler 1993, p. 21).  
 326 
                                                                                                                       
 
60 In her essay “Sorties” (1975), Cixous states: 
 
Organisation by hierarchy makes all conceptual organizations subject to man. 
Male privilege, shown in the opposition between activity and passivity, which he 
uses to sustain himself. Traditionally, the question of sexual difference is treated 
by coupling it with the opposition: activity / passivity (Cixous 1986, p.64) 
The male phallic signifier therefore establishes itself as present and active, whilst 
determining its other as passive; it can therefore only flourish by destroying the presence 
of its opposite which could threaten the omnipresence of its own economic system. 
 
Either woman is passive or she does not exist. What is left of her is unthinkable, 
unthought. Which certainly means that she is not thought, that she does not enter 
into the oppositions [.] (ibid, p.65) 
 
Cixous is able to conceptualise écriture feminine precisely because patriarchal binary 
oppositions exclude the feminine from its framework. For Cixous, écriture feminine is 
writing that undermines and destabilises the hierarchical phallocentric system of binary 
oppositions. Cixous’ method for destabilising presence and the accompanying binary 
oppositions corresponds to Derrida’s conception of writing as différance. By combining 
the sense of difference and deferral within this neologism, the concept of différance 
illustrates how meaning is constructed through a process of deferral – where meaning is 
never truly present or absent, but determined by reference (deferral) to the absent 
signifiers that constitute its difference within a system of language. By exposing the 
effects of différance within writing, Derrida prevents binary oppositions from establishing 
their self-present foundations. Cixous repeats this move by declaring écriture feminine 
bisexual – not bisexual in a conventional sense, where difference is not recognised and 
both sexes are desired through the same economy, but bisexuality as radical difference. 
This other bisexuality is the ‘non-exclusion of difference or of a sex [and is] the 
multiplication of the effects of desire’s inscription on every part of the body and the other 
body’ (ibid, p.155). In other words, whereas desire has previously been defined in terms 
of the presence of the phallus and its lack within the female sex, for Cixous, écriture 
feminine allows desire to flow from the anatomy of both sexes without positing the 
presence or absence of either sex.  
Cixous’ écriture feminine appears to deny the presence and lack inherent within a 
male sexual economy. Cixous’ assault upon a phallocentric metaphysics of presence 
extends to a refusal of the feminine as a positive identity for meaning. Cixous is aware 
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that any such endorsement risks repeating the phallocentric process of exclusion within a 
single sanctioned economy. As such, Cixous rejects the possibility of defining écriture 
feminine – such a definition would reduce feminine writing to a static form and betray its 
essential fluidity. As Cixous states: 
 
[…] this practice can never be theorized, enclosed, coded – which doesn’t mean 
that it doesn’t exist. But it will always surpass the discourse that regulates the 
phallocentric system [.] (Cixous 1980, p.253) 
 
Cixous’ work finds itself ironically repeating the patriarchal characterisation of 
femininity in its attempt to undermine the single phallic economy. This is symptomatic 
of the concurrence of Cixous’ notion of the feminine with Lacan’s conviction that all 
that is outside the phallic economy (Symbolic Order) remains in the unspeakable 
realm of the Imaginary - where all difference is abolished and a fundamental unity 
exists. It is therefore no coincidence that Cixous’ conception of écriture feminine as a 
space beyond monosexual difference corresponds with the conventional alignment of 
femininity with fluidity, fertility and the irrational. This correspondence is evident in the 
fact that Cixous makes analogies with the maternal body, and the all-encompassing 
unity it offers within the Imaginary, when describing and practicing écriture feminine. In 
her essay Coming to Writing (1977), Cixous makes explicit reference to the all-
encompassing maternal body and its capacity to give birth:  
 
I have the tireless love of a mother, that is why I am everywhere, my cosmic 
belly, I work on my world-wide unconscious, I throw death out, it comes back, we 
begin again, I am pregnant with beginnings. (Cixous 1991, p. 53) 
 
Cixous explicitly connects écriture feminine with the female body by suggesting that 
such writing emanates from an embodied woman’s voice: ‘writing and voice … are 
woven together […] She physically materializes what she’s thinking; she signifies it 
with her whole body’ (Cixous 1985, p. 170).  
 
61 In Revolution in Poetic Language (1974), Julia Kristeva identifies a distinction 
between the semiotic and the symbolic. For Kristeva, the semiotic is associated with 
the undifferentiated pre-language pulsions articulated within the dyadic chora of 
mother and child. The chora (from the Greek word meaning womb and enclosed 
space) is to be understood as the ephemeral movements and positions articulated 
within the mother-child relationship, such heterogeneous pulsions are dyadic in that 
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they follow patterns of expulsion and introjection associated with the mother child 
relationship. As such, the semiotic realm of the chora exists prior to the Symbolic 
Order: it is anterior to the sign, representation and identity.  
 
The chora is not yet a position that represents something for someone (i.e., it is 
not a sign); nor is it a position (i.e., it is not yet a signifier either); it is, however, 
generated in order to attain to this signifying position. Neither model nor copy, the 
chora precedes and underlies figuration and thus specularization, and is 
analogous only to vocal or kinetic rhythm. (Kristeva, J 1974, p.94) 
 
Kristeva opposes a pre-Oedipal mother and child relationship to the Symbolic 
realm of the Father.  
 
For Kristeva, the transition from the pre-Oedipal semiotic realm to the 
Symbolic occurs at the mirror stage where ‘in order to capture his image unified in a 
mirror, the child must remain separate from it’ (ibid, p.100). Kristeva refers to this as 
the thetic phase in which the subject must recognize themselves as a separate 
identity before any proposition or positionality can be deduced. Kristeva states: 
 
All enunciation, whether of a word or of a sentence, is thetic. It requires an 
identification; in other words, the subject must separate from and through his 
image, from and through his objects. (ibid, p.98) 
 
As such, for Kristeva, there is no sign ‘that is not thetic and every sign is 
already the germ of a sentence attributing a signifier to an object’ (ibid, p.99).  From 
this perspective, the sign can be ‘conceived as the voice […] projected from the 
agitated body (from the semiotic chora) on to the facing imago or on to the object 
which simultaneously detach from the surrounding continuity’ (ibid, p.100). The 
alienation of the self, that occurs via an identification with an external image, is 
completed through the process of castration and entry into the Symbolic Order. There 
is within Kristeva’s notion of development and identity a division between the feminine 
maternal and the male paternal realm. As Kristeva states: 
 
The discovery of castration […] detaches the subject from his dependence on the 
mother, and the perception of this lack makes the phallic function a symbolic 
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function – the symbolic function. This is a decisive moment fraught with 
consequences: the subject, finding his identity in the symbolic, separates from his 
fusion with the mother, confines his jouissance to the genital and transfers 
semiotic motility on to the symbolic order. (ibid, p.101) 
 
The semiotic realm then, corresponds to the maternal, whereas the Symbolic 
corresponds to the phallic genital realm. On entering the Symbolic realm, the subject 
(either a woman or a man) can still allow the semiotic to continue to make itself felt. 
According to Kristeva, this is most apparent within modern literature.  
 
[W]hen poetic language – especially modern poetic language – transgresses 
grammatical rules, the positing of the symbolic (which mimesis has always 
explored) finds itself subverted, not only of its possibilities of […] denotation 
(which mimesis has always contested), but also as a possessor of meaning 
(which is always grammatical, indeed more precisely, syntactic). In imitating the 
constitution of the symbolic as meaning, poetic mimesis is led to dissolve not only 
the denotative function but also the specifically thetic function of positing the 
subject. (ibid, p. 109) 
 
 The semiotic then, has the potential to disrupt the Symbolic order via the use 
of signifiers that do not follow typical grammatical rules or conventional meanings. In 
doing this, the semiotic has the potential to unsettle customary conceptions, social 
relations and notions of subjectivity. By advocating the semiotic as a potentially 
subversive agency, Kristeva valorises the pre-oedipal phase as a means to disrupt the 
phallic Symbolic order. By upsetting established conventions within the Symbolic 
order, the pulsions within the semiotic forge the possibility of generating new 
meanings – at this point, such notions enter the realm of the symbolic. As Kristeva 
points out, 
 
poetic language puts the subject in process/on trial through a network of marks 
and semiotic facilitations. But the moment it stops being mere instinctual 
glossolalia and becomes part of the linguistic order, poetry meets up with 
denotation and enunciation – verisimilitude and the subject – and, through them, 
the social. (ibid, p.110) 
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Though the semiotic disrupts symbolic conventions, the fact that it occurs within 
language means that the thetic break remains intact. What is called into question 
though, is the reified, transcendental truth value associated with such symbolic 
conventions. 
 
Mimesis and the poetic language inseparable from it tend, rather, to prevent the 
thetic from becoming theological; in other words, they prevent the imposition of 
the thetic from hiding the semiotic process that produces it, and they bar it from 
inducing the subject, reified as a transcendental ego, to function solely within the 
systems of science and monotheistic religion. (ibid) 
 
Kristeva contends that, along with the unconscious processes of displacement and 
condensation, the tendency for the modern novel to combine different sign systems 
via the same signifying material of language, is an effect of a semiotic polyvalence 
which both shatters and generates objects in a manner that operates outside of a self-
identical closed symbolic system. Kristeva refers to this process of combination as a 
transposition in that the passage from ‘one signifying system to another demands a 
new articulation of the thetic – of enunciation and denotative positionality’ (ibid, p.111). 
Here, objects are ‘never single, complete and identical to themselves, but always 
plural, shattered, capable of being tabulated’ (ibid). As such, Kristeva proposes that by 
making an intrusion into the symbolic realm, the semiotic intervenes in the realm of 
the ideological. Rather than taking a typical ideological position that follows a given 
convention, the semiotic confronts ideology by undermining the self-certainty of all 
reified positions – it does this by unfolding the thetic process and repeating the means 
by which the split occurs; it therefore does not deny ideology, but is ‘rather the enemy 
within and without, recognizing both its necessity and its pretensions’ (ibid, p.112).   
By positioning the semiotic chora within the feminine realm, Kristeva ultimately 
presents a definition of the feminine as unrepresentable. In fact for Kristeva, both the 
concepts of male and female, with all their corresponding traits, are constructs 
generated within the symbolic order – give this, all attempts to represent the realm 
outside the symbolic as essentially feminine are destined to repeat the dichotomies 
within its order, hence the proclamation: ‘’There is no such thing as Woman’. Indeed, 
she does not exist with a capital ‘W’, possessor of some mythical unity’ (Kristeva 
1979, p.205). Despite Kristeva’s insistence that, as a construct within the symbolic 
order, Woman does not exist, her reference to the realm beyond the symbolic as 
maternal affirms the male / female dichotomy whilst wishing to subvert it. This impasse 
within Kristeva’s thought is no more apparent than in both her political and aesthetic 
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positions. Against the tendency for both first and second wave feminism to 
essentialize gender positions – whether in the form of extending male values and 
gains (individualism, humanism, pay, suffrage and working conditions and positions) 
to women or by endorsing feminine values to an oppressive masculine order – 
Kristeva champions the notion of an aesthetic practice which can be ‘summarized as 
an interiorization of the founding separation of the socio-symbolic contract, as an 
introduction of its cutting edge into the very interior of every identity whether 
subjective, sexual, ideological, or so forth’ (ibid, p.210). This attempt to subvert given 
gender relations via a dialogue between maternal semiotic and paternal symbolic 
positions ultimately affirms the necessity of the sacrificial break that entry into the 
paternal symbolic order requires. This position assumes that the break which the 
symbolic order entails is a necessity - as such, attempts to subvert its law via either 
the assumption of the feminine into the symbolic position, or its radical negation will 
inevitably lead to either an inverted oppressive order or a tumultuous chaotic state 
akin to psychosis. As such, a play within the potentialities of roles is deemed a 
preferred compromise, whilst retaining the guise of a radical liberating position. As 
Kristeva points out: 
 
[T]he habitual and increasingly explicit attempt to fabricate a scapegoat victim as 
foundress of a society or a counter-society may be replaced by the analysis of 
the potentialities of victim/executioner which characterize each identity, each 
subject, each sex. (ibid). 
 
62 As a consequence of Lacan’s conception of the Imaginary and the Symbolic 
Order, a person that repudiates or finds themselves outside the Symbolic Order is subject 
to psychosis – Lacan refers to this condition as ‘foreclosure’:  
It is an accident in the symbolic register and of what is accomplished in it, namely 
the foreclosure of the Name-of-the-Father in the place of the Other and in the 
failure of the paternal metaphor which I designate as the defect that gives 
psychosis its essential condition [.] (Lacan 2006,p.576)  
To place woman outside the Symbolic Order places her within the space of the irrational, 
whilst resorting to a metaphysics of presence to explain her predicament. 
 
63 Kristeva herself recognizes the precariousness of this position. An appeal to negativity, 
as an eruption of the semiotic, in which to avoid the essentialised and equally tyrannical 
orders of the masculine or feminine, risks leading the subject into a dead-end from which 
it is impossible to speak. Kristeva speculates on the relation between suicide and those 
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female authors whose impossible position on the border between male discourse and 
maternal semiotic expression lead, quite literally, to death.  
 
It is not certain that anyone here and now is capable of this […The ego] is a 
fragile envelope, incapable of staving off the irruption of this conflict, of this love 
which had bound the little girl to her mother, and which then, like black lava, had 
lain in wait for her all along the path of her desperate attempts to identify with the 
symbolic paternal order. Once the moorings of the word, the ego, the superego, 
begin to slip, life itself can’t hang on: death quietly moves in. (Kristeva 1974b, 
p.156-7) 
 
If disruptions within the symbolic order are perceived as a ‘negativity masking the death-
drive which Kristeva sees as perhaps the most fundamental semiotic pulsion’ (Moi 1985, 
p. 119), then, as we shall see, there should not be too great a distance to travel to revise 
Kristeva’s position in which to avoid the trappings of a psychoanalytic symbolic order and 
its reified gendered positions. 
 
64 Battersby positions Kant’s thought, rather than Descartes, as the model for 
metaphysical thinking within modernity. Through Kant’s ‘Copernican revolution’, the 
self in modernity becomes the centre of all knowable reality. In Kant’s The Critique of 
Pure Reason (1781), the world that can be known to us is given through the 
categories of human understanding which interprets information through the filters of 
space and time. As the spatial-temporal world is known through the categories of 
human understanding, the noumenal world (the world as it is) cannot be known, 
leaving the phenomenal world as relative to the imagination of the transcendental self. 
Battersby outlines Kant’s criticism of Descartes metaphysics of self - the Cartesian 
Cogito ergo Sum (“I think therefore I am”) - by indicating how the self is ‘neither 
transparent to itself nor indubitable. In so far as the unity of the self is a necessary (a 
priori) supposition […] it is only given in relation to the space-time world’ (Battersby 
1998, p.84). Unlike the Cartesian rational subject - self-centred and transparent to 
itself - Kant’s transcendental self cannot be known to itself in any direct manner, it 
requires a transcendental object (not-self) from which to distinguish itself against. Two 
things follow from this: firstly, any perception of the Kantian self is relational to the 
objects it perceives and, secondly, for the Kantian self to exist, it must involve bodies. 
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In the Kantian world, if the self dreams itself and is conscious of its dream, it has 
also to dream something other than self. And that something has to be spatial: it 
has to involve bodies. (ibid) 
 
The problem within traditional metaphysical notions of the self is not that they 
assume self-certainty – as we have described, Kant’s metaphysics denounces the 
certainty of Descartes Cogito ergo Sum – what Battersby wants to draw our attention 
to is the gender-blindness within post-Kantian metaphysical definitions of the self. For 
Kant, that which is external to the self is strictly spatial, whereas that which is internal 
– the transcendental self – is strictly temporal. Because the recognition of the 
transcendental self relies upon the differentiation of itself from external objects, the 
body is placed within the paradoxical situation of being ‘neither self nor not-self’ (ibid, 
p.70) – it is outside, yet necessary for the constitution of the self. The body therefore 
disturbs the distinction between the spatial and temporal realms within Kant’s 
metaphysics of the self. This contradiction is particularly apparent when Kant makes 
reference to the internal body. When discussing aberrant bodies with unusual 
arrangements of internal organs, Kant indicates that, though these bodily differences 
are recognised by the senses, the transcendental self cannot explain these 
differences through its internal representations of what constitutes a self.  
 
[…] Kant treats space and time in ways that mean that the ego is located inside 
the bodily container, and all that is ‘other’ is outside – in space. Indeed, the 
container is described in ways that mean that inner bodily spaces cannot make a 
difference in terms of identity (ibid, p. 67). 
 
This problematic is further accentuated if the internal bodily space of a pregnant 
woman is considered - here the identity of selves (mother and unborn child) are 
mutually implicated in ways that completely upset Kant’s conception of self as given 
through the internal / temporal and spatial / outside distinction. As Battersby points 
out, ‘Kant has a model of selfhood that means he is unable to think otherness within 
the self, the foetus within the womb – or even the relation between the inside and 
outside of the body’ (ibid, p.71). Kant’s metaphysics rely upon a notion of matter that 
is inert – such a notion is essential if Kant is to have a stable conception of the self 
that can both recognise and position itself in relation to objects within the world.  
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Identity – at least in the realm of phenomenal reality – entails constructing self 
against an inert matter […] This is essential to Kant’s system, since he has 
argued that the unitary self can only be established by reference to permanent 
bodies in space. Thus even introspection – ‘inner’ experience which is temporal – 
‘depends upon something permanent which is not in me, and consequently can 
be only in something outside me’. Temporal self-awareness is made dependent 
on a spatial construction of permanent bodies in space[.] (ibid, p.69) 
 
The issue of the internal body threatens the concept of a transcendental self that 
determines the inert forms of objects within the known world – if the internal body is 
capable of containing otherness within it, then the notion that the mind of the 
transcendental self constructs reality, rather than matter being animate and self 
forming, is put into question. As Battersby points out, ‘if matter can form itself, why 
must Kant treat all form as if imposed by the structures of the human mind? (ibid, 
p.74) If Kant’s system is to retain its integrity, the female form, as an overt body with 
the potential to contain otherness within it, must be excluded from an account of a 
body as container for the transcendental self - the body of the transcendental self 
must therefore be male in its attributes.  
 
The self is constructed as a homogeneous unity through its differentiation from 
the ‘object’. As such, it seals over fractures within the self and treats the body as 
closed in ways that prevent Kant from thinking determinate biological principles 
that could account for sexual difference – or the growth of another self within the 
womb. (ibid, p.73) 
 
 Battersby demonstrates the ways in which Kant’s metaphysics of self both 
excludes and contains feminine attributes within its system. The excluded feminine is 
situated outside the system in relation to a masculine notion of the self. As such, the 
perception of the male self both constitutes the known world, whilst also defining that 
which cannot be known: the feminine. Batterby draws our attention to Kant’s 
description of ‘nature’ as a ‘mother’, as well as his reference to the goddess ‘Isis’ who 
is hidden behind veils. On the one hand, Kant is depicting nature as an entity capable 
of generating and giving birth to all that is, whereas, on the other hand, this feminine 
force is something that must remain veiled and is therefore unknowable. Woman is 
therefore positioned both inside and outside the categories of understanding that 
constitute the self. 
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In Kant’s mind-constructed reality, the ‘I’ keeps itself at a regulated – and 
respectful – distance from the ‘object’ and ‘nature’ which acts as a kind of 
unknowable ‘excess’. Nature, matter and the ‘transcendental object’ are 
feminized; but the ‘I’ is masculinized in ways that position women as both ‘inside’ 
and ‘outside’ the ‘universal’ structures that govern the self (ibid, p.79)  
 
This situating of woman as not fully self is also evident in Kant’s description of human 
behaviour. Kant divides human behaviour into three main types: ‘Animality’ describes 
the sphere of human behaviour that is instinctual and purely biological; ‘Humanity’ 
describes the capacity to judge, reason and set goals in relation to the self and the 
rest of the world; lastly, the highest form of human behaviour is ‘personhood’ in which 
the self exercises both free-will and pure rationality.  The fact that ‘personhood’ 
reflects the attributes of a masculine transcendental self – namely, its definition as a 
realm of pure rationality, giving form to both itself and external others – means that 
those attributes usually associated with the feminine – characteristics that involve an 
organic engagement with others: empathy, nurturing and caring – are denigrated and 
positioned outside the realm of full ‘personhood’. As Battersby states, ‘[r]eading Kant’s 
remarks about women […] in the light of […these] division[s] it becomes clear that for 
Kant women are fully animal and also human; but he is much more ambivalent about 
their status as persons’ (ibid, p.64).  
To summarise, the problem with the Kantian transcendental self is ‘not its inability 
to bring mind and matter into relationship, but rather that the self is established via an 
oppositional relationship to matter – a matter, moreover, which is dead, and which is 
hence incapable of birth or of ‘morphing’ into new shapes and identities’ (ibid, p. 61). 
The demotion of women and the feminine within the Kantian system is therefore to be 
understood as a means of preventing the sovereignty of the masculine self from being 
infected or disrupted by the animated process of birthing and transformation.  
 
65 Lacan points out that when we say ‘I am’ we are admitting to the fact we have entered 
the Symbolic Order that is inaugurated through the phallic signifier. When we enter the 
Symbolic Order, we suffer the loss of our imaginary identity with the mother and the 
world. Lacan paraphrases Descartes by adding a supplement to his Cogito Ergo Sum – 
he states that ‘’I am what I think’, therefore I am: divide the ‘I am’ of existence from the ‘I 
am’ of meaning. This splitting must be taken as being principle, and as the first outline of 
primal repression’(Lacan 1980, p.37). Therefore, for Lacan, the self-assured subject only 
comes into existence by submitting to the Other of the Symbolic Order. Descartes does 
not recognise that his proof of subjective existence, on which he bases his claims to truth, 
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are an effect of acquiring language which, in turn, is to become lost to the speech of the 
other and to be subject to a radical break with the world. 
66 Following Lacan, Irigaray believes that anything outside the economy of the phallic 
order - that which exceeds its own reflection – has been placed beyond representation – 
for Irigaray, that which is beyond representation is femininity / woman. Irigaray therefore 
believes that woman can only find expression in three ways: adopting the role of the 
mystic, mimic her position within masculine discourse as a man lacking or, thirdly, speak 
outside masculine rationality through the morphology specific to woman’s body. In 
Speculum of the Other Woman, Irigaray locates mysticism as a sanctioned space in 
which subject and Other mingle ‘one term into another’ and where there is a ‘contempt for 
form as such, [and a] mistrust for understanding […] and the dry desolation of reason’ 
(Irigaray 1985a, p.191). Religious mysticism provided a space for the most profound 
revelations to occur, in which ‘the poorest in science and the most ignorant [women] were 
the most eloquent’ (ibid, p.192). By mimicking the suffering of Christ, woman could create 
a space where her own pleasure could unfold – a space in which similar symptoms to 
hysteria could be observed.  
If woman is that which cannot be represented, then perhaps woman must resort to 
mimicking male discourse in which to point to a feminine space beyond it. This mimetic 
method is evidently used by Irigaray within the Speculum of the Other Woman. Irigaray 
quotes large sections from such writers as Freud, Plato, Kant and Hegel – each an 
example of male authority within philosophical discourse. For Irigaray, it is important not 
to pose the question “What is woman?” as to do this positions woman within the dictates 
of male Symbolic Order. It is better to mimic male discourse in a way that reveals the 
feminine blindspot that can exceed and disturb their logic: the feminine is to be found 
exactly where male logic cannot see.  
 
[T]hey do not claim to be rivaling men in constructing a logic of the feminine […] 
They should not put it, then, in the form “What is woman?” but rather, repeating / 
interpreting the way in which, within discourse, the feminine finds itself defined as 
lack, deficiency, or as imitation and negative image of the subject, they should 
signify that with respect to this logic a disruptive excess is possible on the 
feminine side. (Irigaray 1985b, p.78) 
 
67 As with Deleuze, Battersby’s conception of becoming shares a similar concern 
for repetition. By making reference to the work of Kierkegaard, the concept of self is 
informed by an analogy with sound – identity is defined in terms of patterns and 
rhythms that form a score that we recognize as a self. Battersby draws attention to our 
relationship with the world via the sense of sound, rather than the typical emphasis 
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placed on the visual when defining the relationship between the world and ourselves. 
This acts as a strategy in which to define a metaphysics of becoming from a 
metaphysics of presence in which the world is understood in terms of static models. 
According to Battersby, the emphasis on the visual within philosophy ‘seems to have 
contributed to the long-standing appeal of the notion that the mind perceives and 
thinks by ‘bundling’ diverse and discontinuous images and concepts’ (Battersby 1998, 
p.179). Against this notion, our experience of sound is described in terms of a 
continuous experience of difference in which memory, repetition, pattern and 
disruption play an active part in recognition. For Battersby, sound keeps us in a 
 
continuous dynamic relationship with an environment which is indefinite and 
outside the circle of vision, surrounding us on all sides. There are no easily 
recognizable edges or centres to the sound that comes at us. Hearing favours 
the ever present, the unavoidable and the continuously evolving; we have to be 
trained to artificially divide this potential into ‘moments’ or ‘sound bites’. Thus, 
hearing suggests a model of identity that does not operate in terms of discrete 
units. Our ears let the outside world (the ‘other’) inside the screen of the ‘I’, whilst 
filtering into background ‘noise’ and rendering inconspicuous that part of 
‘otherness’ that cannot also be used by the ‘I’. (ibid, p.178) 
  
As with Deleuze and Guattari’s description of the effect of sound in the writing of 
Kafka, sound has no clearly discernible boundaries, is continuously changing and can 
affect bodies not in an immediate proximity to its source. By considering the 
implications of sound in understanding our relationship with the world, Battersby is 
able to critique Kant’s understanding of subjectivity. As discussed, Battersby is critical 
of Kant’s notion of the transcendental self in terms of the fact that it equates the 
feminine with nature and defines it as unknowable – as such, ‘personhood’ is built 
around a masculine model in which the self is placed in opposition to an inert matter 
and notions of birthing and transformation (becoming) are excluded.  Battersby draws 
our attention to the fact that Kant trivializes sound in favour of vision. For Battersby, 
‘Kant’s world is above all a visual world’ (ibid, p. 179) in which his three stages of 
synthesis designate a ‘temporal continuity of the ‘I’ and the spatial stability of the ‘not-
I’’ (ibid, p. 179-80). Music for Kant is described as ‘a ‘play’ from bodily sensations to 
aesthetic ideas, but the pleasure in this ‘play’ comes from the fact that aesthetic ideas 
double back onto the body with ‘concentrated’ force’ (ibid, p.181). As such, the ‘unity’ 
of music is ‘primarily bodily, and not imposed by the mind in the manner of the 
‘syntheses’ of sight’ (ibid). Vision is therefore privileged in that it allows us to 
synthesize discreet objects (that have been seen) into mental concepts, whereas 
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music, as sound, may provoke these concepts in which to amplify them, but has no 
means in which to form them in itself – sound and music therefore remain an affection 
of the body, whilst sight gives us the means to generate mental concepts.  
Battersby refutes Kant’s denigration of sound. As the above implies, sound has 
the potential to provide a notion of identity that is generated in a dynamic, evolving 
relationship with the world. Here identity depends upon the recognition of patterns 
formed by repetitions and reminiscences that discern a composition from an otherwise 
continuous noise. Such a conception perceives identity not as a linear temporal 
recognition of the self and the world via the recollection of static objects in space; 
memory and repetition is instead interpreted anew depending on the patterns and 
rhythms such recollections find themselves entwined with in the present. As Battersby 
states:  
 
[I]dentity is maintained by the way the embodied ‘I’ responds to that which seeps 
into it from outside and the way it focuses on rhythms, harmonies, dissonances, 
resonances and other vibrations that sound patterns produce. The tension 
between memory, anticipation, habit and desire that enables us to distinguish 
music from that which simply recedes into background noise also involves bodily 
habits and expectations, as well as the cogito itself. (ibid, p.181) 
 
As such, repetition ‘does not simply involve the recurrence of the same: it is not a 
mere ‘retake’ of the past’ (ibid, p.183). Battersby makes reference to Kierkegaard’s 
Repetition (1843) in which to point to a mode of subjectivity determined by echo and 
repetition, in which new patterns of becoming occur: 
 
Kierkegaard provides us with a model of the self that can allow self-shaping, 
whilst also limiting the power of the subject, and positing a self that is shaped by 
forces outside it. Kierkegaard shows that musical repetition can mark out depths, 
as well as surfaces. Like an echo machine in a recording studio, Kierkegaard’s 
recollection – and time itself – loops round on itself, and in ways that allow new 
patternings and novelty to emerge from the thematic resonances and auditory 
‘fuzz’. (ibid, p. 183) 
 
What is posited here then is a ‘mode of time which would proceed via echo – and 
repetition – and which is non-linear in the Kantian sense’ (ibid). In summary, via the 
writing of Kierkegaard, Battersby is able to constitute a notion of subjectivity that is 
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neither ‘fully autonomous nor completely determined, the self is produced relationally: 
in the resonances between self and other; in a ‘present’ that is a generative caesura 
between future and past’ (ibid, p. 184).  
 The idea of echo, repetition and becoming in the work of Kierkegaard, 
which allows a recollection that forms new patternings and novelty, is also recognized 
in the work of Deleuze and Guattari via a similar analogy with sound and music. For 
Deleuze and Guattari, the musician ‘affirms the power of becoming’ (Deleuze / 
Guattari 1996, p. 297) because their use of the refrain proceeds within a multilinear 
system in which ‘everything happens at once’ (ibid). The deterritorialization of the 
refrain within music ‘propels itself by its own nonlocalizable middle (milieu) […] It is a 
Body Without Organs, an antimemory pervading musical organization […]’ (ibid). As 
such, progress and continuity exist without a strict linear relation between past and 
present.  
 
68 Battersby recognizes that Deleuze and Guattari reverse the notion of alienated man 
within traditional Marxism – instead of seeing man as a unified, centred subject unable 
to realize his potential due to capitalist relations, Deleuze and Guattari contend that 
man is precisely alienated from his potential by perceiving himself as such a unified 
individual within capitalism. Despite this reversal, Battersby points out that Deleuze 
and Guattari share a similar blindspot with Marxism by neglecting the realm of 
reproduction and care within their theory.  
 
[A]s in classic Marxism, questions of reproductive relationships continue to be 
subordinated to relationships of production and capital […] Thus, when Deleuze 
and Guattari develop the image of the ‘Body Without Organs’ as a counter to the 
organic model of the (privatized) body and the (centred) self, they present this 
undifferentiated and ‘organless’ body as the flow of energies and drives that 
ontologically precedes the shaping of the individual into an ‘organic’ whole. This 
body is presented as if it were prior to difference, including sexual difference. 
(Battersby 1988, p. 194) 
 
69 In support of this position, Kristeva points to the fact that all known archaic societies 
are founded upon a symbolic break that instigates a taboo – as we have seen this, 
this is clearly evident in Freud’s appeal to a primordial myth that instigates the law 
against incest.  
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In all known archaic societies, this founding break, of the symbolic order is 
represented by murder – the killing of a man, a slave, a prisoner, an animal. 
Freud reveals this founding break and generalizes from it when he emphasizes 
that society is founded on a complicity in the common crime. (Kristeva 1974, p. 
119) 
 
70 As Phillip Goodchild points out: 
 If all becoming proceeds by way of a becoming-woman, then it involves the 
constitution of a multiplicity of phantasms as erogenous zones that are no longer 
localized on a specific organ. When Deleuze and Guattari write about becoming-woman, 
they mean that one learns to add the affect of a woman, which might include Irigaray’s list 
of capacities for sexual multiplicity, for living as a body, for laughing, touching and 
caressing […], to one’s own collective assemblage, whether one is male or female. 
Similarly, becoming child is learning to acquire the subjective apprehensions of a child, 
including sexual fascination with the surrounding world, and particularly with animals, 
their affects, smells, and expressions, following trajectories of subjectivity that exist in the 
milieu, rather than in a unique person. If all becoming proceeds by way of a becoming-
girl, this is because the girl is the one whose desire is stolen from her first of all in order to 
impose a history or morality in the form of a specific role or identity […] Nothing remains 
as a spectator outside the planes of thought, imagination, or desire: each moment or 
mode of existence through which the girl passes is an erogenous zone; everything can be 
affected.  
 Becoming also proceeds by way of a becoming-animal […] Animals are 
characterized by their capacity to express their territories, apart from signification, through 
rhythms, sounds, colours, and smells as various contents […] When Deleuze and 
Guattari write about ‘becoming animal’, therefore, they refer to this function of expressing 
territories. (Goodchild 1996, p.171). 
